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My
Parents**

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FOREWARD

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, in publishing Dr. Tapasvi S. Nandi's thesis entitled "The Origin and Development of the Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics".

Dr. Nandi has dealt with the subject in its historical perspective which forms an interesting study in probably one of the most important theories advanced by Sanskrit literary criticism. He has shown how the theory of Vyañjana-Rasa-Dhvani was ably established by the efforts of such alamkārikas as Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. Ānandavardhana's views were by and large found to be acceptable to his followers with rare exceptions, such as Kuntaka, Mahima, Bhoja, Dhanañjaya and Dhauka, etc. The Vaiṣṇavite alamkārikas such as Rupa Goswamin tried to give a different colouring.

I am thankful to Dr. Nandi for agreeing to the publication of this research work which was accepted by this University for the award of the Ph.D. degree. I also wish to express our grateful appreciation of the financial assistance given by the University Grants Commission for this publication.

I have no doubt that the students, teachers and others interested in this subject will find this reading a rewarding experience.

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K. G. Parikh
University Registrar

PREFACE

The present work actually forms the thesis for Ph.D. prepared under the guidance of Prof. R. C. Parikh of the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. My thanks are due to the Gujarat University authorities for undertaking the publication of this work, which though written first, is actually my third work in a book form, the other two being, 'Sanskrt Nātakano Paricaya', and 'Bhāratīya Sāhityaśāstranī Vicāra Paramparā', (in Gujarati) both being the publications undertaken by the University Book-Production Board, Gujarat Rajya. A fourth book viz the translation of *Locana* in Gujarati, with introduction and annotations is also in Press, and the Gujarat University has taken up its publication and my fifth work, viz. The *Kāvyaaprakāśa* (I-VI) with Gunaratna's *Sāradīpikā* is also to be published soon. I am extremely thankful to Dr. Solomon, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Gujarat University and Dr. J. M. Shukla, Reader in Sanskrit, Gujarat University, for their helpful suggestions. My thanks are also due to Mrs. Harsha Nandi and daughter Chinmayee for being helpful in their own way throughout the course of the publication of this work. I also thank my sister Sragdharaben for preparing the word-index. Shri Ramanand Press also deserves thanks for the speedy work it carried out.

'Āsopālava', 4, Professors' Colony,
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T. S. Nandi

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INTRODUCTION

One of the great prasthānas of Sanskrit Poetics is what we might call 'Dhvani, particularly rasa-dhvani, prasthāna'. It is therefore natural that the topics of vyañjana-dhvani and rasa should have been discussed by many modern scholars. However, as far my knowledge goes, no one has discussed in detail, the origin and development of these two topics and their inter-relation in a connected form. It has been my humble attempt to do this work in the present thesis

In Dhvanyaloka, we find the dhvani theory in its fully developed form. At Dhv. I 2 we are told (1) that the 'artha' or sense which is the soul of poetry, is of two kinds viz vācya or expressed and pratiyamāna or implied. It is this pratiyamāna artha which is regarded as the soul of poetry (Dhv. I. 5) (2), though Alhinava would allow this honour to that pratiyamāna sense alone which conveys rasa (3) In Dhv I 7, we are told (4) that this pratiyamāna sense is not understood merely by the knowledge of grammar or logic, but it is known only by those who know the essence of poetry. Thus, Dhv indicates a verbal process in poetry which is only grasped by the aesthetics of poetry. So, what one has to find out in great poetry is his 'vyañgyārtha' or the suggested sense, and the word that is capable of shedding light on it. When in a poem, this verbal process of vyañjana predominantly engages the mind, it is called 'dhvani' or 'dhvanikāvya' by the sūris or sages. Ānanda says that the soul of poetry is dhvani (kāvyasyātma dhvanih- Dhv. I.1). Here dhvani is a synonym of vyañgyārtha. But he also says (Dhv. I. 13) and Mammata follows him, that a poem in which dhvani predominates is called dhvanikāvya (kāvyaviscārah sa dhvanīriti sūtibhah kathitah) (Dhv. I. 13). Here dhvani is a characteristic of a poem which is classified by Mammata as uttama-īdamuttamam atīśayinī vyañgye vācya dhvanirbudhaih

kathitah (K P I) Thus in one sense, dhvani is a characteristic of a poem in which vyaṅgyārtha predominates

From Dhv I 1, we have to infer that Ānandavardhana does not regard himself to be the first to promulgate this theory. As we learn from the introductory portion of the Dhv, this theory was a subject of great controversy amongst the learned critics of Sanskrit poetry. The very first verse informs us that though the wise have ordained that the soul of poetry is dhvani, still, some say that there is nothing like dhvani, while others say that it is something secondary in a poem, and still others maintain that the essence of dhvani is something beyond words (Dhv I 1) (5)

Unfortunately however, we do not find any work earlier than Dhv, which treats of dhvani in this fashion. So, I have attempted in this thesis to find out, if possible, the earlier background of this theory.

The theorists of poetry or writers on poetics in Sanskrit were primarily, as it should be, concerned with the nature and functions of poetry. Poetry, however, is an art which uses human speech as its medium. Therefore, these writers thought it proper to concern themselves with word and whatever it conveys, i.e. the various meanings, particularly the emotive suggestions in contrast with its direct or scientific meaning. In other words, they considered, what is called in modern logic, the scientific and the emotive uses of language (Susane Stebbing Introduction of Logic). This has led to the theory of abhidhā, lakṣaṇa and vyañjana in Sanskrit poetics.

According to Ānand there are three types of dhvani, viz. vastudhvani, alampkārādhvani and rasādhvani. But vastu and alampkāra dhvanis can also take the form of abhidhā. Rasādhvani, however, is exclusively conveyed by vyañjana. Thus vyañjana and rasa become intimately correlated. It appears that all the emphasis laid upon vyañjana is mainly for the purpose of rasa-conveyance. In this way these two topics viz

vyāñjanā and rasa become so to say, parts of a single theory. So, investigation (or inquiry) in one topic remains incomplete without an investigation in the other topic. So in the second and third parts of my thesis, I have tried to study the origin and development of the concepts of rasa and the various theories advanced for its conveyance by different theorists (Part II & III)

In the first part of my thesis, I have started with the references of dhvani and vyanjana in the vedic literature including the Upanisads, starting with Rgveda. After that I proceed to Nirukta, Rk-pratisakhya, Astadhyayi of Pāṇini and Mahabhāṣya of Patañjali.

It may be noted that we fail to come across the words 'vyāñjanā, pratiyamāna' as such in the Rv. The word dhvani also does not occur in the Rv. We will see, however, that we do come across different forms of the root √dhvan in Rv and also of the word 'dhvani' in Av. But these occur in the usual sense of 'sound' and do not have the technical sense of dhvani as seen in Sanskrit Poetics.

However, we do come across different forms of the root √añj, and vi+√añj, such as ayyate, ayyase, ayyamanah, vyajyate, vyanjate etc etc. A careful study of the different occurrences of √añj in its various grammatical forms shows that it seems to carry principally the meaning viz (i) 'to anoint' with a view to embellish, the second stage being that of embellishment proper, and (ii) 'to shine'. Its use with the prefix 'vi' is in the sense of 'to shine forth' 'to glitter' etc. The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by the application of some ingredient, the stages being first anointing and then the consequential embellishment and the general meaning of adding zest to a thing, and this adding zest, by means of revealing the hidden meaning of a thing. Moreover, the survey of the occurrences of vi+√añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings, viz to bring out something hidden, by the application or enhancement of something, to brighten, to embellish,

to decorate, to adorn, to display I have similarly studied all such occurrences of $\sqrt{aṅ}$, $vi+\sqrt{aṅ}$, \sqrt{dhvan} and $dhvani$ in the Nighantu and the Nirukta, Pāṇini and Patañjali.

The Nighantu does not contain $\sqrt{aṅ}$ and $vi+\sqrt{aṅ}$ in any grammatical form. There are certain occurrences of $\sqrt{aṅ}$ in the Nirukta, but this is only by way of explaining the vedic mantras quoted therein, and we fail to come across any new shades of meaning other than those already found in the Vedas. Nor do we find any occurrences of \sqrt{dhvan} or the word $dhvani$ in either the Nighantu or the Nirukta. However, at 713, in the Nirukta we have *vyāṅjanamatram* in the sense of more indication. 'Vyāṅjana' here means an indicator. This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyāṅjana' in the sense of 'indication'. Similarly, in Ch 1 (Nirukta) Yaska cites the opinion of Gargya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of *nāma* and *ślyāta* with a particular meaning. Says Gargya *na nirabaddhah upasargah arthān nirāhuh nāmā khyātayostu karmopasamyogadyotakāḥ bhvanti*. Thus, it seems, Yaska comes very near to the power of *dyotana* or suggestion. We know that in the *kāvyaśāstra* the word *dyotana* is used as an equivalent of *vyāṅjana*. Thus these early occurrences of the $\sqrt{aṅ}$ and $vi+\sqrt{aṅ}$ and *vyāṅjana* foreshadow the later technical use in Sanskrit Poetics.

In the *Rā-pratisakhya* we do not come across anything worthy of note. In Pāṇini also there is no mention of *vyāṅjanā* or *spṛṣṭa* or *dhvani* as such. We come across 'vyāṅjana' in the technical sense of a consonant. But at Pā II, 1 34-*vyāṅjanairupasiṅkte*, the explanation given is *dadhuh upasiṅgam dadhikam*. Thus *vyāṅjana* is anything that is used to enhance the relish of the main or principal object of eating. We come across the same use of the term *vyāṅjana* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, wherein Bharata cites the analogy of *śālavādīrasa* (Nā Śā Ch VI). This can have an important bearing on the *vyāṅjanavāda*

of the *ālaṃkārikas*. In *Patanjali* also, we come across occurrences of different forms of $\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ and $\text{vi}+\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ and also of *sphota* and *dhvani*. But the term *dhvani* occurs in the sense of sound only. The word *vyañjanā* by itself is missing even here. At VIII 1.70, in the *Mahābhāṣya* it is observed, 'vyajyate anena iti *vyāñjanam*'. Thus '*vyāñjana*' is that which reveals or manifests or brings something into light. This sense of *prakāśana* is note worthy, especially from the point of view of the *vyāñjanāvada*.

I have also studied the occurrences of $\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ and $\text{vi}+\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ in works of early poets such as *Asvaghosa*, *Kalidāsa* and also *Bhāsa*, the supposed author of the thirteen *Trivendrum* plays. Literary criticism follows literature. So, I have tried to note certain important occurrences in these poets, which could have inspired the Sanskrit poetists in the formation of the theory of *vyāñjanā* and *dhvani*. For example, *Bu Ca* IV 84 reads : 'upapañnamidaṃ vākyaṃ sauhārdavyāñjakam tvayi'. Herein a *vākya* is said to be '*sauhārdavyāñjaka*' i.e. 'suggestive of friendship'. Similarly in *Kalidāsa's Meghaduta* (purva, 29) we have

'saubhāgyam te subhaga virahāvasthayaṃ *vyāñjayanti*'. This is the description of the river *Nirvindhya*. As *Mallintha* explains, the '*nyakanṭyikabhava*' is clearly suggested here. Moreover, *Kumārasambhava* VII 91 reads

tan sandhiṣu *vyāñjitavṛttibhedam*
rasāntaresu *pratibaddharāgam* etc

This has a clear reference to the concepts of *vyāñjanā* and *rasa*. Instances can be multiplied. One fact emerges out of this, and it is that the *ālaṃkārikas* might have found much in this to draw upon.

Ānandavardhana and *Mammata* make it clear that the original inspiration for the theory of *vyāñjanā* comes from the *Sphota*-doctrine of the grammarians (6). So, I have tried to investigate this relationship. I have based my study on the original works such as the *Mahābhāṣya* of *Patanjali* and the

Vakya-padīya of Bhartrhari, etc as well as the exposition of Sphota-in the works of scholars like P. C Chakravarty and Gaurinath Shastri I have tried to draw as many as nine important points to justify the statement of Ānanda and Mammata that the Sphota doctrine is their original source of inspiration for the dhvani-theory (Ch II)

As vyañjanā is one of the sabdavyūttis, and as a general discussion on sabdavyūttis forms an important part, particularly in later Sanskrit Poetics, I have thought it proper to discuss these topics also in detail (Ch III)

In these chs III & IV, I have not only discussed the nature and scope of different sabdavyūttis, but also the recognition of these by different schools of thought such as those represented by the Vaiyākaranas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc (Ch IV)

In these chapters, I have consulted the original works, yet I am particularly indebted to the works of P C Chakravarty and Prof Devasthali In Ch V, I have tried to study the exact recognition of different sabdavyūttis in the works of early poeticists such as Bhamaha, Dandin, etc It should be noted, however that in the works of these authors, we do not come across any systematic discussion of the nature and scope of the sabdavyūttis, as is seen in the works of later authors on alampkāra such as Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha etc However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of functions of word. Bhamaha has discussed the nature of word and has tried to refute the Sphotavāda Bhamaha's familiarity with the function other than vyañjanā is quite apparent as shown by me in the thesis (Ch V) As to his familiarity with vyañjanā, we may say that vyañjanā does not occupy the same place as abhidhā in his mind, i e he does not seem to have known vyañjana as a separate vūtti He, however, uses different forms of व्यञ्ज with the later meaning of vyañjanā at different places As in Bhamaha, so also in Dandin, we do not come across any mention of vyañjanā as such by name However, we come

across different forms of root *vi-√añj* in the sense of, 'to suggest' We also come across the term 'pratiyate' meaning 'is implied' We come across clear references to *lakṣanā* or *gaunī*. Vāmana very often refers to *bhakti*, *lakṣanā*, or *gaunārtha* and *upacāra*. But he also does not mention *vyañjanā* by name. He seems to touch *vyañjanā* only indirectly

In Udbhaṭa there are some direct and indirect references to the different *vr̥ttis* including 'avagamana' (*kāvyaśālmkāra*, Udbhaṭa) The meaning of 'avagamana' is very near to *vyañjanā*

In Rudrata, we come across direct and indirect references to *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā* and also indirect references to *vyañjanā*. Thus we see that in these early authors from Bhaṁmaha to Rudrata, we do find references in their works which go to indicate that the idea of *vyañjanā* was not absent from their minds, though we cannot say that they have clearly visualised it, much less defined it It should be noted however, that the charm that comes out of *vyañjanā* is recognised by these earlier authors in different *śālmkāras* such as *paryāyokta*, *samāsokti*, *aprasūta*, *prasaṁsā*, *dīpaka*, *ākṣepa*, etc.

The exponents of *dhvani* school like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka and Jagannātha say that the earlier writers such as Bhaṁmaha, Dandin, etc though without clearly defining *dhvani*, had subsumed it under various *guṇas* and *śālmkāras* An element of implicit sense can be seen in the treatment of different *guṇas* and *śālmkāras* in the earlier authors, but I have, however, found no explicit recognition of *dhvani* as observed by Ānanda, Abhinava etc So, my submission is that even if an element of implicit sense is seen in different *śālmkāras* and *guṇas* treated by the early poeticists, and thus even if *vyañjanā* is seen as partly subsumed under this, it should not be taken as a proof that the theory of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* was clearly recognised by Bhaṁmaha, Dandin, etc. (Ch. VI)

After having thus far studied the problem of the origin and development of the concept of vyañjanā-dhvanī, I have attempted a study of the origin and development of the concept of rasa in Part II of my thesis which covers Chs VII-IX. I have already referred to the probability that the importance attached to vyañjanā or dhvanī in Sanskrit poetics is more or less due to its being the sole conveyor of rasa.

I have studied the occurrence of rasa in the vedas and the upanishads and in the Nirukta and the Bṛhaddevatā. I have also studied the occurrences of rasa in the works of both Pāṇini and Patañjali. Then, I have studied the occurrences of the word rasa in different senses in the works of early poets such as Āśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, (Ch VII), and then I have noted the view of Bharata (Ch. VIII). After this, I have studied the approach of the early ālaṃkārikas such as Bhaṭṭamāha, Daṇḍin, etc. to the problem of rasa (Ch IX). The method of approach is similar to that in case of dhvanī and vyañjanā in Part I.

In the course of my study, I have tried to indicate as many as nine interesting points with reference to the use of the word rasa in various senses in the Rv. We find the word rasa in the vedas, not only as signifying something liquid but we also find the qualities of joy-giving, tastefulness, exhilaration, being the essence of the vedas, etc. attached to rasa. Thus rasa in the vedas becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence, etc.

The Nāṭya Śāstra (Ch. I 17) says that the fact of rasa in Nāṭya is derived from the Av. Abhinava tries to explain this in a rather obscure way. But I have tried to explain this in a different way. It should be noted however, that though the word rasa occurs at several places in the Av., we have no clear case of the later meaning of nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa in it. From another point of view, we may say that several hymns of the Av. taken by themselves are impressive love lyrics, their ritualistic application notwithstanding. The number of such hymns

is about thirty I have tried to suggest that the attempt to correlate nātyarasa or kāvyarasa to Av is not unjustifiable from this point of view

In the upanishads however, we see that the word rasa occurs also in the sense of essence of the universe and the Taittiriya Up. identifies ātman with rasa-raso val sah In the Chāndogya Up. rasa is a synthetic product of many ingredients In the Nirukta and the Bṛhaddevatā I have not found anything useful for my purpose

Thus, the different ideas associated with the word rasa in the vedas and the upanishads, have implicit in them the idea of aesthetic taste as well and the term rasa might have been used in the sense of aesthetic taste also as may be seen in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Ch VII)

In Ch VII, I have tried to study the occurrence of √ras, or the word rasa in the works of Pāṇini and Patañjali In the dhātupāṭha √ras is seen in the sense of to 'make sound', 'liquidification', and 'to taste' In Pa V 2 95- 'rasadibhyasca,' the meaning of rasa according to Pāṇini is not clear The Mahābhāṣya seems to suggest that the meaning here is different and illustrates it by using the expression-'rasiko natah', in which the aesthetic sense of rasa is quite clear The Kāśikā here explains that the matup suffix is ordinarily to be used in respect of the qualities grasped by senses, but in case of 'rasiko natah' or 'rūpini apsarasām', etc, the idea is to suggest not merely the rasa or rūpa apprehended by sense-organs, but sentiment or emotion and beauty respectively The Tattva-bodhini on the Siddhāntakaumudī makes this all the more clear when it says—rasikam ityatra tu rasa sabdena bhavo gṛhyate na tu rasanāgrāhyo gunah (pp 303, NS Ed '33). From this we have to assume that this aesthetic sense of rasa might have been well established in usage, otherwise Patañjali could not have used the illustration of 'rasiko natah'

Then, I have studied the occurrences of 'rasa' or √ras in the works of early poets such as Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and

Kaṇḍaśa I have tried to suggest, quoting illustrations, that it is precisely such clear instances as explained in Ch VII, in the works of literary masters that might have been the original source of inspiration for theorists to formulate the rasa theories

Ch VIII clearly explains the views of Bharata as seen in ch 16 of the Nāṭya, dealing with the concepts of lakṣaṇa, guṇa, doṣa, and alaṃkāra II II stated (vs 113-114) that the guṇas and the alaṃkāras have to be used in poetry may in consonance with the delineation of different rasas Here, II be noted, rasa is visualised in connection with poetry, in addition to nāṭya

Ch IX studies the ideas of rasa as seen in the works of early poeticists such as Bhaṃmaha, Daṇḍa etc I have observed that the earlier alaṃkārikas such as Bhaṃmaha, Daṇḍin, etc do not totally ignore the fact of rasa But they try to incorporate it under alaṃkāra, a source of charm to poetry Daṇḍin is more elaborate in his treatment than Bhaṃmaha Udbhaṭa also seems to be better informed about the concept of rasa and is probably the first to take rasa as svasabdavācya One point is clear that in all these authors the ultimate 'ālaṃkārya' seems to be 'kāvyā' itself, rasa being only an alaṃkāra, a kāvyālo bhākaradharmā

In Vāmana and Rudraṭa, we notice a new trend of incorporating rasa, bhāva etc. under guṇa, the essential or eternal quality of kāvyā (nityadharmā) For Rudraṭa the number of rasas is not just eight or nine In fact all the bhāvas can be enhanced to the capacity of rasa Ānandavardhana with his theory of vyañjanā and dhvani has given a new orientation to the entire theme of rasa Abhinava elaborates this position

Thus far I have traced the two streams of thought, one pertaining to śabdavṛttis, with particular reference to vyañjanā and dhvani, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concept of rasa and other cognate ideas In the

Dhv. we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other and bringing forth an integrated theory of rasa and dhvani.

So, in Part III of my thesis, comprising chapters X-XVI I have studied the theory of rasa and dhvani from the point of view of its development. This includes topics such as dhvani and rasa in Ānandavardhana', 'classification of poetry', 'the pūrvaśakṣa against vyañjanā in Ānanda', 'some anti-dhvani theorists', 'dhvani in Abhinavagupta', 'rasa experience as in Lollata, Śaṅkuka, etc.' 'rasa experience as in Abhinava,' and 'some other writers on rasa such as Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Bhoja, Nāyadarpanakāśa, Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. Ch. X gives a brief introduction to part III.

'Rasa and Dhvani in Ānanda' forms the subject of ch XI. This is done in a novel and all-comprising fashion Ānanda does not discard the other elements of poetry as *alamkāra*, *guṇa*, etc., mentioned by early authors such as Bhāmaha and the like. Another point worth noting is that we come to understand how the rasa-theory which originated with rūpakas or with nāṭya became generally a topic for all varieties of poetry. We have seen that Bhāmaha, Dandin and others clearly emphasise the element of rasa in the mahākāvya and kathas, the two important varieties of prabandha kāvya. But Ānanda makes the importance of rasa more comprehensive or universal in all the varieties of poetry of which prabandha is only one. Thus we may say that as far as our knowledge goes, it is in Ānanda that we find the element of rasa becoming the soul of all poetry, a thing which Viśvanātha in his famous utterance viz. *vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam*, makes more explicit. It may be remarked that the concept of rasa was extended even to non-literary arts such as painting, sculpture, music and dance. (See *Viṇudharmottara purāṇa*.)

Then follows the discussion of the three-fold classification of poetry as given by Ānandavardhana. He however refrains

from calling it *uttama*, *madhyama* and *avara* or *citra*. In Ch XII I have discussed how Ānanda refutes the *pūrvapakṣa* against *vyājanā* in the Dhv. In doing so, he refutes the *abhāvavādins* first and clearly distinguishes between *vyājanā* and *abhidhā*, *vyājanā* and *tātparya*, *vyājanā* and *lakṣanā* and *vyājanā* and *anumāna*. He also refutes the *Naiyāyikas*.

While starting the exposition of *dhvani* as expounded in Dhv. we raised the question of the earlier writers who did not accept *dhvani* and against whose view Ānanda was trying to establish his theory. We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works or authors who hold views opposed to the *dhvani* theory. Consequently, we relied upon Dhv. and Locana for those views. We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv. which carry on their polemics against the *dhvani* theory. In order to complete the discussion on *dhvani* I have also taken up a critical consideration of these works also (Ch XIII).

Among these works, we come across the AVM of Mukula-bhatta, VJ of Kuntaka, DR of Dhananjaya with Avaloka, VY V of Mahima Bhatta and Sṛ Pra of Bhoja.

Mukula seems to incorporate implicit sense under *lakṣanā* which is only a part of *abhidhā* for him. For Kuntaka *vakrokti* is *vicitra abhidhā*. He subsumes implicit sense partly under *abhidhā* and partly under *lakṣanā*. Kuntaka has also given much importance to *rasa*. I have tried to evaluate his position critically. Kuntaka, with his theory of *vakrokti* or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that it charms by the skill of the poet, seems to comprehend all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with *alampkāra* and ending with *dhvani* and *rasa*. For him, even *dyotaka* and *vyānjaka* words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning-*arthapratīti-kāritva*-are termed '*vācaka*' i.e. expressive of meaning, metaphorically. Thus broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed an *antarbhāva*vādin and *bhakti*vādin to a certain extent.

In the fourth prakāśa of the DR, the authors touch the problem of *rasānubhūti* or the experience of sentiment in poetry. Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of *rasādi* but they fail to accept the proposition that *rasādis* are conveyed by *vyāñjanā*. They accept *bhāvabhāvaka* relation between *rasādis* and *kāvya*. They are of the opinion that the *vyāngya* or suggestion of the *dhvani*vādins can be explained with the help of *tātparya* *sakti* or purport alone. Visvanātha in his SD tries to refute the *tātparyavādins*. It seems, however, that the controversy lies in name only.

Mahimabhatta has pointed out as many as ten blemishes in the definition of *dhvani* as given by Ānanda. I have tried to evaluate his argument critically and have shown that some faults as pointed out by him are of a formal nature while others may be taken as of a fundamental nature and so bearing upon his theory of *kāvya*numiti. It may be noted that he has this much justification in his view that the indirect thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential nature. This however, is in no sense a logical *anumāna* or inference and even Mahima laughs at those who want *kāvya*numiti to be *tarka*numiti.

As for Bhoja, the author of *Ś K Ā.* and *Sr. Pra* Dr De seems to suggest that he (i.e. Bhoja) does not accept the *dhvani* theory of Ānanda. Dr. Raghvan tries to refute him. He noted that, in the *Ś K Ā.* and *Sr. Pra* there are *alamkāras* and *gunas* which embody *vyāñjanā*. This however, does not make him a *vyāñjanavādin*, though, as Dr. Raghvan suggests, Bhoja can be taken as an *antarbhāvavādin*.

A critical review of the opponents of the *dhvani* school shows that they are not opposed to *pratiyamānata* or implied sense as a source of charm in poetry. The difference, however, arises as to how this implication is grasped. Ānanda regards

this as one of the functions of words, but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇa*. He therefore posits a third function of word viz *vyāṇjana*. His opponents see no necessity of adding a third function of word because the implied sense can be grasped by the inferential processes of thought, and by meanings yielded through *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa*. So for them, to accept *vyāṇjana* would lead to what is called *gaurava* *dosa*. Thus the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word. Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept what they call the emotive use of language in addition to its scientific function. The various emotive associations that a word has, become so to say, prominent in poetic language. But if one considers the psychological process of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type. In fact, as Mammata says, those who experience and enjoy *rasa* have to be keen in the inference of *sthāyin*—(*loke pramāda-dibhiḥ sthāyanumāne 'bhyaśapṣṭavavatām* etc' K P IV 28). Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views.

In the next chapter (i.e. Ch. XIV), I have considered the views of Abhinavagupta on *dhvani*. Abhinavagupta follows the Dhv in his theories on *dhvani* and *rasa*. His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv known as *Locana* and his commentary on the Nā Śā of Bharata, known as *Nāṭyavedavivṛti* or *Abhinavabhāratī*. The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent. He was a great philosopher of the *pratyabhijñā* school.

As *Locana* and the *Abh* are comm's, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv and Nā Śā. For the same reason, much of their treatment is bound to be piecemeal. In the discussion of the contents of Dhv and Nā Śā, I have, as far as possible, confined myself to the works themselves. Here, while considering Abhinava's comm's, I have noted the points which have been clarified, elaborated and

sometimes improved upon by him. In the treatment of the points some repetition has been unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible. As noted just now, the treatment of the various topics in these commentaries, particularly in Locana, is piece-meal, and so, in order to give a coherent and critical account, I have brought together passages bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account (Ch. XIV).

In Ch. XV, I have tried to discuss the views on rasa-experience as explained by Lollata, Śāṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta. The views of the former i.e. Lollata, Śāṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, are put forth by me as clearly and precisely on the basis of the presentation of their views by Abhinava. In doing this, I have not only consulted the original sources but I have fully utilised the excellent work of Gnoli, and Dr. K. C. Pandey.

Different Scholars have tried to correlate the views of these ācāryas such as Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śrī Śāṅkuka, etc. with different schools of thought. I have tried to show that excepting Abhinavagupta, nothing definite can be stated with reference to the rest. As nirvighnā samvit and camatkāra are central to the concept of rasa in Abhinava's theory I have tried to explain these terms in the light of pratyabhijñā philosophy.

In Ch. XVI, I have tried to record the views of some other writers on rasa. This covers the works of Dhanañjaya, and Dhanika, Bhoja and Rāmachandra and Guṇacandra, and also Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. I have taken up Dhanañjaya, Dhanika, Bhoja and the authors of ND together because they have something novel, something different from the Kashmirian tradition to record, while Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha follow the lead of Abhinavagupta. I have tried to put this in a critical way though of course, as for the views of Bhoja, my thanks are due to the excellent work of Dr. Raghvan. Then follows the 're'sume'.

In the 'resume', I have tried to correlate the conclusions reached in different chapters and present a connected account of the theory of *vyāñjanā-dhvanī-rasa*. I have tried to make clear how Abhinava has incorporated in his theory the views of his opponents. I have also shown how the concept of *rasa* developed from its form of category of aesthetic experience to the stature of the higher spiritual experiences of the *bhaktas*.

As mentioned in the beginning of this statement, *dhvanī-vyāñjanā* and *rasa* are much discussed subjects by modern writers on Sanskrit Poetics. It will be therefore, presumptuous on my part to say that I have discovered something absolutely new. However I humbly submit that the following points worked out in detail in this thesis are, as far as my knowledge goes, new in treatment and interpretation.

(i) The sort of detailed discussion of occurrences of $\sqrt{añj}$, $\text{vi}+\sqrt{añj}$, \sqrt{dhvan} and *dhvanī* in the Vedas, Nirukta, Rk Prā, Aśṭadhyāyī and Mahābhāṣya, and the literary works of early poets such as Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāṣa and Kālidāsa is attempted for the first time and this, (Chs. I) I humbly submit, is one part of my contribution to knowledge.

(ii) I have tried to explain the relationship between the theory of *Sphoṭa* and the theory of *dhvanī*, in (Ch. II) by advancing as many as nine important points.

(iii) In Ch. V, I have tried to discuss the recognition of different *śabdārtas* in the works of early *ālaṃkārikas* such as Bhaṁaha, Dandin, etc.

(iv) In Ch. VI, I have tried to discuss the recognition of *pratyamāna* sense in the works of early poeticists such as Bhaṁaha, Dandin, etc.

(v) In Ch. VII, I have tried to point out nine interesting points with reference to 'rasa' as seen in the Vedas. The investigation, so far as I know, is in much greater detail compared to earlier efforts by different scholars.

(vi) Then, I have tried to study the occurrences of $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$ and *rasa* in the works of Pāṇini and Patañjali. In the Mahābhāṣya, I feel I have pointed out for the first time, that we come across an expression viz 'rāsiko natah' which clearly suggests that *rasa* in its aesthetic sense was known to Patañjali and must have been in vogue much earlier (Ch VII).

(vii) Then, I have tried to suggest how actual practice in the literary works such as those of Asvaghosa, Bhāsa, etc might have influenced the theorists to formulate their theories of *rasa* (Ch VII)

(viii) In Ch VIII, I have tried to put the views of Bharata in a precise and clear way, and have also suggested that Bharata also thought of *rasa* with reference to poetry-kāvya-as well, and not with reference to nāṭya alone

(ix) In Ch IX, I have attempted an investigation into the treatment of *rasa* by Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc

(x) In Chs X—XII, I have tried to put the ideas on *rasa* and dhvani as found in the Dhv of Anandavardhana. I have tried to present the whole matter in a critical and comprehensive way and have tried to evaluate the arguments for and against vyañjana critically

(xi) In a similar way, I have tried to present the ideas of some anti dhvani theorists (ch XIII) in a critical and comprehensive way

(xii) Chs XIV presents the views of Abhinava on dhvani in a coherent way. Whatever is found in the form of a piecemeal treatment is taken up by me and arranged in a connected way so as to evolve a distinct pattern

I have also attempted to present as clear and precise an account as possible of the views of Lollata, Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in Ch XV, and tried to see whether these can be correlated to some 'darśana'

(xii) In Ch. XVI, I have tried to present the views of some other important writers on rasa, such as Dhanañjaya, Dhanika Bhoja, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. I have tried to give a critical account of these authors

All this, I humbly claim is my contribution to knowledge.

Foot-Notes

(1) Dhv I 2

10'rtbah sabdādayasāgbyah kāvyātmeti vyavasthītaḥ |
vācyapratīyamāṅgākyau tasya bhedaḥvubhau smrtau ||

(2) Dhv I 5

kāvyasyātma sa evārthah tathā cādikaveḥ purā |
krauñcadvandvaviyogottah sokah ślokatvamāgataḥ ||

(3) Locana on Dhv I 5.

tena rasa eva vastūtaḥ ātmā, vastvalamkāradvau tu sarvathā
rasam pratī paryavasyete iti vācyādutkṛtau .. etc

(4) Dhv I. 7-

śabdārthasāsanajñānamānatrenaiva na vedyate |
vedyate sa || kāvyārthatatvajñaireva kevalam ||

(5) Dhv. I 1.

kāvyasyātma dhvaniriti budhairnyah samāmnātaparvāḥ
tasyābhāvaṃ jagadurapare bhaktamāhustamanye |
kecidvācāṃ sthītamavisaye tattvamūcustadīyaṃ
tena brūmah sabdādayamanah prītaye tatsvarūpam ||

PART I

CHAPTER I

√AÑJ VI+√AÑJ, √DHVAN AND DHVANI IN THE VEDAS
(Cir 1500, B C)

In this chapter we will try to study the occurrences of √añj, vi+√añj, √dhvan, dhvani etc in the vedas (Cir 1500 B C)

First of all, we will take up Rgveda

Rv. I 124.8 is—

svásā svásre jyā'yasyai jonimaraigápatyasyāh
praticáksyeva |
vyucchánti rasmī'bhīh sū'yasyañjyankte
samanagā iva vra'h ||

Sayana explains : añji vyañjikam tejih yadvā,
añji vyaktam jagat, ankte, anakti, prakasayati

i.e. anoints brings into light, displays, causes to appear, reveals, Griffith explains it as 'deck'.

Rv. V. 1.3 :

yádim ganásya rasana'májigrah sucirankte
súcibhirgobhiragnih |
a'ddákshī yuyate vājayántyuttanāmūrdhivó
adhayaJJuhu'bhīh ||

Sā -ankte=vyanakti, visvam jagat.

=anoints

Griffith- 'is anointed'

Rv. VIII. 29.1 :

babhrureko visuṣāḥ sūnāro yúvāñjyañkte
hiranyāyam |

Sa-añji, abhivjajyate prakasyate anena ityañji
abharanam

abhivyakṣādhanam kuṣḍalamukutadīkam svaśa-
tīram. ankte abhivyañjavati

=adorns, causes to appear, brings into light,
displays, decks; Griffith-'decks'

ankti-

Rv. I. 153.2 :

prástotirvāṃ dha'ma na práyuktiráyāmi
mitra varuṇā suvrātīb |
anākti yádvr̥ṣṇ vidáthesu hóta sumnāṃ vām
suri'r̥vr̥ṣṇāvi'yaksan. ||

Sā. - anakti = vyajjayati = manifests, displays,
brings into light, reveals, Griffith-'decks',

Rv. IV. 6.3 :

yata' sujūṣi' rāti'nī ghitāci
pradaks nīddevatīmuraṇāh |
údu svárurnavajā' na'krāh pasū anakti
sū hitah sumékah ||

Sa.-anakti = gacchati,

yadva sudhitah svasureva
udu utkr̥ṣṭiḥ pasvāḥ pasū anakti
svaruṣṭi pasumanakti it <ṣṭiḥ = anoints

Griffith-'anoints'

Rv. X. 68.2 :

sam góbhirnāgirasó náksamāno
 bhāgaivédaryamānam nināya |
 jāne mitró na dāmpati anaktī br'haspate
 vājáyāśu'ṁrivñajú ||
 Sā.-anakti = samgamayati = brings together
 = unites;

This seems to be an unusual meaning; may be metaphorical; Griffith-'decks';

añjate-Rv. I. 92.1 :

etā' ṁ tyā' uśásah ketumakrata pūrve árdhe
 rájaso bhānūmañjate |
 niṣkṛavānā' ā'yudhariva dhr̥ṣṭāvah prátī
 gavòrusiryanti mātáraḥ ||

Sā.-bhānum, prakāśam añjate = vyaktikurvanti
 =displays, causes to appear, brings into
 light, manifests, reveals,

Griffith-spread (shining light)

i.e. causes to appear, display, reveal.

Rv I. 151.8 :

yuvā'ṁ yajñāṁ prathamā' góbhirañjata ṛ'tāvānā
 mánaso ná práyuktiṣu |
 bhāranti vāṁ mánmanā guródṛpyatā mánasā
 revádāsāthe ṁ

Sā.-añjate = vyañjayanti yajamānāḥ

=display, cause to appear.

Griffith-'deck';

Rv. VIII. 72.9 :

pari tridhā'turadhvaram jūrāfreti nāvīyasā ।
madhva hōtaro añjate ॥

Sa - añjate = madhva añjate itī = anoint

Rv. IX. 10.3 :

rājāno na prasistibhih Sómāso gobhirañjate ।
yajāo ra sapta dhātṛ'bhih ॥

Sā - añjate = ayyante = smśrīyanta ityarthah
= anoint, adorn,

Griffith - 'deck',

Rv. IX. 102.7 .

samīcine abhi tmanā yajvī' rī'sya mātārā ।
tanvāna yajnatranusagyādanjate ॥

Sā - añjate somap mī'srayanti tada svayama-
bhigacchatī = mī, (i.e. anoint),

Griffith - 'adorn'

Rv. IX. 86.43 :

añjate vyañjate sāmāñjate kṛatum rihanti
mādhunābhyañjate ।

sindhorecchvasé patayantamukśāṃ hiraṇyapaśāh
pasumasu ṛbhṇate ॥

Sā - añjate - (gobhih), anoint,

vyañjate = vividhamañjanti,

sāmāñjate = samyaganjanti,

and madhunā grīyena abhyañjate = well anoint,

Griffith - 'balm' (i.e. anoint),

añjanti :

Rv. I. 95.6 :

ubhé bhadré joṣayete na mene pā vo na va'sra'iva
upa tashuv évaśh

sā dīkṣāṃ daksipatirbabbhūvañjanti yām
daksinatō havīrbhih ॥

Sā.-añjanti = ārdrikurvanti; tarpayanti (i.e. anoint)
Griffith-'balm'.

Rv. III. 8.1 :

añjanti tvā'madhvaré devayānto vānaspate
mādhunā dai'vyena |
yadūrdhvāsti'sṭhā drāviṇebā dhattādyādvā kṣāyo
mātúrāsya upāsthe ||

Sā.-añjanti=tvayi gṛtaṃ siñcanti ityarthah
(i.e. they anoint) Griffith-'anoint';

Rv. III. 14.3 :

drāvatāṃ ta uśāsā vājāyanti āgne vā'tasya
pathyābhirāccha |
oātsīmañjanti pūrvyāṃ havi'rbbhirā' vandhūreva
tasthaturduroṇé ||

Sā.-añjanti=siñcanti=anoint (and adorn)
Griffith-'adorn';

Rv. V. 3.2 :

tvāmaryamā' bhavasi yātkañ'nāṃ nā'ma
svadhāvaṅgūhyāṃ bibharṣi |
añjanti mītrāṃ sūdhitaṃ na gobhir yāddāmpati
sāmanasā kṛṇōṣi ||

Sā.-govikāraih kṣīrāḍibhiḥ añjanti='anoint',
Griffith-'balm'.

Rv. V. 43.7 :

añjanti yāṃ prathāyānto nā viprā vapā'vantāṃ
nā'gninā tāpantah |
pitūrma putrá upāsi preṣ'ha ā' dhatmó
agni'mṛtáyannasādī ||

Sā.-añjanti=anoint;
Griffith-'deck';

Rv. IX. 109.20 :

añjānty enaṃ mādhu rasēnendrāya vṛṣṇa i'nduṃ
mādāya ।

Sā -añjanti=samyojayanti=(mix, i.e. anoint)
Griffith-'balm' (=anoint),

añdhve.-Rv. X. 100.10 :

ūrjam gāṃ yāvase pīṃ attana ṛta'sya yā'h
śādane kós'e añdhvé ।
tanū'revā tinvō astu bhesajāmā sarv'atātīmādītum
vṛṣṇamahe ॥

Sā. -añdhve=vyañjayatha=Cause to appear,
manifest, display;

Griffith-'are balmed'.

ajmah.-Rv. IX. 45.3 :

Griffith-'balm'

aṅdhi.-Rv. X. 156.3 :

ā'gne sthūrāṃ rayim bhara prthūṃ
gómantamas'vī'nam ।
aṅdhi' kham vartāyā paṇīm ॥

Sā.-aṅdbī vrstyudakāḥ sīṣca=anoint;

or, atmiyāḥ tejobhīḥ vyañjaya prakāśaya=reveal,

Griffith.-oil, i.e. anoint;

anajyāt.-Rv. X. 31.4 :

nṣtyas'cakānyatsvāpatīrdāmūna yāsma u devāḥ
savitā' jaja'na ।

bhāgo vā góbhiraryamémanṛjyatsō asmai
cā'rūs'chādayadutā syāt ॥

Sā - anajyāt=vyaktikuryāt

=to cause to appear, reveal, manifest;

Griffith - 'may appear to him'.

anajan - Rv. III. 19.5 :

yattvā hótāramanājanmiyédhe niṣādāyanto

yajáthāya deva'h |

sa' tvāṃ no agne'vitēsa bodhyádhi śrávāṃsi

dhehi nantanū'su. ||

Sā - anajan, gṛtābutibhīrauṣan = anointed;

Griffith - anoint;

ānaje - Rv. I. 102.1 :

īma'ṃ te dhīyaṃ prā bhare mahó mahi'masyá

stotrē dhīśāñā yáta ānájé |

tāmutsavé ca prasavé ca sāsahimī'ndraṃ

deva'sah śávasāmadanna'nuo. ||

Sā. - ānaje = aktā śāṃsīśāsīt = anoint;

and adds : añjū vyaktimraksanagatiṣu;

Rv. VIII. 63.1 :

śá pūrvyó maha'nāṃ venáb r'tubhīrānaje |

yasya dvā'rā mánuspitā devéṣu dhīya anájé. ||

Sā - ānaje = āgacchati;

or, prāpa, ānajiḥ prāptikarmā;

ajyate :

Rv. VIII. 20.8 :

góbhirvānó ajyate sóbharīṇāṃ ráthe kóse

hiraṇyáye |

góbāndhavah sujātā'sah isé bhujé mahā'nto

nah śpārāse nú ||

Sa - ayyate, vyajyate, prakatīkriyate, = revealed,
Griffith - 'bathed'.

Rv. VIII 51 9 :

yasyāyam viśv ā ryo da sah Sevadhīra arīh |
tira'scidaryō rusame paviravi tubhyet'ō ayyate
rayāh ||

Sā - ayyate = praksiṇyate (Vālakṣīyabbāsyā),
Griffith = 'is brought off

at Rv. IX. 32.3 :

Sā - ayyate = śicyate, or smṛdhīkriyate =
(anointed),
Griffith - 'anointed',

Rv. IX 76.2 .

Rv X. 118.3

Sā - ayyate-śicyate-anointed,
Griffith - 'bathed'

Sa - ayyate gobhīh (= is anointed),
Griffith - 'bathed',

Rv. III. 40 6

gīrvanah pahl nah sūtān mādhdordhā'rabhirajyase |
īndra tva dātamidyāsaḥ ||

Sa - ayyase = śicyase = " (you) are anointed "
Griffith - 'art bedewed', (i.e. anointed),

Rv IX. 66 9 .

mrjānti tva samagraviśvya jirā vadhi svāpī |
rebhō yadajyase vane ||

Sā - ayyase = akṭāh Sīkto bhavati, = anoint
Griffith - 'deck thee',

also at Rv. IX. 85.5 :

Sa.-ajyase=sikto bhavasi; anointed;

Griffith-'balm'd' with milk;

also at Rv. IX. 78.2 :

, Sā.-ajyase=preryase;

Griffith-'balm'd'.

aktaḥ, aktā, aktaḥ, occur at

Rv. IV. 3. 10-Sā.-sikto bhavati; 'sprinkled with oil'-Griffith.

VI. 4 6-Sā.-saṃśiṣṭaḥ; 'decked'-Griffith;

VI. 5-6,-Sā. saṃsīktaḥ, 'decked with brightness'-Griffith.

IX. 96-22-Sa-sīktaḥ; 'decked'-Griffith;

aktam-at,

Rv. II. 3-4-Sā.-ājyena aktam, 'bedewed with'-Griffith;

IV. 27-5,-Sā.-sīktaṃ; 'filled with a shining liquid'-Griffith;

IX. 74-8,-Sā.-saṃprīktaṃ; 'shining, milk anointed'-Griffith;

X. 177-1;-Sā.-vyaktaṃ; abhivyaktaṃ; 'adorned with'-Griffith;

ajyamānaḥ-occurs at

Rv. IX. 97-35-Sā.-gobhiḥ sicjamānaḥ
-'is purified'-Griffith;

X. 31-9-Sā.-vyajyamānaḥ, vyaktibhavan
=caused to appear, revealed, displayed,
Griffith-'balm'd';

ajyamānā—occurs at,

Rv X, 31-10, Sa 'nisicyamānaretaskā'

añjat, añjan—at

Rv I. 92 5—añjan, añjanti (Sā)=display,
—'deck'—Griffith.

In the Yajurveda

anaktu—occurs at VI 2,

XXVII. 12;

XXXVII 11,

añjantu—XXIII 8,

anaje—XXXIII. 29,

ānañja—VIII. 30,

ajyate—XXXIII. 82,

aktam—II 16,

añjat—XXIX 1, and 2,

and samañjan—XX. 37,

'anaktu'—Yv. VI 2.

agreṇīrasī svāveśa unneṇīṇa metasya vittādadhī
tvā sthāsyatī devastvā avitā madhvānaktu
supīppalābhyastvausadhibhyah |

dyāmagreṇasprksī āntarīksīṇ madhenōprāṇ
prthivīmuparevāḍīṇbhīḥ ||

anaktu=mraksīyatu, (Uvaṭī)=anoint,

Yv. XXVII. 12 :

tīnūnāpādāsuro visvīveda devō devās devāḥ |
patīō anaktu mādhvī grīēna ||

anaktu=anoint, (Uvaṭa),

Yv. XXXVII. 11 :

yamā'ya tvā makhā'ya' tvā sū'ryasya tvā tápase ।
devástvā savitā' mādhvānaktu ।
prthivyā'h samsp'r'saspāhi ।
arcírasí śócírasí tapo'sí ॥
madhvā anaktu (Uvāta), -anoint ,
anaktu = liṃpatu (Mahidhara).

añjantu - occurs at,

Yv. XXIII. 8 :

vāsavastvāñjantu gāyatrēpa cchāndaśā rodrā'st-
vañjantu trais'tubhenac chāndaśādityā'stvāñjantu
jā'gatena chāndaśā bhū, bhuvāḥ svartājīñcchā-
cīñnyavye gāvya etádánnamatta devā etádánna-
maddhi prajāpate ॥
añjantu = anoint;
= snigdham kurvantu = anoint, (Mahidhara)

ānaje, occurs at

Yv. XXXIII. 29 and is Rv. I. 102-1,

ānañja - at Yv. VIII. 30 :

purudaśmó vísurūpa índurantármahīr ā'na'ñj dhīraḥ ।
ekapadīm dvīpadīm tripadīm catuspadīmastāpadīm
bhūvanā'nu prathantām svā'hā ॥
ānañj, -añjater vyāktīkaraṇārthasyaitadrūpaṃ.
vyāktīkaroti (Uvāta ;
= brings into light; displays, causes to appear etc. etc

ajyate - Yv. XXXIII 82,

It is the same as Rv. VIII. 51-9

Uvāta observes : ajyate dhātūnāmanekārthatvāt

añjirdānārthaḥ vikaraṇavyatyayasca anakti dadāti
rayiḥ dhanam

aktam—at Yv. II, 16 :

va'subhyastvā rudrēbhyastvā'dityēbhyastvā
sa'mjānāthaṃ dyāvāpṛthivī mitrā' va'ruṇau tvā
vṛstyāvatāṃ ।

vyantuva'yo'ktaṃ ri'hāṇā marūtāṃ pṛ'satirgaccha
vasā' pṛ'sṇirbhūtvā' divaṃ gaccha ta'to no
vr'ṣṭimā'vaha ।

caḥṣus'pā' agne'si ca'kṣurme pāhi ।

aktam=drutameva (Uvaṭa);

samañjan—Yv. XX. 37.

narāsa'msaḥ pra'ti sūro mī'mānasta'nūna'pātpra'-
tiyajña'sya dhā'ma ।

gōbbhīrvapā'vānma'dhunā samājña'n hiraṇyai'-
schandri yajati pra'cetāḥ ॥

samañjan=anoointing; -

añjan—Yv. XXIX 1 and 2;

añjan=vyakti, kurvan (Uvaṭa)=revealing; displaying;

and añjan=samañjan=anoointing gr̥tena (Uvaṭa);

In the Sāmaveda we have,

ajyase—I. 195.

añjate—I. 564;

II. 1121; 964; 1755;

vyañjate—I. 564;

samāñjate—I. 564;

ajyate—II. 770;

II. 1099,

II. 1609;

añjānīḥ—II. 1080;

II. 1209,

Now,

Sv. I. 195 is Rv. III. 40-6

Sv. I. 564 is Rv. IX. 86-43;

Sv. II. 1121 is Rv. IX. 10-3;

II. 1755 is Rv. I. 92-1;

II. 770 is Rv. IX. 32-3,

Sv. II. 1099 is

sam vatsa iva mātṛbhīrindurhinvāno ajyate ।

devāvirmado matibhiḥ pariskrutaḥ ॥

ajyate = 'is sent' Griffith.

The root may be √aj and not √añj

Sv. II. 1609 is Rv. VIII. 51 9

Sv. II. 1080 is;

punāno vāre pavamāno avyaye vrsō acakṛdadvane

devānām soma pavamana niskṛtam gobhirañjāno

arṣasi ॥

añjānaḥ = 'balm'd with' Griffith,

i.e. anointed;

Now we may examine the occurrence in the Av.

anakti - Av. V. 27 2.

devo deveṣu devaḥ pṛtho anakti madhṛā ghrtena ।

=anoints (Whitney);

añjate - Av. XVIII. 3-18. is Rv. IX. 86-43;

anajmi - Av. IV. 14-6.

aja'manajmi pa'yasā ghrtena divya'm payasa'm

suparṣa'm bṛha'ntam ।

tēna gema sukṛta'sya loka'm sv'rārohitā abhi

nā'kamuttama'm ॥

anajmi-abhidhārayāmi (Sā.);

=anoint; Whitney;

(ii) 'to shine' Its use with the prefix 'vi' ■ in the sense of 'to shine forth', 'to glitter' etc The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by the application of some ingredient.*

vi+√añj :

We come across different forms of the root vi+√añj in the Vedas

We will first take up the Rgveda

We can make a note of the fact that vi+√añj occurs more frequently in what are known as the later mandals of the Rv. We will try to study all these references carefully and will try to find its sense or senses in their various occurrences.

vyañjate :

Rv I. 64 4 :

citraírañjibhírvapuse vyañjate va'ksaṣu rukā'm
a'dhi yetire s'ubhé |
amsesvesam ní mīmṛksur rsta'yāḥ sak'm jajñire
svadha'yā divó na'raḥ ||

* Grassman, Roth and Bothlingk also have '√añj' in the following senses

- (i) to anoint, to rub the ointment, to embalm, (salben),
- (ii) to emit, (spitzen),
- (iii) to shine, to glitter (glanzend),
- (iv) to shine forth, (erscheinen)
- (v) to decorate (schmücken),
- (iv) to embellish, to attire dress (zürüsten)

vyañjate=vyaktam kurvanti

alamkurvantītyarthah (Sā)

i.e. they bring into light, cause to appear,
display, reveal, decorate and

añjibhiḥ is explained by Sā as rūpabhi—
vyañjanasamarthabhi ābharāṇaḥ

Griffith explains it as = 'they deck',
añjibhiḥ as 'glittering ornaments'.

Rv. VII 79.2 : is

vyanjate divó antesvaktū'nvis'o na' yuktā' usa'so
yatante |
sa'm te ga'vasta'ma ā' var'trayanti jyótīryacchanti
savitēva bāhū ||

Sā explains as, 'vyaktīkurvanti'—

i.e. cause to appear, reveal etc

Griffith—'paint' (i.e. anoint),

Rv. IX. 86.43 is the same as seen above (see añjate),

yyañjate=vidhamañjanti (Sā).
and samañjate samyagañjanti,
=anoint, well anoint,
Griffith—'balm' (i.e. anoint),

vyajyate—Rv. X 85 28,

nīlaloṣita'm bhavati kṛtya'saktīrvyajyate |
ēdhante sayā jātā'yah pī'tirbāndhēṣā bādhyate ||
vyajyate=tyajyate (Sā)
=driven off (Griffith)

The root is vi+√aj, not vi+√añj

It should be noted that this is the same as
Av XIV. 1 26

Whitney observes that the root is vi+√aj

Rv. IX. 71.7 is

pa'rā vyakto aruṣo diva'h kavirvṛ'sā triprṣṭhó '
 . anavista gā' abhí |
 saha'sraṇitirya'tiḥ parāya'tī rebhó na pūrvīruṣa'so
 ví rājati. ||

Sā. ~somaḥ vyaktaḥ vispaṣṭadhārāyuktaḥ yadvā
 vasatīvaribhirvis'eṣeṇāḥ siktaḥ sṃ.
 i.e. clearly manifested, displayed or well anointed;
 Griffith - 'shines';

vyaktam - Rv. X. 14.9;
 X. 127.7;

Rv. X. 14.9 :

a'peta vīta ví ca sarpatā'to'smā etāṃ pita'ro
 loka'makran |
 a'hobhiradbhīraktúbhirvyaktaṃ yamó
 dadātyavasā'namasmai ||

Sā. explains : vyaktaṃ = saṃgatam;
 = accompanied with (i.e. adorned with);
 Griffith - 'adorned with';

Rv. X. 127.7 :

úpa mā pépis'atta'maḥ kṛṣa'm vyaktamasthita |
 ūṣa ũéva yātaya ||
 Sā. says : vyaktaṃ vis'eṣeṇa svabhāsā sarvasy-
 āñjakaṃ spaṣṭīrūpaṃ vā i.e. that which well
 anoints everything with its own light, or
 that which is clearly manifested;

Griffith (that which) decks, (i.e. adorns);

R. 2.

vyakta :

Rv. VII. 77.3 :

devā'nām cā'kṣoḥ subha'gā va'hantī sveta'm
na'yantī sudṛ'sīkama'svaṃ ।
uṣā' adars'ī ras'mibhirvyaktā citrā'maghā
viśvamanu-pra'bhūtā ॥

Sā. - does not wait to explain vyaktā. But it means, 'clearly manifested'.

Griffith - (that which) 'shines apparent' i.e. clearly shines;

Rv. VIII. 56.4; is;

ta'tro a'pi prā'nīyata pūta'kratāyai vyaktā ।
a'svānāmīuna' yūthyām ॥

There is no Sāyapabhāṣya on this. We get vāḷakhilyasūktabhāṣya which explains it as: vividham gantā; nānāprades'eṣu pracalan.

Rv. X. 86.5. is,

priyā' taṣṭā'ni me kapiṛ'vyaktā vyadūduṣat ।
sīro nvasya rāviṣaṃ na' suga'm duṣkr'te bhuvam
viś'vasmādīndra ūttaraḥ ॥

Sā. - explains as vyaktā = vyaktānyājayai,
vis'eṣaṇāktāni i.e. (well adorned);

Griffith : vyakta = beauteous things (i.e. well adorned);

vyaktāḥ - occurs at Rv. VII. 56-1.

Rv. VII. 56-1; is,

kā' iṃ vyaktā na'raḥ sanīḥ rudra'sya ma'ryā
a'dhā sva'svāḥ ।

Sā.-'kāntiyuktāḥ' i.e. 'beautiful' 'lustrous',
'radiant';

Griffith - 'radiant';

vyaktam - Rv. X. 85.21;

udīrṣvā'taḥ pā'tvatī hyeṣ'sā vis'vā'vasuṃ nā'masā
girbhīrīle |

anyū'miccha pitṛṣā'dam vyaktāṃ sa'sāte bhāgō
janū śā ta'sya viddhi. ||

Sā.-explains 'as : vyaktāṃ anūdhetī paris'gutāṃ
vigatāñjanāṃ vā |

i.e. 'clearly manifested', or that whose añjana
is removed.

Griffith - 'fair' (i.e. beautiful).

vyañjata - occurs at Rv. VIII. 7.25,

Rv. VIII. 7.25. is,

vidyūdbastī abhidyavaḥ sīprāḥ
s'īrṣa'nhrācya'yīḥ |
s'ubhrā' vyañjata śriyó ||

Sā.-vyañjata vyañjayanti vyaktīkurvanti dhā-
rayanti, tyarthaḥ i.e. 'display'; 'bear';

Griffith - 'deck'.

We have seen as many as thirteen occurrences in which we come across different forms of the root vi + √añj in the Rv. These thirteen references from the Rv. bear the general sense of opening up something hidden and bringing it to light, embellishing, decorating, adorning and the like.

Thus, we can say that the root vi + √añj in the Rv. has these two connected meanings (i) revealing and (ii) adorning.

The Yajurveda has,
 vyaktaḥ—at XIX. 87;
 and vyaktaṃ—at XXXV. 1:

Yv. XIX. 87 is;

kumbhó vaniṣṭhúrjanitā' śa'chībhirya'sminna'gre
 yōnyāṃ ga'rbho anta'ḥ |
 plas'i'rvyaktaḥ śata'dhāra útso duhé na' kumbhaḥ
 svadhā'm pitṛ'bhyaḥ ||

Uvaṭa explains, vyaktaḥ=spāṣṭaḥ i.e. clearly manifested or displayed; Mahidhara has vyaktaḥ=spāṣṭaḥ.

Yv. XXXV. 1. is,

apetó yantu paṇa'yo'sumnā devapīya'vaḥ |
 asya' loka'ḥ sutā'vataḥ dyubhirā'hobhiraktúbhi-
 rvyakta'm yamó dadātvavasā'namasmai. ||

The second half is almost identical with Rv. X. 14.9b and Uvaṭa has vyaktaṃ=spāṣṭākṛtaṃ clearly displayed; =manifested;

Mahidhara explains similarly.

Sāmaveda has

vyasjate—Sv. I. 564;
 and vyaktāḥ—Sv. I. 433.

Sv. I. 564 is the same as Rv. IX. 86.43;

Sv. I. 433 is the same as Rv. VII. 56.1;

Atharvaveda has :

vyasjate: Av. XVIII 3.18; is the same as Rv. IX. 68.43;

Whitney explains: 'they anoint out' (vi);

vyajyate—Av. XIV. 1.26. is Rv. X. 85.28;

Whitney explains it from root vi + √aj and not vi + √añj.

vyaktaṃ - Av. XVIII. 1-55 is Rv. X. 14-9;

vyaktā - Av. XX 126-5.

Thus, we see that the Av. has here practically everything borrowed from Rv.

The survey of the occurrences of the root vi + √añj in the vedas shows two connected meanings, viz., to bring out something hidden by applying or enhancing something, to brighten, to embellish, to decorate, to adorn.

Thus, putting together the result of our survey, we get :

(1) to deck; to adorn;

as in Rv. I. 64-4; (Sā. & Griffith)

Rv. X. 14-9 („ „)

Av. XVIII. 1-55 (Whitney),

(2) to manifest clearly; display, cause to appear

as in Rv. I. 64-4; (Sā.);

Rv. VII. 79-2. (Sā.);

Rv. VII. 77-5. (Sā.);

Rv. IX. 77-7. (Sā.) (Griffith);

Rv. X. 85-21; (Sā.)

Yv. XIX. 87. (Uvaṭa and Mahidhara)

Yv. XXXV. 1 (Uvaṭa and Mahidhara);

Rv. X. 14-9. (Sā.);

Av. XVIII. 1-55 (Sā.)

- (iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith),
as in Rv. VII. 79 2,
- (iv) to balm (i.e. anoint); (Griffith);
Rv. IX. 86 43
Sv. I. 564,
- (v) to anoint
as in Rv. IX: 86-43 (Sā.)
Av. XVIII 3 18 (Sā.) and also Whitney;
Rv. X. 86 5 (Sā.)
- (vi) to shine forth;
Rv. VII. 77-3. (Griffith)
- (vii) beautiful; (vyaktā); Griffith
as in Rv. X. 86-5,
and also 'kāntiyuktaḥ' according to Sā. at
Rv. VII. 56-1.
'radiant', Griffith-Rv. VII. 56 1
and also Sv. I. 433 (Griffith)
'fair'—Rv. X. 55 21 (Griffith)

We may also note the occurrences of the root $\sqrt{\text{dhvan}}$, or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas.

We come across,

adhvanīti -at Rv. VIII. 6 13.

adhvānayat – at Rv. VI. 18.10.

dhvanayit-at Rv. I. 162 15

and dhvani, dhvanayah at Av. V. 20 7.

Rv. VIII. 6.13. is:

ya'dasya manyūra'dhvanīdvi' vṛtra'm parvaśo ruja'ni
apa'h samudra'mairayaḥ ||

Sā.-stanayitnulaṣṣanaṃ śabdaṃ akarot; {L. 1
Griffith - 'thundered'.

Rv. VI. 18 10 :

agni'rna śuṣkaṃ va'namindra hetī' rakṣo nī'
dhakṣyaṃsa'nirna' bhīmā' |
gambhīra'ya rṣya'yā yó rurojā'dhvānayaḍ duritā'
dambha'yaccha ||

Sā.-yuddhe garjanalakṣaṇaṃ śabdaṃ karoti.

Rv. I. 162.15 :

mā' tvāgni'rdhvanayiddhūma'gandhirmókhā
.....etc.

Sā.- 'to make noise'.

Griffith - 'make thee crackle',

Av. V. 20 7 is,

antareme nabhasī ghoṣo astu pṛthak te dhvanayo
santu sībham |
= 'let there be noise'; Whitney;

Thus, the root √dhvan and the word dhvani carry the sense of 'to make noise' and 'noise' respectively.

The occurrences of the root vi+√añj in different forms might have proved to be a remote source of inspiration for the theory of vyanjanā in times to come.

- (iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith);
as in Rv. VII. 79-2;
- (iv) to balm (i.e. anoint) (Griffith),
Rv. IX. 86-43
Sv. I. 564;
- (v) to anoint
as in Rv. IX. 86-43 (Sā.)
Av. XVIII 3-18 (Sā.) and also Whitney;
Rv. X. 86-5 (Sā.)
- (vi) to shine forth;
Rv. VII. 77-3. (Griffith)
- (vii) beautiful; (vyaktā); Griffith
as in Rv. X. 86-5;
and also 'kāntiyuktāḥ' according to Sā. at
Rv. VII. 56-1.
'radiant', Griffith-Rv. VII. 56-1
and also Sv. I. 433 (Griffith)
'fair'—Rv. X. 55-21 (Griffith)

We may also note the occurrences of the root
√dhvan, or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas.

We come across,
adhvanīt-at, Rv. VIII. 6-13.
adhvānayat-at Rv. VI. 18-10,
dhvanayit-at Rv. I. 162-15
and dhvani, dhvanayaḥ at Av. V. 20-7.

Rv. VIII. 6-13. is;

ya 'dasya manyūra 'dhvanīdvi' vṛtra 'm parvaśo ruja 'nī
apa 'ḥ samudra 'mairayaḥ ॥

This is a very important occurrence. 'vyanjana' here means 'an indicator' This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication' In a similar sense, we find another root viz. √dyut In Ch I. Yaska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of nama and akhyata, with a particular meaning Says Gargaya na nirbaddhāḥ upasargāḥ arthan nirāhuḥ nāmākhyā tayostu karmopasaṁyogadyotakāḥ bhavanti.

Thus, it seems, Yāska comes very near to the power of 'dyotana' or 'suggestion' of words, though, he does not mention it by name We know that in the Kavyasāstra, the word 'dyotana' is used as an equivalent of 'vyañjanā' 'Vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication' in Yāska as noted above is also an important occurrence of vi + √añj. We do not come across the occurrence of √dhvan or dhvani in either Nighantu or the Nirukta.

√añj and vi + √añj in Rkprātis'ākhya, Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini (Cir. 300 B.C.) and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.)

Rk. Prā :

In the RK. Pra, it should be noted at the outset, that we do not come across words such as vyañjanā, dhvani etc. The word vyañjana, in the technical sense of a 'consonant' occurs at several places (4)

Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini (Cir 300 B.C.).

In Pāṇini, we get 'vyañjana' at II 1-34, IV iv. 26, and II. iv 12 (5) In the last two occurrences,

√añj and vi + √añj in the Nighantu and the Nirukta
(Cir 700 B C - 300 B C)

The Nighantu .

The Nighantu has no word like 'vyanjana' nor any other from the roots √añj and vi + √añj

The Nirukta * (Cir 700 B C - 500 B C)

In Nirukta, however, we have come across certain occurrences of √añj in different forms, wherein it seems to carry the sence of 'to anoint' (1)

We have P. P of vi + √añj in 'vyaktavācāh' at 11 29 in the sense of 'distinct speech' - (vi + √añj = to manifest clearly) (2)

At 7 13 we come across the word 'vyañjanamatram' in the sense of 'mere indication' (3)
This reads as below

.. athotā karmabhirṣirdevataḥ stauti vṛtraha
purandara itī, tanyapī eke samamananti bhūyapī
tu samāmnānat vyañjanamatram tu tat tasyabhidha
nasya bhavati yatha brāhmaṇaya bubhuksitaya
odanap dehi, snataya anulepanam, pipasate
paniyam iti

(Moreover, a seer praises deities with regard to their activities, as (Indra) the Vṛtra-slayer, or the City-destroyer, and so on Some make a list of these also but they are too numerous to be collected together in a list These epithets are mere indications of (a particular aspect of the proper) appellations, just as 'give food to a Brahmana who is hungry, or unguents to one who has taken a bath, or water to one who is thirsty' (3)

cussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action (kriyā ' which has 'mandra ' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga viz. 'āñ'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion.'

We find 'vyajyante' at I. 3.1. 19-20; the author
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says that without 'kriyā' action, the kālās such as bhūta, vartamāna etc. are not suggested. vi+√añj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion'—(athavā nāntareṇa kriyām bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante-) (and also, astyādibhis'cāpi bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante) (I. 3.1. 19 20)
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Again, at III. 1.67. 14/57—

tiṅgabhibitena bhāvena kālapurusopagrahā abhi-
vyajyante kṛdabhihitena punarṇa vyajyante.

We have 'vyajyante' in the same sense. The author says that the meaning of 'bhāva' or 'action' is suggested by both tin and kṛdanta. But there is some difference in these two. Whatever is suggested by kṛdanta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by tin, kāla, puruṣa, and upagraha (parasmai, and ātmane) are suggested.

Moreover, at VIII. 2.48 23/23, we have
408

añjerasañjanam añjanam ca prakāśanam tathā añjervy-
añjanam vyañjanam ca prakāśanam—the context is that when √añj is in the sense of prakāśana, we do not change 'ta' into 'na' in case of a P.P.P. Thus, we get √añj in the sense of 'prakāśana'.

it is seen in the sense of a consonant. At II. i. 34, we have : 'vyañjanairupasikte'. It is explained as : dadhnā upasiktaṃ dādhikaṃ'. Anything that is used to enhance the relish of a principal object of eating is called a vyañjana, e.g. curd, in the case of rice.

Thus, vyañjana is that which serves to enhance the relish. We come across the same use of the term vyañjana in the Nāṣā wherein Bharata cites the analogy of sādavādirasa (Cb. VI). This can have an important bearing on the vyañjanāvāda of the Ālaṃkārikas, wherein, vibhāva, anubhāva, etc. cause to enhance the sthāyī to the capacity of rasa.

It should also be noted that Pāṇini does not mention 'dhvani', nor does he refer to sphaṭavāda. He mentions one Sphaṭāyana without referring to the theory of sphaṭa (VI. i. 121). We also come across the word 'vyakta' meaning 'distinct', 'clear', in the sūtra I 3.48 (6).

The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.) :

In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of different forms of the roots añj and vi + √añj and also of words such as vyañjana, Sphaṭa, etc. (7). Some of the important occurrences are as below :

We find 'vyañjante' at Pā. Su. VIII. 1.70. line 15, page 381; iḥāpi tarhi mandrasādhanā kriyāṅgā vyañjate. The context is that in the illustration, "mandrairindra' haribhīryābī mayirūromabhiḥ; the word 'mandra' being not an indicative of 'gati' 'or' action, does not get an anudātta svara. While dis-

cussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action (kriyā ' which has 'mandra' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga viz. 'ān'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion.',

We find 'vyajyante' at I 3 l. 19-20, the author
258

says that without 'kriyā' action, the kālās such as bhūta, vartamana etc. are not suggested. vi + √añj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion'—(athavā nāntareṇa kriyām bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante-) (and also, aṣṭyādibhis'cāpi bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante) (I 3-l. 19 20)
258

Again, at III. 1-67. 14/57—

tīṅgabhiḥiteṇa bhāvena kālapurusopagrahā abhivyajyante krdabhiḥiteṇa punarṇa vyajyante.

We have 'vyajyante' in the same sense The author says that the meaning of 'bhava' or 'action' is suggested by both tīṅ and krdanta But there is some difference in these two. Whatever is suggested by krdanta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by tīṅ, kala, purusa, and upagraha (parasmai, and ātmane) are suggested.

Moreover, at VIII 2-48 23/23, we have
408

añjerasañjanam añjanam ca prakāśanam tīṅhā añjervyañjanam vyañjanam ca prakāśanam—the context is that when √añj is in the sense of prakāśana, we do not change 'ta' into 'na' in case of a P.P.P Thus, we get √añj in the sense of 'prakāśana'—.

Later on he says that $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}c}$ is also seen in the same sense 'aṅcitah gacchati' means 'prakāśayati ātmānam iti gamyate'. In our popular usage aṅcitah gacchati means 'being alert he goes-samāhito bhūtvā gacchati'. The author here uses terms such as 'iti gamyate'. This brings us very near to the vyañjanāvāda.

Thus we see that $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$, $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}c}$ and $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ are all used in the sense of prakāśana, i.e. manifestation, or revealing or bringing something into light, or displaying something etc ... 'vyañjana' occurs in its technical sense of a consonant. At VIII. 2.48 $\frac{24}{408}$ however, we get it in the sense of prakāśana,

as noted above. Thus $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ and $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ seem to occur in the same senses as in the earlier literature. $Vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ in the sense of suggestion is also noted as at Mahābhāṣya VIII 170 15/381, or Mahābhāṣya I. 3 1. $\frac{19}{258}$ etc. as noted above.

**Different forms of $vi + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$, dhvani etc.
as seen in earlier poets.**

- (i) Bhāṣa. (Cir. 300 A.D.)
- (ii) Aśvaghoṣa. (Cir. 100 A.D.)
- (iii) Kālidāsa. (Cir. 400 A.D.).

We have traced the earlier occurrences of the words connected with vyañjana in the vedic literature. Now let us take note of these words in earlier classical literature e.g. the plays of Bhāṣa and works of Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa.

That criticism follows literature does not require proof. That practice precedes theory and in turn is guided by theory is well proved in the story of literature, science, fine arts, etc. So, before we come to Bharata and Bhāmaha, let us take note of the usage of vyañjanā, rasa, etc., in earlier classical literature. The date of the plays attributed to Bhāsa is still a matter of controversy. Bhāsa, however, is placed earlier than Kālidāsa by scholars like Keith and others. I shall therefore, take him first for the sake of convenience of the treatment of the subject.

Bhāsa : (Cir. 300 A.D).

In the thirteen plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we come across words like vyaktam, vyakti, suvyaktam, vyaktikṛtam etc., in the sense of 'clearly manifested.' We also come across sūcayati, sūcayitavyah, ūcayanti etc., in the sense of 'suggesting or indicating' (8). Some of the more interesting occurrences are as below :

In the second act of Avimāraka the prince is sitting all alone, lost in the thoughts of Kuraṅgi. Meanwhile, two maid servants of Kuraṅgi came there with some message. The dialogue proceeds as follows :

Dhātṛi-ārya ! kiṃ cintyate ?

Avimārakaḥ-Bhavati, śāstraṃ cintyate

Dhā - kiṃ nāmaitad ramaṇiyam śāstraṃ vivikte
cintyate ?

Avi.- Bhavati ! yogasāstraṃ cintyate !

Dha - (sasmitam) pratigrhitam mangalavacanam !
yogasāstrameva bhavatu !

Avi (ātmagatam) ko nu khalu vākyarthah '
anyadapyabhilāśivasadanyathā samkalpa
yāmī ! (prakāsam) kimabhipretam bhavatyāh !

Dha - yogamicchantyavāgate svah ! anumata
arjuna yoga iti nanu nisthitam kāryamas
mākam rājakule vivikta avakase ! tatrāpi
ko pi jano'dhikātaram yogam cintayannasti !
tena saha tatraivaryeṇa susthu yogavi
dhānam cintyatamiti !

The passage leaves no doubt that the author is not only fairly conversant with the 'abhipreta artha' or the implied sense, but also seems to be conversant with the verbal function called *vyāñjana*.

In the Carudatta act II we come across the following dialogue

Gaṇika - samvāhaka āryah ! sukhmāra kala
śikṣitāryeṇa !

Samvāhakah - kaletī śikṣitā !
ājivikedanīm samvrtta !

Gaṇikā - nirvedasucakamiva vacanamaryasya !
tatastatah !

Thus a sentence becomes 'sūcaka' or suggestive of a bhāva called *nirveda*.

Again in the act III we have,-

Brahmanī ha dhik ! (niskrānta)
Vidūsakah esā vacā duḥkham rakṣitvaśrabhiḥ
sucayitva gata ! bhoh ! idam !

Here also, 'asru' or tears, an anubhāva, become suggestive of the feeling of grief.

Again, In the act I, we have Gaṇikā—(prāvārakam grhitvā saharṣam)—anudāsinaṃ yauvanamasya paṭavāsagandhaḥ sūcayati !

The fragrance is said to reveal that his yauvana is 'anudāsina' (not indifferent to the joys of life).

In the Pratimānāṭaka, act V we have,

Rāmaḥ.....aye imāni khalu pratyagrā-
bhīṣiktāni vṛkṣamūlāni adūragatāṃ maithilīm sūcay-
anti ! tathā hi.....etc. (Act. V.)

Here, one fact viz. that Sitā has not moved much farther, is suggested by yet another fact viz. the roots of trees that are recently sprinkled. But herein, we can read even the process of reasoning on the part of the hero. The word 'dhvani' occurs in the usual sense of 'sound' only.

As'vaghōṣa : (Cir. 100 A.D.)

Now we turn to Aśvaghōṣa (9). We come across 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'embellishment' 'adoration' etc., as in Śaundarananda XVIII. 11—viz,

maitrīstanīm vyañjanacārusāsnām
saddharmadugdhām pratibhānaṣṛṅgām !
tavāsmi gām sādhu nipīya tṛptaḥ
tṛṣeva gāmuttamavātsavarṇaḥ !

Here, the word vyañjana, it may be noted is in the sense of alaṃkāra.

Again, at Bu Ca XVI 73, we have vyañjana in the same sense

sarvakleśabbhividdhānām kleśasālyasamuddharaḥ ।
sarvalakṣaṇasampannāḥ sarvavyañjanamaṇḍitāḥ ॥

vi + √añj in the sense of 'to manifest clearly' or 'to suggest' occurs at Bu. Ca IV 84

upapannamidaṁ vākyaṁ sauhardavyañjakam

atra ca tīṇumesyami yatra ma dusthu manyase ॥
tvayi ।

Herein, a vākya is said to be 'sauhardavyañjaka' i.e. suggestive of friendship. The sentence, i.e. a group of words, suggests the bhāva of 'sauhārda'. It may be noted that this passage is specially interesting and useful from the point of view of our inquiry

The occurrence of vyañjana meaning ornament in the verses quoted above is also of some importance for our investigation. We know that in Vāmana the word alampkāra has two senses, (i) that of saundarya, and (ii) that of a figure of speech. It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana had also a sense similar to alampkāra i.e., beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion. The first sense of alampkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in Sanskrit Poetics

We come across some occurrences of 'dhvani' in the sense of 'sound' only. This cannot have any reference to the theory of dhvani of the writers of poetics

Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D.) :

In Kālidāsa, we come across vi+√añj in its different grammatical forms (10). All the occurrences of vi+√añj, in the Kumara., except at II. 11, are in the sense of 'to manifest', 'to display' 'to bring into light' etc. At II. 11, we have 'vyakta' and 'vyaktetara' having the philosophical connotation of 'the manifest' and 'the unmanifest'. Kumāra. VII. 91 is more interesting. It runs as below :

tau sandhisu vyañjitavrttibhedam
rasāntaresu pratibaddharāgam |
apas'yatāmapsarasām muhūrtaṃ
prayogamādyam lalitāṅgabhāram ||

Here, we have 'vyañjita' in the sense of manifested, revealed. There is also the mentioning of pañcasandhi, vrtti, and rasa. This suggests an advanced stage of the science of dramatury.

In the Megha. 12 (pūrva), we have 'snehavyaktiḥ', i.e., the manifestation of love. Megha. 29 (pūrva) is very interesting. It reads as

venībhūtapratanusalilā' savatītasya sindhuh
pāṇḍacchayā tataruhatarubhram'sibhirjīṛṇa
saubhagyam te subhaga vīrahāvasthayā
kārsyam yena tyajati vidhinā sa
tvayāvopapādyah ||

That the nāyakanāyikābhāva is suggested here is clear. Mallinātha explains it fully. 'Vyañjayanti' is explained as 'prakāśayanti' i.e. 'suggesting'. The river Nīrvindhya is said to suggest, by her R. 3.

condition in separation, the good fortune of the cloud, the lover. This may have an important bearing on the formation of the theory of vyañjana of the writers on poetics, wherein something else is suggested with the help of something else.

In the Raghu also very often we have $v_i + \sqrt{a}ñj$ in the sense of 'to manifest' Raghu XIII 12 and XIV. 26 are more interesting They read as below

XIII 12—

velanilaya pra^rta bhujanga vahormivisphūr
jathuniviseśāh |

suryāms'usamparkasamrddharagairvyajyanta
ete manibhih phagasthaih ||

vyajyante=unniyante (Mallinatha)— i e are suggested, and XIV 26 is—

athādbhīkasnigdhabilocanena mukhena sitā
śarapāṇḍureṇa |

ānandayitri pariṇeturāsīdanaksaravy
añjita^rdohadena ||

anaksaravyañjita is explained by Mallinātha as
ṛvāgvapārṇa yathā bhavati tatha vyanjita^m

In Malavika, Vikrama, and Abhi Śa, in a the occurrences, $v_i + \sqrt{a}ñj$ carries the sense of 'to manifest'

Thus, we have seen that in Bhāsa, Asvaghosa and Kālidasa, we come across certain occurrences of $v_i + \sqrt{a}ñj$ in the sense of 'to suggest', that might have paved the way to the formation of the theory of vyañjanā at the hands of the writers on poetics

Foot notes :

- (1) añjate occurs at Nirukta 12.7 and is the same as Rv. I. 92.1.

añjan, at 3.20; (i.e. Rv. I. 92.5.);

añjanti at 8.18; (i.e. Rv. III 8.1);

and also, ankte vyakte vyaktatare (Ch. I); akṣipī kasmāt, añkteḥ, etc.—in the sense of ‘clearly manifested’, and also, anakti at 8.10;

Yāska explains ‘uṣāsānaktā;

He says : uṣā vyākhyātā. nakteti rātrīnāma. anakti bhūtānyavas’yāyena, apī vā naktā avyaktavarṇā tayoreṣā bhavatu.

anakti = anoints,

avyaktavarṇā = not of distinct colour (i.e. having no clearly manifested colour).

‘vi + √añj’ is seen in the sense of manifestation;

- (2) vyaktavācaḥ at 11.29 ■ :

devīm vācam ajanayanta devāḥ tām sarvarūpāḥ pas’avo vayanṭi,

vyaktavācas’cāvyaktavācaḥ ca

- (3) Translation ~ Sarup p.p 120

Nirukta (7.13)–

iti imā devatā anukrāntaḥ-sūktabhājaḥ havirbhājaḥ, ṛgbhājas’ca bhūyistāḥ kas’cinnipātabhājaḥ, atha uta abhidhānaiḥ samyujya havis’codayati indrāya vrtraghne indrāya aṃhomuce iti. tānyapi eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt yattu samvijñānabhūtam syāt prādhānyastuti tat samāmane atha uta karmabhiḥ ṛsiḥ devatāḥ stanti vrtrahā purandaraḥ iti. tānyapi eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt. vyaśjanamātram tu tat tasyābhidhānasya bhavatu yathā brāhmaṇāya bubhuksītāya odanam dehi, snātāya anulepanam, pipāsate pānīyam iti.

(Nirukt=7.13)

(4) RK Prā. has,

‘vyañjana’ at XVIII (patala) 32 (sūtra), 42, 43,

vyanjanam ‘-I 5, 22,

II 8

VI 14,

‘vyanjanasya’-XIV 15,

‘vyanjanāt’-XIV 47,

XVIII 44,

‘vyanjanānam’-XIV 16

‘vyañjanani’-I 6 23,

IV 1,

XVIII 33,

‘vyañjane’-VII 1,

‘vyañjanena’-III 17,

‘vyañjanesu’-VIII 48

‘vyanjanasamgamam’-XVIII 40

‘vyanjanasannipatah’-I 37,

vyañjanodayam’-VII 33,

‘vy ñjanodayāt’-VI 46,

(5) Pāṇini (astadhyayi)

II iv 12,-

IV iv 26,-

(6) ‘vyaktavāc-I 3 48-vyaktavācām samuccāraṇe-

‘vyaktivācānah -I 2 51 ,-

sphotivācānah-VI 1 123-avaṇ sphoṭāyanasya

(7) In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali we have
 vyañyante - at Pr Sū I 3 48 line 7-8-8-8/page 283
 abhivyañyeta at V 3 55 17/415,
 vñjana at VIII 21 48 23-23/408
 vyañjana at pratyāhara sūtra 23 26/26
 and at I 13 3/11/13/15/22/25

Foot notes :

- (1) añjate occurs at Nirukta 12.7 and is the same as Rv. I. 92.1.

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Yāska explains 'uṣāsānaktā;

He says : uṣā vyākhyātā. nakteti rātrinaṁma. anakti bhūtānyavas'yāyena. api vā naktā avyaktavarṇā tayoreṣā bhavati.

anakti=anoints;

avyaktavarṇā=not of distinct colour (i.e. having no clearly manifested colour).

'vi + √añj' is seen in the sense of manifestation;

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devīm vācam ajanayanta devāḥ tām sarvarūpāḥ pas'avo vayanu,

vyaktavācas'cāvyaktavācaḥ ca

- (3) Translation—Sarup p.p 120

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(Nirukt=7.13)

(4) RK. Prā. has,

‘vyañjana’ at XVIII (paṭala) 32 (sūtra); 42; 43;

‘vyañjanam’-I. 5; 22;

II. 8;

VI 14;

‘vyañjanasya’-XIV. 15;

‘vyañjanāt’-XIV. 47,

XVIII. 44;

‘vyañjanāṁśam’-XIV. 16.

‘vyañjanāni’-I. 6.23;

IV. 1;

XVIII. 33;

‘vyañjane’-VII. 1;

‘vyañjanena’-III. 17;

‘vyañjanesu’-VIII. 48,

‘vyañjanaśamgamam’-XVIII. 40;

‘vyañjanasannipātaḥ’-I. 37;

‘vyañjanodayam’-VII. 33;

‘vyañjanodayāt’-VI. 46;

(5) Pāṇini (aśādhyañi)

II. iv. 12;-

IV. iv. 26;-

(6) ‘vyaktavāc-I. 3.48-vyaktavācām samuccāraṇe-

‘vyaktivācāṇaḥ’-I. 2.51 ,-

‘sphoṭāyanaḥ’-VI 1. 123-avañ sphoṭāyanasya.

(7) In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali we have ;

vyañjante - at Pā Sū. I. 3.48 line 7-8-8-8/page 283.

abhivyañjeta : at V. 3.55.17/415,

añjana : at VIII. 21 48.23-23/408.

vyañjana : at pratyāhāra sūtra 23 26/26

and at I 13 3/11/13/15/22/25;

I. 1.3. 21/48;
 I. 1.50. 19/123
 I. 1.51. 16-19/128;
 I. 1.73. 18-21-21/189;
 I. 2 30 15/18/19/19/21/23/24/30,

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II. 1.34 35 19/386

III. 2 109 4/117;

VI. 1.2. $\frac{1/2/4/5/7}{7}$,

VI. 1.3 14/8,

VI. 1.131-17/19,

VI 1 223 $\frac{19/20/21/23}{119}$,

VI 1 223 $\frac{6/9/9/15}{120}$;

VI 4.16-3/185,

VII. 1 73 19/265,

VIII 2 4-4/389

VIII. 2 48. $\frac{24/24}{408}$, $\frac{2}{409}$

vyañjanādyartha : at VII 2 115 $\frac{7/8}{314}$,

vyañjanānta at I. 1 29 $\frac{10}{91}$:

II. 4 43 $\frac{2/2}{485}$

IV. 1 1. $\frac{18/21/21}{191}$

VI. 1 223 $\frac{17}{119}$: $\frac{8/11/20/21}{120}$;

VI. 4 56. $\frac{23}{203}$:

VIII 2.82 $\frac{23}{415}$:

(8) In the Svapna_{vi}savadattam we have the following :

‘sarpavyakti’—at Svapna V.

‘vyaktam’—at Svapna V. 7

‘vyaktam’—at Svapna VI. 14

In the Pratijñāyāugandharāyāna we have ‘vyaktam’
Ātmahite ksaman (Act I) Introduction.

and also, Yaugendha.—vyaktikṛtam asāmarthyam etc
and, ‘vyaktam’ balam. etc

and also ‘vyaktam’—(Act II 1),

Kāncukīyaḥ—‘suvyaktam’—(Act II),

rājā—‘vyaktam’—(Act II),

Yau—vyaktam bharatarohako etc (Act IV)

The Avimāṛaka has,

Kaundjayanah—vyaktahimamurtih etc) Act. I)

Avimāṛakaḥ—vyaktam svayam viṇām vādayati—(Act III)

The Cārudatte has:—

Nayakaḥ sarvabhā suvyaktam gitam (Act III) and
also,

Sajjalakaḥ dipaprabhavyaktikṛtam dr̥syate—(Act III)

The Pratimānātaka has,

Rāmaḥ suvyaktam prabhavāmiti etc (I 11) and
also

Bharataḥ—bahumānavyākṣiptena manasa suvyaktam
nāvadharitam etc (Act III).

The Abhisekanātaka has,

Angadaḥ } vyakta mutsṛjya dham etc. (II 25), and
also

Rāvanah vyaktamindrajitā etc (V 10), and also

Rāmaḥ vyaktam daivagatim etc (VI 34)

The Dūtavākya has—

Duryodhanah—suvyaktam prāpta eva kṣaṇāḥ and
also,

Sudars'anaḥ ...avyaktādiracintyātmaḥ etc

The Dātaghatotkaca has—

Durtarastraḥ-savyaktaṁ nihataṁ etc I. 26 and
also, -savyaktaṁ dhanuḥ etc I 28

The Pañcaraṭāra has

Bhīṣmaḥ- savyaktaṁ bahus'alinaḥ' etc. I 50, and
also

Bīhannaḥ Yena savyaktakāraṇa II 65

The Madhyama has,

Bhīmaḥ savyaktaṁ rāksasiḥ etc I 26

The Urubhaṅga has,

trītyaḥ vyaktiḥ kṛtā dinakarograkaraḥ =etc I 121
and also

As'vatthāma vyaktaṁ nurjita eva etc I 58 d

The Bālacarita has vasudevaḥ vyaktaṁ ghoṣasamipe
etc

- (9) The Saundarananda has vi+√anj at II 38, XIII 41,
and XVIII 11,

The Bu Ca has vi+√anj at,

IV 58, IV 84, IX 64, XII 18, XII 22 XII 40, XVI
73, and XVI 130, and 'dhvani at IV 51, V 80, VIII
72,

Bu Ca. IX 64, XII 18 XII 22, and XII 40, have
'vyakta' and 'avyakta' having a philosophical con-
notation of 'the manifest' and 'the unmanifest' Sau
II 38 and XIII 41 have vi+√anj in the sense of 'to
indicate', 'to manifest clearly'

Bu Ca XVI 130 has vi+√añj in the sense of 'to the
letter' as opposed to 'artha' or 'spirit'

- (10) In Kālidasa we have, vi+√anj at

Kumāra -II 11, V 62, VI 23, VI 51, VII 91, VIII.
37, VIII 71, and IX 6,

Megha -Vs 12, 29 55 (pūrva) ,
and 21 (uttara)

Raghu -I 10, IV 68, V. 16, VI 12, VII 58, XI 41,
XIII 12, XIV 26, XVI 23, XVII 40, XIX 30 XIX.
41 , vi+√anj occurs in the sense of 'to manifest '

Mālavikā Somewhere after I 9, II 10, and IV 1,

Vikramo Somewhere after III 7, and V 7,

Abhi Śaku Somewhere in act V

and at VII 8, VII 17,

√dhvan or 'dhvani' occurs at
vs

Ṛtu - 10 (Pravṛdvarṇanam)
15 (, ,)
and 21 (, ,)

kumara -I 56,
VIII 24,
VIII 71,
XI 36 38,
XIV 27, 39, 45

Megha -Vs 42, 56 (pūrva)-
Vs 3, 36 (uttara)

Raghu -II 72,
IV 73
VI 56,
VII 41.
and XVI 13,

CHAPTER II

'Dvani in the Grammarians and certain parallelisms between Sphotavāda and the theory of dhvani'.

We may say, on the authority of Ānandavardhana (middle of the 9th cen A.D. De, Sk P p. 101, Ed '60), that the concept of dhvani was not unknown to the early poeticists such as Bhamaha (last quarter of the 7th cen. A.D. to the middle of the 8th cen. A.D. De p. 49-50), Dandin, (1st half of the 8th cen A.D. De p. 67) etc. Ānandavardhana observes that Bhamaha and others subsumed dhvani under various heads such as alamkāra, guṇa, etc. I am going to examine this position in Ch VI, but one point is clear that in Bhamaha, Dandin, etc. dhvani has not emerged as the soul of poetry.

Ānandavardhana and his followers clearly mention that they have derived inspiration for the dhvanivāda from the Sphotavāda of the grammarians. We may therefore examine the Sphotavāda of the Vaiyākaraṇas and also their concept of Sphota and dhvani. We will also consider as to how far the writers on poetics are exactly indebted to the Vaiyākaraṇas in upholding their theory of dhvani and vyañjanā.

The grammarians are held in very high esteem by the poeticists. They, for their concept of dhvani

in poetry, turn to the Vaiyakaranas whom they quote with great respect. Ānandavardhana in his *Dhv* says 'The expression,' is designated by the learned', brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it had not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate sound units by the term *dhvani* or 'suggester'. In the same way, since the element of suggestion was common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, was given the same designation, viz *Dhvanī* by other learned men, whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry was profound and who were the followers of the principle laid down by the grammarians" (1)

(Translation : Krishnamoorthy)

Mammata (middle of the 11th cen and beginning of the 12th cen A D – De, p 146) also in his *K P* speaks to the same effect when he says

"This (i.e. poetry) is the best when the suggested sense eclipses the expressed sense, it is styled *Dhvanī* by the learned" And also—"Idam, i.e. Poetry. The learned grammarians gave the style of *Dhvanī* to the word, in as much as it is suggestive of the suggested thing, viz *Sphota* (The Revealer)" (2)

He adds, "Hence, others also following their
new (gave the name of *Dhvanī*) to the pair of

word and sense such as are capable of suggesting a sense other than the direct sense" (3).

Now, one thing that emerges very clearly out of this is that the term dhvani was first used in a peculiar sense by the grammarians and the poeticists, borrowing it whole sale, applied it to the domain of poetry in their own way.

Patañjali :

In order to get a clear idea of the concept of dhvani in the grammarians, we will turn to Patañjali first.

In the Paspasāhnika we come across the following discussion (4) . "when one says 'gauh' what is Sabda ? Is it the object which has the dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc ? "No", he says, "it is called dravya' . "Is it then its gesture, movement, or winking ?" "No", he says "it is called kriya or action " "Is it then the whiteness, blueness, brownness, or greyness ? No, it is called 'guna' Is it then the sum total of the qualities like "sattā" which ever exists even when the individuals are broken or destroyed ?" "No", he says, "it is called āhrti".

Then what is Sabda ? (5). "Sabda is that on the manifestation of which, the correct knowledge of the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc., is produced, or the sound which has a decisive meaning is said to be 'Sabda' in the world .. Hence, dhvani is Sabda".

When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearer; the individuality cow, her action, her qualities genus cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of 'g' au' and 'visarga'. The hearer wants to make out the exact connotation. Individually cow, her qualities, etc., are seen by the eyes and the word 'gauh' is heard by the ear. So, it is absurd to take this for the exact connotation. But since the relation of Sabda and artha guṇa and guṇī, and kṛiyā and kṛiyavān is that of identity according to the grammarians as there is a rule tadabhinnaābhinnasya tīdabhinnaatvam, it is quite natural to think so. The Mīhabhāṣyakāra says that the guṇī, guṇa, etc. are not the true connotations of the Sabda, but the true connotation is Sphota—that, which when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear knowledge of the object 'cow'.

The Sanskrit grammarians hold that the Sabda is not the sound units that we hear but it is manifested in the mind after the whole word is pronounced. It may be noted that according to Sanskrit grammarians, Sabda is of four phases viz. pīṭa pīṣyanti madhyamā and vīkharati. Sabda Brahman when manifested at the muladhāri or the sacral plexus is called para vāk, when manifested at the naval it is pīṣyanti, at the heart madhyama and vīkharati is that phase which is manifested out of the vocal organs as the articulated sound (6)

In the ninth śloka, Pīṭa-jāli discusses the tīparasūtra (pa. 1170). There are two points to

√añj, vi + √añj, √dhvan and ..

be examined (i). Is 'tatkālasya' a correct expression or not? And (ii).—Is this sūtra an apūrvavidhi or a niyamavidhi? While discussing the latter point the author talks about Sphoṭa and dhvani (7):

At the end of some technical discussion (8), it is stated—

evam tarhi Sphoṭaḥ, śabdaḥ dhvaniḥ Śabdaguṇaḥ.—
'If so, Sphoṭa is the Śabda and dhvani is the Śabdaguṇa'.

Katham? how?

bheryāghātavat—Like the beater of a drum.
tadyathā bheryāghāto bherīmāhatya kaściddvīpśati
padāni gacchati, kaś'cit trips'at, kaś'cit catvāriṃs'at.

"This may be illustrated as follows—

One beater of the drum goes twenty steps at the time when the sound by beating the drum lasts, another thirty steps, and another forty steps. Beating is the same. The increase is due to the sound production by beating'.

It is observed,

"dhvaniḥ Sphoṭasca śabdānām, dhvanistu khalu
laksayet |

alpo mahāṃs'ca, keśāṃcit ubhayaṃ
tatsvabhāvataḥ ||

With reference to śabdas there are dhvani and Sphoṭa. Of them dhvani alone is cognisable to the sense of hearing. It is short, it is long, and it is by nature both (long and short) at the hands of some.

śabda, he makes his position very clear by suggesting that no question of order such as priority and posteriority and that of plurality can be logically raised in relation to Sphota which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he observes, that passes through successive stages in case of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. So, it is particularly due to varying modulations of voice, as caused by vocal apparatus, that 'ka' sound seems to be different from 'kha' sound and the like. But Sphota remains unaffected. Thus the Sun, a fixed body, seems to be quivering when reflected in an agitated pool of water (11)

Order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to Sphota. The dual aspects of śabda as observed already imply that śabda has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection (12)

The grammarians maintain that there are two different aspects of words, viz, *lārya* or the popular form and *nitya* or the permanent form. The former is usually produced by the exercise of the vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, and the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. Sphota is to be identified with this latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and Sphota are (1) Sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the

positive instrument whereby Sphota is comprehended. (ii) After having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, Sphota is capable of being heard, and (iii) sound acts upon the organ concerned and serves to manifest Sphota

Bhartrhari supports the third view. Sound serves as an outer garment of Sphota. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable in itself, Sphota reveals its existence through the medium of sound.

Sound and Sphota are intimately related. As to how sound and Sphota, that are related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartrhari refers to four different views. Some hold that Sphota is recognised as identical with sound, just as crystal looks red when in contact with a japa kusuma (13). Others say that sound (though not cognisable by itself) is indicative of Sphota. Still others maintain that the exact nature of Sphota is too subtle to be determined and it is sound only that comes under comprehension and finally according to some, Sphota is really manifested but is indistinct and unintelligible on account of distance from where it is evolved.

While referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of śabda, Bhartrhari holds that the cognition of śabda practically follows from the last sound together with the impression made by the preceding ones. We may try to understand this, 'varnoccātaprakriyā' or the process of the pronouncing of sound units.

There are three opinions as to the nature of a word, (i) the word is not eternal, i.e., it is *anitya*. The words are created and destroyed. They have a *jāti* or a class in keeping with other objects. This view is held by the Nyaya Vaiśeṣika systems. (ii) Varnas or sound units are *nitya* or permanent and are the cause of *śabda*. These letters have a relation with meaning and this relation is called *śakti*. This view is held by the Mīmāṃsa, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools. (iii) Third is the opinion of *Sphoṭavāda* or the *abhaṇḍatavāda* of the grammarians. The grammarians believe in the identity and indivisibility of the letters. On account of the contact of air and the like, the varnas or sound units are manifested as different. These manifested letters are known as '*nāda*'. They suggest the *Sphoṭa* which is gathered by *antimabuddhi* i.e., final cognition. As suggested above, Patañjali has already made this thing clear, when he talks of the four forms of *va* such as *para*, *paśyanti* etc. These are the four stages through which *Sphoṭa* (*nāda-bindu*) receives manifestation. Both *parā* and *paśyanti* are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by the sense organ. *Parā* resides in the *mūlādhara* or the sacral plexus in the form of a motionless *bindu* (14).

Paśyanti comes up to the naval region pushed up by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is *madhyamā* that indicates *Sphoṭa*. All these are more or less mysterious in nature. *Vaikhari* is the popular form and it is what is uttered by the vocal organ and is capable of being heard by others. It is again

held that *nāda* is simultaneously produced by *madhyamā* and *vaikharī* but there is a lot of difference between the two (15). The *nāda*, produced by the *madhyamā* is slightly cognised by us either at the time of counting *japa*, or when the ears are shut up (16). This *nāda*, manifested by *madhyamā* is what we precisely know by the name of *Sphoṭa*. It stands for Brahman and is eternal, one, without division, etc. According to this view, it is one and the same indivisible *Sphoṭa* that is represented by *varṇa*, *pada* and *vākya*, in the same way as one and the same face appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword, and looking glass, or as a piece of stone taking reflection from red or blue flowers seems to be either red or blue (17). The difference between 'ka' and 'ga' is not on account of the diversity of *Sphoṭa*, but points to the peculiarities of sound that serves to manifest *Sphoṭa* (18). The unity and indivisibility of *Sphoṭa* are brought about by its comparison with the sky and consciousness, which though one and not admitting of fractions, are said to have such attributive difference as *ghaṭākāśa*, *maṭhākāśa*, and *jīva*, *īśvara*, etc. respectively. Thus those who take *pada* and *vākya* to be similarly indivisible units say as follows : just as letters are devoid of parts, so too no letters are comprehended in *padas* (19).

Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility of both *pada* and *vākya*, it is the last letter that indicates *Sphoṭa*, and each

preceding letter serves to make for a cognition of the intended sense (20).

Taking into consideration the difference between madhyamā and vaikharī sound can be divided into two viz original or eternal (i.e. inexhaustible) and artificial (derived) or momentary (21) The natural sound only, which is generated by madhyamā, suggests Sphota. The unnatural (aprakṛta dhvani) sound is so termed because it rises from prākṛta dhvani and undergoes an amount of modification in the form of long and short sound. Sphota which is essentially one and beyond any modification is not in the least effected by the quick utterance of sound which practically refers to vaikṛta dhvani. Another point that should be noted down is that it is Sphota alone, as is evident from its derivative meaning that is really associated with the expressiveness of sound (sphutatyarthōsmāditi Sphotah) [For the sake of convenience alone we regard word as having meaning. A closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that Sphota alone is finally the significant element of speech. Moreover, Bhartṛhari holds that Sphota is practically one and the same but it is only the indicator of Sphota viz Sound that differs (22)]

How is Sphota manifested ?

The answer is that it is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by preceding letters (23) And, it is evidently an intellectual

operation which enables us to retain recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. 'Manifested by sound', implies that Sphota, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation

Thus Sphota is regarded as 'antimabuddhigrāhya'. There is a rule that śabda, buddhi and kārma are dvikṣaṇasthāyī (i.e. they continue to stay for two moments) They come into existence in the first moment, exist in the second and die out in the third. For example, we may take the word 'ghata'. There are four letters in it viz., 'gh' 'a' 't' and 'a'. First 'gh' is created. It continues to stay in the second moment. In this very moment 'a' is created. In the third moment 'gh' is destroyed but 'a' continues to exist and 't' comes into existence. Now when 't' continues in the next moment, the last 'a' comes into existence. In the sixth moment the last 'a' also disappears. Now, for those who regard letters to be eternal, 'utpatti' means 'abhivyakti'. So the whole word ghatī, the varṇasamghāta—or the collection of letters never comes into existence at one and the same moment. Then how is the meaning gathered? The answer is that though the varṇa sound unit is destroyed, it gives rise to some saṃskāra or impression. This saṃskāra or impression stays on and is united with the next letter. Thus the assemblage of saṃskāras unites with the last 'a' and we get the word 'ghatī'. This happens in case of yajñadikārya

(or sacrificial rite) which gives rise to the fruit in form of heaven (svarga). Sphota is also 'antimavarnagrāhya' in this very sense.

The gist of the above is that eternal and indivisible sphota is manifested in the form of letters through dhvani or sound.

So, dhvani is two fold Prākṛta or natural and vaiṣṛta or unnatural as already observed. The prākṛta-dhvanī is qualified by the qualities such as 'katva', 'hrasvatva', 'adyudattatva', etc. Even though Sphota is self-manifested it is as though obstructed by the accumulated vayasamyoga or, contact with air. By removing this obstruction, the prākṛtadhvani manifests Sphota. This manifested Sphota is different from the dhvani and so Sphota is said to be one, eternal, all-pervading and manifested by different dhvanis and it gives meaning when it becomes antyabuddhigrāhya - i.e., when gathered at the last moment. This prakṛtadhvani is the same as varṇasound-units and Sphota is never manifested unless through them. Vaiṣṛta dhvani has a different function. It creates vṛttibheda e.g., dṛṭvāmbitādi in the letters gathered by prākṛta dhvani. Thus even if there is vaiṣṛtadhvanibheda we have no prākṛta-dhvanibheda. So we get uniformity in form i.e., eka-rūpita of ākāra and the like.

Thus, the term dhvani is used in three different ways :

- (1) Dhvani is used for 'śabḍa' of the Naiyāyikas. On the basis of this, the ālankārikas call vyāṅgyārtha to be dhvani,

the sādharmaṃyā being pratīyamānatva or utpadyatva

- (ii) According to Vaiyākaraṇas, Sphota is vyaṅgya-suggested, and prākṛtadhvani is the vyañjaka or suggester. Dhvani is thus vyañjaka. On the basis of this, the ālamkārikas call the 'vyañjaka sabdārthau' to be dhvani, and
- (iii) the vaikṛtadhvanis make for the vṛttibheda. Hence, vyañjanāvvyāpāra is termed as dhvani.

So, for the grammarians the relation between Sphota and dhvani is that of vyaṅgya vyañjaka.

We have also noted that the grammarians use dhvani to mean (i) nādamatra or sound only, and (ii) śabda or word. So ghaṭa the dhvani which is just sound-nādamatra-by itself has no relation with the object ghaṭa-ṭ pot which is seen, touched, etc (sparśaksama). The sound ghaṭa is something quite different from the object ghaṭa which can be seen, touched, etc. Still, it should be noted very carefully that the sound ghaṭa indicates something which it is not viz the object ghaṭa. This idea of one thing indicating something else which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. So, in all cases of expression where one thing expresses something which it is not, it is, so to say, taken as a case of dhvani. It is this mode of expression, both to be found in ordinary conversation as well as in literature, that in Sanskrit tradition is studied as a particular linguistic mode of expression. Therefore, dhvani is that which suggests something other than

itself, and which is known to be separate from itself, and by this common point of suggestion (*vyāṅjakatvasamyāt*) the *vyāpara*-process-is also called *dhvani*. According to the *vaiyākaraṇas* the world is *artharūpa* i.e., of the form of *artha* or meaning, and is derived from *Sphoṭa*, the *SabdaBrahma*. In the like fashion, we derive the *ghatartha* from the word *ghata*.

This *dhvani* is identified with word in our day to day affairs. So *kāvya* is also termed as *dhvanikāvya*. Every sound is suggestive of the *SabdaBrahma*, which is *Sphoṭarūpa*. The *artha* of this *SabdaBrahma* is world. Thus, *Sabda*, through *Sphoṭa*, suggests an object. The whole process is as follows: *dhvani-sabda-SabdaBrahma*-i.e., *Sphoṭa* and *vivartita artha*. Here we may note that even in the process of gathering the conventional meaning from the word, an element of suggestion or *vyāñjanā* is involved. *Vyāñjanā* is that process by which something not manifested becomes manifested. *Dhvani* or *Sabda* first suggests *Sphoṭa* and as *Sphoṭa* is eternally connected with the meaning, we derive meaning from *dhvani*. Moreover, it may be noted that *vyāñjanā* is that process of manifestation through which something already existing is manifested. *Vyāñjanā* does not create new objects.

Sphotavāda and Vyāñjanāvāda

We will be able to make a note of certain marked parallelisms between the *Sphotavāda* of the grammarians on the one hand and the *vyāñjanavāda* on the other. The points of comparison are as below

- (1) As observed earlier, for the grammarians, dhvani is explained as 'dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ'. Dhvani is so termed because it sounds or rings or reverberates Sphoṭa, i.e. suggests it. The word ghata, for example, is used for the object-*artha*-ghata, which is seen, touched etc. This idea of one thing indicating something else which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. So all cases of expression, where one thing expresses something which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. The writers on poetics extend this connotation of the word dhvani. Taking the quality of 'dhvanitva' into consideration, they include all that was related to this in dhvani. Thus, *guna*, *alampkāra*, *rīti*, *vṛtti*, *pada*, *padamsa*, *varna*, *vākyārtha*, all these become *vyañjaka*, suggestive of the *vyangya*.
- (2) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound 'ghata' for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through Sphoṭa which in its turn is suggested by the sound ghata. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the *ālampkārikas* also, the process of *vyangyārthagrahaṇa* is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through *abhīdha* or through *lakṣaṇā*.

- (iii) The grammarians believe in *vākyasphota*. They do not accept the separate existence of *padas* i.e., individual words, and much less of letters or *varṇas*. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or *padas* and thus through letters or *varṇas*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the *Mīmāṃsakas*, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the contents. The nature of condition is the multiplicity of letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word, the *vākyasphota*.

Similar is the case with some *ālamkārikas*, *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa* form the nature of condition and *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* is the nature of the contents. Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa* with *vyañjanā*.

- (iv) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i.e., *jñānasya viṣayah*, while the word-whole is *jñānasya phalaṃ*—the result or the fruit of knowledge. For the *ālamkārikas* also, *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇa* are *jñānasya viṣayah*, while *vyañjanā* may be taken as *jñānasya phalaṃ*. These two are not to be confused.

- (v) The grammarians believe in *vākyasphoṭa*. So they avoid the contingency faced by the *padavādin* viz., that of recognising parts even of letters or *varṇas*. Similarly, those *āṃkārikas* who want to arrive at *vyāṅgyārtha* with the help of *lakṣaṇā*, will have to go for a second *lakṣaṇā*, and a third and a fourth *lakṣaṇā* *ad infinitum*, involving further and further *prayojanas*.
- (vi) *Sphoṭa* is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with *dhvani* i.e., the sound of a word. The *vyāṅgyārtha* is also a separate entity, not to be confused with *abhidheyārtha* or *lakṣyārtha*.
- (vii) For the grammarians, there is a *krama*, a sequence, in the process of gathering meaning from a word. From word to *Sphoṭa* and from *Sphoṭa* to meaning—this is the sequence. In the same way, with the *āṃkārikas* also, there is a sequence, perceptible or imperceptible, between *vācyārtha* and *vyāṅgyārtha*.
- (viii) It is non-discrimination that makes for the acceptance of letters for the word-whole. In the same way, it is non-discrimination that results in our recognising *vyāñjanā* as either *abhidhā* or *bhakti*.
- (ix) For the *vaiyākaraṇas*, there is a gradual and clearer revelation of the *Sphoṭa*. Each sound-unit reveals the whole of *Sphoṭa* and

not a portion of it. The revelation gets clearer and clearer by each succeeding sound-unit. The Sphota revelation is a gradual process and the mind acquires progressively greater and greater aptitude for receiving further glimpses. With the utterance of the last sound unit the process comes to a close. By itself, there is neither qualitative nor quantitative difference in the word essence, but there may be difference in its grasping by the mind. Thus the degrees of difference are purely subjective and not objective.

For the *śloka* also, the gathering of *vyaṅgyārtha* is a gradual revelation in the sense that it comes only after the *abhidhārtha* or the *lakṣyārtha* as the case may be.

The writers on *śloka*, for their concept of *vyaṅjanā* are also partly indebted to other *darsanas* such as the *sāṃkhya*, *vedānta*, and *śaiva darsanas*. *Vyaṅjana* for the poeticists manifests that which is not yet manifested i.e. it brings into light that which already exists but is not presented before us. The analogy cited is *ghaṭapradīpānyaya* (Dhv. III) i.e., the analogy of the lamp and the jar.

Foot notes :

(1) *Dhvanyāloka* I : सूरिणि कथित इति विद्वदुपहर्षमुक्तिं न तु यथाकथञ्चित् प्रवृत्तेति प्रतिपादयते । प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणा, व्याकरणमूलभावात् सर्वविद्यानाम् । ते च तेषु श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्याहरन्ति । तथैवान्यैस्तेन्मतानुसारिणि सूरिणि काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिणि वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्र शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्युपदेश्यते व्यञ्जकवसान्यात् ध्वनिरित्युक्त ।

(2) *Mammata K P* “इदमुत्तममतिशयिनि व्यङ्ग्ये वाच्याद् ध्वनिर्बुधे कथित ।” and also ‘इदमिति काव्यम्, बुधे वैयाकरणे प्रधानभूतस्फोटरूपव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकस्य शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहार कृत ।”

(3) *K P* “अतस्तन्मतानुसारिभिरन्यैरपि व्यङ्ग्यभावित्वाच्चव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जन—
क्षमस्य शब्दार्थयुगलस्य ।”

(4) “अथ गौरित्यत्र क शब्द ? किं यत् तत्सास्नादिलाङ्गूलककुदखुर-
विषाण्यर्थरूप स शब्द ? नेत्याह, द्रव्य नाम तत् । तस्मात्
ध्वनि शब्द ।”

(5) “कस्तर्हि शब्द ? येनोच्चरितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो
भवति स शब्द, अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनि शब्द इत्युच्यते ।
तद्यथा शब्दं कुरु, मा शब्दं कार्षी, शब्दकार्यं माणवक, इति ध्वनिं
बुर्वन्नेवमुच्यते । तस्मात् ध्वनि शब्द ।

(6) *The Mahābhāṣya* reads as follows

चत्वारि याक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिण ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेद्वयन्ति तुरीय वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

M B I I I

The Vākya-padīya (V P) also reads

वैखर्या मध्यमायाश्च पश्यन्त्याश्चेतदद्भुतम् ।

अनेकतोर्यमेदायास्त्वया वाच परं पदम् ॥ I 144

According to *Nāges'abhatṭa*, the definition
येनोच्चरितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो जायते स शब्द

applies to the Madhyamā Vāk, and the definition, प्रतीतपदार्थको ध्वनि शब्द applies to the Vaikharī Vāk

- (7) The whole discussion proceeds as follows किं पुनरिदं नियमार्थमाहोस्वित् प्रापकम् ? कथं च नियमार्थं स्यात् ? कथं वा प्रापकम् ? यद्यत्र अण्प्रहणमनुवर्तते ततो नियमार्थम् । अथ निवृत्तं तत प्रापकम् । तपरस्तकालस्येति नियमार्थमिति चेत् दीर्घप्रहणे स्वरभिन्नप्रहणम् ।

तपरस्तकालस्येति नियमार्थमिति चेत् दीर्घप्रहणे स्वरभिन्नानां प्रहणं न प्राप्नोति ।

- (8) केवाम् ? उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनासिकानाम् । अस्तु तर्हि प्रापकम् ? Let it then be an apūrvavidhi ? प्रापकमिति चेत् ह्रस्वप्रहणे दीर्घप्लुतयोस्तु प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः ।

विप्रतिषेधातिरिक्तम् । It is decided by the dictum विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् । अण् सर्वान् गृह्णाति इत्येतदस्तु तपरस्तकालस्य इति वा । तपरस्तकालस्य इत्येतदभवति विप्रतिषेधेन । अण् सर्वान् गृह्णाति इत्यस्य अवकाश इत्था अतपरा अण् । तपरस्तकालस्य अवकाश दीर्घास्तपरा ।

ह्रस्वेषु तपरेषु उभयं प्राप्नोति, तपरस्तकालस्य इत्येतद् भवति विप्रतिषेधेन ।

यद्येवम् हुतायां तपरकरणे मध्यमविलम्बितयोः उपसङ्ख्यानं कालभेदात् ।

हुतायां तपरकरणे मध्यमविलम्बितयोः उपसङ्ख्यानं कर्तव्यम् तथा मध्यमायां हुतविलम्बितयोः तथा विवृतायां हुतमध्यमयोः ।

किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति ?

ये हि हुतायां वृत्तौ वर्णास्त्रिमाणाधिकारस्ते मध्यमायाम् । ये च मध्यमायां वर्णास्त्रिमाणाधिकारस्ते विलम्बितायाम् ।

सिद्धस्वरस्थिता वर्णा यद्यनुस्विराचिरवचनाद् वृत्तयः विशिष्यन्ते ।

यत्रैव कश्चित् आश्वभिधायी भवति—आशु वर्णान् अभिषत्ते, कश्चिच्चिरेण, कश्चिच्चिरतरेण । तद्यथा—तमेवाध्वानं कश्चिदाशु गच्छति, कश्चिच्चिरेण गच्छति, कश्चिच्चिरतरेण गच्छति । रथिक आशु गच्छति, आश्विकश्चिरेण, पदातिकश्चिरतरेण ।

विषम उपन्यास । अधिकरणमात्राया व्रजति-क्रियाया । तत्रायुक्त
यदधिनरणस्य वृद्धिहासौ स्याताम् ।

(9) The Mahābhāṣya reads the following Rk to this effect

चत्वारि वाक् परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुः ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति तुरीय पाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

(10) Says Abhinavagupta—"अस्माभिरपि प्रसिद्धेभ्यः शब्दव्यापारेभ्यः
अभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणास्वेभ्यः अतिरिक्तो व्यापारो ध्वनिरित्युक्तः । एव
चतुष्कमपि ध्वनिः । तद्योगाच्च समस्तमपि काव्यं ध्वनिः । तेन व्यतिरेका
व्यतिरेकव्यपदेशोऽपि न युक्तः । वान्यवाचकमिथ इति । वान्यवाचक-
सहितं समिथ इति मध्यमपदलोपी समासः । गामश्च पुरुषं पशुम्
इति षत्सु च योऽत्र चकारेण विनापि । तेन वान्योऽपि ध्वनिः, वाचनोऽपि
शब्दो ध्वनिः, द्वयोरपि व्यञ्जकत्वं ध्वनतीति कृत्या । समिथ्यते विभावानु-
भावसंयतनयेति व्यङ्ग्योऽपि ध्वनिः ध्वन्यत इति कृत्या । शब्दनं शब्द-
शब्दव्यापारः । न चासावभिधादिरूपं अपि त्वात्मभूतं सोऽपि ध्वनन-
ध्वनिः । काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्य च योऽर्थः सोऽपि ध्वनिः । उक्तप्रकार-
ध्वनिचतुष्टयमयत्वात् । अत एव साधारणहेतुमाह-व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्यात्
इति । व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावः सर्वेषु पदेषु सामान्यरूपं साधारण इत्यर्थः ।
(Locana, on Dhv I 13)

(11) प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात् ।

तत्र प्रतिबिम्बमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्तेऽग्नादयो V P I 49

(12) प्राहृत्य प्राहृत्य च द्वे शक्तौ तेजसो यथा ।

तथैव सर्वशब्दानां एते पृथगवस्थिते ॥ .. V P I 55

(13) यथा ज्वाकुसुमरूपानुपक्रमेव स्फटिकादीनां ग्रहणं तथा ध्वनिरूपानुपक्रमे
एव स्फोटस्तद्विभागेनोपलभ्यते इति केषाचिन्मतम् etc
(पुण्यराज under V P I 82)

(14) परावाङ्मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिसंस्थिता ।

हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ॥

(15) युगपदेन मध्यमावैखरीभ्यां नाद उत्पद्यते—(मञ्जूषा)

- (16) मध्यमा नादस्य कर्णपिचाने जपादौ च सूक्ष्मतरवायुव्यङ्ग्या—मञ्जूषा ।
- (17) यथा च मुखे मणिकृपाणदर्पणव्यञ्जकोपाधिराशात् दैर्घ्यवर्तुलत्वादिभान तद्वत् ।
- (18) व्यञ्जकध्वनिगतं कल्पयत्वादिक स्फोटे भासते ।
- (19) पदे न वर्णा विशन्ते घणेष्वप्येवा इव ।
वाक्यात् पदानामानन्त्य प्रविशेको न कश्चन ॥ ...V.P.I. 77.
- (20) पदवाक्ययोस्तु सखण्डत्वस्योऽन्तिममर्गवद्भव स्फोट एक एव । पूर्वपूर्व
घर्णस्तु तात्पर्यमाहक । —(मञ्जूषा)
- (21) ध्वनिस्तु द्विविधः । प्राकृतो वैकृतश्च ।
स्फोटस्य ग्रहणे हेतु प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते ।
वृत्तिभेदे निमित्तस्य वैकृत प्रतिपद्यते । (V.P.I 77)
- (22) स्फोटे व्यञ्जकध्वनिमतत्वादिभानात् ककारो बुद्ध हृत्सौपाधिको
भेदव्यवहारः । (मञ्जूषा)
- (32) पूर्वपूर्वध्वन्युत्पादिताभिव्यक्तिजनितसंस्कारपरम्परापरिणकोन्त्यनुद्धिनिप्राप्त
इत्यर्थः । वैयट ।

CHAPTER III

S'abdavṛttis; the nature and scope of Abhidhā

S'abdārthavṛttis :

According to the sanskrit writers of poetics, words possess three distinct śaktis or functions, called, (i) the abhidhā śakti, (ii) the lakṣaṇa śakti, and (iii) the vyañjanā śakti. The terms vṛtti and vyāpāra are also used as synonyms for the term śakti. Thus, by the abhidhāvṛtti or the power of expression, the word is supposed to give the conventional meaning or the samṛthitārtha, by the lakṣaṇāvṛtti it gives lakṣyārtha, or the secondary sense, based upon certain conditions, and by the vyañjanāvṛtti, the word gives the vyangyārtha or the suggested sense. Accordingly, the word is said to be vācakā, lakṣaka and vyañjaka, and the sense is said to be vācya, lakṣya and vyangya respectively. We also come across the mention of a fourth vṛtti called the tātparya vṛtti, but as it is connected with the sentence i.e., the correlated meaning of all the words in a given sentence, and not with words taken individually, the ālamkārikas generally do not choose to include it under the functions of a word.

As regards the nature of these śabdavyāpāras, there is a lot of difference of opinion among thinkers of different schools. The grammarians and the

philosophers (=dārsanikas) and even some of the ālamkarikas do not recognise the function called the vyañjanāvāpāra. Even the earlier authors on ālamkāra such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and Vamana etc., almost failed to recognise or even mention vyañjana as a separate vṛtti in kāvya. The tālikas (i.e. logicians) and the Mīmāṃsākas and some of the later ālamkarikas also (e.g. Mahima and Bhoja) did not accept it (2). There are also others who distinguish between gaunī and lakṣaṇa. We will try to consider the nature of the different vṛttis separately and discuss the difference of opinion with reference to the same.

Abhidhā .

We begin with abhidhā or the function of denotation or expression. Abhidhā is that function by which the word gives the conventional-samketita or the primary meaning. The word here becomes vacaka and the sense is termed as vācyārtha (3). Thus, for example the word 'gauh' by abhidhāvāpāra means, 'śasnādīmat-pacuvīśesah' or, an entity having ■ dew lap, horns, etc. This conventional or the samketita artha is gathered directly and hence is called the mukhyārtha or the principal meaning and the word is known as mukhya and the abhidhā-śakti is also called mukhya śakti, or the mukhyāvāpāra.

As to the nature of samketagrahāna or gathering of convention, there is a considerable difference of opinion. This samketa has been classified in different ways. The Nuyāyikas classify samketa as 'pāribhāṣika',

'naimittika' and 'aupādhika' When we fix up a name for calling somebody, say, e.g., a father calls his son Devadatta, or when we fix up a technical term to refer to a particular meaning in science, e.g., say, dhvani, guṇa, etc., in the ālamkāraśāstra, it is termed as 'pāribhāṣikā-samketa' Naimittika is that which refers to jāti, e.g., asva, manusya etc., and aupādhika is that which refers to the upādhis or attributes For the Naiyāyika, upādhi or attribute means that jāti in which so many apara-jātis reside e.g. paśu consists of asva, go etc (4)

For Bhartṛhari, samketa is two fold viz aṣṭāṅika (or natural) and ādḥunika (or man made) By aṣṭāṅika is meant the same as naimittika of the Naiyāyikas Thus āṣṭāṅika is nitya Ādḥunika-samketa is of the form of yadākadā' (i.e. kāda-utka) and the Śāstra-kārs make its use (5)

Classification of Abhidhā

Abhidhā is said to be three fold viz (i) rudhī, (ii) yoga and (iii) yogarudhī These are again known as (i) kevala samudāya śaktiḥ, (ii) kevalavayava śaktiḥ and (iii) samudayavayavasakti-samkara (6) Rudhī is said to be there where the word as a whole samudaya-conveys the meaning Here, we gather the meaning with the help of akhaṇḍasakti of the word (7) Here rudhī is formed because the meaning of the components of the word is not at all comprehended separately, or, even if the meaning of the word is gathered separately, it is ultimately not recognised Again, when meaning of the components

of a word becomes important, in order to get the full sense of the word as a whole, it becomes the case of *yogātmaka abhidhā* (8) *Yogarūdhī* is said to be in cases where *avayavasakti* and *samudayasakti* are both required (9) In the case of 'pankaja', the etymological meaning is 'that which is born in mud' This can be applicable to anything born of mud, other than lotus also. The *Naiyāyikas* do not accept either *rūdhī* or *yoga* in this case *Appayya Dīksita* holds that it is better to accept *yogarūdhī* here (10).

At times it happens that there are more than one conventional meanings attached to one and the same word. Here, *abhidhārtha* is decided with the help of various factors such as context and others *Bhartrhari* has mentioned all these factors (11) *Viśaṇanātha* also gives a fuller explanation (12)

Thus, we have seen that *abhidhā* deals with the directly expressed sense of a word.

Tatparya Vṛtti :

Now, we may consider the *tatparya vṛtti* *Abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇī* are the functions of a word, i.e. words taken separately. The meaning of the sentence whole is conveyed neither by *abhidhā*, nor by *lakṣaṇā*, but by a separate power of the sentence called *Tatparya*. The meaning of the sentence is thus termed as *tatparyārtha* The *tatparyasakti* is that power which assimilates the sense gathered by *abhidhā* and gives a new sense (*abhinavartha*) which is not just an assimilation of *vācārtha* (i.e. not *yogamātra*), but

is something unique (apadārthōpi vākyarthah) The Dhvanivādins call it tātparyavṛtti. In this view of the Dhvanivādins we can easily read the influence of the abhihitānvayavāda of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. It may be noted that even though Kumārila recognises a separate function for vākyārtha, as something different from abhidha, we do not get the clear mentioning of tātparyavṛtti in the works on Mīmāṃsā till we come to Mīmāṃsā-kṛustubha of Khaṇḍadeva (13th or 14th Cen. A.D.)

Vākya, its import .

While treating the nature of this tātparyavṛtti, we will at the outset, consider the nature of a sentence or vākya and its import

Expression of thoughts is the sole purpose of the use of language. Ideas, again, are completely and best expressed through the medium of sentences as such and not by means of individual words. Thus, a sentence is rightly called the unit of significant speech. An idea becomes definite only when it is capable of being expressed in the usual form of a sentence. Thought, in language, will therefore mean that a man does not think in isolated words but in choerent combination of words, in order to give consistency and relevancy to his very mode of thinking. The Naiyāyikas have drawn our attention to this important linguistic fact, when they deal with the nature of logical propositions. A logical proposition, as we know, is, to all appearance, a sentence — a combination of words connected together by mutual

relation. Jagadīśa says that the so called verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is derivable only from a sentence, i.e. to say, when a number of significant words (sārbhaka), having expectancy (ākāṅkṣa) and compatibility (yogyata) with one another, are related so as to constitute a sentence in the logical sense of the term (13). Thus, a logical proposition is an idea or judgement expressed in the form of a sentence. It should be carefully noted, however, that the meaning of a sentence, which follows from a sentence as a whole, should be distinguished from that of its constituent parts. Jagadīśa notes that śābdabodha is not materially the same as śābdārtha or the meaning of isolated words. The meaning of the sentence is something more than the mere sum total of the significations of component parts. (vilakṣaṇa bodhah-S' S'. Pra.)

Vākya, Definition : Before dealing with the import of a sentence, we will try to understand the definition of a sentence. Thus, Patañjali says that action (ākhyata), with the help of all or each of the following viz. avyaya or indeclinable, kāraka, and viśeṣana or adjective, makes for a sentence (14). A kriyāviśeṣana or an adverb is also included herein (15). Just action, aided by viśeṣana alone, can also make for a vākya—(ākhyātaṁ savīśeṣaṇam). At times a sentence is of the nature of an action alone—ekāntam (mbh. II. 11). The grammarians hold that the pada-pādamsa aspect of a vākya is ultimately illusory, and they accept the sentence whole and give us the concept of vākyasphota. (16).

For the Naiyāyikas, a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy (17). Viśvanātha says that a sentence is a collection of words having compatibility, expectancy and juxta-position or, proximity (18).

In the vedas we come across only consolidated sentences, i.e. sentences which are supposed to have been originally undivided into parts. The Tāttirīya Samhitā supports this—Vag vai paracyavyakṛta—. The grammatical method of analysis is a later development in the history of language. This view is strengthened by the definition of Samhitā or emphonic combination of letters as we find in the Rk Pratisākhya . Padaprakṛtiḥ Samhitā. It is said that the Samhitā or the close combination of letters as 'agnimīle' is what represents the original form and the practice of breaking it up, i.e. into agniṁ and ile, shows only a grammatical process followed in a much later period. The dictum 'padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā' gave rise to a great controversy. The padavadins (=Mīmāṃsakas) and the vākyaavadins (=Vaiyākaranas) have constructed it in different ways. The padavadins take padas as real and significant, and the sentence for them is only a combination of such padas (inflected words). They explain the compound 'padaprakṛtiḥ' in such a way so as to prove the priority or originality (pūrṇatva) of the padas (padāni prakṛtiyasyaḥ). The Vākyaavadins take the sentence, or better say vākya-sphoṭa, to be the only significant unit of speech. They simply reject the notion of the precedence or priority of the padas in

preference to that of a sentence and thus explain the compound padaprakṛtiḥ as padānam yā prakṛtiḥ seyam padaprakṛtiḥ. It is difficult to say which of the two explanations is more acceptable (19). Durgācārya has some relevant notes on this. It is emphatically stated that the Mantras, revealed as they were through the holy seers of antiquity, manifested themselves in the compact form of the saṁhita or combination, and not in that of isolated words. The teacher makes the student acquainted first with the Vedas in their Saṁhita form before he is allowed to proceed in his study on a grammatical line. Again, at the time of performing Vedic rites, the priest cites the Mantras in their consolidated form.

Grammarians :

The grammarians attach much importance to vākya-sphota as the really significant element of speech. Thus, Sphotavadins are the same as vākya-vadins. The author of the Śabdakaustubha says that of the eight varieties of Sphota, only vākya-sphota is accepted to be real and significant (20). Thus, to the Sphotavadin the sentence is an indivisible unit (akhaṇḍa) and the analytical method of grammar that breaks up a sentence into parts is but an artificial device used for the understanding of unintelligent people (21).

Punyaraja also holds that this view is shared even by Pāṇini and Patañjali (22). So, "padānyasatyam vakyameva satyamityarthah"—notes Punyarāja on

Vakyārtha .

As to the nature of the vakyārtha, we come across different views (see, Dr Kapildeva Dwivedi in his arthaviṇāṇa or darśana, where he has quoted from Jayanta Bhatta — This is quoted by Bholasankar Vyāsa), as below

- (i) The sense of a sentence is jñāna
- (ii) As kṛiyā (action) is the most important element in a sentence the vakyārtha is kṛiyā,
- (iii) The vākyaārtha is phala (result, fruit) as we perform any action with a view to some phala
- (iv) The vakyārtha is Puruṣa (Iśvara), for the result of action (phala of kṛiyā) is for Him
- (v) The vākyaārtha is bhavanā i.e. the vāpāra or activity of the karta or agent with reference to some desired object, such as svarga or, heaven
- (vi) The vakyārtha is sambhāvana or vidhi
- (vii) The vākyaārtha is niyoga or preraṇā
- (viii) The vākyaārtha is udyoga.
- (ix) The vakyārtha is pratibha,

The Naiyayikas hold phala to be the vākyaārtha while the Vaiyākaranas believe it to be pratibha or intuition. The view of the dhvanivāda is not gathered clearly but as the ālamkārikas follow Vaiyākaranas in general, we may hold them to do the same here also

So, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the meaning expressed by a sentence is pratibha or intuition which is innate or ingrained in us all (30) This pratibha is inborn and not postnatal, neither a sense-born acquisition nor a result from common experience. It is termed as samskāra or bhāvana, finally seated in our mind and linked together with the continuous currents of knowledge flowing from previous stages of existence. Thus, it is termed as purvavaśanā also. The Vaiyākaraṇa has to take recourse to the theory of previous existence in order to explain the concept of pratibha.

So, what a sentence really signifies is the sense abiding in intelligence (buddhārthasya vacyatvam). Words may have different meanings as taken individually, but when grouped together in a sentence, we have a single sense that is different from the padārthas or the meanings of isolated words. This kind of a sense derived from the whole is called pratibha or intuition (31). According to intuition, says Puṣyaraṇa, the padārthas, unreal in themselves, help in the manifestation of pratibhā (32). According to Bhāṣārharī, the first thing that pratibhā achieves is to bring about an association of the meaning which seems to be otherwise unconnected (asamvṛsta). It is the objective (viśaya) that is directly conveyed by a sentence (33). This pratibha is directly manifested by the use of words or by the ever blossoming intellect which originates from the experience or memory of bygone lives (34). Pratibhā is the source of all popular usages, and serves as the most reliable

it is one that retains in itself the action usually denoted by a verbal root (56). We find certain sentences in which some words seem to be so predominant by their very nature as to denote the entire meaning by themselves without the help of others. The meaning of the sentence *gāyako gāyati*—can be gathered by the single word '*gāyakah*' the verbal form '*gāyati*' being unnecessary. Only in such cases a single inflected word is found to stand for the whole sentence, even independently of the verbal form. But, so far as the grammatical conception of the sentence is concerned, one cannot just do away with '*vyāpāra*' i.e. action. We can easily notice here that a sentence, whether consisting of a single word (i.e. either a *nāma* or an *akhyata*), or a combination of words must be, as a rule indicative of some action, either expressed directly or understood. To the Indian grammarian a sentence without a verb is an impossibility.

The Naiyāyikas, however, do not share this view of the grammarians. *Jagadīśa* maintains that a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but he does not put much emphasis on the inclusion of a verb. It is not necessary that the verb should be mentioned explicitly, specially when (*kriyā*) action is easily understood from the context. So, *Jagadīśa* rejects the notion of the grammarians that there can be no sentence without a verb (57). He bases his contention on popular usage '*Kuto bhavān?*', is a combination of words having no verbal form and yet forming a sentence.

So, it is not correct to say that a sentence without a verb is practically incomprehensible. For, the grammarian, herein, a verb, viz. āgacchatī ' is implied and without it neither the sense is complete nor is the proper kāraka, (i.e. apādāna) determinable

We have noticed that Bhartrhari has referred to as many as eight different views on the constitution of a sentence. These views, generally speaking, fall under two distinct categories, viz. akhandapaksa, and bhandapaksa. The Sphotavādīs who take the sentence to be an indivisible unit, support the former viz. akhandapaksa, Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, who take the sentence to be a combination of words, are in favour of the latter, viz. bhandapaksa.

We have seen that to the Sphotavādī, Sphoṭa represents the real word (the eternal word), sound being only a quality of it (58). Sphoṭa is two fold viz. external and internal (59). The external Sphoṭa admits of further division into class and individual (60). Those who support the indivisibility of a sentence, are likely to take a sentence as forming either a class (jātisphoṭa) pertaining to a combination (samghātavartinī), or an individual (vyaktisphoṭa), that is to say that a sentence is one without any parts (ekōnavayavah), or an intellectual assimilation (buddhyanusambrtiḥ) (61). These three definitions according to the Sphotavādīn are duly noticed and explained by Bhartrhari. According to Sphotavāda, a sentence that is expressive of sense is one and not dissolvable into parts (62). It represents either vyaktisphoṭa or jātisphoṭa i.e., an individual or a

class in so far as the outward manifestation of Sphota is concerned. The formal difference seen in these various types of sentences is said to be simply due to upādhi viz the operation of vocal organs employed in the production of sound and so on (63). Sphota has its internal aspect or vital side and in that it is not at all verbal but purely intellectual. The intellectual assimilation as showing the internal form of a sentence means that a sentence, so far as it is related to the internal world of thought, remains essentially intellectual in its origin before it is materialised into audible sound—It is Nāda or sound says Bhartṛhari, that turns such intellectually assimilated ideas into concrete expression of a sentence (64).

For the khandapaḷṣa, a sentence is either an action, a kind of order or succession, a collection of words the first inflected word, i.e., pāda or inflected words i.e. pādis having mutual expectancy with one another. We have earlier seen these views. For those who regard the sentence as a 'krama', the word 'krama' is used in the following way. Though usually the word 'krama' implies a property of time as 'paurvāparya' (65)—i.e. priority and posteriority, its particular use in grammar is explained by Bhartṛhari and Puṣṭavarāja as below. Every inflected word in a sentence has got some special significance as that of karmatva, kṛitrtva, etc., which come to our notice in a successive or well marked order together with similar meanings (viśeṣa) conveyed by other words (66). For example, if we want to bring out the sense of a

sentence like, 'devadatto grāmam gacchatī', in a strictly grammatical method, we are apt to express it in the following way the act of moving which has 'devadatta' as its agent and the village as its object. Here, the idea of 'karmatva' which adds a special feature to the meaning obtained severally from each inflected word, is called 'viseśa' that becomes comprehensible in a fixed or definite order-(67) This definite order is regarded as the main factor of a sentence. Again, it is stated that there can be no sentence made up of words alone, if it happens to be devoid of such an order (68) Thus, a sentence is intrinsically a particular order in which words are combined together in such a way as to express the intended sense (69)

These definitions of a sentence that are acceptable to the *khayda pakṣa*, can be classified into two classes on the basis provided by the two well known schools of the *Mīmamsā* system, viz *Bhṛta* (i.e. of *Kumārila*) and *guru* (i.e. of *Prabhākara*) *Kumārila* and his followers uphold the '*abhihitānāvayavāda*' as against the '*anvītabhidhānavāda*' of *Prabhākara* and his supporters. According to *Kumārila*, therefore, a sentence should be explained either as a combination of words (*samghata*) or as an order (*krama*) and according to *Prabhākara*, it is a verbal form (*ākhyāta*), or the first inflected word (*adyam padam*) or inflected words possessing mutual expectancy (*sarvapadam sākhaṅsam*) that make for a sentence (70)

These two views, then, refer to the meaning expressed by a sentence. There is a great difference

of opinion as to the meaning or the significance of a sentence. For the Sphotavādin it is *pratibhā* (71). To one who defines *vaḥya* as a verbal form, it is action ('*kriyā*') that forms the meaning of a sentence (72). For the *abhihitānvayavāda* it is association (*samsarga*) (73). 'Samsarga'—'association' is used here in its literal sense. It means that a sentence acquires some special feature, or import (*tātparyārtha*) when it conveys the intended sense (74). It means that when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional significance, distinct from those of the constituents. Thus, the sense that evolves out of such *anvaya* or correlation of meaning is something more than a mere sum-total of them (75). Jagadīśa calls it—*vilakṣṇobodhah*—or special significance that results from the correlation of meanings. For the *anvitābhidhānavādin*, on the other hand, the meaning of a sentence is for all purposes the same as is signified by its component parts (76). Thus the import or the *tātparyārtha* of the *anvitābhidhānavādin* is nothing more than the meaning given by individual words themselves (77).

As to what forms the '*nimitta*' of the *vaḥyārtha* there prevail different views. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvabindu* refers to these views and establishes the Bhatta view as the *Siddhānta*. We will try to see the different views in the light of *Tattvabindu*, as follows.

- (i) According to the Spotavādī grammarians the nimitta for the vākyārtha is akhaṇḍa vakya, the padavarṇavibhāga being only the result of Avidyā (78)
- (ii) According to some Mimāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas the nimitta for the vākyārtha is the knowledge of that last letter which is accompanied by the saṃskāras or impression of the experience of the meaning of the preceding padas (79)
- (iii) Or, according to some other Mimāṃsakas, it is that varnamala or series of letters that is reflected in the mirror of memory, accompanied by the experience or anubhava bhāvanā of tattad padapadartha (=those words and letters) (80)
- (iv) Or vākyārtha is just the expressed meaning (abhidheyārtha) of the words correlated with other words on account of expectancy compatibility and juxtaposition. Thus anvitapadas or correlated words make for the expression of vākyārtha. This is according to Prabhākara (81)
- (v) The padārtha, which is accompanied by ākāṅkṣa yogyatā and sannidhi and expressed by the words used, makes for the vākyārtha. Thus first of all the padas give padārthas and then with the help of ākāṅkṣa yogyatā etc., they give vākyārtha. This is the abhihitānvaya-vāda of Kumārila Vācaspati Miśra also accepts this view. * On this

abhihitānvayanvāda is based the idea of
tātparvavṛtti (82)

Now, the first view is taken up for consideration. The Sphotavādin holds that if it be held that the varṇas in the vyasta form make for the vākyārtha, then the other letters become redundant (83). If it is held that samastavarṇas make for the vākyārtha, then again, there are two alternate possibilities viz. (a) do you consider this correlation (samuha) as genuine (vāstavika) or artificial-(aupādhika)? (84) The idea is that whether the varṇas-letters are naturally (vastutaḥ) (genuinely) correlated to one-another or not. We have the experience that they are correlated and thus as they are thus accompanied by the experience of the bearer, they become related. But as varṇas are nitya and vibhu, they cannot be correlated to one another and as we have the experience of these letters gathered at different times, the experience also cannot be correlated (85).

The Sphotavādi also refutes the view of those who held the view that pūrva purva saṃskārayukta antīma-varṇa makes for the vākyārtha. The Sphotavādi asks as to what do the varṇavādins mean by the word 'saṃskāra', or 'impression'. It is either the smṛtibīja or something like the purification of rice etc., by chaffing etc (86). Certainly, the second alternative is not meant here. So here, the saṃskāra stands for smṛtibīja. But smṛti itself being just a vāsanā or impression, which is of the form of power of the soul, the vākyārthapratīti thus becomes the result not of the saṃskāras but of the power

of the soul Again, the Sphotavādī says that even though we have identical letters in words such as *nadī*, *dīna*, *sāra*, *rasā* etc., we have different meanings. So, letters in their *akṣanda* form only, make for sense Thus, *akṣanda-vākya* should be accepted by the *varṇavādi* (87) The Sphotavādī cites the illustration of the word 'gauḥ' and says that the experience of the word *gauḥ* suggests that there is *ekata*-oneness- and *akṣandata*-wholeness-in this word For, if we take the different letters to be the objects of our experience it runs contrary to our day to day experience (88) If it is argued by the *varṇavādin* that just as the individual soldiers make for the army, or just as individual trees make for the forest, similarly different *varṇas* make for a *pada* and thus *pada* is *upādhi*, to this we ask as to what is meant by this 'upādhi?' 'Upādhi' or attribute can be two-fold, viz. (1) *ekajñānvisayatā*, or becoming the object of one and the same experience or, (2) *ekābhīdhehyapratyaya-hetutā*-i.e., becoming the cause of the experience of one and the same *bhava* (*ekābhīdheya*) Now, if by the *upādhi* is meant (1), then we will have to accept the *pada-jñāna* even before *varṇajñāna* which goes against the *varṇavādi*, and if by *upādhi* is meant (2), then, there is *staretarāśrayadosa* As *arthabhinnatā* or difference in meaning-is the cause of the distinction between one *pada* and another, and as *padabhinnatā* is gathered with the help of *arthabhinnata*, the fault of *staretarāśraya* arises Thus, the *vākya*-*ārtha* should be connected only with the *akṣaṇḍa* *sphota* This is the view of

the Sphotavādin, which forms the *prima facie* view in the Tattvabindu.

After explaining the first view held by the Sphotavādin in detail Vācaspati goes on refuting it. Vācaspati argues in the following way. Do the Sphotavādins establish their view on the foundation of our (1) normal experience, or (2) on the difference of senses of *pada* and *vākya*? (89) If the first alternative is accepted, then again two alternatives prop up therein according as (a) you accept *vākya* to be *avayavi* i.e., having *avayavas* or parts in form of *padas* or (b) you do not accept any *avayavas* or parts with reference to the *vākya*ārtha. Now (a) cannot be accepted as *pada* is held to be 'vibhu' or all-pervasive even by the objector, and in that case it is not possible to dream of an *avayavi* *vākya* which is 'vibhutara' or more pervasive. The very notion of 'vibhutara' is illogical (90). Again, the Naiyāyikas take *śabda* to be the quality of *ākāśa* and quality or *guṇa* is *avibhājya*—i.e., incapable of division, and it cannot be the *samavāyikā* of anything else, it being always 'dravya' itself. Thus, *padas* cannot be the *angas* or factors of the *vākya*ārtha (91). Now, if you accept the second alternative i.e. (b), viz. that there is no *avayava* in a *vākya*, then it follows that the sentence as a whole makes for the sense and neither the *varṇa*, nor the *pada* is important and therefore *varṇa* or *pada* has no independent existence in a language. Well, it is true that only the sentence exists in a language, and that this *akhaṇḍaspoṭa* is manifested by *dhvani*, but

all this is putting aside the reality and is like the face reflected in a jewel, sword, or a mirror. Again, we ask that if the first dhvani reveals the sense, what would be the use of other dhvanis. Again, your antimadhvani also fails to reveal the Sphota fully. So, this Sphota and akṣaṇḍavākya is a wrongly postulated hypothesis. The final dhvani reveals the sense only if it is aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. So they cannot be held as useless. Just as a jeweller gives his opinion about a particular stone after looking at it repeatedly, in the same way, the hearer decides the vākyārtha, with the help of the final dhvani aided by the impression of the preceding dhvanis. It is because of this that we, the padavādins, accept the last letter, aided by the impression of the preceding letters to be the cause of vākyārtha (92)

The varnavādin refutes the theory of Sphota, for according to him, for vākyarthagrahana, or gathering of the sentence-sense, there is no necessity to postulate the hypothesis of Sphota. The varṇas themselves, used in the pada, make for arthapratiti or apprehension of meaning. When they are in a particular order (say, sarah), they give a particular meaning, and when they are in a different order (say, rasah) they give a different meaning. Thus, the pada gives a particular meaning with the help of krama-sequence-, nyūnātirikṭatva, swara, vākya, śruti smṛti, etc. If different letters of the same pada are pronounced by different people, we do not get the meaning. If I say, for example, 'sa' and you say 'rah', we do not get the idea of 'sarah'.

Thus, it is necessary that a pada should be pronounced by one and the same man, at one and the same time. Thus, eka-kartṛtva is an important factor in arthānubhava and is the jñāpakahetu of it. So the vākyārthajñāna is the result of varṇasamūha and it is no use postulating the hypothesis of an anavayava vākya (93).

It may be noted that Maṇḍanmīśra in his Sphoṭasiddhi finally establishes the Sphoṭavāda in an admirable way after refuting the views of Kumārila and his supporters. We need not go into those details here.

Vācaspati then considers the second view held by some Mīmāṃsakas and some Naiyāyikas. This view is slightly better according to him than the first one, as there is no postulation of any adṛṣṭa like Sphota herein. This view takes letters and words to be the cause of vākyarthapratīti. We get some trace of this view in the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. According to Vātsyāyana, when letters are spoken, the hearer listens to them. These letters are not correlated in form of words-padas-, and therefore the hearer first of all correlates them and through the agency of words (padavyavasāyena) and with the help of memory, he correlates different words also and gathers thereby the vākyārtha (94).

So, according to this view, we do not hear any sentence fully at a given moment. The speaker speaks letters one by one. As the letters perish immediately (āśuvinaśitva) and in a moment (kṣaṇikatva), every first letter disappears when the next one is uttered.

Thus, when the whole sentence is completed, the listener hears only the last letter at that moment. But he undoubtedly gathers the whole sentence. The solution to this situation is that even though the preceding letter or letters die out the moment they are uttered, they leave behind them their impression in the minds of the listeners. With the hearing of the last letter this impression comes up in form of memory and produces the vākyārthadhī (95)

The abhīhitānvayavādin (i.e. the Siddhāntin) refutes the above view as below : Is it so that the last syllable explains the vākyārtha after causing the memory of the correlation of the meaning of itself and the vākyārtha ? Then, we say that when the mental impression exhibits its strength viz., the remembering of padārthas, the padapratyakṣa, etc., at this moment, the cause viz. impression, does not exist. At the same time, when a listener remembers the correlation of pada and padārtha, he cannot clarify the position of the final syllable of a pada or vākya. So, the hearing of the last letter accompanied by the memory of the preceding etc., cannot make for the vākyadhī (96).

The third view is supposed to be held by some other Mīmāṃsikas. According to the commentator of the Tattavabindu, this view is not held by any particular ācārya, but both this and the preceding one are just placed as prima facie views by Vācaspati Miśra (97). According to some this view is held by the earlier Mīmāṃsaka Upavarṣa, who is older than

Sabara (98) So, according to Upavarṣa 'gauh' is constituted of g, a, u, and visarga

These varṇavādins hold that we gather the meaning of a word or a sentence in the same way in which it is used by the elderly people. Now, these elderly people, in their regular affairs, do not use single letters or words, but use sentences to convey meaning. But a sentence cannot be without parts (anavayava). So, the sentence is just the correlation of letters (varṇasamūha) left in memory. This varṇamālā or dhvanimālā is the cause and vaśyārthadhīh is the effect. The knowledge of pada-padartha is held to be instrumental only (nimittamātra) while the vaśyārthadhīh follows genuinely from the varṇamālā or a group of letters or phonemes or syllables (99). The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do not accept this view. They find two faults with this, viz, those of 'gauravadosa' and 'viśayābhavadosa' (100). They explain it in the following way, suppose, they say, we take the following eight sentences—viz 'arbhaka, gāmanaya, arbhaka, gāṃ badhana, sīso, gamānaya, sīso, gāṃ badhana, bala, gāmanaya, bala, gam badhana, dimbha gamanaya, dimbha, gam badhana'—Now, in these eight sentences we can see only seven different words viz gam, ānaya, badhāna, arbhaka, sīso, bāla, and dimbha. According to the varṇavādin (i.e. the third view), we will have to accept separate power of each of the eight sentences. Thus, we will have to accept eight śaktis in respect of these eight sentences. If we accept the view of the padavādins, we will have to accept only seven śaktis with reference

to seven words. Thus we have to go for unnecessary acceptance of additional śaktis if we accept the varṇavāda. Thus, it becomes redundant on account of kalpanā-gaurava (101). Another fault that is seen in this view is that of viśiṣyābhāva. The varṇamālā in a vākya can cause vākyaārthadhīḥ only when there is first padārthadhīḥ. Padārthajñāna is a must before vākyaārthajñāna. It is only when the padārthas are correlated that the vākyaārtha flashes upon our mind. Thus, padārthajñāna is necessary before their correlation (anvaya). In this case, how can we take varṇamālā as the cause of vākyaārthadhīḥ? Again, when we listen to a sentence, we cannot remember the syllables of even five or six words in a sentence, then what to talk of a long sentence full of many words? (102). Thus, this (viz. the third view) cannot be accepted.

The fourth view is the one held by Prabhākara and his followers who are known as anvitābhīdhānavādins. For them, the words used in a sentence, on account of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, are first correlated and then they yield the vākyaārtha, through the power called abhīdhā (103). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas or the abhīhitānvayavādins object to this view. Their objections are as below - when the anvitābhīdhānavādī says that the abhīdhā power of a word is able to convey its meaning as well as correlation (anvaya), is it so that the vākyaārtha is gathered through all the padārthas together or not? If they (=anvitābhīdhānavādins) hold that all the words together do not convey the vākyaārtha, then for them only the first word-pada-will convey the vākyaārtha.

So, the use of other padas becomes redundant, as the *vivaksa* (intention) of the speaker will be conveyed by just one word alone¹ (104) Or, if it be said that other words also convey *vākyārtha*, then in the sentence, *hariḥ gam badhnāti*, wherein we get three words, the meaning of the action 'badhnāti' will not become clear until it is connected with 'hariḥ' the agent and 'gam' the object. The same is the case with the other words. Thus, there arises the contingency of *itaretaraśraya* (The illustration cited by Vācaspati Miśra is *ukhayām pacet*) (105).

The fifth view is held by *abhihitānvayavādins* or by *Ānandīya* and his followers. According to them, the padas first convey their meaning separately, and then after getting correlated, they convey the *vākyārtha*.

Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvabindu* refutes *Prabhākara's* *anvītabhidhānavāda* and establishes the *abhihitānvayavāda* as the *Siddhānta*. The *abhihitānvayavādin* says that unless a contrary evidence arises, usually, for any effect, we consider the immediately preceding factor as the cause of it (106). Whenever there is *vākyārthajñāna* it is preceded by *padārthajñāna-smṛti*, which should be then recognised as its cause. Again, this *padārthasmarana* alone is not sufficient for bringing about the sentence-sense, but their correlation is also important. Thus the *smaraṇa* of the *padārthas* in the mind, qualified by *ākāṅkṣā*, and *sannidhi*, makes for the *vākyārthadhīh* (107). Again the *abhihitānvayavādin* holds that the mental impression (*manovāsana*) by itself does not create the *smṛti* or memory of the objects of experience that

were known or unknown earlier. It just makes for the remembrance of the padārthas of a given padasamūha qualified by ākanksā, योग्यता etc. Thus, padārthasmṛti goes with (i.e. is sahakṛtā) ākanksādi and thus only (i.e. ākāṅkṣādi trayasahakṛta) makes for the knowledge of the vākyārtha.

As for the argument that if padārthajñāna is caused by smṛti which is different from padaś, then, in that case, it will not be capable of causing knowledge of the vākyārtha; for, in case if it is held to be capable of this, then we will have to accept this as the seventh pramāṇa over and above the six, held by the Mīmāṃsādarśana. Or the śābdapramāṇa will have to be included in this novel pramāṇa, and this is not noticed by Śābara and others, who have not accepted padārtha as a separate pramāṇa because they have already mentioned āgamapramāṇa which could have been only a sub-variety of the new padārtha pramāṇa (108), and also that if āgamapramāṇa is a sub-variety of padārtha, then, padārtha should be mentioned along with the other five pramāṇas, and this means casting aspersions on the scholarship-vidvattā-and omniscience-sarvajñatva-of Bhagavān Bhaṣyakāra. Moreover, if we take padārthajñāna as the nimitta of vākyārthajñāna then, we will have to accept either three vṛttis or two, such as (i) the first śakti that helps the pada to give its individual meaning, and (ii) the second that causes its memory, and (iii), the third that correlates, or at least the two that give padārthajñāna and vākyārthajñāna R. 7.

respectively while in the view of the anvitābhīdhana-vāda only one śakti is required and thus there is no kalpanāgaurava—or the contingency of imagining many vṛttis (109)(110) Vācaspati gives the following reply

The abhīhitanvayavādī holds that only one śakti as mentioned by the Prabhākaras can not be connected with the anvaya or correlation. For thus, as anvaya or correlation is just one and identical with reference to different padas, we will have to accept the position in which all the padas stand for one another as synonyms¹ (111). The abhīhitanvayavādī again asks the following question to the anvitābhīdhana-vādī. Is it so that a pada by its śakti conveys only the meaning as such (padarthasarūpa) and not the correlation (anvaya) also which makes for the vākyārthadhīh? Or is it so that it conveys both its meaning and the correlation, both of which help to bring about the vākyārthadhīh? The knowledge of the correlation of one padārtha with another padārtha is born of some other padā either known (spasta) or unknown (aspasta), and not by the padas themselves. Those who are learned in the vedas also hold this view and according to them, kṛiya or action, by abhīdhā cannot convey the karta or agent (112). Thus, the abhīhitanvayavādī accepts another śakti, different from abhīdhā, and it is termed as lakṣaṇaśakti. For them in laukika and vaidic sentences, the vākyārthadhīh is caused by lakṣaṇa. Vācaspati-misra clarifies the stages which the roṭa-listener-has to pass through while going from vākyasravaṇa to

vākyarthajñāna. It is as follows—An individual listens to the sentences, spoken by the elderly people and thereby becomes conscious of activity (pravṛtti), inactivity (nivṛtti), joy or sorrow (haṣṭi, soka) etc. Thus, he records this sentence as the cause of pravṛtti, nivṛtti etc. As the elderly person goes on using one word (pada) after another, he gathers newer and newer meanings (anupajāta) and this new (or anupajāta) meaning dawns upon the mind only after listening to some particular words (viśeṣa pada) even though the words already pronounced are very well there. Thus the child takes them to be the cause of it (i.e. knowledge). This knowledge is only with reference to the padārtha alone and as such it cannot make for the pravṛtti, nivṛtti, etc. But when the whole sentence sense is gathered then only it causes pravṛtti, nivṛtti etc. This viśiṣṭa artha or, particular meaning, goes with the whole sentence. The vṛddhavyavahara results into this. The words used in the vṛddhavyavahara have this conveying of the viśiṣṭārtha as its object, but by abhidhā they convey only the padārtha alone. Thus, as in the case of laukika vākyas, so also in the case of vaidika vākyas the words convey the sentence-sense through lakṣaṇā alone (113).

It becomes quite clear that for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas the grasping of the meaning of the sentence, the vākyārtthagrahaṇa, is achieved with the help of lakṣana. Kumārila himself notes in his vārtika that vākyārtho lakṣyamāno hi sarvatraiveti na sṭhitiḥ.

Pārthasarathī Miśra in his Nyāyaratnamala refutes the anvītābhidhānavāda and establishes that

even though in a single sentence, we get many padas, still, with the help of *ākāṅkṣādi* we gather the correlation between different padas (114) Neither the sentence, nor the words by themselves make for the *vākyaṛthadhī*. First of all, from the padasvarūpa we get *padārtha* through *abhidha* and then *vākyaṛtha* becomes *lakṣita* i.e. indicated (115) In a sentence there are many words, but when there is *vākyaṛthadhī*, all the padarthas are united just as all types of pigeons get together for picking up grains (116).

Vācaspati has made it quite clear that the power that correlates the word senses in a sentence is quite different from *abhidha* and it is *lakṣaṇa*. But this *lakṣaṇa* is different from *lakṣaṇa* of the *ālamkārikas* and thus we come across at least four *vṛttis*, viz., *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇa*, *grāhi* and *padārthānvayaśakti*. In order to avoid the gaurava of recognising so many *vṛttis* the *padārthānvayaśakti* is also termed as *lakṣaṇa* (117) This *lakṣaṇa* or *padārthānvayaśakti* is different from *lakṣaṇa* of the *ālamkārikas* and probably because of this others might have named it differently as *tātparyaśakti*.

Ālamkārikas

As seen above, some of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas later on, called it *tātparya vṛtti* in order to distinguish it from *lakṣaṇa* as such. Probably, the Mīmāṃsakas in Kasmira, followed this tradition which was mentioned by even Abhinava and Mammaṭa. Moreover Abhinava and Mammaṭa have identified *grāhi* and *lakṣaṇa* of the Mīmāṃsakas. Thus, for them, *tātparya* becomes the third *vṛtti* and *vyaṛjana* is therefore

termed as the *Turiyā Vṛtti* (118). Abhinava and Mammata also accept this view of the *abhihitānvayavāda*. It becomes clear when we read *ityanta-granthena upapadītasya abhinavaguptacaryasammata-paksasya bahuvacanam s'ri mammaṭācāryapādāḥ svasammātatvamuktamiti tīkākāraḥ sarvaḥ uktamitidīk* (Bālabodhinī pp. 27).

But later on, certain *dhvanīvadins* rejected this *tātparyavṛtti*, and *Vidyānātha*, the author of *Pratāparudhīya*, includes *tātparyavṛtti* in *vyāñjanavṛtti* and mentions the *tātparyārtha* as identical with the *vyangyārtha*. The view *viz-soyam īṣoriva dīrghadīrghatara abhidhā vyāparaḥ* etc. (supposedly mentioned by *Bhaṭṭa Lollata*) considers *tātparyavṛtti* as just a part of *abhidhāvṛtti*. *Mahima* gathers the *tātparyārtha* with the help of *anumāna* or inference. He does not recognise *tātparyavṛtti* in gathering the sense of 'nisedha' or negation, from the sentence, *viśam bhakṣaya, macāsyā grhe bhukṣitah*. For him, the *nisedhārtha* does not fall in the province of *sābdabodha*, but is gathered by the process of *anumāna*, where the *vacyārtha* becomes the *hetu*. Thus, here we have an instance of *ārthī prakriyā* and not *sabdi prakriyā* (119).

Lakṣaṇā :

After considering the nature of *abhidhā* and *tātparya* we may consider *lakṣaṇā* or the power of indication, or that function of a word which gives us the secondary meaning. The word that gives the secondary sense is called *lākṣaṇika*, the sense, *lakṣyārtha*, and the function, *lakṣana*. That words

are at times used in a sense other than the primary was recognised by pioneer grammarians such as Patañjali who admitted a *gaunī vṛtti* besides *mukhyā vṛtti*. He has explained the conditions that necessitate the recognition of *lakṣaṇa* as a process of transference of one attribute to another. The various illustrations of *lakṣaṇa* cited by him under the rule Pa. 4-1-148, are as below *mā caḥ hasanti, gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ, yastih praveśaya* etc. These are so clear and typical that they have been often used by others. The *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas* and all the other schools of thought recognise *lakṣaṇa*. Though this *vṛtti* was generally called *lakṣaṇa* other names also were current viz *gaunī vṛttiḥ, bhāktih* or *upacāra*. Usually when there is a *lakṣaṇika* or, secondary use of words, we see commentators saying *gaṅgāyām śabdaprayogaḥ, bhāktah va* or, *upacāroyam* etc., though of course herein we come across different shades of meaning. We will consider this in detail later on.

Lakṣaṇā, then, is a secondary function. As *Mammata* says, the power really belongs to *vācyaṛtha*, though, for all practical purposes, it is supposed to belong to *vacaka śabda* (120). Thus, if *gaṅgāyām ghosaḥ* is taken as an instance of *lakṣaṇā*, the *lakṣyārtha* of *gaṅgā tata* is, really speaking conveyed by the *vācyaṛtha* viz *gaṅgāpravāha*, and not by the word 'gaṅgā'. The idea is that the power of the *śabda* 'gaṅgā' becomes exhausted in expressing *gaṅgāpravāha*. Now, where lies the possibility of the word, which has become powerless after giving the *abhidhārtha*, conveying the *lakṣyārtha* viz. *gaṅgātata*?

Thus, when we say that *lakṣaṇā* is the power of a word, we are slightly inexact and attribute to the word, a function that belongs to its sense.

Conditions of *Lakṣaṇā* :

Lakṣaṇā presupposes three conditions. (121).
 (i) The *vāc्यārtha* must be inapplicable (i.e. *mukhyārthabādhā*) (ii) The *lakṣyārtha* must be such as is connected with the *vāc्यārtha*—(*mukhyārthayoga*, or *tadyoga*), and (iii) The *lakṣaṇā* must have been resorted to either (a) in keeping with usage or *rūḍhi*, or (b) with a definite purpose (*prāyojana*).

The *vāc्यārtha* becomes inapplicable or *bādhita* because of its coming into conflict with the *pramāṇas* (122). In *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, the *mukhyārtha* viz. *gaṅgāpravāha* is *bādhita*, say, by *pratyakṣa* *pramāṇa* and again fails to comply with the second requirement of a *vākya* viz. '*yogyatā*'. In determining whether a sense is *bādhita* or not, we take note of the *tātparya* or purport of the words. Thus, when we say that in *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* the *mukhyārtha* of *gaṅgā* is *bādhita*, it is the purport or tenor of the sentence that makes us say so. Otherwise, one could have said that the *mukhyārtha* of *ghoṣa* (and not *gaṅgā*) is *bādhita* and that *lakṣaṇā* applies to *ghoṣa* and not *gaṅgā*.

Now, the *lakṣyārtha* must be such as bears some sort of connection—may be even of *vaiparītya* or contrariety—with the *vāc्यārtha*. If this condition is not fulfilled, every sense could be the *lakṣyārtha*. The connection may be any one of the five enumerated


by Bhartrmītra and others

abhidheya sambandhat sādṛśyāt samavāyīta hi
vaiparityāt kriyayogāllakṣaṇā paricadhā mata || (123)

Canons of interpretation in Sanskrit, are, on ground of 'gaurava doṣa' against the secondary use of words, where the primary use would give the same idea (124) Lakṣaṇa which is a secondary function, requires justification Lakṣaṇā is justified on the score of prayojana or rudhī Gāṅgātate ghoṣaḥ will fail to convey the sense—prayojana—of the preponderance of śaītya and pāvanatva or coolness and purity, that is conveyed by 'gāṅga im ghoṣaḥ', which, therefore, is justified The example of lakṣaṇa based on rudhī is 'karmaṇi kuśalaḥ' according to Mammata Viśvanatha disagrees (125) Hemacandra does not accept rudhīmūlā lakṣaṇā at all (126) It might have been that all instances of lakṣaṇa must have been prayojanamūla in the beginning The first gentleman who transferred 'kuśala' to the realms other than that of darbha-grahana did so on the basis of upacāra (i.e. transfer due to similarity) But constant use has totally overshadowed the prayojana element in it Māṇikyacandra very critically brings out this view point when he says nirudhā itī bhras opacāra-praṇītayaḥ Kumārila also recognised this fact, and even went to the length of saying that even rūdhīlakṣaṇās may to-day be employed as prayojanalakṣaṇās under certain circumstances (127) We have seen that 'tadyogaḥ' is one of the requirements for lakṣaṇā This tadyoga may be 'samīpya sambandha', 'angangībhava sambandha',

tatkarmya, sādrśya, svāmibhṛtya sambandha, tādārthya etc. Based on these sambandhas or relations, lakṣaṇa is divided into gauṇī i.e., based on sādrśya sambandha and śuddhā i.e. based on sādrśyetara sambandha. We will consider the classification of lakṣaṇā later on. It may be noted here that according to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, and certain ālamkārikas such as Hemacandra, gauṇī vṛtti is recognised as distinct from and independent of lakṣaṇā. Thus, a word has, in view of the latter, four vṛttis viz abhidha, gauṇī, lakṣaṇa and vyañjana. Vidyānātha, in his Prataparudriya refutes the view of the Prābhākaras and observes that gauṇī cannot be a separate function of a word. If at all, it can only be a subdivision of lakṣaṇa, as in both there is mukhy ārthabaddha and tadyoga. If gauṇī be accepted as a separate function of a word, he observes, then we would have to accept several functions based on several relations (128). The Naiyayikas also hold a similar view (129).

Classification of lakṣaṇā : Mammata seems to classify lakṣaṇā in the following way—



Thus, *gauṇī lakṣaṇa* is that which is based on *sādrśya sambandha*, and *s'uddha* is one which is *sādrśyetara-sambandhamulā* (i.e. the relations of *kāryakāraṇa*, *tadarthya*, *tātkarmya*, etc.) *Suddha* is again four fold as shown above, while *gauṇī* is two fold.

It should be noted however, that these divisions and subdivisions pertain to *prajñānavṛtti lakṣaṇā* alone and not *rudhīmula*. *Māṇikyacandra* suggests that *rudhī lakṣaṇa* is so well established that we cannot penetrate into its nature (130). Thus, it is of the type of *abhidhā* (131). The S. D. gives a more detailed classification.

Upādāna lakṣaṇā is also known as *ajahatsvārtha* or *ajahallakṣaṇa*. Its definition is, according to *Mammata*, *svasiddhaye paraksepah*. It is a subdivision of *śuddha*. The example is *kuntāḥ pravṛṣanti*. The *vāc्यārtha* of *kuntāḥ* cannot be logically constructed with 'pravṛṣanti'. So, there is *mukhyā rthabādhā* and we derive the idea of 'kuntin' or 'kuntadhāriṇī'. In this instance, the *vāc्यārtha* is completely comprehended in the *lakṣyārtha*. The idea of 'kuntāḥ' is completely included in that of 'kuntadhāriṇī'. So, it is called *upādāna lakṣaṇā* or *ajahat-svārthā*.

Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā is defined as 'parārtham svasamarpiṇam'. It is also termed as *jahallakṣaṇā*. This is another sub-division of *s'uddhā*. In this particular variety, the *vāc्यārtha* surrenders its meaning and yields place to the *lakṣyārtha*. In *gangāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, the word *gangāyāṁ* surrenders its *vāc्यārtha*.

viz gangāpravāha and makes room for the lakṣyārtha viz gangatāta. This variety is called lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇa because gangā here serves as the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) both of the vācyārtha and the lakṣyārtha. The sampradāyaprakāśinī explains lakṣanā as lakṣaṇam upalakṣaṇam. Maṇikyachandra and others explain the word lakṣanā as lakṣaṇena tatadījñāpanena. According to Nāgesvarī it is lakṣinena svarthasamarpaṇena upalakṣita. This svarthasamarpaṇa is total and not partial (132).

These two viz upādāna and lakṣaṇa are the varieties of sūddha only, and not of gaunī. While dealing with upādāna lakṣanā Mammata takes care to refute the views of two different schools. The first view refuted is that of Maṇḍana Miśra according to Udyota or that of Mukula bhaṭṭa, according to Maṇikyachandra. According to this view the jātivācaka śabdāś like gaṇh conveys vyakti by upādāna lakṣaṇā. Abhidhā is exhausted in giving the sense of gotva and therefore govyakti is indicated by the word gaṇh, through the process of upādāna lakṣaṇā. For Mammata it is not so. According to him govyakti is gathered by avinabhavamūla ākṣepa, i.e. by invariable implication. Lakṣanā is not possible for want of either prayojana or rudhī. Govyakti is here ākṣepagrāhya, i.e. gathered by implication.

The second view refuted is probably the one held by the Mīmāṃsikas. According to this view, rātribhojana in case of Devadattī who is stout and yet does not take his food by day, is a matter of lakṣyārtha. Again, rātribhojana includes the idea of

divā-abhojana Therefore, it is the case of upādāna lakṣaṇa. But, not so, according to Mammata, who holds that this is a case of arthāpatti which should be accepted here as it involves a lesser amount of gaurava than lakṣaṇā. We have seen above that s'uddhā is so called as it has no reference to upacāra, gauṇī on the other hand is based on upacāra. Upacāra is based on resemblance (133).

Sāropā and sadhyavasānā are two sub divisions common to both suddhā and gauṇī. Both sāropā and sadhyavasānā involve āropa, to a smaller or greater extent. In saropā, the āropa is associated with a consciousness of distinction between the object superimposed and that superimposed upon and in sādhyavasānā, the āropa is carried to such an extent that all consciousness of distinctness between the two objects is lost owing to the latter being merged into the former. Again, if the instances involve the idea of sādṛśya, they become the sub divisions of gauṇī and if they involve the relations of sādṛśyetaśasambandha they become the sub varieties of s'uddhā. Thus gaurāhikā and gaurevāyam are instances of gauṇī sāropā and gauṇī sadhyavasānā, while āyurghṛtam and āyurevedam are instances of sāropā suddhā and sadhyavasānā s'uddhā. In short, we have a lesser degree of āropa in saropā than in sādhyavasānā where it is termed as adhyavasāna (134). It may be noted, that when based on sādṛśya, sāropā becomes the basis of rupakālamkārah and sādhyavasānā, that of atīśayokti.

Mammata and Viśvanātha give three different views as to the functioning of laksanā in the instance-gaurvāhikah. They are as below : (i) According to the first view, gauh in gaurvāhikah indicates gogata-jadyamāndyadīgunas. As these are found to be common to vāhika also, the word gauh expresses vāhikārtha. (ii) The second view says that gauh indicates vāhikagatajadyamāndyadīgunas (not gogata gunas as in the first view). These gunas or qualities through avinābhavasambandha suggest vāhika vyakti. (iii) The third view is that gauh indicates vāhika himself as being the substratum of jadyamāndyādī common to both. The third view is accepted by Mammata. We do not know exactly as to who held the first two views. The third is held by the Mīmamsakas as is clear from a citation from Kumarila in support. In Kumarila's Tantravartikā (8th cen. A.D.) which constitutes the commentary on the last three padas of the 1st adhyaya and also the 2nd and 3rd adhyayas of the Sabarbhāṣya, we read the following mānantaraviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe abhidheya-vinābhutapraīṭirīlaksanocyate । lakṣyamāṇaṅguṇairiyogat vrtteristā tu gaunata ॥ As to the second view, Māṇikyacandra notes that it is very close to that of Mukula (135).

Mammata also mentions certain sādṛś'yetara-sambandhas such as karyakāranabhava, tadarthya, svasvāmibhava, avayavavayaibhāva, tatkarṁya, etc. Māṇikyacandra adds māna e.g. adhākam as'nāti, dhārana (=holding) e.g. tuladhṛtam candanam tulā; ādhīpatya (=leadership) as in pumanayam gotram

(= This person is family) ; sthāna as in māñcaḥ krosanti etc. The sambandhas are numerous (136)

As to the classification of laksanā, authors on the ālambārasāstra differ. We have seen Mammata's view. Jagannatha's view is almost similar. Viśvanātha gives as many as eighty varieties of laksanā. The Vṛttivartikakara (Appayya Dīkṣita) gives a seven fold division of prayojanavati laksanā (137). It may be noted that Mammata also admits the gūḍhatva and agūḍhatva of the prayojana.

Laksanā, not accepted *

There are certain ālambārikas who do not accept laksanā as a separate vṛtti at all. e.g. Mūlābhata, Mahimābhata and Kuntaka accept only abhidhā. They do not accept laksanā as a vācya-yāpāra. Bhāṭṭa Mūla suggests this when at the end of Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā he says ityetaḍabhidhāvṛttam daśadhātrā vivēcitam. He includes the varieties of laksanā under his ten fold scheme of abhidhā. According to him, he treats of laksanā only because for him the dhvani of vyañjanāvidins is not different from laksanā (138). We will consider Mūla's views in the chapter on dhvani-virodha (Ch. XXIV). For Mahima also, the word has only one s'akti and that is abhidhā (139). For Mahima, laksyārtha becomes anumita or inferred through vācya-rtha which serves as a hetu. According to him, in gangāyām ghoṣaḥ when we derive the meaning of people staying on the Ganges, it is anumitigamya or derived through inference. Similarly, in gauravahika, there is no laksanā-yāpāra, but we have anumāna or inference

of the similarity of *vāhikā* and *gauh*, on the strength of the superimposition of *gotvā* on *vāhikā*. If it is otherwise, who will superimpose a thing on something totally different (140)

Next comes *Kuntika*. *Kuntaka* does not clearly negate *lakṣaṇā* at any place. But when he describes *vākrokti* as '*vicitrā abhidha*' we get a glimpse of his approach (141). The *Mīmāṃsikas* and the *Nyāyikas* accept *lakṣaṇa* as a separate *vṛtti*.

From the above discussion it is clear that *lakṣaṇa* is a derived function of language. The primary sense of a word used in several contexts gets modified or transferred by these. An attempt has been made by Sanskrit writers to note down as many such contexts as possible, for example, the relation of similarity which gives the varieties of *gaunī*, the relations of nearness, causality, ownership, possession, *tātkarmya* etc.—which are responsible for the derived meanings of words. As we have seen, writers like *Mukula Bhatta* do not consider it necessary to consider *lakṣaṇa* because, they think that it is derived from *abhidha* conditioned by contexts. But the grammarians, *Mīmāṃsakas* and logicians recognise *lakṣaṇa* as a separate function because it is necessary for them, for logical clarity, to distinguish the different meanings conveyed by a word in different contexts.

Vyañjanāvṛtti

We now consider the nature of what is termed as *vyañjanāvṛtti*. As noticed already, it is recognised to be the *turiyāvṛtti*, the first three being *abhidhā*,

tatparya and laksana. We have also seen that the tatparya vṛtti is called a sabdavṛtti only through upacāra i.e. metaphorically, and the gaunī of the Mīmāṃsakas is included in laksanā, though certain writers on alamkāra, such as Hemacandra mention it as a separate vṛtti.

The Dhvanyāloka says that in poetry there is something which is beyond the expressed sense and it is this that is the true essence of poetry (142). We will see later on in due course, that some modern European writers also have underlined two uses of language, viz the scientific and the emotive and that the latter one has a special role in poetry.

For the realisation of this implied or the pratiyamāna or vyaṅgyārtha i.e., the suggested sense, the writers on alamkāra have established a separate vṛtti or function of a word, and it is termed as the vyañjanavṛtti which is not identical with either abhidha or laksanā. With the help of vyañjanā, a word, subordinating itself and its meaning, suggests the vyaṅgyārtha which is more important and is termed as 'dhvani' in a poem (143). Just as an object, already existing beforehand, is manifested by light, in the same way this pratiyamānārtha becomes manifested with the help of vyañjanā. The pratibhā of the reader also plays a major role in gathering this vyaṅgyārtha, observes Hemacandra (144). The vacyārtha or laksyārtha, is only an instrument, a nimitta, in the realisation of vyaṅgyārtha. The stock example is—'gangayāṃ ghosah'—wherein the idea of coolness and purity is gathered through a separate power called vyañjanā.

Mammaṭa in his k. p. II. 9 days :

Yasya pratītimādhātuṃ lakṣaṇā samupāśyate ।
phale śābdukagamyētra vyañjanānnāparā kriyā ॥

and adds :—prayojanapratīpipādayiṣaya yatra lakṣaṇayā śābdaprayogaḥ tatra nānyatastatpratīpattirapī tu tasmādeva śābdīr. na cātra vyañjanā-¹ṛtenyo vyāparaḥ i.e. with reference to this fruit, for conveying the apprehension of which indication is resorted to, (and) which is understood from the (indicative) word alone, (there is) no other function than suggestion . . where (as in a sentence) a word is used with indication with the desire of conveying the motive, there the apprehension of that motive does not arise from anything else, but from that word alone. And there (i.e. with reference to the motive) there is no other function except vyañjanā.

Mammaṭa brings in the topic of vyañjanā while concluding the topic of lakṣaṇā. He says that lakṣaṇā again can be three-fold, viz (one) based on rūḍhi and the other two varieties based on prayojana which may be gūḍha i.e. concealed or agūḍha i.e. not-concealed. To convey this prayojana, the vyāpāra or the function resorted to, is always vyañjanā. It is not abhidhā in the absence of convention or śamaya, and it is not lakṣaṇā in the absence of further prayojana (II. 10). Again, the vyūṅgyārtha is not identical with the lakṣyārtha because, the latter one is not the primary sense or the mukhyārtha, nor is there any incompatibility i.e. bādha, nor any connexion with the fruit (yogaḥ phalena na), nor any motive herein (na prayojanametasmin), nor does the word

fail in conveying the motive (na ca śabdah skhalad-gaṭh). (K. P. II. 11.) Mammaṭa adds the following explanation: As the word Gaṅgā indicates the sense viz. the bank, because it is incomplete with the present context in its primary sense of the stream, like that if it were incompatible with the present context in its indicated sense of the bank also, then it would further indicate the motive. And the bank is not the primary sense of the word Gaṅgā. Also here there is no incompatibility. And there is no connection of the bank, which is the indicated sense of the word Ganga, with properties like coolness, holiness etc., which are to be further indicated by that motive which is supposed to be indicated. Moreover the word Gaṅgā is not unable to convey the motive, as it is to convey the sense of the bank, in the absence of the three conditions (145). Mammaṭa adds that in this there would be anavasthā, the absence of finality which would cause the destruction of the very root (mūlakṣayakāriṇi anavasthā. K. P. II. 129) If this prayojana is to be indicated, it would be indicated by yet another motive, and that second motive also will be indicated by a third one, and so on. Thus, want of finality or regressus ad infinitum, causing the non-apprehension of the matter in hand, i.e. the first motive, would result. Mammaṭa also rejects the case of the indicated sense being accompanied with or qualified by the motive. The object of knowledge is different from knowledge, and the fruit of knowledge is also different from it. The object of direct perception is a blue thing and the like. But the fruit is knownness or

self consciousness. Thus, with reference to a qualified object, indication is not possible. But properties or qualities such as holiness and the like are realised as residing in the bank and are apprehended by a function other than expression, purport or indication. And this function is designated by terms such as *vyāñjanā*, *dhvanana*, *dyotana* etc., and it should be necessarily admitted as having an independent existence (146)

Classification :

Mammata has classified *vyāñjana* into *lakṣaṇāmūlā* or that based on *lakṣana* and *abhīdhamūlā* or that based on *abhīdhā*. The *lakṣaṇāmūlā* is illustrated as in 'Gangayam ghosaḥ'. The *abhīdhamūlā* occurs when the function of expression of a word having more than one primary sense, is restricted to one sense by means of conjunction and the like, and the process which produces the apprehension of a sense that is not expressed is suggestion (147). Conjunction (or *samyogaḥ*) disjunction (or *viprayogaḥ*), association (or *sāhacarya*), antagonism (or *virodhita*), motive (or *arthah*), context (or *prakaraṇa*), special mark (or *lingam*), proximity of another word, (i.e. *s'abdasyanyasya sannīdhiḥ*), capability (i.e. *sāmarthyam*), propriety (or *aucitya*), place (or *desaḥ*), time (or *kalāḥ*), gender (*vyaktiḥ*), accent (*svara*) and etc. are the causes of recollection i.e. apprehension of a particular meaning, when there is no decision or determination regarding the meaning of a word. Mammata also gives proper illustrations for all these cases. He concludes that, when though the power

and Mahima Bhatta do not accept this variety at all. There are others who reject the whole of *sābdi vyañjanā* which, according to them falls within the scope of *s'lesa*. Still others accept *abhidhāmūlā s'abdi* only in certain cases. He holds that in the particular illustration viz. *asāvudayamārūdhah kāntimān raktamarḍalah*, the earlier authors recognise a case for *abhidhāmūlā s'abdi vyañjanā* (152). But for him, it is a case of pure *s'lesa*, as both the meanings are gathered by *abhidha* (153). Appayya Dīksita does not accept *s'abdas'aktimūlā vyañjanā*, but he does accept *s'abdas'aktimūlā dhvani* on the grounds that herein its charm is dependent on the use of certain words only (154). Viśvanātha observes that Mahima's view viz. that in the particular illustration viz. *durgālanghita vighrahe* etc., there is no presence of any *aprākaraṇikārtha* i.e. non-contextual meaning whatsoever, is only *gajanimittā* on his part (155). Jagannātha has his own view. He holds that both in case of *nanārthaka s'abdas'aktimūlā dhvani* and in case of *s'lesa kāvya*, there cannot be any obstruction in gathering both the meanings (i.e. *prākaraṇika* i.e. contextual and *aprākaraṇika* i.e. non-contextual) simultaneously. It is no use saying that while in *s'lesa* there is *tātparyajñāna* with reference to both the senses, while it is not so in case of *vyañjana*. Jagannātha is of the opinion that in *s'abdas'aktimūlā dhvani* both the meanings are equally *vācya* or expressed and that both are gathered through *abhidha*. It is therefore not wise to accept *vyañjanā* for gathering the other sense-*aparārthapratīti* (156). Thus he does not seem to agree with the *dhvanivadins* in general.

in case of the s'abdaśāktimūladbhvani. But at places he agrees He believes that in case of words having multiple sense, when rūḍha or yaugika words are used, even the aprākaraṇikārtha is vācya. But when it is a case of yogarūḍha or yaugikarūḍha padas having a multiple sense, according to Jagannātha, the non-contextual sense is gathered through vyañjana (157). The illustration cited is-abalānām s'riyam hṛtvā....etc. Here, in respect of the first meaning in term of lightening and the cloud, there is rūḍhaśabda. But in respect of the second meaning, there is either rūḍhi or yoga. Again the second meaning is not avayavalabhya only, as in the case of yaugika words. This is, therefore, a proper instance of vyañjanā. Thus says he,

yogārūḍhasya s'abdasya yoge rūḍhyā nyāntrite ।

dhiyam yogaspr's'orthasya yā sūte vyañjanaiva sā ॥

i.e. when yogaśakti in case of yogarūḍha śabdas becomes restricted by the rūḍhiśakti, (according to the dictum-rūḍhiryogādbalīyasī-) the yogārtha is derived through vyañjanā alone.

Modern Views :

Modern European thinking as to the function of language in poetry bears some striking resemblance. We may look into it in the light of Susan Stebbing (Introduction to Logic), and I. A. Richards (Meaning of Meaning, Principles of literary criticism) and other authors.

Language conveys both information and emotion. When the emotional element is subdued or suppressed

as far as possible we have the informative function of language. When, however, the main function is to convey emotion and use information even for the purpose of evoking emotion as in rhetoric and poetry we call it the emotive function of language. The first is termed the scientific use of language, and the other, the emotive use of language.

Thus, one important function of language is to communicate information. For science, this is the only function, and for this, it evolves a terminology i.e. a set of technical terms which aim at precision, i.e. uniqueness of reference. A scientific statement is, qua scientific, precise. The aim of the scientist is to use his verbal symbol so as to achieve uniqueness of reference and thus to use language, in order to communicate information that is exact and precise.

However, we see in our day to day life, that very often statements are made not merely to communicate information, but to arouse in the hearer a certain state of mind. Literary critics, everywhere, have realised that the poet uses language not mainly to express statements that are true or false, but to express what is neither true nor false. Thus, when e.g. Shelley says

. . . Life, like a dome of many coloured glass
stains the white radiance of eternity

Untill death tramples it to fragments "

he is neither talking non sense, nor making an assertion that must be accepted or rejected as true or false. The question of truth or falsity does not arise at all.

The poet is using language for an entirely different purpose from the scientist who says, "The Specific heat of air at constant pressure is 0.2734" To distinguish between these two uses of language, Mr I. A. Richards has suggested the convenient terminology viz—"the scientific use of language", and "the emotive use of language" (*Principles of literary criticism* Ch XXXIV and also *Meaning of Meaning*, pp 226-9, 255-60, 271-5). When language is used simply in order to refer to a referend, its use is scientific. When it is used in order to arouse an emotional attitude in the hearer, to influence him in any way other than giving him information, then its use is emotive. The most unmistakable examples of the emotive use of language can be found in literature, just because it is not the main function of literature to instruct. Owen Barfield in his, 'Poetic Diction A Study in Meaning,' pp. 13, 14, says "When words are selected and arranged in such a way that their meaning either arouses, or is obviously intended to arouse æsthetic imagination, the result may be described as poetic diction. He adds, "... the same sounds and signs may easily be vehicles of poetry at this place and not in that, at this time and not at that, to this person and not to the other." The scientist uses words so as to eliminate this variation of response. It may be noted that what is called logical connection has little relevance to the emotive use of language. Whereas, it is the condition of success in scientific language.*

* Susan Stabing Introduction to Logic

Foot notes .

- (1) प्रतीयमान पुनरन्यदेव वस्तवस्ति वाणीषु महाकविनाम् ।
यत्तद्वैमकावयवातिरिक्त विभाति लावण्यमिवाङ्गनाम् ॥ ध्वन्या I 4
- (2) The तर्कदीपिका says व्यञ्जना तु शक्तिर्लक्षणांतभूता शब्दशक्तिमूला
अर्थशक्तिमूला त्वनुमानादिना अन्यथा सिद्धा ।
- (3) साक्षात्सङ्केतित योऽर्थमभिपद्यते स वाचकः । K P II and also तत्र
सङ्केतितार्थस्य बोधनादभिप्रायिभा । SD II
- (4) यत्रार्थे यन्नामाधुनिकसङ्केतवत् तदेव पारिभाषिकम्, यथा पित्रादिभिः
पुत्रादौ सङ्केतितम् चैत्रादि यथा वा शास्त्रकृदिम् सिध्यभावादौ
पक्षसादि । जातिवाच्यताशक्तिमन्नाम नैमित्तिकम्, यथा मौ गद्यादि,
यदुपाध्यवच्छिन्नशक्तिमन्नाम तदौपाधिकम्, यथा काशपञ्चादि-शब्दश्च
- (5) आज्ञानिकश्चाधुनिक सङ्केतो द्विविधो मतः । नित्य आज्ञानिकस्तत्र या
शक्तिरिति गीयते । कादाचित्कश्चाधुनिकः शास्त्रधरादिभिः कृतः । VP
- (6) सेयमभिधा त्रिविधा, केवलसमुदायशक्ति केवलावयवशक्ति समुदायावयव
शक्तिसंकरश्चेति । R G pp 141
- (7) अलङ्कारशक्तिमानर्णकापप्रतिपादकत्व रुढिः । - वृत्तिवार्तिक (अप्यवशीक्षित)
- (8) अवयवशक्तिमानसापेक्षं पदस्यैकार्यप्रतिपादकत्व योगः । - ibid
- (9) अवयवसमुदायाभयशक्तिसापेक्षमेकार्यप्रतिपादकत्व योगरुढिः । - ibid
- (10) नैयायिकास्तु - पञ्चजादिशब्दरूपैकपदोपादानरूपयान्तरङ्गप्रत्यासत्तया नाभि-
कमलकुमुदान्वयात्प्रागेव पञ्चजनिकर्तृत्ववैशिष्ट्येनोपस्थितस्य पदमस्य पदमाध-
यत्वेनोपस्थितस्य पञ्चजनिकर्तृत्वस्य च नाभिकमलकुमुदायान्वये नाकाङ्क्षा,
न च विशिष्टस्य तदन्वयविषयिणी शान्दधी, इति तदन्वयार्थ स्वतन्त्र
पञ्चपञ्चजनिकर्तृत्वोपस्थितये पञ्चजादिपदस्य लक्षणैवाभ्युपगतव्या न तु
रुढिर्योगो वा । - वृत्तिवार्तिक अप्यवशीक्षित-pp 5
- (11) सयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता । अर्थ प्रकरण लिङ्ग शब्दस्या
न्यस्य सन्निधिः । सामर्थ्यमौचित्यं देश कालो व्यक्ति स्वरादयः ।
शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्युतिहेतवः ॥ हेमचन्द्र adds आदिग्रहणात्
अभिनयापदेशानिदेशसङ्गैर्लघुनाक्षरा गृह्यन्ते । काव्यानुशासन 123, pp 65.

- (12) सशङ्खचक्रो हरि इति शङ्खचक्रयोगेन हरिशब्दो विष्णुमेवामिषते ।
 अशङ्खचक्रो हरि इति तद्वियोगेन तमेव । मीमार्जुनौ इत्यर्जुन पार्थ ।
 कर्णार्जुनौ इति कर्ण सूतपुत्र । स्थाणु चन्द्रे इति स्थाणु शिव । सव जानाति
 देव इति देवो भवान् । कुपितो मकरध्वज इति मकरध्वज काम । देव
 पुरारि इति पुरारि शिव । मधुनामत्त पिक इति मधुर्वसन्त । पातु वो
 दयितामुज्ज इति मुप सामुरयम् । विभाति गगने चन्द्र इति चन्द्र शशी ।
 निशि चित्रमानु इति चित्रभानुर्वह्नि । भाति रथाङ्ग नपुसक-यकृत्या रथाङ्ग
 चक्रम् । स्वरस्तु वेद एव विशेषप्रतीतिकृत् न कान्ये इति तस्य विषय
 नोदाहृतम् । S D
- (13) वाक्यभावमवाप्तस्य सार्थकस्यावबोधत ।
 सपद्यते शाब्दबोधो न तन्मात्रस्य बोधत ॥ श श प्र ३२
- (14) आख्यात (साव्ययकारकविशेषण) वाक्यम् । महाभा II 11
- (15) सक्रिया विशेषण च । mbh II 11
- (16) तदस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि एकमभिन्नस्वभावक वाक्यम् । तद्वुध
 बोधनाय पदविभाग कल्पित इति । वा प टीका पुण्यराज ।
- (17) मिथ साकाङ्क्षशब्दस्य व्यूहो वाक्य चतुर्विधम् । श श प्र १३
- (18) वाक्य स्यादयोग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्त पदोत्पद्य ॥ विश्वनाथ सा ६ I
- (19) दुर्गाचार्य on निरुक्त I 17 says सहिताया प्रकृतित्व उपाय ।
 मन्त्रो ह्यविभाज्यमान पूर्वं श्रपेर्मन्त्रदक्ष सहितयैवामिव्यज्यते न पदै ।
 अतश्च सहितामेव पूर्वगम्याय-त्यनुधाना ब्राह्मणा अधीयते चाध्येतार ।
 अपि च याज्ञे कर्मणि सहितयैव विनियुज्यन्ते मन्त्रा न पदै ॥
- (20) यद्यपीहाष्टौ पक्षा उक्तास्तथापि वाक्यस्फोटपक्षे तात्पर्य ग्रन्थकृताम्-
 शब्दकौस्तुभ ।
- (21) VP I : 240 says उपाया शिक्षमाणानां बालानामपलापना ।
 असत्ये वर्तमानि स्थित्वा तत सत्य समीहते ॥
 and पुण्यराज on VP II 57 तस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि,
 एकमभिन्नस्वभावक वाक्यम् । तद्वुधबोधनाय पदविभाग कल्पित ।

- (22) एषं घृणकारस्य भाष्यकारस्य चाखण्डपक्षोऽभिरुचित । पुण्यराज on VP II 37
- (23) उपाधिमेदेनैव शब्दस्य मेदप्रतिभासो न स्वतो नित्यवात्-पुण्यराज on VP II 22 and also अभिज्ञयत्वमप्यासुरूपत्वमागतं शब्द । पुण्यराज VP II 129.
- (24) असत्ये धर्मानि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते । VP II 240
- (25) पदे न धर्मा विद्यन्ते वर्गेष्वयथा इव ।
वाक्यात् पदानामयन्तः प्रविचेको न कश्चन ॥ VP I 173
- (26) यथा पदे विभक्त्यन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः ।
अपोदधारस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्ण्यते ॥ VP II 10
- (27) वाक्यार्थस्यापि तथैव निर्विभागत्वं प्रतिपादयितुमाह ॥ पुण्यराज
- (28) शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।
विभागे प्रक्रियामेदमविद्वान् प्रतिपद्यते ॥ VP II 13
- (29) माङ्गणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद्माङ्गणकम्बले ।
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैवस्युरनर्थका ॥ VP II 14
- (30) तत्राखण्डपक्षे प्रतिभा वाक्याथ । पुण्यराज on VP II 1
- (31) विच्छेदप्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभाऽयैव जायते ।
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादितम् ॥ V.P II 145
- (32) पदैरसत्यैरेवोपाधिभूतैरुपपादितामभिव्यक्त्यामिति ।-पुण्यराज on VP 145.
- (33) उपरक्षेपमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता ।
सार्वभूमिवापक्षा विषयत्वेन वर्तते । VP II 147
- (34) साक्षाच्छब्देन अनित्यं भावनानुगमेन वा ।
इति क्लृप्ततायाः ता न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥ VP II 148
- (35) प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकं सर्वं समनुपश्यति ॥ VP II 149
- (36) समारम्भा प्रतीयन्ते तिरथामपि तादृशात् । VP II 149

- (37) जन्मान्तराभ्यासहेतुकेयम् । पुण्यराज ।
- (38) स्वरवृत्ति विकुरुते मधौ पुस्कोकिलस्य क० ।
जत्वादय कुत्रादिकरणे केन शिक्षिता । II 151.
आहारप्रत्यभिद्वेषप्लवनादिक्रियासु क ।
जात्यन्वयप्रसिद्धासु प्रयोक्ता मृगपक्षिणाम् ॥ II. 152.
- (39) प्रतिभायाश्च शब्द एव मूलमित्याह । पुण्यराज
and also, भावनानुगतादेतदागमादेव जायते ।
आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते ॥ V.P. II 53.
- (40) स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादष्टोपपादिता ।
विशिष्टोपहिता चेति प्रतिभा षड्विधा विदुः ॥ V.P. II 54.
- (41) अयमर्थोऽर्थान्तरसाक्षात् इति व्यवहारात् । लघुमञ्जुषा pp 497
- (42) The S D II says योग्यता पदार्थानां परस्परसम्बन्धे बाधाभावः ।
पदोच्चयस्यैतदभावेऽपि वाक्यत्वे षड्विधा सिद्ध्यति इत्याद्यपि वाक्य
स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षा प्रतीतिपर्यवसानविरहः । स च श्रोतुजिज्ञासा रूपः ।
निराकाङ्क्षस्य वाक्यत्वे गौरश्च पुरुषो हस्ती इत्यादीनामपि वाक्यत्व
स्यात् । आसत्ति मुभ्यविच्छेदः । बुद्धिविच्छेदेऽपि वाक्यत्वे इदानीमुच्च
रितस्य देवदत्तशब्दस्य दिनान्तरोच्चरितेन यच्छतीति पदेन सङ्गतिः स्यात् ।
अनाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतयोरारम्भार्थमन्वैऽपि पदोच्चयधर्मत्वमुपचारात् ।
- (43) सुप्तित्न्तचयो नैषमतिव्याप्तादिदीपतः । श श प्र 13
- (44) घटवृत्ति कर्मत्व
- (45) अर्थैकत्वादेक वाक्य साक्षात् चेद् विभागे स्यात् । मी.सू. II 146
and also एकार्थ पदसमूह वाक्य । शा.भा.मी.सू. II 146
- (46) साक्षात्क्षयव मेदे परानाकाङ्क्षशब्दकम् ।
कर्मप्रधानं गुणयदेकार्थं वाक्यमिष्यते ॥ V.P. II 4
- (47) मेद संसर्गो वा वाक्यार्थ इति यदुच्यते । . एकप्रयोजनत्वादुपपन्नम् ।
शा. भा. on Mī Sū II 1 45
- (48) तस्मात्तेभ्य प्रतीयेताधितत्वात् प्रयोगस्य-मी. सू. II, 1. 4. and also
अपूर्वस्याख्यातपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वम् शा.भा. and also भाष्यशब्दा एधापूर्वस्य
चोदकाः । शा.भा.

- (49) आख्यातशब्द सङ्घातो जाति सङ्घातवर्तिनी ।
 एकोऽनवयव शब्द कमो बुध्यनुगृह्णति ॥
 पदमाय पृथक् सव पद साक्षादमित्यपि ।
 वाक्य प्रति मतिर्भिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् ॥ VP II 1
- (50) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति ।
 आख्यातशब्दे नियत साधन यत्र गम्यते ।
 तदप्येक समाप्तार्थं वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ VP II 327
- (51) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थः । पुण्यराज-on VP II 1
- (52) आख्यात साव्ययकारकविशेषण वाक्यम्-वार्तिक 9 on वा 2 । 1
- (53) अपर आह । आख्यायनं सविशेषणमिति एव सर्वाणि श्रोतानि क्रिया विशेषणानि mbh on Vartika 9
- (54) यथानेकमपि क्त्वान्तं तिङ्-तस्य विशेषकम् ।
 तथा तिङन्त मत्राहु तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ॥ VP II 6
- (55) नास्त्यत्र वाक्यभेदः, मञ्जनीत्येतत् प्राप्पान्येनैक क्रियापदमत्र स्थितमन्यानि क्रिया-तराणि तद्विशेषणान्येव-पुण्यराज, and also बहुष्वपि तिङ्-तंषु सावाकक्षेप्येकवाक्यता । VP II 450
- (56) वाक्य तदपि म-यन्ते यत् पद चरितक्रियम् । VP II 326
- (57) क्रियारहित न वाक्य अस्तीति शब्दो प्रादो निर्युक्तत्वादधद्ध्येय ।
 श श प्र on वा 13
- (58) शब्दो शब्दः, ध्वनि शब्दगुण इति । पुण्यराज VP II 1
- (59) शब्दोऽत्र द्विविधः । वाच्य आभ्यन्तरश्च । पुण्यराज VP II 1
- (60) वाच्योऽपि जातिव्यक्तिभेदेन द्विविधः ।
- (61) तत्राखण्डपक्षे जाति सङ्घातवर्तिनी, एकोऽनवयव शब्दो बुध्यनुगृह्णतिरिति त्रीणि लक्षणाणि (पुण्यराज on VP II 1)
- (62) एव निरशमेव वाक्य वाचकमित्येव युक्तम् । पुण्यराज on VP II 12
- (63) ननु प्रतिभाम् सोऽसावुपाधिकृत एवेत्यर्थः पुण्यराज on VP II 19

- (64) यदन्त शब्दतत्त्व तु नादरेक प्रकाशित ।
तदाहुरपरे शब्द तस्य वाक्य तथैकता ॥ V P II 30
- (65) क्रमो हि धर्म कालस्य तेन वाक्य न विद्यते । V P II 51
- (66) सन्त एव विशेषा ये पदार्थेषु व्यवस्थिता ।
ते क्रमादनुगम्यन्ते न वाक्यमभिधायकम् ॥ V P II 50
- (67) क्रमेवमित्यादयो विशेषा सन्त एव पदेभ्य ऋणेन प्रतीतेभ्योऽवगम्यन्त
इति क्रम एव वाक्यम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 50
- (68) क्रमव्यतिरेकेण शब्दात्मक न वाक्यमभिधायकमस्तीत्युच्यते ।
- (69) क्रम एव वाक्यमिति पदक्रमो वाक्यमुक्तम् । पुण्यराज on V P II 52
- (70) अप्रापि सङ्घात क्रम इत्यभिहितान्वयपक्षे लक्षणद्वयम् पुण्यराज on
V P II 1 and आख्यातशब्द पदमाद्य पृथक् सर्वपद साकाङ्क्ष
मित्यन्विताभिधानपक्षे लक्षणत्रयमिति विभाग ।
- (71) तत्र खड्गपक्षे त्रिविधे लक्षणेऽपि प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज V P II 1
- (72) आख्यातशब्दो वाक्यमिति अस्मिन् पक्षे क्रिया वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज
on V P II 1
- (73) सङ्घातपक्षे क्रमपक्षे च सप्तर्षो वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज on V P II 1
- (74) पदानां परस्परान्वये पदार्थवशादाधिक्य सप्तर्षे स वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज
V P II 41 and also
- सम्बन्धे सति यत्त्वन्वयाधिक्यमुपभाष्यते ।
वाक्यायमेव त प्राहुरनेकपदसम्भवम् ॥ V P II 42
- (75) पदानां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थ समुल्लसती
त्यभिहितान्वयवादिनाम् मतम् । K P II 7
- (76) पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थ । पुण्यराज
and also वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिन K P II 7
- (77) पूर्वमेते यो वाक्यार्थ स वाच्यान्तगत एवेत्यर्थ ।
- (78) अनवगतमेव वाक्यमनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितालीकपदविभागस्य निमित्तमिति
केचित् । तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 6
- (79) पारमार्थिकपूर्वपूर्वपदपदार्थानुमानजनितसंस्कारसहितमन्त्यवर्गविज्ञानमित्येके ।
तत्त्वबिन्दु PP 6

- (80) प्रत्येकवर्णपदपदार्थानुभवभाषितभाषनानिचयलब्धत्रन्मस्मृतिदर्शनाहता वर्णमाटेयये । PP 7 ibid
- (81) पदान्येवाकक्षितयोम्यतासजिहितपदार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थभिधायिनीत्यपरे । PP 7-ibid
- (82) पदैरेव समभिव्याहारवद्विरभिहिता स्वार्था आकाङ्क्षायोम्यताऽऽसत्तिसाग्रीचीना वाक्यायचीहेतव इत्याचार्या । PP 8-ibid

(82 a) We have seen above the view of the Sphota vadins as explained by Bhartṛhari. We will try to see how Vacaspati Miśra tries to refute the above-mentioned view of the grammarians

In the beginning we will see the arguments put forward by the Sphotavadin, which is the pūrvaśāstra here. For him akhaṇḍa Sphota is the nimitta for the vākyārtha. When we take Sphota to be akhaṇḍa śabda we can not take the pada-vākyady vibhāga which we come across on the ordinary plane (vyavaharika-or empirical plane) to be 'akhaṇḍa śabda'. The varṇavadins hold varṇas letters to be nimitta of vākyārtha. But the Sphotavadins may put the following question before the varṇavadin

- (83) सा न तावत्प्रत्येकम्, अनुपलभविरोधात्, वयान्तरोच्चारणतथैव-प्रसङ्गात् तदवाबन्धु PP 25
- (84) नापि मिलिता, तथा भाषाभावात् । तथा हि वास्तवी वा समूह एतेषा माभ्योयते ? अनुभवोपाधिको वा ? ibid
- (85) तत्र सर्वेषामेव वर्णानां नित्यतया विमुक्त्या च वास्तवी सगतिरिति प्रसङ्गिनी केषाञ्चदेव पदवाक्यभावोपपादयितुमर्हति । अनुभूयमाना नवनवानुभवानुसारिणी तत्पर्यायिण पर्यायकनी न समूहभाग्भावांत । न सत्त्वेकदेशकालानवाच्छन्ना समूहवन्तो भवन्ति भावा अतिप्रसङ्गात् । PP 25 ibid
- (86) यो तु खल्वयं सस्कारोऽस्मिन्मात आयुष्मत ? किं स्मृतिवीर्य, अन्यो वा प्रोक्षणादभ्य इव प्रोक्ष्यादे । PP.25 ibid

- (87) तस्मात् स्वसिद्धान्तव्यामोहमपहाय अभ्युपेयतामनुसहारुद्धरेकपदवाक्य-
गोचरता । PP.35. *ibid.*
- (88) गौतम्येक इदं पदमित्येकपदावभासिनी धोरस्ति लौकिकपरीक्षकाणाम् ।
PP 49. *ibid.*
- (89) स स्वरवयमेको वाक्यात्मा वाक्यार्थधीहेतुः अनुभवादवा व्यवस्थाप्यते अर्थ-
धीमेदाद् वा अन्यथा अनुपपद्यमानात् । PP.9. *ibid.*
- (90) न तावत्पूर्वं कल्पः । अवयवव्यूहपरिमाणत्वादवयवानाम् । परममहतां च
घर्णानां तदनुपपत्तेः । PP.9. *ibid.*
- (91) गगनगुणत्वे च अद्रव्यतया समवायिकारणत्वाभावेनावयवमाभावाभावा ।
PP.10
- (92) पूर्वपूर्वाभिव्यक्तिरङ्कारसचित्रोत्तरोत्तराभिव्यक्तिक्रमेण स्वन्यो ध्यनिः
स्फुटतरं विधिष्ठस्फोटविज्ञानमापत्ते इति न वैयर्थ्य । द्वतीयादिष्वनीनाम् ।
नापि पूर्वेषां तदभावे तदभिव्यक्तिजनितनस्काभावेनान्यस्य ध्वनेरसहाय-
तया व्यक्त्यवसासवाक्यधीहेतुभावाभावात् । PP.20 *ibid*
- (93) तत्सिद्धमेतदर्थोपपत्तरनुमानस्य वा निवृत्तिस्तदेकगोचरपदवाक्यः यसाधनीति
स्थित नानवयवमेकं वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य येनैकमिति ।—तत्त्वविन्दु—PP 76
- (94) वाक्यपरपठेषु व्युत्पन्नैर्गोचरैस्तु तावच्छ्रवणं भवति श्रुतं वर्णमेकमनेन
या पदभावेन न प्रतिगन्धते प्रतिसन्धाय पदं व्यवस्यति पदव्यवसायेन
स्मृत्या पदार्थं प्रतिपद्यते पदसमूहप्रतिसंपानाच्च वाक्यं व्यवस्यति
सम्बद्धां पदार्थान्गृहीत्वा वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते । न्यायगुण वात्स्यायन-
भाष्य, III.2.62.
- (95) स रास्वमन्यो वर्गः पूर्वपूर्ववर्गपदपदार्थविज्ञानजनितवासनानिचयसंविद-
धनजेन्द्रियमभिगमजन्यमहणस्मरणरूपसदसद्रूपनिर्मासप्रत्ययपरिवर्तपदवा-
क्यार्थधीहेतुरूपेयते ॥ तत्त्वविन्दु —PP.77.
- (96) न अन्यवर्गभ्रुतिः स्मृता नीता वाक्यार्थबोधिनी, PP.76 *ibid.*
- (97) एतत् मतद्वय संभावनामात्रेणोपन्यस्तं इति चेच्च । तत्त्वविन्दु टीका
तरपदिभावना । PP.7.
- (98) यत् एव तु शब्दा इति भगवानुपपत्तेः—नीमांसाभाष्य 1.1.5 and also
गौरित्यम् क शब्दः ? गकारोच्चारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपपत्तेः । योग-
मुक्ता, ५५ II 1.17.

(99) वृद्धप्रयोगाधीनावधारणो हि श्रुत्यर्थवत् । न च पदमात्रं व्यवहाराद्यं प्रयुज्यते वृद्धा, किंतु वाक्यमेव, तच्चानवयव न्यवेधीति स्मृतिसमास्या वगैरमात्रा परिशिष्यते । सा च नैमित्तिकं वाक्यार्थबोधमाधत्त । पारमार्थिकस्तु पदतदर्थबाधो निमित्तमात्रणावतिष्ठते र्गमालं वाक्याप्रधीहेतु इति । तत्त्वविन्दु-PP-83,84

(100) गौरवाद्धिदशाभावात्तदनुधेरेव भावत ।

वाक्यार्थं धियमाधत्ते स्मृतिस्या नासुरावलि । तत्त्वविन्दु-PP 84

(101) इत्यष्टानां वाक्यानां अष्टौ शक्य कल्पनीयास्तवेति कल्पनागोरधम् । पदवादिनस्तु सप्तानां सप्तैव शक्य इति कल्पनालपयम् । श्रुत्या-
मिति पदप्रक्षेपणं पदवादिनोऽष्टानां पदानां अष्टौ शक्य इति । तत्र तु
योऽष्टापरा इति मद्गौरवमापन्नम् । pp 84 85 ibid

(102) आप च त्रिचतुरपञ्चपदवाक्यवर्तिनीपदार्थप्रत्ययव्यवहितापि वग्नेन वग
माला स्मर्येतापि तदभ्यधिकपदवति तु वाक्ये सातिदुष्करा । P 89
ibid

(103) पदान्याकाङ्क्षिनासमयोग्यनान्तरसगतान् । pp 89 ibid
स्वार्थानभिधन्तीह वाक्य वाक्यार्थमाचरम् ॥

(104) तत्रानभिहितस्वार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थभिधाने पदादेकस्मादेवोच्यरिना द्ववक्षा
प्रतीते वैवर्धमितरेषाम् । pp 93. ibid.

(105) Anvītabhidhānavādī may argue as follows. If we do not accept the anvītabhidhānavāda, then, in that case, we will have to postulate two abhidhāśaktis, viz the one that conveys the sense of individual words and the other that conveys the sense of the whole sentence, after correlating the word-sense. Again says he, there is no fault in our view. Even though every word in a sentence with abhidhā power, conveys the correlated meaning, still, the sense of the sentence is not gathered just by the first word alone. So, it should be held that a word, by abhidhā, conveys its own meaning and correlation and not the meanings of other words. The anvītabhidhānavādīns again put the following question to the abhidhānavādvādīns viz that when we get some knowledge from the words, what

type of knowledge is it ? The Śāstra speaks of four types of knowledge viz pramāṇa samśaya viparyaya and smṛta. Now, arthapratīti can not be taken as a pramāṇa, because pramāṇa occurs only with reference to that which is already existent. Padārtha cannot be supposed to be existent before padaśravaṇa. Nor can we take padārthajñāna as either samśaya or viparyaya (=mithyajñāna). As there is no fifth type of jñāna we should take padārthajñāna as smṛta only. Thus a pada depends on samśayaodbodha and they make for the smṛti in form of padārthajñāna.

विधान्तरावगमात् स्मृतिलक्षणयोगतः ।

अभ्यासातिशयात् रूपस्मृतेर्नान्योन्यसम्बन्धः ॥ pp 100 तद्विन्दु and also न च पचमी विद्या समस्तीति स्मृतिः परिशिष्यते । pp 100 ibid

The k vyaprasaṅga of Mammaṭa also throws light on the anvayabhidhānavāda. Mammaṭa discusses this theory in the second ullāsa and then elaborately in the fifth ullāsa. Accordingly to Prabhakara then the vācvartha is itself the vāk्यartha.

वाच्यार्थ एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्यताभिधानवादिनः । K P

The words in a sentence first express the samanyārtha and then the viśiṣṭārtha. These two are two aspects of the same sense. This viśiṣṭārtha is nothing else than the vācārtha itself.

(106) एव ताददीर्घो न्यायो यदसति बलवद्वाचकोपनिपाते सहकारिणि कार्ये च श्रयामन् दि कारणम् । सति तदभावभाषिते तथा चापस्मृति पदत् । -तद्विन्दु pp 111

(107) तःपूर्वमेव (मानसीनां) स्वर्यस्मृतीनामाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतामतिबहुलारिणीना कारणत्वं वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययः प्रथमस्याम् ॥ pp 112 ibid

(108) ननुक्तं न मानांतरानुभूतानामथरूपाणां वाक्यार्थधीप्रसवसामर्थ्यं उपलब्धम्, उपलब्धे वा सप्तमप्रमाणप्रसङ्गः, आगमस्य वा तत्रैव अन्तर्भावः । तदेव प्रवृत्तादिभिः सह नुपकल्पतयोपन्यसनीयम्, न त्वागमस्तद्वदः । -तद्विन्दु pp 120

(109) न हि मानानुचिद्विधिविति प्रयुक्ते, प्रयुक्ते माद्वयरात्रादिविति वसिष्ठमुचिद्विधिविति वा सौकिन्धः । pp. 121. ibid.

- (111) तथा च तिष्ठ शक्तयः द्वे वा । पदानां हि तावदर्थरूपाभिधानस्याः शक्तिरतदर्थरूपाणां अन्योन्यान्वयशक्तिः, तदाधानशक्तिश्चापरा पदानामेवेति । स्मारकवपक्षे तुल्यशक्तिद्वयम् । अन्विताभिधानपक्षे तु पदानामेकैव शक्तिः तत् कल्पनात्माघवात् एतदेव न्याय्यम् । pp. 133 *ibid*
- (111) तन्मात्रविषये तस्याविशेषात् सर्वशब्दानां पर्यायताप्रसङ्गः । pp. 123 *ibid*.
- (112) अनन्यालभ्यः शब्दार्थ इति त्रैविध्यवृद्ध्या । अत एव मास्यातादौ कर्मादिभिधायिता नाद्रियन्ते । pp. 131 *ibid*.
- (113) तथा हि वृद्धप्रयुक्तवाक्यध्वनिसमन्तरः प्रवृत्तिर्नृत्तिर्द्वयोक्तमयसम्प्रतिपत्तेः स्युरक्तस्य स्युत्पिबुस्तद्वहेतुभ्यस्मनुमीयते । तस्य साधु अभ्यनेकेषु अनुपपन्नस्य पदज्ञातध्वनिसमन्तरः सम्भवतः तद्वहेतुमायमवधारयति । न चैष प्रत्ययः पदार्थमात्रगोचरः प्रवृत्त्यादिभ्यः कल्प्यते इति विनिश्चयं गोचरोऽभ्युपेयते, तद्विशिष्टापरता अवसिता वृद्धव्यवहारे पदानाम् तस्मान् लोकांशसारेण वैदिकस्यापि पदसदमस्य विशिष्टार्थप्रत्ययप्रयुक्तस्य अविशिष्टार्थाभिधानमात्रेण लक्षणया विशिष्टार्थयमकद्वयम् ॥ pp. 153 *ibid*
- (114) सन्निध्यपेक्षयोक्त्यैरूपतक्षणतामन ।
अनन्येभ्यस्त्वितानो स्यान् सब्रमह्म मम ॥ व्याकरणमाला, वाक्यार्थप्रकरण pp. 78
- (115) तस्मान्न वाक्यं न पदानि साक्षान् वाक्यार्थबुद्धिं जनयन्ति किन्तु ।
पदस्वरूपाभिहितैः पदार्थैः सलक्ष्यतः सावि ते सिद्धमेतत् ॥ pp. 79 *ibid*
- (116) वृद्धा युवान् । शशवः कपोताः खड्गे यथाऽमी यपल्लवन्ति ।
तथैव सर्वे युगपत्पदार्थाः परस्परैरान्वयिनो भवन्ति ॥
- (117) एव च न चेदियं पदवृत्तिर्लक्षणा लभ्यमन्वेति भवन्तु तर्हि चतुर्थी दृष्टव्यात् ।
अस्तु वा लक्षणा एव ॥ तत्त्वविन्दु pp. 157
- (118) S ॥ 53) स तात्पर्याद्व्यावृत्तिमाहुः पदार्थान्वयबोधने ।
तात्पर्यार्थं तदर्थं च वाच्यं तद्बोधकं परे ॥ ॥ 2
and also अभिधाया एकैकपदार्थबोधनविरताद्वाक्यार्थरूपस्य पदार्थान्वयस्य बोधिका तात्पर्यं नाम वृत्तिः । तदर्थेन च तात्पर्यायं । तद्बोधकं च वाक्यमभिहितावयवादिनां मतम् । S D
and also आद्योक्तयोर्मन्त्रासन्निधिवशाद् वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपार्णममवयवतात्पर्यार्थो विशेष्यवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थं समुन्तसुनोत्यभिहितान्शवादिनां मतम् । K P ॥
- (119) विषयभागादपि परानेतद्वृद्धमोजनस्य दाहणम् ।
वाच्यादतोऽनुमितिं प्रहरणवस्तुस्वरूपदा ॥

विषयक्षणमनुमनुते न हि कश्चिदकाण्ड एव सुहृदि मुधीः ।

तेनात्रार्थान्तरमतिरार्थी तात्पर्यशक्तिसाः न पुनः ॥ व्यक्तिविवेक-I 67,68 pp. 122.

- (120) मुख्येन अमुरुष. अर्थ-लक्ष्यते स आरोपितः शब्दव्यापारः सान्तरार्थ-निष्ठो लक्षणा । K P. also प्रवीण—शक्यव्यवहितलक्ष्यार्थविषयत्वाच्छब्द आरोपत एव ॥ व्यापार यस्तुतः अर्थनिष्ठ एवेत्यर्थः । तदेतदुक्तम् सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ इति । also उद्योत-सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ इति साक्षादर्थनिष्ठः सांतरा परंपरया शब्दनिष्ठ इत्यर्थः । also साहित्यचूडामणि-अन्तरं व्यवधाने तत्प्रहितः सान्तरं तत्रार्थं निष्ठं तात्पर्यं यस्य ।
- (121) मुख्यपादभाषे तशोभे रुढितोऽयं प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यने यस्मा लक्षणाऽऽरोपिता क्रिया ॥ K.P. II
- (122) See माणिक्यचन्द्र-मुख्यास्य अनुपपत्तेरनुप्रयोगाच्च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन भाषे साहित्यचूडामणि also observes भाषः प्रमाणपराहतावम् ।
- (123) माणिक्यचन्द्र gives the following illustrations (i) अभिषेधेन सवध, गङ्गायां घोष (ii) सादृश्य-गौर्वाहीक गौरेषावम् । (iii) समवाय-साहचर्यम्-कुन्ताःप्रविशन्ति; (iv) वैपरीत्य-भद्रमुल. meaning भद्रमुल (v) क्रियायोग-भद्र इति समरे शत्रुभस्मम् (शत्रुभ a proper name is used with reference to a slayer of enemies)
- (124) तन्त्रवार्तिक notes : अगत्या लक्षणात् तन्ममभिधायकतमेव ।
- (125) केचन कर्मणि कुशलः इतिरूढावुदाहरन्ति । तेषामयमभिप्राय कुशाललातीति व्युत्पत्तिलभ्य कुशप्राहिरूपो मुख्योऽर्थः प्रकृतेऽसम्भवविवेकत्रादिसा धर्म्यसम्बन्धन दक्षरूपं अर्थं बोधयन्ति । तदप्ये न मग्यन्ते । कुशप्राहिरूपार्थस्य व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यत्वेऽपि दक्षरूपस्यैव मुख्याथत्वात् । अन्यद्वाह शब्दानां व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यस्य मुख्यार्थत्वे गौः शेते इत्यत्रापि लक्षणा स्यात् । गमेर्गौ इति गमघातोर्गौप्रत्ययेन व्युत्पादितस्य शाशब्दस्य शयनकालेऽपि प्रयोगात् । S D
- (126) कुशल-द्विरेक द्विकादयस्तु साक्षरसंकेतितविषयत्वान्मुख्या एवेति न रुदि-लक्ष्यस्य अर्थस्य हेतुत्वेनास्मानिरुक्ता । (काव्यानुशासन) ।
- (127) Kumārila-निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चिन्नामार्थ्यादिभिपानवत् ।
क्रियन्ते साम्प्रतं काश्चित् काश्चिन्नैव त्वशक्तितः ॥
- (128) -गौणवृत्तिर्लक्षणाया निष्ठा इति प्रमादराः । तदयुक्तम् । तस्याः लक्ष-
णार्था अन्तर्भावान् । -प्रतापहरीय ।

- (129) शङ्खितभगवत्या अतिरिक्तं गौणी वृत्तिरिति मीमांसका । सा च तदतिरिक्ता नति नैयायिका आहु । -प्रणापद्येय ।
- (130) माणिक्यचन्द्र notes स्मृतिस्तु या लक्षणा सा लोके प्राचुर्यं गतेति न तस्या नयत्थम् ।
- (131) अ भधव्यापारतुल्यैरामाविते भाव ।
- (132) मा णिक्यचन्द्र यत्र शब्द सवधा स्वमर्थ त्यज्जय लक्षयसि तत्र लक्षणेन तदादिज्ञापनं लक्षणा ।
- (133) -उपचारो हि नाम अत्यन्तविशङ्कितयो पदार्थयो सादृश्यातिशय महिम्ना भेदप्रतीतिस्थगनमात्रम् । S D

सुषामागर explains as - उपचारश्च सादृश्यसम्बन्धन प्रवृत्ति । सादृश्यातिशयम ह्मना मिश्रयोर्भेदप्रतीतिस्थगन वा ।

सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी says गौर्वाहीक इत्यादिष्वन् भेदेन प्रतीनयोरैक्यारो पणमुपचार ।

- (134) सम्प्रदायप्रकाशिनी explains अ वसान निर्वचयज्ञानम् । तदिह अत स्मिस्तदेवे यथासरूपम् । माणिक्यचन्द्र says ननु पूर्वस्या (ic सारोपाया), अपि अभेदोऽस्ति रूपकस्याभेदमकृत्वात्, सत्यं, तत्र भासन्नानामात्रणभेद इह तु अत्यासन्नतया ।

- (135) -S D explains अत्र केचिदाहुः शासहचारिणो गुणा जाड्यमायाश्चो लक्ष्यन्ते । ते च गोशब्दस्य बाहीकार्थोभधान निर्मितोभयन्ति । तदयुक्तम् । गोशब्दस्याग्रहीतलक्ष्णेन बाहीकार्थमभिधातुमसामर्थ्यात् गोशब्दार्थमात्र बोधनाच्च । अभिधाया विरतत्वात् विरतायाश्च पुनइत्यानाभावात् ।

अन्ये पुनर्गोशब्देन बाहीकार्थो नाभिधीयते किं तु स्वार्थसहचारिगुण साक्षात्त्वेन बाहीकार्थगुणा गुणा एव लक्ष्यन्ते । तदप्यन्ये न मन्यन्ते । तत्र गोशब्दाद्बाहीकार्थो प्रतीयते, न वा । आयऽपि गोशब्दादेव वा । रुक्षिताद्वा गुणा दविनाभावद्वारा । तत्र न प्रथम । बाहीकार्थस्यासंकेतितत्वात् । न द्वितीय । भविनाभावलभ्यस्याप्यस्य शाब्देऽन्वये प्रवेशायमवात् । शाब्दी ह्याकाक्षा शब्दनेव प्रप्यते । न द्वितीय । यदि हि गोशब्दान् बाहीकार्थो न प्रनीयेन तदास्य बाहीकशब्दस्य च सामानाधिकरण्य असम्भ स्यात् ।

तस्मादेव गोशब्दो मरयया वृत्त्या बाहीकशब्देन सहान्वयमलभमानो अज्ञादिमाधर्म्यमन्त्राद्बाहीकार्थं लक्षयति । बाहीकस्याऽस्तत्वातिशयबोधन प्रयोजनम् । इय च गुणयोगाद् गौणीतुच्यते ।

- (136) माणिक्यचन्द्र says सहचरण स्थान तादृध्ये वृत्त मान-धारण साक्षीप-योगमाधन आधिपत्येभ्यो मय वर राज सवतु चन्दन गङ्गा-शकट-अन्न पुष्पेषु अतद्वत्त चेऽपि तदुपचार ।

- (137) जहल्लक्षणा, अजहल्लक्षणा, जहदजहल्लक्षणा, सारोपा, साध्यवसाना, शुद्धा and गौणी । इत्येव सप्तविधा फललक्षणा ।
- (138) लक्षणामार्गवगाहिल्व तु ध्वने सहृदये नूतनतयोरवर्णितस्य विद्यत इति दिशसु मूलयितुमिदमत्रोक्तम् (अभिधावृत्तिमातृका) ।
- (139) शब्दस्यैवाभिधाशक्तिरर्थस्यैव । अङ्गता । - व्यक्तियिवेक ।
- (140) गोतवारापेण चाहीके तत्साम्यमनुमीयते ।
कोट्यतस्मिन्नतुल्यत्वे तत्त्व व्यपदिशेदुबुध ॥ व्य विवेक 1. 46.
- (141) - चमोक्ति प्रसिद्धाभिधानव्यतिरेकिणी विचित्रैवाभिधा । चमोक्तिजीवित pp 21.
- (142) ध्वन्यालोक 1. 5 प्रनीयमान पुनरन्यदेव वस्तुवस्ति धाणीषु महाकवीना । यत्तद्विभक्तपयवातिरिक्त विभानि लावण्यमिवाङ्गनामु ॥
- (143) ध्वन्यालोक 1.13 यथार्थ शब्दो वा तमयमुपवर्जनीकृतस्वार्थः । व्यङ्ग्य काव्यविशेष स ध्वनि इति सूरभि बधित ।
- (144) हेमचन्द्र explains तत्त्वव्युपजनितार्थावगमपरिज्ञातप्रतिपत्तिप्रतिभा-सहायार्थद्योतनशक्तिव्यङ्ग्यम् । का शा I
- (145) KP11.11- लक्ष्य न मुख्य नाप्यत्र बाधो योग फलेन नो ।
न प्रयोजनमेतस्मिन्, न च शब्द स्वलद्वगतिः ॥
यथा गङ्गाशब्द सोतसि सथाध इति तत्र लक्षयनि, तद्वद् यदि तत्रेऽपि सथाध स्यात्, तदा प्रयोजन लक्ष्ये । न च तत्र मुख्योऽर्थः । नाऽप्यत्र बाध । न च गङ्गाशब्दोऽस्य तत्रस्य पावन-वाद्यै-लक्षणीयै सम्बन्धः । नापि प्रयोजने लक्ष्ये किञ्चित् प्रयोजनम् । नापि गङ्गाशब्दस्तद्विषय प्रयोजन प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थः ।
- (146) प्रयोजनं सहितं लक्षणीयं न युज्यते । K. P II 12
श्रुत इत्याह,
ज्ञानस्य विषयो हान्य फलमयदुदाहृतम् ।
प्रयत्नादेर्नास्ति विषय फल तु प्रकृता सवित्तिर्वा ।
विशिष्टे लक्षणा नैवम् ।
निगदेनैव व्याख्यातम् ।
विशया स्तुस्तु लक्षिते ।
तदादौ ये विज्ञेया पावनवादयस्ते चाभिधानात्पर्यङ्गनाभ्यो व्यापारान्तरेण गम्यः । तच्च व्यङ्ग्यन्यननयोतनादिशब्दवाच्यमवश्यमेवितव्यम् ।
- (147) अनेकाधस्य शब्दस्य याचकत्वे निर्यात्रते ।
मयोगायैरवाच्यायधीकृद्वावृत्तिरङ्गनम् ॥ K. P II 14
- (148) तस्मादभिधानात्पर्यङ्गव्यतिरिक्त चतुर्थोऽसौ व्यापारो ध्वननयोतन व्यङ्ग्यनप्र यापनावयमनास्तिोदरव्यपदेशनिरूपितोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । लोचन 14
- (149) शब्दप्रमाणवैशोऽर्थो व्यनक्त्यर्थांतरं यत् ।
अर्थस्य व्यङ्ग्यवत्त्वे तन् शब्दस्य सहकारिता ॥ K. P III. 3

(150) S.D. 11. यद्वद्व्यञ्जक कृतानां अन्यसंज्ञकवाच्ययोः ।

प्रत्यावेदेशकानां हेतोर्वेदादिकस्य च ॥

Says प्रतीय—अर्थव्यञ्जकताया यद्वद्व्यञ्जकताया नामावश्यक्य-
मात्रम् । न तु शब्दव्यञ्जकतायां सर्वधानुपयोगः । अत्र एव शब्दशक्तिप्रयुक्तात्,
सुरभिमार्गं भवान् भुङ्क्ते इत्यादितो द्वितीयादलीलार्थप्रतीतिः । न तु शुभादि-
प्रयुक्तात् । अस्ति शब्दव्यञ्जकता यच्चित् तन्माहात्म्येन विनापि इत्यन्यदेतत् ।

(151) S.D. II —अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे त्रियन्त्रिते ।

एकनाथेऽन्यधीहेतुव्यञ्जना सामिधाधया ॥

(152) —अत्र प्राञ्च—तत्र शब्दशक्तिमूलो व्यञ्जनाव्यापारः एव शरणम् ।
गम्यन्तराभावात् । वृत्तिवार्तिक — pp. 9.

(153) यद्य तु दूमः — अभावुदयमारुहः न्यादौ प्राकरणिके अर्थे प्राकरणिक-
वदप्राकरणिकेऽपि रात्रकरमण्डतादिशब्दानां परस्परान्वययोग्यवृत्तितद्भाष्य-
धनदेशादिवाचकानां समभिव्याहाररूपमभिधानियामक्रमस्तीत्यर्थेऽयस्यापि
प्राकरणिकत्वं इव प्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकरूपत्वे अप्युभयप्राभिधेय व्यापारः,
यद्योक्तमभिव्याहारस्यापि शब्दान्तरसंज्ञिधिरूपत्वेन प्रकरणवदभिधानिया-
मवत्वात् । pp. 10 वृत्तिवार्तिक ।

(154) ननु एव प्रस्तुतार्थपर्यालोचनालभ्ययोरेव वस्तुतत्त्वकारयोर्व्यञ्ज्युपगमे तत्र
अर्थशक्तिमूलेव व्यक्तिर्मवेदिति पृथगर्थशक्तिमूलत्वनेः शब्दशक्तिमूलो न
स्यात्, इति चेद्, मैवम् । तत्रास्तेऽपि प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतोभयसाधारणशब्द-
सापेक्षतया प्रस्तुतमात्रपरपर्यायशब्दान्त (र) परिकृत्यसहिष्णुत्वेन ततस्तस्य
पृथग् व्यवस्थितेः । वृत्तिवार्तिक. pp. 15

(155) दुर्गांश्चैव-इत्यादौ च द्वितीयां नारयेन इति यदुक्ते महिमभट्टेन,
तदनुभवसिद्धमपलपतो गमनिमीलितैव । S.D.V. ।

(156) इत्थं च नानापरिच्छेदेऽपि सत्पर्यायियः कारणताया शिथिलीभवन्नां अता-
त्पर्यायं विषयशब्दबुद्धिसंज्ञादनाय व्यक्तिस्वीकारः अनुचित एव, शक्त्यैव
बोधदयापत्तेः । R.G. pp. 141.

(157) एवमपि योगू-डेहले रूढेज्ञानेन योगापरहरणस्य सकलतन्त्रसिद्धयारूढ-
नधिकरणस्य योगार्थलिङ्गितस्य अर्थान्तरस्य व्यक्ति विना प्रतीतिः
दुरुपपादा । R.G. 141.

CHAPTER IV

S'ABDAVṚTTIS AS SEEN IN THE DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT SUCH AS THOSE REPRESENTED BY THE VAIYĀKARANAS, THE MIMĀMSAKAS ETC

We may now study the S'abдавṛttis as known to or recognized by the different schools of thought such as those represented by the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas etc. First, we will take up the views of the grammarians. In the Mbh of Patañjali, we find mainly the discussion of the mukhya and gauna artha; i.e. the discussion of the primary and the secondary sense. In the discussion of mukhyartha or the primary sense, we come across terms such as abhidhāna and the like. In the discussion on gaunartha, we find ideas which later on seem to crystallise into gaunī and lakṣaṇī vṛtti.

Vaiyākaranas

In the Mbh, we come across terms such as gauna, mukhya, abhidhātum, abhidhānavat, abhidhānārtha, abhidhāya, abhidhīyamāna, abhidheya, etc etc (1). But, we do not meet with either any precise mention of, or any definition as such of abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣaṇī, or vyañjana. Nevertheless Patañjali mentions two types of meanings viz., mukhya or the primary sense, and gaunī or the secondary sense.

While discussing the type of secondary meaning, he mentions at least four different circumstances under which the secondary function takes place (2). Thus, tatsithya or the relation of location, taddharmya or the relation of substance and quality or function, sāmīpya or proximity, and sīhacarya or being together, are mentioned under pā IV 1 48. Thus we find that Patañjali mentions abhidhāna and the like, which pāc

R 9-b

the way for *abhidhāvṛtti*. *Abhidhā* is thus seen under the name of *abhidhāna* or *mukhyārtha* in the *Mbh*, and the material for the later *vṛttis* of *gaunī* and *lakṣanā* is also seen herein. The material for the *gaunī* lies in the *sādharmya* relation as noted above, while that for *lakṣanā*, in other relations such as *tāsthya*, *samīpya* etc. which lead to the secondary sense. No strict line of demarcation is laid between *gaunī* and *lakṣanā*. When we come to a later grammarian of repute viz. *Bhartṛhari*, we find material which is the source of the later theory of *vyākṛjānā*. In the *Mbh* itself, nothing more definite about *vyākṛjāna* than what we have already noticed earlier is to be seen.

Bhartṛhari, the author of *V P* has divided *s'abdārtha* into *gauna* and *mukhya*, and has shown two-fold *upacāra* (or imposition) with reference to *s'abda* and *artha*. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e.g. the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and 'vāhika', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings (4). A word does not express more than one meaning at a time—*yaugapadyamatikramya paryaye vyavasthate-V P*. The other meanings that are not *mukhyārtha*, are to be comprehended by either context (or *prakaraṇa*) or connexion with some other words (i.e. *yogat s'abdāntareṇa vā*) (5). *Bhartṛhari* holds that the word 'go' which denotes 'govyakti' is also applied to 'vāhika' on account of his *sādharmya* with 'go' (6). He observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes *gauna* and *mukhya*—*prasiddhibhedāt gaunatvam mukhyatvam copapadyate-V P*.

As explained by *Puṇyaraṇya* on *V P* II. 256, the *artha* is two-fold viz. *svārūpa* and *bāhya*. *Svārūpa* is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'govā' of the word 'go'. The *bāhya* is that which is indicated by *upacāra* e.g. when *vāhika* is said to be 'go' (7). Thus far, *Bhartṛhari* gives the basis for *abhidhā* and *gaunī* or *lakṣanā*, almost on the lines of the *Mbh*.

Over and above this, Bhartṛhari discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i.e. a word having multiple senses. Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having more meanings than one, all of which are mukhyarthas. In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc. In this connection, he gives the following verses

vakyāt prakaraṇadārbhādaucityāddeś'akalataḥ |
s'abdarthah pravibhajyante na rūpādeva kevalāt ||
V P II 316

samyogo viprayogas'ca sghacaryam virodhitaḥ |
arthah prakaranam lingam sabdasvanyasya sannidhiḥ |
samarthyamaucitī deś'ah kālō vyaktiḥ svarādayah |
śabdarthasānavacchede viśeśasmṛtihetavaḥ ||
V P II 317 318 (8)

Here, we may ask as to what it is that fixes the particular meaning of the word and debars other multiple senses which it has by convention and usage? To Bhartṛhari this question does not seem to have occurred. For him, saṃsarga or conjunction and the like, link the word to one mukhyartha or the primary sense. But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional sabdavṛtti, over and above abhidhā and gaṇti, and lakṣaṇa. In this, we may see the inspiration for the vyañjanāvṛtti. This is corroborated by the fact that writers like Mammata, Viśvanātha and others mention these very verses (i.e. V P II 317, 318) as authority for their theory of abhidhāmūla vyañjana.

Among the later grammarians, Nageśa (18th cen. A.D.) was the first to recommend the case of vyañjana. He apparently follows the ālampkārikas and repeats the same arguments

Nageśa holds that in certain cases, after mukhyartha or mukhyarthabādhā, as the case may be, gathered, a further

meaning is to be seen. This artha is either prasiddha, i.e. known, or aprasiddha i.e. unknown, and is either related to the mukhyārtha or is unrelated to it. This sort of meaning is flashed upon the mind through vyañjanasakti (9). Thus, Nagesa holds vyañjana to be abhidhāmūla and laksanāmūla. This vyañjana rests on śabda, artha, pada, padaikadeśa, varṇa, racanā, cetādi. When a woman casts a glance of her eye with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested. This apprehension is supported by experience—*anubhavasiddha*. So, even in *cetā*, vyañjana can be seen (10). Vyañjakatva lies both in padas and arthādi. That vyañjana, wherein arthādi are suggested, rests on *vaktṛbodhavyādhivaisṛjyañjana*, or the knowledge of the particular speaker, hearer etc. The *pratibhā* or the genius of the hearer acts as a *sahakāri kṛtānta* (11). In the absence of *pratibhā*, there is absence of the apprehension of the suggested sense. By *pratibhā* is meant the *navanavonmeśa*'glini buddhi. This *navanavonmeśa* is due to *pūrvajanmasamskāra*s or the impression of the past birth. So, for Nagesa, *pratibhā* is that factor which accompanied by *prakaraṇāñjana* in form of the speaker, hearer etc, makes for the apprehension of the suggested sense (12).

This vyañjana is held to be connected even with the previous life (13). In case of *gato'stamarāḥ*, when we desire different meanings the mukhyārtha is never contradicted (*bādhita*). So, the other meaning is not gathered through *lakṣanā*. So vyañjana is not to be included in *lakṣanā* (14). The *nipāta*s and *upasarga*s also are suggestors as are the padas. The *Sphota* is always *vyangya* or suggested and is described as such in the works on grammar. *Bhāṭṭabā* also takes *Sphota* to be *vyangya*. Thus, Nagesa considers vyañjana to be useful even for the grammarians *vaiyākaraṇāṇāṃpi etatsvīkārahavyaḥ* *yakah*.

Mīmāṃsakas

Now we will consider the views of the Mīmāṃsakas. Jaimini and Śābara hold that the language of the Sūtras must,

as far as possible be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance Jaimini says this expressly in *Mi Sū* 1 3 30 When it is said *prayogacodanābbavā-darthaikatvamavibhagat*, 'avibhagat' means that no difference is seen between language of the scriptures and that of common parlance Thus, both words and sentences in the veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage (*Mi Sū* 1 2 32-*avis'itsastu vākyārthah*) (15) However, the cases of veda and loka are not absolutely parallel The *vaidika vākya* is *apauruṣeya* i.e. not of human origin and always true, *laukika vākya* is *pauruṣeya* i.e. of human origin and therefore at times it may not be free from errors because of its human agency A further important point of distinction is that in the case of a *laukika vākya*, the *abhipraya* or some *dṛṣṭa artha* or intention of the particular speaker is more important than the *s'abda* Thus, *sabda* becomes only a means of conveying the *artha* or *abhipraya* or intention (16) Therefore, in a *laukika vākya*, *sabda* in its *vācyārtha* is not strictly honoured Sometimes, the *vācyārtha* is given up in favour of some *lakṣyārtha* which suits the *abhipraya* of the speaker in a much better way (17) In a *laukika vākya*, at times such devices as *adhyāhāra* or implication and *viparīṇāma* or transference are also resorted to (18) In the *vaidika vākya*, nothing else but *s'abda* is *pramāṇa* (19) *Sabara* therefore very often refers to the general rule that *lakṣanā* is not admissible in a *vidhi-vākya*, while it has scope elsewhere (20) Thus, the *Mīmāṃsakas* mention both *mukhya* and *gauna arthas* They seem to accept *mukhya vṛtti* and *gaunī* or *lakṣanā* We will try to see if there is any distinction drawn between *gaunī* and *lakṣanā*.

Jaimini and *S'abara* discuss the two senses viz. *mukhya* and *gauna* under *Mi Sū* III 2 1-2, *S'abara* holds that '*mukhya*' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and as it were the face of the word While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as *jaghanya*, it being also termed as *gauna* as

It is connected with some *guna* (21). Thus, the *Mīmāṃsakas* seem to hold at least two *s'abdavṛttis* viz. *mukhyā* and *gaunī*. They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more meanings, one is its *mukhyārtha* while the rest are all gathered by the secondary power through the relation such as *sādṛśya*, and the like. The word *barhiḥ* means grass primarily, but is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through *sādṛśya*. The word *parvan*, in the same way, primarily means 'samudāya' but through *samudāya-sambandha* it also secondarily means *kāla* (22). Words such as *māta*, having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one (23). It should be noted that *S'abara* seems to suggest that in case of a *gaunārtha*, it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at random. The *s'abdārtha sambandha* is *nitya* and therefore it is inadmissible to apply any word to anything which it has no power to signify (24). It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e.g. *kus'ala*, *praviṇa* etc. In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed the *yaugikārtha* and the other one is based on usage and is termed as *rūḍhārtha*. On account of *prasiddhi* i.e. because of its being more current, the *rūḍhārtha* is taken as the *mukhyārtha* in such cases. The *Mīmāṃsakas* seem to hold that *lakṣaṇa* is resorted to only as a means to avoid *guṇarhākya*, when the primary sense is found to be unsuitable to the context. This again is only as the last resort (25). The *Mīmāṃsakas* hold that the most important principle to be borne in mind is that between the two functions of a word viz. *śruti* (or *abhidha*) and *lakṣaṇā*, the former is stronger than the latter (26). *S'rutya-sambhava* or *mukhyārtha-bādha* is the first pre-requisite of *lakṣaṇā*. On *Mṛ. Śū. VIII.3.34* *S'abara* lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the *vācyārtha* cannot be entirely abandoned. Thus, even the *lakṣyārtha* is bound to be *s'abdārtha*. It cannot be *as'abdārtha* (27). Thus, the condition of 'tadyoga', or connection comes in. This is explained again under

kinds of lakṣaṇā There seems to be no reference to vyākṣaṇā as such

Naiyayikas

We have seen in our discussion of *samketā* that Gotama recognises what is specified as *abhidhā* later on. For him, the *padārthas* or the meanings of the word consist in *vyakti* or individual, *ākṛti* or form, and *jāti* or class. These are the aspects of reality expressed by a word. The acceptance of *abhidhā* by Gotama and other Naiyayikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on *samketā*. As to what is expressed by a word is shown in *Nyāyasastra* II 2 65—*vyaktyakṛtijāyastupadgrthah*. This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class. Now let us see his views regarding *lakṣaṇā*.

We come adross some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or *upacāra* at *Nyāyasastra* II 2 64—*sahacaranasthgnatadarthavyavrttamānādhārana-sāṃpiyāsādhanaḥdhīpatyebhyo brāhmaṇamañcakataraṅgasaktucandanagaṅgāsātalaṅganapuruseṣvata-dbhāve pī tadupacārah* (31-A). Thus Gotama holds that secondary usage or *upacāra* operates on the strength of ten relations such as *sahacāraṇa* (or going together), *sthāna* (or place) etc. The Vātsyāyā *bhāṣya* cites illustrations to the point. Thus, 'yastikāṃ bhojaya' or feed the stick, means the *brāhmaṇa* with a stick is to be fed. This explains the relation of *sahacāraṇa* (or going together). *Sthāna* or location is illustrated in 'mañcāḥ kṛsanti', *īdārtthya* or the relation of purpose is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. *Vṛtta* or behaviour is the relation as seen in, 'this king is Yama or Kubera'. He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. *Māna* or measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure. *Dhārana* or the relation of weighing is illustrated when sandal wood held in balance is called 'tulacandana'. The relation of *sāṃpiyā* or proximity seen as in, 'gaṅgāyāṃ gāvah' or cattle are grazing in the Ganges. Thus the place near the river is called by the name of river on

the strength of *sāṃpya* or proximity 'Yoga' or combination is yet another relation. Thus a black piece of cloth is called black because it is united with black colour. *Sādhana* or means is illustrated when food is said to be *prāṇa* or life. Actually, food is the *sādhana* or means or life. *Ādhipatya* or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of a family is said to be family or house himself (*ayam puruṣaḥ kuḷam, ayam gotram* etc.)

Elsewhere also in the *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* we come across numerous references to *bhakti* and *bhākta artha*. But we do not come across any reference to *vyāñjana*. Word is not accepted to be *vyāñya* and *abhivyañgya* or manifested. 'Vyañgya' is seen only in the sense of 'manifested' and not 'suggested'.

We now turn to the new school of *Naiyāyikas* as represented by *Gaṅgeś'a* (1700 A.D.), *Gaḍadhara* (1700 A.D.), *Jagadīś'a* (1700 A.D.) etc. *Gaḍadhara*, *Jagadīś'a* and *Mathurānātha* (1700 A.D.) are the authors of *Saktivāda*, *S'abdas'aktiprakāś'ikā* and *Vyūtpattivāda* respectively wherein they have dealt with the topic of *s'abda*, *sābdārtha* and *s'abdavṛttis*.

In the *S'abdas'aktiprakāś'ikā* (S' S' Pra) words are classified as below

- (i) words with conventional meanings assigned to them (or *rudha*),
- (ii) words with secondary signification (or *lakṣaka*),
- (iii) words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i.e. *yogarudha*)

and (iv) words, possessing derivative or *yaugika artha* alone. *S'abdas'aktiprakāś'ikā* 16 reads

(*rudham ca lakṣakam caiva yogarudham ca yaugikam* |
taccaturdhā parairudhayaugikam, manyate'dhikam ||)

The word 'gaṅgāyām' in the illustration 'gaṅgāyām ghosah' forms an example of *lakṣaṇa*. Pañkaja is a *yogarudha* word defined as—

yannāma svāyavavṛttilabhyarthena samam / svārthasyān-
vayabodhakṛt tannāma yogarudham, yathā pañkajakṣnasarpa-
dharmadī-S'. S' Pra 26 i.e. they are those which combine
in themselves twofold signification-conventional as well as
derivative. The *yaugika* words are those such as *kāraṇa*,
pācaka etc., that cannot the same meanings as are gathered
by their component parts in which they may be grammati-
cally analysed.

Gaḍādhara in his *S'aktivāda*, discusses the problem of *s'aktigraha*. By 's'akti' he means the *mukhya vṛtti* called *abhidhā*. He discusses at length the topic of *sāṅketagṛahakatva* of this *mukhyāvṛtti*. At places, he touches *lakṣaṇa* also, which is connected with *abhidhā*. In the beginning of his work, he recognises two functions viz. *sāṅketa* and *lakṣaṇā* with reference to *padārtha*—*sāṅketa* *lakṣaṇā* = *artho padāvṛttih* (*S'aktivāda*). He does not go for any further relation. He has neither mentioned nor rejected *vyāñjana* as a *vṛtti*, but his commentators try to interpret him in such a way as to make him refute *vyāñjana*. Thus, Kṛṣṇabhāṭṭa observes that *vyāñjana* need not be recognised as distinct from *lakṣaṇā* and so also *gaunī*. Both *gaunī* and *vyāñjana* can be included in *lakṣaṇā* (32). Another commentator of his, Mādhava, tries to refute *vyāñjanavāda*. The *vyāñjanavādin* figures as an objector here. The objection is that, the *s'aktivibhāga* of Gaḍādhara is not correct, for *vyāñjana* is a separate *vṛtti*. When it is said by the heroine that, *gaccha gacchasi cet kanta*, etc., the meaning, viz., that 'if you will go, I will die', is gathered through *vyāñjana* alone, in the absence of which we fail to gather this sense (33). The *Siddhānti* (i.e. *Naiyāyika*) does not agree with this. If *vyāñjana* is recognised as a separate *vṛtti*, it must have some definite form. If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of *vācya*. When there is the apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to *abhidhāñjana*.

Thus even in vyañjanā, we cannot proceed without the vācya-
ārtha, which is its cause. Thus, vyañjanā is not a separate
vṛtti other than abhidhā.

The vyañjanāvādin accepts something like ■ s'abdivyañ-
janā, e.g. vayasṭhā nāgarāsaṅgārdāṅgāṇām hanā vedanām
From this sentence, two senses viz. (i) a young woman, in
company of a young man, removes the torment of the limbs
of the body, and (ii) Haritākī with Sunthī removes physical
pain, are derived. For the supporter of vyañjanā, it is a case
of abhidhātmikā vyañjanā. But for the Naiyāyikas, the other
sense is also gathered through abhidhā and it is futile to go
for an abhidhātmikā vyañjanā with reference to the pratiyamā-
nārtha (35). Others (i.e. the vyañjanāvādins, the pūrvaśakṣa),
hold that the fact of pratiyamānārtha can be gathered in
poetry, only through vyañjanā, and therefore its acceptance is
inevitable (36). For the Naiyāyikas, this implied sense is
gathered not by any vṛttiviseṣa, but by the faculty of mind.
Thus, vyañgyārtha is just a mental apprehension (mānasa
bodhamātra),—mansaiva vādy's'abodhasvikarat (Mādhavi).

Jagadīś'a, in his s'abdas'aktiprakas'ikā, kārikā 24, refers
to the illustration viz. mukham vīkāsitasmitam etc., whereby
suggestiveness has been established by Mammata and others.
He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of
vyañjanā. He holds that there is no justification to recognise
something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect
meaning of a work is concerned (37).

The so called vyañgyārtha i.e. s'āitya and pāvanatva, or
saurabha (i.e. the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is
derived by the usual mental apprehension, the special beauty
of erotic sentiment (camatkara) also being a matter of mental
apprehension (mānasabodha).

Thus we have seen that language is used both in the
scientific mode and also in the emotive mode. Scientific
usage becomes the source of our abhidhā and the emotive
use accounts for lakṣanā and vyañjanā.

We have thus tried to study the concept of s'abdavyttis in different dars'anas in the historical perspective. The gram-
marians and the Mimāṃsakas, as seen above, were concerned
more with the scientific use of language and therefore they
mention only abhidhā and lakṣaṇa (and also guṇavāda in
case of the latter). The Nāyāyikas also, for the same reason,
see no need of recognising vyañjana. The grammarians, how-
ever as observed by us, enunciate the doctrine of Sphota.
They also provide us with clues regarding the development of
vyañjana. Coming to the ālamkārikas, Ānandavardhana and his
followers clearly define the three vyttis viz abhidhā, lakṣaṇa
and vyañjana. In the discussion of dhvani, they take the
grammarians as their authority and we have tried to show
above that their claim is not unfounded.

Foot Notes

Patañjali has a 'gauna' and 'mukhya' as below

At 1.1.15 एव तर्हि गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रयय इति ।

1.4.108 -गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये संप्रययो भवति । तद्यथा गौरनुबन्ध्य भजोऽ

गनीधोनीय इति न बाहीकोऽनुबध्यते ।

8.3.82-भग्ने स्तु स्तोमसोमा । गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये संप्रतिपत्ति तद्यथा

गौरनुबन्ध्यो etc

अभिधातुम् occurs at 2.3.1 -करोतेऽस्तपयमान कतोऽनवयवेन सर्वं कर्मा

भिषत् कश्चिदात्पुनस्तपयमानया द्वितीयया य कटस्थ कर्म तच्छब्दमभिधातुम् न
हि कर्मविशेषः ।

अभिधीयमान occurs at 2.2.24 25/421,

सामान्याभिधाने हि विशेषानाभिधानम् । 4

सामान्ये ह्यभिधीयमाने विशेषोऽनभिहितो भवति । तत्रावश्य विशेषार्थिना

विशेषोऽनुप्रयोज्यः । etc अथवा विभक्तयर्थोऽभिधीयते एतच्चात्र युक्त

यद्विभक्तयर्थोऽभिधीयते तत्र हि सर्वपक्षात् पद वर्ततेऽस्येति । etc

अभिधावत् at 1.1.58 1.3/153

. अनङ्गवाहमुदहारि या त्य हरसि शिरसा कुम्भ मग्निं साचीनमभिधावन्तम-

द्राक्षीरिति । तस्य यथेष्टमभिसवधो भवति । उदाहारि मग्निं या त्य कुम्भ

हरसि शिरसानङ्गवाह साचीनमभिधावन्तमद्राक्षीरिति ।

अभिधानतः—at 1.3.1. 6/258;

प्रथमभावग्रहणं च । ११ ॥

प्रथमभावग्रहणं च कर्तव्यम् । प्रथम यो भावमाहेति । कुतः पुनः प्राथम्यं किं शब्दतः आहोस्विदर्थतः । किं चातः । यदि शब्दतः सनादीनां घातुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति । पुत्रीयति वस्त्रोयति इति । अपार्थतः सिद्ध्या सनादीनां घातुसंज्ञा ॥ एव तु दोषो भाववचने तदर्थप्रत्ययप्रतिषेध इति । एवं तर्हि नैवार्थतो नापि शब्दतः किं तर्हि । अभिधानतः । सुमध्यमेऽभिधाने यः प्रथम भावमाह ।

6 3 46प्रधानतो वा यतो वृत्तिः ॥८॥

अथवा गौणमुख्ययोर्मुख्ये कार्यसंप्रत्यय तथया गौरतुबन्धोऽजोमीपोमीय इति न बाह्योऽनुवध्यते ।

अभिधानलक्षण—3 3 19. 7/146 :

अकर्तरि च कारके सङ्गायाम् । (3 3 19)

.... 'अतिप्रसङ्ग' इति चेदभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम् ॥ ३ ॥

अतिप्रसङ्गात् इति चेत्तन्न । किं कारणम् । अभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम् । अभिधानलक्षणा कृतद्वितसमासा । अनभिधानान्नभिध्यन्ति ।

अभिधानवत् and अभिधेयवत् at 1 2 51 15/227 .

लुपि युक्तपदव्यक्तिवचने । 1 2 51

अन्यत्राभिधेयव्यक्तिवचनभावाल्लुपियुक्तपदनुदेश ॥ १ ॥

अन्यत्राभिधेयव्यक्तिवचनानि भवन्ति । यवान्यत्र । लुकि । लवण स्य । लवणा यवान् । लवणं शाकमिति । अन्यत्राभिधेयव्यक्तिवचनानि भवन्ति । लुकि । इहनात्माभिधेयव्यक्तिवचनानि प्राप्नुवन्ति । इध्यन्ते चाभिधानवास्तुरिति तच्चान्तरेण यत्न न सिध्यतीति लुपि युक्तपदनुदेश । एवमर्थमिदमुच्यते । अस्ति प्रयोजनमेतत् । किं तर्हीति .. . etc

अभिधानार्थ—2, 3 51. 13/395,

तद्धितार्थोत्तरपदसमाहारे च । 2, 1 1 1 1 1 1

..... अभिधानार्थ ॥ १७१

अभिधानार्थ ॥ समाहारग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । समाहारेणाभिधानं तथा स्यात् तद्धितार्थेन माभूदिति । ... etc.

अभिधाय—5 3 74 4 6/424

कुत्सिते । 5374 इह कुत्सितक अनुकम्पितक इति स्वशब्देनोक्तत्वा
सत्यार्थस्य प्रत्ययो न प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । कुत्सितस्यानुकम्पया भविष्यत्यनु-
कम्पितस्य कुत्सायाम् । अथवा ।

स्वार्थमभिधाय शब्दो निरपेक्षो इव्यमाह समवेतम् ।
समवेतस्य च वचने लिङ्ग वचन विभक्ति च ॥
अभिधाय तान्निवेशानपेक्षमाणद्वयं कृत्स्नमात्मानम् ।
प्रियकुत्सनादिषु पुन प्रवर्ततेऽसौ विभक्तयन्त ॥ etc
अभिधान-1 169 1/178,

अणुद्विषवर्णस्य चाप्रत्ययः । 1.169

अभिधानप्रत्ययः सवर्णान्न ग्रहीष्यति । यान्हि प्रत्ययः सवर्णग्रहणेन
गृहीयान्न तैरर्थस्याभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानान्न भविष्यति । etc
1 260 6/231 -कृत्स्नोपेष्टनदाना च मक्षत्रे । 1 260 ।

कृत्स्नोपेष्टनदाना चन्द्रमसि पङ्क्तौशब्दो वर्तते । बहवस्तेऽर्थास्तत्र युक्त
बहुवचनम् । यदा तयोरेषाभिधानं तदा द्विवचनं भविष्यति ।

1 264 $\frac{18\ 21}{233}$ सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविम्वनौ । 1 264

प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशान्नैकेनानेकस्याभिधानम् ॥१॥ प्रत्यर्थं शब्दा अभिनिविशन्ते ।
किमिदं प्रत्यर्थमिति । अर्थमर्थं प्रति प्रत्यर्थम् । प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेतस्मात्कारणा-
न्नैकेन शब्देनानेकस्यार्थस्याभिधानं प्राप्नोति । तत्र को दोषः । ..etc
also 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 22/241

... ननु चोक्तं प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशान्नैकेनानेकस्याभिधानमिति । यदि चैकेन
शब्देनानेकस्यार्थस्याभिधानं स्वान्न प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशं कृतं स्यात् ।

प्रत्यर्थं शब्दनिवेशादेकेनानेकस्याभिधानमिति चेत्तदपिप्रत्यर्थमेव ॥३०॥ प्रत्यर्थं
शब्दनिवेशादेकेनानेकस्याभिधानादप्रत्यर्थमिति चेदेवमुच्यते । यद्यप्येकेनानेकस्याभिधानं
भवति तदपि प्रत्यर्थमेव । यावतामभिधानं तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्यः । यावतामर्था-
नामभिधानं न भवति तावता शब्दानां प्रयोग इत्येव पक्षो न्याय्यः ।

यावतामभिधानं तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य इति चेदेकेष्यनेकस्याभिधानम् ॥३१॥

यावतामभिधानं तावता प्रयोगो न्याय्य इति चेदेवमुच्यते । एषोऽपि न्याय्य
एव यदा एकेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति । यदि तर्हेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति
प्लक्ष्यप्रोक्षौ एकेनोक्तत्वादपरस्य प्रयोगोऽनुरूपः । . etc

also 1.2.3.5. 79/242..... एकैनोपनत्वादपरस्य प्रयोगोऽनुपपन्न इति चेदनुक्तः प्लक्षेण न्यग्रोधार्थ इति कृत्वा न्यग्रोधशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । कथमतुल्यौ यावतेदानोमेवोपनमेकेनाप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवतीति । सरूपाणामेकेप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवति न विरूपाणाम् । किं पुनः कारण सरूपाणामेकेनाप्यनेकस्याभिधानं भवति न पुनर्विरूपाणाम् ।

अभिधानं पुनः स्वाभाविकम् ॥३३॥

स्वाभाविकमभिधानम् ।

उभयदर्शनाच्च ॥३८॥

उभय सत्यपि दृश्यते । विरूपाणामप्येकेनानेकस्याभिधानं भवति । तद्यथा । याथाज्ञाता । याथा चिदस्मै पृथिवी नमेते इति । विरूपाणां किं नामैकेनानेकस्याभिधानं स्यात्किं पुनः सरूपाणाम् ।

also at 1 3 1 6/258 : मूवादयो घातवः । 1 3 1 . ..

.. प्रथमभावग्रहणं च ॥११॥...etc & see above, अभिधानतः ..

again at, 1.4 51 8/335 कथितेऽभिहिते त्वविधिस्त्वमतिगुणकर्मणि लादिविधिः सत्ये ।

कथिते लादिभिरभिहिते त्वविधिरेव भवति । किमिदं त्वविधिरिति । ..etc.

again, 2 1 1 7/363-संख्याविशेषो व्यक्ताभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषणं च योगः ।

अथैतस्मिन्नेकार्थीभावकृते विशेषे किं स्वाभाविकं शब्दैरर्थभिधानमाहोस्विद्वाचनिकम् ।etc

again, 3.1 7 18/12 धातोः कर्मणः समानकर्तृकादिच्छाया वा । 3 1 7

अनभिधानाद्वा ॥५॥

अथवानभिधानात्सुबन्तादुत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति । न हि सुबन्तादुत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया अभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानात्तत्र उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।...etc

again 2 1.36-²/₃₈₉ अर्थे शब्दो यं पुच्छिन्न उत्तरपदार्थप्रशानरच तत्पुरुषस्तेन

पुच्छिन्नगस्यैव समासस्याभिधानं स्यात्, स्त्रोनपुसकल्लिहस्य न स्यात् ।...etc.

2 1.51. 13/395 तद्विधतार्योत्तरपदसमाहारे च । 2 1.51 ..see अभिधानार्थं above, 2.1 69 24/403 - कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मत्वर्थविशेषाभिधानं यथा स्यात् ।...etc

2 1 67 $\frac{10\ 10\ 15}{403}$

रूपमपि यद्यत्र कदाचिर्कर्मधारयो भवति कर्मधारयप्रकृति-
भिर्मन्वर्थायैरभिधानं प्राप्नोति । सर्वेद्यायमेवमर्थो यन्- कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मन्वर्थायैर-
भिधानं मा भूदिति । ...etcतत्र कर्मधारयप्रकृतिभिर्मन्वर्थायैरभिधानमस्तु
बहुव्रीहिणेति बहुव्रीहिणा भविष्यति स्फुटत्वात् ।...etc

2 2 24 18/421 पदार्थाभिधाने नुप्रयोगानुपपत्तिरभिहितत्वात् ॥४॥ पदार्थ-
स्याभिधाने -नुप्रयोगस्यानुपपत्तिः । विश्वगुर्देवदत्त इति । किं कारणम् अभिहित-
त्वात् । विश्वगुस्तद्देनाभिहितं सोऽर्थ इति कृत्वा नुप्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति ।

2 2 24 13,15/424 न ज्ञानमिदानीदसमानाधिकरणेषु सज्ञाभावः ॥१६॥

अभिधानात् । तत्त्वावश्यमनभिधानमाश्रयितव्यम् । कियमाणेऽपि वै परि-
गणने यत्राभिधानं नास्ति न भवति तत्र बहुव्रीहिः । तथापि एव भुक्त्वन्तो
ऽस्येति ।

अथैतस्मिन्सत्यनभिधाने यदि कृतिपरिगणनं क्रियते वर्तिपरिगणनमपि कर्तव्यम् ।
तत्कथं कर्तव्यम् ।... etc

2 2 29 23/432 पक्षस्य न्यप्राप्तत्वादन्यप्राप्तस्य पक्षत्वात्स्वशब्देनाभिधानं
भविष्यति ।

again at, 2 2 29 25/433. . अभिधानं स्वाभाविकम् ॥१५॥

स्वाभाविकमभिधानम्etc

and 2 3 12, 13/442-न वान्यतरेणानभिधानात् ॥८॥

न वैष दोषः । किं कारणम् । अन्यतरेणानभिधानात् । अन्यतरेणान-
भिधानम् । सद्विषयवेनाभिधानमस्तिप्रत्ययेनानभिधानम् । यतोऽनभिधानं तदाश्रया
सप्तमी भविष्यति । कुत्रो ॥ स्वत्वेतत्सत्यमिधाने ज्ञानमिधाने ज्ञानमिहिताश्रया
सप्तमी भविष्यति ॥ पुनरभिहिताश्रय प्रतिषेध इति ।

अनभिहिते हि विधानम् ॥९॥

अनभिहिते हि सप्तमी विधीयते । नाभिहिते प्रतिषेधः ।.....किं पुनः
द्रव्य साधन आहोस्विद्गुणः । किं चातः । यदि द्रव्य साधनं नैतदन्यद् भवत्य-
भिहितात् । अथ हि गुणः साधनं भवत्येतदन्यदभिहितात् । ...etc

- 2 3 5 14/445 कालाप्यनोरत्यन्तसंयोगे । 2 3 5.

. ...एलिभिरभिधानं यथा स्यात् ।... etc

3 1,7 18/12 see above

3.1.7. 13/13 11/15-अकर्मणो लघुमानकर्तृकाद्धानभिधानम् ॥७॥ इच्छा-
यामभिधेयायां सन्विधीयते न चाकर्मणोऽसमानकर्तृकान्दोषयमानेन सनेच्छाया
अभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानात्तत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।

.....सर्वस्य वा चेतनावत्त्वात् ॥१५॥ ...एवमपि इध्यते ग्रामो गन्तुमिति
परसाधन उत्पद्यमानेन तेन ग्रामस्याभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

3.1.22 9-11/29-एकाग्रजलदिग्रहणे च । २१.....यत्रैकाग्रो हलादिश्चोत्प-
द्यमानेन यद्ध्यस्याभिधानं न भवति न भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः । etc....यत्र चानेकाग्रो
हलादेर्दोषयमानेन यद्ध्यस्याभिधानं भवति भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः । ...etc

3.1.26 22/31 इह ताहि पाचयत्योदनं देवदत्तो यद्दत्तोनेत्युभयो. कर्तृल्लेना-
भिधानं प्राप्नोति । प्रत्ययार्थविशेषणे पुन. सति न दोषः । प्रधानकर्तारि लादयो
भवन्तीति प्रधानकर्ता लेनाभिधीयते यश्चात्राप्रधानं सिद्धं तत्र कर्तरीत्येव
तृतीया । ...etc.

3 1 67 $\frac{1-1-3-9}{58}$ किमुच्यते कृताभिहित इति न लेनाप्यभिधानं भवति ।
अथाप्य लेनाभिधानं आधयितुम् । ...यदि च लेनाप्यभिधानं स्यान्नेदं पक्षान्तरं
स्यात् । .. तस्मान्नैतच्छब्दं यच्चतु लेनाप्यभिधानं भवतीति । भवति चेदाभिहिते
विकरणाभाव इत्येव । etc

again at, 3 4 26 13-18/174 .. ननु च भुजिप्रययेनानभिहितः
कर्तेति कृत्वा अनभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्भविष्यति तृतीया । यदि सत्यभिधाने चान-
भिधाने च कुत्रचिद्वदनभिधानमिति कृत्वानभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्भविष्यति तृतीया
यवाग्वा द्वितीया प्राप्नोति । किं कारणम् । नमुलानभिहितं कर्मेति ।
etc ..etc pp 175...यदि सत्यभिधाने चानभिधाने त कुतश्चिद्वदनभिधानमिति
कृत्वानभिहिताश्रयो विधिर्भविष्यति तृतीया यदुक्तमोदने द्वितीया प्राप्नोतीति स
दोषो न आयते । ...

4 1 48 6/218- सिद्धं तु स्त्रिया. पुंशब्देनाभिधानात् । २१।

सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् । स्त्रिया. पुंशब्देनाभिधानात् । स्त्री पुंशब्देनाकारान्तेनाभि-
धीयते ।

4 1 91. $\frac{14-15}{246}$ अपन्याभिधाने स्त्रीपुलिङ्गस्याप्रसिद्धनपुंसकत्वात् । १४।

अस्याभिधाने स्त्रीपुङ्गिणस्याप्रसिद्धिः । किं कारणम् । नपुसकलिङ्गत्वात् । अपत्यं नपुसकलिङ्गं तेन नपुसकलिङ्गस्यैवामिधाने स्यात्स्त्रीपुङ्गिणस्य न स्यात् । ननु चेदं पुरस्तादेव चोदितं परिहृतं च । उत्पत्तिस्तत्र चोद्यते इह पुनस्तत्पन्नेनाभिधानं चोद्यते ।

4 1 93 5/248 उत्पादयितरि चापत्यपुत्रते स्त्रिया युवत्या अभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

14/249-एवमपि स्त्रिया युवत्या अभिधानं न प्राप्नोति ।

25/250-क्रियमाणेऽपि हि सञ्ज्ञकारिग्रहणे यत्र तात्परादिभ्य उत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं भवति भवति तत्रोत्पत्तिः ।...etc

4 2 1 5/271 रक्षादीनामर्थ्याभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानादुपाध्यायार्थव्ययम् । १।

रक्षादीनामर्थ्याभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानादुपाधिग्रहणमनर्थकम् । न ह्यं रागादुत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं स्यात् । अनभिधानान्तत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति ।

4 3 25 13/307 कस्मान्न भवति तत्रास्ते तत्र शेते इति । अभिधानात् । तच्च बावदयमभिधानमाश्रयितव्यम् । क्रियमाणेष्वपि स्वार्थमिर्देशेषु यत्र जातादिषुत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थस्याभिधानं न भवति तत्र प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिः ।

also at 4 3 155 3-6/325, 4 4 76 14/333, 5 1 59 24/355 and 8 1 4 4/365 in the same sense

(2) Pā IV 1 48 in पुत्रोपादाख्यायाम् ।

सिद्धं तु स्त्रियो पुत्रद्वेनाभिधानात् ॥३॥ अथवा पुनरस्तु तस्यैव मायनेनाभिसवधेन । ननु चोद्यते पुत्रोपादाख्याया तद्विषयलङ्घनमिति । नैष दोषः । नावश्यमयमेवाभिसवधो भवति तस्यैवमिति । अयमप्यभिसवधोऽस्ति सोऽयमिति । कथं पुनरतस्मिन् त इत्येतद् भवति । चतुर्भिः प्रकारैरतस्मिन् इत्येवद् भवति । तात्स्थात् तादृघर्म्यात्सामोप्यात्साहचर्यादिति । तात्स्थात् तावत् । मया हसन्ति । गिरिर्देश्यते । तादृघर्म्यात् । जहिं यान्तं मद्भक्त इत्याह । मद्भक्तं यानि कार्याणि जट्टियपि तानि क्रियन्त इत्यनो जनी मद्भक्त इत्युच्यते । तत्सामोप्यात् । मन्त्राया घोषः । कूपे गर्गकुम्भम् । तत्साहचर्यात् । पुनतान्प्रवेशय । यष्टीं प्रवेशयेति ।

(3) The न्यायकोश observes शक्तिलक्षणाभ्यामतिरिक्तैश्च गौणी वृत्तिरिति नीमांसकाः । सा च तदतिरिक्ता नैति नैयायिका आहुः । (न्यायसिद्धा-तमञ्जरीप्रकाशः)

(4) एकमाहुरनेकार्यं शब्दमन्ये परोक्षकाः । निमित्तमेदादेकस्य सार्वार्थ्यं तस्य भिद्यते । V.P. II 252 also Punyaraja says तत्रैकशब्ददर्शने शब्दोपचारः प्रसिद्धप्रसिद्धिनिमित्तकः ।

(5) अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां वा योगाच्छद्धान्तरेण वा । V.P.

(6) यथा सास्नादिमान् पिण्डो गौशब्देनाभिधीयते ।

तथा स एव गोशब्दो बाहीकेऽपि व्यवस्थितः ॥

(7) पुनराज says : अर्थः शब्दस्य द्विविधः स्वरूपं बाह्यश्च । तत्र निमित्ता-
ज्जाख्यादेशोऽस्य बाहीकेऽप्यनुपज्यते, शब्दस्तु गोत्वमेवाभिधत्त इति बाह्यायोपचारः ।

(8) Punyaraja holds that verses 317, 318 give someone else's views Mammata and others quote them as representing Bhartrhari's views.

(9) मुख्यार्थसंबन्धासम्बद्ध साधारणमुख्यार्थबाधप्रहादिप्रयोज्यप्रसिद्धार्थविषयक-
धीजनकस्य व्यञ्जना ।

(10) अनया कटाक्षेणामिलापो व्यञ्जितः इति सर्वजनप्रसिद्धेस्तरस्या चेष्टा-
वृत्तिवत्स्य अपि आवश्यकत्वाच्च ।

(11) अनया चार्थबोधे जननीये वक्तृबोद्धव्यवाच्यादिवैशिष्ट्यज्ञान प्रतिभा च
सहकारि तद्धीजनकज्ञानजनकमेव वा ।

(12) वक्तृजादिवैशिष्ट्यसहकारेण तज्जनिका बुद्धि प्रतिभा इति फलिताम् ।

(13) एव च शक्तिरेतज्जन्मगृहीतैवार्थबोधिका, व्यञ्जना तु जन्मान्तर
गृहीतापि, इत्यपि शक्यतेः अस्या मेदकम् ।

(14) एव गतोऽस्तमर्कः इत्यादेः शिष्येण सन्ध्याशब्दनादेः कर्तव्यत्वाभि-
प्रायेण गुरु प्रति प्रयुक्ताद्वक्तृतात्पर्याभावेऽपि प्रतिवेद्यादीनामभिसरणीयक्रमादि
बोधस्य वाच्यार्थप्रतीतिपूर्वकस्य वाच्यार्थबाधज्ञानेऽजायमानस्य लक्षणया उपपाद-
यितुमशक्यत्वाच्च ।

(15) M.S 1.2 32 अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः । and also, अविशिष्टस्तु
लोके प्रयुज्यमानानां वेदे च पदानामर्थः । स यथैव लोके विवक्षितस्तथैव
वेदेऽपि भवितुमर्हति । (S B on 1.2 32 pp.150)

(16) MS XI.1.26 लोके कर्मार्थलक्षणम् । and also SB. on it-
यच्च लोकवदिति, लोके कर्मार्थप्रधानम् । कार्यवशात् सकृदप्युक्तो सकृदाहरति,

असकृदप्युक्त सकृदाहरति नाहरति वा । अथैह शब्दलक्षण कर्मणि यथा शब्दार्थे प्रवृत्ति । तस्मात्लोकवदित्यदृष्टान्त । pp 2114 and also see MS XI 1, 62 अर्थात्लोके विधित प्रतिप्रधान स्यात् । and also SB on it- अर्थात्लोके प्रदोषस्य सकृदसकृन्दा क्रिया । यदि सकृत्कृतं सर्वं प्रकाशयति, सकृत् क्रियते, अथ न प्रकाशयति, ततोऽपकृत् । तत्तदवास्य प्रयश्चसामर्थ्यम् । अथैह विधिन वक्त्रकारोऽनुवक्त्रो वा गम्यते, न प्रत्यक्षेण । SB pp 2129 and also शब्दलक्षण कर्मणि शब्दामिहित गम्यते, न लोकाभिप्राय । (SB on X 5 57 pp 1968) लोके कर्मार्थलक्षण भवति, न शब्दलक्षण यथाऽर्थस्तथा क्रियते, न यथा शक्त । वेदे तु शब्दमेवार्थाऽवगम्यते । तथैवानुष्ठेयमिति । SB on VI 8 27 pp 1516 and also शब्दप्रमाणत्वा वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माक प्रमाणम् । । लोके तु कार्यं दृष्ट्वा बोधितमबोधितमप्यनुष्ठीयत एव । (SB on III 2 36 pp 793) and also लोके कर्मार्थलक्षण, शब्दलक्षण पुनर्वेदे । SB on III 1 17 pp 726) and also लोके अर्थलक्षण सत्यवहारे । येन येनार्थं समुत्पेन वक्त्रोऽनुवक्त्रो वा स समुत्पेतेव । इह तु वेदे शब्दलक्षण । SB on III 1 16 pp 725 etc

(17) यथा लोके प्रत्यभुग्देवदत्त इत्युच्यते । यद्यपि सूत्राकादिभिरधिक प्रत्यो भवति, तथापि भुजौ प्रत्यो निर्विश्यते व्यञ्जनान्बोदनार्थानि । SB on X 8 29 pp 2079

(18) लौकिकेषु तु वाच्येष्वेव गम्यते । तानि हि विज्ञातेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यमाना न्याय्याहार्यणानि गौणानि विपरिणतम्यवहितार्थानि च प्रयुज्यते । तस्मात्तन्मा- हस्याद्वयनावगम्येक्ष्यर्थेषु भवति तत्वरूपे विध्याश्रय । यथा मृगतृणादिषु । SB on IV 3 2 pp 1247

(19) See 16 above and also • न शब्दप्रमाणकानामन्तरेण शब्द भवति-र्याप्या । (SB on VI 1 3 pp 1353) शब्दलक्षणे च कर्मणि शब्दो न प्रमाणम् । (SB on X 5 44 pp 1962)

(20) नन्वनुवादेऽपि लक्षणा । अनुवादपक्षे लक्षणाया दोष । SB I 4 22 pp 364 अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधी (SB on IV 4 91 pp 1278) यज्ञयुषशब्दवानुवादपदो न्याय्यो न विधिरसि । गौणो हि स भायुषशब्द यागादिषु । (SB on IV 1 8 pp 1201)

(21) क पुनर्मुंक्ष को वा गौण इति । उच्यते । य शब्दादेवावगम्यते, स प्रथमोऽर्थो मुख्यः । मुपमिव भवतीति मुख्य इत्युच्यते । यस्तु सल

प्रतीतादर्थात् केनचित्संबन्धेन गम्यते, स पश्चाद् भावाज्जवनमिव भवतीति जघन्य । गुणसम्बन्धाच्च गौण इति ।

(22) नायमुभयत्र पर्वशब्दो वर्तते । यदि कारवचनस्तत्संबन्धात्समुदाये गम्यते । यदि वा समुदायवचनस्तत्संबन्धात्काले । अन्यतरवचनो नोभयवचन । तत्र समुदायवचने कल्प्यमाने प्रकरणमनुगृहीतं भवति । अवि च पृणाते पर्वशब्दः पृणोति च दाने प्रसिद्धः । दानानि च समुदायाः । तस्मात् समुदाया भोज्याः । एव शब्दावयवप्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भवति । S B on IX 2 53, pp 1739)

(23) अनेकम्याप्येक शब्दो भवति वाचकः । तद्यथा मातेति मातरमपि वदति मातारमपि । माता च परम देवता समा च पुत्रेष्वित्येतैरुपबद्धमानो जननीवचनोऽवगम्यते । माता सम क्षिप्रं जेत्येभिरनुबध्यमानो धान्यस्य मातुर्वाचकः । (S B on X 14 pp 1810)

(24) शब्दे उच्यन्ति नत्र तावन्मुखा प्रतिपत्तिः । शब्दे कार्यस्यासमवायर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । यथा गामानयेति । इह तु शब्द इव कार्यं समवति, नार्थः । अतोऽत्र शब्द विज्ञास्यामः । पूर्वस्मादेव वाद पापीयान् । कस्मात् । औत्पत्तिकत्वात् । औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नो संबन्धः । यो हि शब्दो यस्मिन्नर्थे औत्पत्तिकेन संबन्धेन प्रसिद्धो न ततोऽन्य प्रत्यावयितुं शक्नोति । न हि गोशब्देनाश्वोऽभिधातुं शक्यते । S B on शब्दमात्रमिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिकत्वात् । MI SI VIII 2 4-5 pp 1542

(25) यदाञ्जस्येन शब्दार्थौ नावकल्पते तदा रक्षणायापि कल्प्यमान साधुर्भवति । यथा अग्नौ तिष्ठति, अवरे तिष्ठति अग्निसमीपे तिष्ठत्यवटसमीपे तिष्ठतीति भवति सव्यवहारः । रक्षणादि लौकिक्येव (S II on pp 488) श्रुत्यसमवे रक्षणायापि व्यवहारो भवति । यथाग्नौ तिष्ठत्यवटे तिष्ठतीति । (S B on pp 1485) and also श्रुत्यसमवे रक्षणापि न्याय्यैव । S B on pp 1280 असति श्रुत्यर्थे रक्षणायां ग्राह्यः । S B pp. 1551, again, मुख्याभावे गौणो गृह्यते (S II 1437 pp) समवति श्रुत्यर्थे रक्षणायां ग्राह्यः । S, B pp 1560 and also भवति रक्षणायापि शब्दार्थे (S B pp 1230) अगतिश्चैषा यत्क्षणापरिग्रहः । S B on pp 1545, again, त्रित्वं हि चतुष्टयादीनि साहचर्याच्छक्नोति रक्षयितुम् । रक्षणा त्वाधिना भवति । किं क्रियताम् । अगत्याधीयते । सत्या गतौ नाश्रयितव्याः । S B pp 2021

(26) श्रुतियलक्षणाया ज्यायसी । S B pp 134, श्रुतिलक्षणाविषये श्रुति ज्यायसी । S B pp, 324 श्रुतिलक्षणाविषये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या न लक्षणा । S B pp 565 1244 1262, श्रुतिलक्षणाविषये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । S B on pp 1210 1222, again श्रुतिश्च लक्षणाया गरीयसी S B pp 1260 श्रुतिश्च लक्षणाया बलीयसी S B pp 1278; श्रुतिलक्षणयोश्च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । S B pp 1556, and also श्रुतिश्च लक्षणानो न्याय्या । S B, pp, 2243,

(27) स्वार्थे वर्तमान सादृश्य ममयति । स्वार्थं जहत् कथं गमयेत् (S B on VIII 3 34) and also, न च लक्षणया प्रयोगे शब्दार्थं परिच्छिद्यते । यत्कारण स्वार्थे वर्तमानोऽर्धान्तरं लक्षयति । स्वार्थं जहन्नेव लक्षयेत् । S B on VIII 3 34

(28) कथं नु स्वार्थाभिधानेन प्रत्ययव्यवस्येति चेत् । अर्थसम्बन्धात् । सिंह इति निरुक्तिं प्रमत्तकारिता तत्र प्रायेणेति प्रसन्नकारीति गम्यते । अर्थं प्रयत्नसामर्थ्यात् । यो हि मन्यते प्रसन्नकारीति गम्यते । अर्थप्रयत्नसामर्थ्यात् । यो हि मन्यते प्रमत्तकारिण प्रत्याययेमिति क्व यदि सिंहशब्दमुच्चारयति सिद्धत्वाभिप्रेतम् । सिंहार्थं प्रतीतं सवधादितरमर्थं प्रत्याययति । एव स्वार्थाभिधाने तद्गुणसम्बन्धं प्रतीयते । S B on I 4 22 pp 357-360

(29) गुणसयोगाद्यदगौणमिदमभिधानं भविष्यति । भवति हि गुणादप्यभिधानम् । यथा सिंहो देवदत्तः, अग्निर्माणिक्य इति ।

(30) गुणवादस्तु । गौण एव वादो भवति यत्सबन्धिनि स्तोत्रव्ये सवन्ध-तरं स्तुयते । S B pp 213

(31) (S B on III pp 187) गुणवादस्तु स्यात् । यथा स्तेनो प्रच्छन्नरूपा एव च मन इति गौण शब्दः । Thus stenapp manah is gunavada-and also, स्यात्, प्रायात् । MSu I 2 11.

(32) एव च गौणीव्यञ्जनयोः पृथग्गृहित्वेन न्युक्तं, तयो लक्षणाया मतर्भावसम्भवात् ।

(33) एतद्विभाजनमनुपपन्नम्, व्यञ्जनाया अतिरिक्तवृत्तत्वात्^{etc}

(34) व्यञ्जनात् यज्ज्यशब्दत्वेऽप्यस्य कार्यतावच्छेदकघोटौ गौरवात् । माधवो, शक्तिवादटोका.

(35) तादृशबोधे तात्पर्यज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वे शक्त्यैव तादृशबोधसंभवे अभिषा
मूलव्यञ्जनास्वीकारानुपपत्तेः । pp. 2. Ibid.

(36) न च व्यञ्जनावृत्तिरवानुपगमे तत्र तत्र तादृशबोधस्य अनुभवसिद्धस्य
अनुपत्तिरित्यपत्त्या वृत्तिव्यमज्जीकार्यमिति वाच्यम् ।

(37) यथाकथञ्चिदुपनयवशेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीसम्भवात् । मानौरधिक-
मुल्लप्रमेदपर्यवसित चमत्कारं सत्यपि शब्दस्यैव मानसस्यापि बोधविशेषस्य हेतु-
त्वायाः सुवचावात् । व्यञ्जनाख्यपदार्थान्तरस्य स्वरूपसत्त्वाया अन्वयेषुदौ तद्-
हेतुत्वस्य च प्रमाणविरहेणासत्वाच्चेति संक्षेपः । शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका, का. 24

CHAPTER V

S'ABDAVRITIS—as in the earlier ālaṃkārikas

Bhāmaha (Last quarter of the 7th Cen A D -Middle of the 8th Cen A D -De (S P.) P. 49-50, Ed '60

Dandin (First half of the 8th Cen De ibid, p. 67.

Vjmana (Middle of the 8th and Middle of the 9th Cen. A D. i e. about 800 A D -De ibid, p. 80

Udbhata (End of the 8th Cen. A D. and beginning of the 9th Cen A D.-De ibid, p. 73

and Rudrata (Middle of the 9th Cen A.D De ibid, p 85.

Sabdavrttis in earlier writers on Poetics

It should be noted at the outset that the earlier writers on poetics such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc., do not discuss the problem of S'abдавrttis theoretically like later writers such as Mammata. So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in their works. However, we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of the functions of a word.

Bhāmaha

We begin with Bhāmaha. In Bhāmaha, we come across some direct or indirect references to abhidhā as below. In the verse 19 which reads as,

“s'abdas'chando'bhīdhanārthā, itihāsas'rayaḥ kathāḥ

loko yuktā kalās'cetī mantavya kavyagaurhyamī”...—he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study. They are s'abda or grammar,

chandas or metrics, abhidhāna or lexicography, itihāsa or traditions etc. Thus, abhidhāna is here used in the sense of lexicon. However, Abhinava quotes from Udbhata's vivaraṇa of Bhāmaha as follows

sabdas'chandobhidhānārthāḥ iti , abhidhānasya s'abdabhedam
vyākhyātum bhāttodbhāto babhāse-s'abdanāmabhidhānam abhi-
dhāvyāpārah, mukhyo guṇavyūttis'ca

If this interpretation of Udbhata is correct, we may say that Bhāmaha here refers to abhidhā vṛtti by 'abhidhānam'. We have seen that earlier writers use the term abhidhāna to refer to abhidhā. But this interpretation of Udbhata seems doubtful, if we strictly adhere to the context which purports to enumerate the several branches of learning as noted above.

However, in the following passages we will find that Bhāmaha is familiar with the theory of abhidhā.

At III. 21, and III. 25, we come across the mention of the word 'abhidhā', but in both the cases, it means 'mere expressing' or 'naming' and not abhidhāvyāpāra. But, while discussing the fault called 'avācaka' at I. 41, Bhāmaha says that—
saksādarūḍham vācyerthe nābhidhānam pratiyate— The line means that an expression which is not conventionally related to the direct meaning is not understood. Here, the terms viz 'vācya artha' and 'saksādarūḍham' show his familiarity with abhidhā.

The following discussion shows that Bhāmaha knows very well the theories of Sphota and apoha which are mentioned by later writers in connexion with abhidhā. Bhāmaha, of course, does not accept the theories of Sphota and apoha in this connexion.

In the sixth pariccheda Bhāmaha discusses the nature and scope of sabda. He also tries to strike some definition. In the

related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal

Finally, at VI 20 he concludes that it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts

(VI 20—varnabhedagadidam bhinnam varnāhsvāgms'avikalpatah |
ke sabdāh kīṇca tadvyamityaho varṇma dustaram ||

He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on dravya or object, kriyā or action, jāti or class and guṇa or quality (VI 21)

From the above discussion it follows that Bhaṁaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VL 13 14) and his views seem to be very near to those of the Mīmāṃsakas. It may be noted that from the above discussion, it follows that Bhaṁah seems to be quite familiar with abhidhā

As to Bhaṁaha's familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particularly vyañjanā, we may say that vyañjanā does not occupy the same place as abhidhā, in his mind, i.e. he does not seem to have known vyañjanā as a separate vṛtti. He, however, uses different forms of vi+√an with the later meaning of vyañjanā at different places. We will consider these usages

At I 73, we come across the word 'vyajyate' as in,

hi śabdenāpi hetvarthaprathāgduktasiddhaye |
ayamarthantaranyāsaḥ sutaram vyajyate yathā ||

—by the word 'hi' the idea of supporter and the supported or the samarthyasamarthakabhāva is suggested

At I. 79, sāmāsokti is defined as,

yatrokte gamyate nyo'rthah tatsamānavis'esanah |
sa samāsoktiruddistā samkṣiptārthatayā yathā ||

Herein, we have a reference to another sense to be gathered by implication

At III 10 paryāyokta is illustrated and explained Bhamaha says that Kṛṣṇa's reply to S'isupāla's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison—rasadanavṛttaye This is also only implied At III 11 udātta is only illustrated as,

udāttaṃ saktimān rāmo guruvakyānurodhakah |
vihayopavanaṃ rājyam yathā vanamupagamat ||

Here the idea of Rāma's virtue is only implied III 21 defines apahnūtī which also carries the same touch as seen above. (It is defined kiñcidantargatopama)

At V 58, we come across the term 'vyajyete' as in

~'yatra dr̥ṣṭāntamātreṇa vyajyete sādhyasādhane |
tamābuh s'uddhad,ṣṭāntam tanmātraviskrteryathā ||

Herein, says Bhamaha, the sādhyā and sādhanā are just suggested by the illustration This according to Bhamaha makes for 'dr̥ṣṭānta' which differs from upama At V 60 also, we have 'vyajyeran' to the same effect

V 60 reads

kathamekapādenaiva vyajyerannasya te guṇāḥ |
iti prayujyate santah kecīdvistārabhīravaḥ ||

In V 59 Bhamaha has given an illustration of pure dr̥ṣṭānta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dilīpa, Aila, Pradyumna and Naravahana, thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king In V 60 says Bhamaha that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word as in V. 59 illustrated above Thus herein, we see a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dilīpa etc are suggested by their naming

In his discussion of various alamkāras, we see that he takes for granted vyaṅgyārtha or implied sense, e.g. in aprast-utaprasaṃsṭ, dīpaka, vyajastuti, nīdars'ana etc This point is

further elaborated in a separate chapter called 'Pratīyamānārtha' in the earlier alamkāras'

Dandin

In the Kāvyaḍars'a of Dandin we come across the following direct or indirect references to the different sabdavrttis. There is no reference to abhidhā as such.

We come across some references to gaunavrtti or laksanā as follows :

At L95 Dandin says that words such as nisthyūta, udeyina, vṛta etc are said to have been used in a charming way only when they are found in the secondary sense Says he

nisthyūtodīṣṇavānīdī gaunavrttivyapā'rayam |
atisundaramaryātra gramakakṣam vigṛhate ||

At IL 254, he says

temi prayogamārgesu gaunavrttivyapā'rayaḥ |
atyantasundaraḥ drṣṭastadudahrtayo yathā ||

He says that at times in 'hetu alamkāra' the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or, the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place These are actually instances where gaunavrtti functions

At IL 100 samānarūpa prahelikā is defined as
samānarūpa gaunvrttaropitairgrathitā padaiḥ |
parusa laksanāstīvan ātravyutpāditas'rutīm ||

Thus, the texture of samānarūpa prahelikā is woven with gaunvrttaropita padas, i.e. words having a secondary sense.

As in Bhāmaha, so also in Dandin we do not come across any mentioning of vyāṇanā as such by name However, we come across different forms of the root, vi+√āṇ in sense of 'to suggest'. We also meet with the term 'pratīyate' in the sense of 'to

implied'. Thus, Dandin seems to know a lot also of what is called implied sense or *pratyamāṇa artha*

At I 76 Dandin defines the *guṇa* called *udātta* as
utkarṣaṇaṁ guṇaḥ kaścit yasminnukte pratiyate |
tadudāttaḥvayaṁ tena saṁāthaḥ kāvyapaddhatih ||

Thus *udātta* occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is gathered—*yasminnukte*—there is an implication of some high quality. This is an indirect reference to *vyāñjana*,

At II 14, *upamā* is described as—
yathākathāncit sādṛś'yam
yatirodbbutam pratiyate |
upamā nāma sa tasyah
prapañco yam pradars'yate ||

Thus in *upamā*, there is an experience of similarity either by *abhidhā*, or *lakṣaṇā* or *vyāñjana*

At II 16 *vastupamā* is said to be *pratiyamāṇaikaadharmā*. In *prativastupamā* also (II 46) there is '*sāmyapratīti*' in an implied way. We will see later on that so many varieties of *upamā* have similarity implied in them. At II 65 Dandin says that words such as *spardhate*, *jayati*, *dvesti*, etc. are *sādṛśyasucakāḥ* or suggestive of similarity. At III 136 *anujñā ākṣepa* is said to occur where through apparent *anujñā* or acceptance something else is implied. Says he

ityanujñā mukhenaiva kṛtasyakṣipyate gatiḥ |
maranam sūcayantyeva sonujñākṣepa ucyate ||

Thus there is some element of suggestion involved in this. So also, in *asṛvacaṇākṣepa* (II 142) the *Nāyikā* suggests her own helplessness (*svāvasthāṁ sūcayantī*).

At II 180 *vyatīreka* is defined as, *sabdopātte pratiyate*
vā sādṛś'ye vastunordvayoḥ |
tatra yadbhedakathanam vyatīrekah sa kathyate ||

Thus vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity II 189 mentions vyatireka which has pratiyamānasādṛśya

At II 234 Dandin holds utpreksā to be suggested by words such as manye, s'anke, dhruvam etc says he

manye s anke dhruvam prāyo nūnamjtyevamādiḥ |
utpreksā vyajyate s'abdarivas'abdo'pi tādrśah ||

Thus II seems that Dandin considers utpreksā to be implied only

At II 303 udatta is explained Dandin says that in the two illustrations (at II 301 and II 302) āsayamāhatmya and abhy-udayagaurava, are respectively suggested-suvyañjita

{purvatras'ayamāhatmyamatrabhyudayagauravam |
suvyañjitamiti proktamudattadvayamapyadah ||

At II 350 nidars'ana is said to contain suggestion
yadi candrāmsubbhīh sprstā dhvāntarāṇi parabhavam |
sadyo rajaviruddhānām śucayanti durantatām ||

Thus there is an indirect reference to vyañjana

We will see in greater detail later on that as in Bhamaha, so also in Dandin we can read a lot of pratiyamāna element in the different alakṛas such as dipaka, samāsokti, aprastutaprasāṃsā, vyajastuti etc.

Vamana

Vamana, in his Kāvyaśamkārāsūtravṛtti very often refers to 'bhakti lakṣaṇa' or 'gaunārtha' and upacāra But he also, does not mention vyañjana He, however, seems to touch vyañjana only indirectly

At I : I, he say that the word 'kāvya' here stands for word and sense embellished by guṇa and alakṛa But, by 'bhakti'. i.e through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to s'abdarthamātra or 'word and sense' alone

(kāvya's'abdoyam guṇalakṛa-saṃskṛtayoh sabdarthayoh
vartate |
bhaktya || s'abdarthamātravacanō'itā gṛhyate ||)

On I : 11 Vāmana says that the word 'arocakī' and 'satṛṇ-
abhyavaharī' are metaphorically used (arocakīsatṛṇābhyavaharī-
s'abdau gaunārthau) Vāmana holds that in vaidarbhī the
presence of all the arthagunas makes for the charm (tasya-
marthagunasampadāsvādya bhavati) Now this totality of
arthagunas by themselves, as it resides in the diction called
vaidarbhī itself is known by the name of vaidarbhī I : 22
says sa'pi vaidarbhī tatsiḥyat

Vāmana then adds sapriyamarthagunasampad vaidarbhītyukta
tatsiḥyadityupacarataḥ vyavahāraṁ dars'ayati Thus, it is used
secondarily

At II : 12 Vāmana considers the fault called 'neyartha' He
holds that when some meaning which is not heard of in the
particular sentence is somehow inferred, it makes for the fault
of 'neyartha' The term viz 'pañktivihangamanābhrī' for
'Dasaratha' is an instance in point By 'pañkti' is meant 'ten'
by 'vihangamanāma' is meant 'cakravāka' Ratha or chariot
is one that bears the name of 'cakravāka' on itself Thus 'pañkti
and 'vihangamanābhrī' means 'Dasaratha' This makes for
the fault of neyartha Then, it is argued that if you find neyartha
in such illustrations then the word 'rathāṅgama' for cakra-
vāka, used by all poets, also will be an illustration of neyartha
To this, Vāmana says na tesāṃ nirudhalakṣanaivāt Such
words as 'rathāṅgama' for Cakravāka are instances of nirudha-
lakṣaṇā i.e. what later alamkarikas call lakṣaṇa based on rudhī
or convention

II : 14, Vāmana says that whatever has an obscene sense
as the other sense is asī'sīla and it is a dosa (asabhyārtan-
taramasabhyasmṛtibhetas' caśīlam) But, he adds at II : 15 that
secondary usage does not fall under this He says, na gupta-lakṣit
asamvṛtaṁ At II : 17, he defines lakṣita as lakṣanīkāsabhyam
lakṣitam i.e. if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is
called 'lakṣitam' and it does not make for the fault of asī'sīla

Under IV. iii 7, Vāmana notes that gaunārtha, lakṣanikārtha can also become an alamkāra. He says—yathā ca gaunasy-alamkaratvaṃ tathā lakṣanikasyāpiti dars'ayitumāha—and he quotes sūtra IV. iii. 8 sādṛśyāllakṣaṇa vakroktiḥ. He says : bahūni hi nibandhanāni lakṣanāyām tatra sādṛś'yāllakṣaṇā vakroktirasaviti. Thus he knows a variety of lakṣaṇās but chooses only one based on similarity as the germ for vakrokti. 'The illustration cited is 'janmabhūmiḥ'. Vāmana says : tadeva-sabhyarthāntaram . l'kṣanikenāsabhyenarthenaṇvītam padam lakṣitam yathā janmabhūmiḥ iti. Vāmana adds that here this word viz-janmabhūmiḥ means the female organ only secondarily and not by the power of expression—taddhī lakṣanāyā guhyartham na svas'aktiḥ iti.

He quotes an illustration in which 'unmīlana' and 'nimīlana' : e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of eye are superimposed on kamala and kairava, through similarity, and secondarily mean the blossoming and fading of the respective flowers ('sādṛśyat vikāśasamkochau lakṣayataḥ'). He cites some more illustrations to the same effect and adds : ityevamādisu lakṣanārtho nirūpyate iti lakṣaṇyāmeva jhātī arthaprati-pattiksamatvaṃ rahasyamgacaksata iti. The secret of lakṣaṇā lies in an immediate gathering of the sense. He says that lakṣaṇā based on something else than similarity does not make for vakrokti—āsādṛśyanibandhanā tu lakṣaṇā na vakroktiḥ.

In at IV. iii 9, he defines utprekṣā, the source of charm is adhyavasāna which is neither adhyāropa as in case of rūpaka, nor lakṣaṇā as in case of vakrokti. Says he na punaradhyāropo lakṣaṇā vā.

At v. : 15, he discusses the topic of words that can or cannot be used in poetry : e. those that are prayojya or aprayojya. He says : (v. : 15) — lakṣaṇās'abdhāśca, and adds : lakṣaṇāśabdhās'ca atiprayuktaḥ prayoktavyaḥ. yathā dvirepha-rodara-śabjau bhramara-caḥravakārtbau lakṣaṇāparaṇ. He adds that : anati-prayuktāśca na prayojya yathā dvikah iti. Thus

Vāmana here refers to what is termed as *rūḍhimūla lakṣaṇa* later on

As already noticed by us, Vāmana does not refer to *vyāñjana* directly. But in places, he notes certain illustrations of 'punarukta' or repetition, which are actually not 'punaruktadoṣa' according to him. He says that such words or such repetitions are charged with further sense. This is an acceptance of the implied sense. But as to how this implied sense is gathered is not made clear by Vāmana.

In II ii 13 he cites certain illustrations. Thus says he, "dhanurjyādhvanau dhanuḥśrutigrūḍheḥ pratipatyaḥ" i.e. in case of *dhanurjyādhvanau* i.e. in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of 'dhanuḥ' or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jyā' or bow-string. So, the use of 'dhanuḥ' should be termed as redundant. But says Vāmana it is not so, because the idea of, 'arohana' is not gathered in the absence of the word *dhanuḥ-na hi dhanuḥ śrutimantareṇa dhanuḥśrutigrūḍhā jyā dhanurjyā iti sakyam pratipattum*

In II ii 14 he cites further illustration to the same effect—*karnavatāṃśasṛavanakundalasirahsekharesu karnadinirdeshasannidheḥ*. Thus, in *karnavatāṃśa*, *karna* is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'sannidhi' or juxtaposition. In II ii 15 Vāmana says 'muktāharaśabde muktāśabdah suddheḥ' i.e. in the word 'muktāhara', the idea of *muktā* or pearls is already expressed by the word 'hara' but the mentioning of *muktā* is not more repetition as it brings about the apprehension of purity. In the same way, (II ii 16) 'puspa māla' has *puspa*, only to bring about the sense of 'utkarsa' or excellence. He adds *utkrāntān puṣpānam māla iti*. When we come across the use of 'māla' with reference to 'ratna' or 'śabda', as in 'ratnamāla' or 'śabdamāla' the usage is said to be a secondary one—*sa tavadupacaritasya prayogaḥ nirupapado hi mālaśabdah puṣparacanāvisameva abhidhatte iti*. In the same way the word 'kāri' in 'kārikalabha' is not redundant as it

brings about the apprehension of 'tadrūpya' or similarity Vāmana says *karikalabhasabde karīśabdah kalabhenaiva gatārthah prayujyate, tadrūpyasya pratipatyartham iti*,

Thus, this type of sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to śabdasaktimulā vyañjana or not is not made clear by Vāmana

In the third adhikaraṇa, second adhyāya, he deals with *samādhiguna* with reference to *artha*. He defines it as—*artha-dṛṣṭih samādhīh* 2 7 Then, he classifies *artha* into *vyakta* and *sūkṣma* || III 2 9 *artha vyaktah sūkṣmasca*. In III 2 10, he says that the *sūkṣma* is also two-fold—*bhavya* or that which can be easily grasped and *vāsānya* or which can be elicited after close application (*sūkṣmo bhavyo vāsānyasca* (III 2 10), and adds—*sūkṣmodvidhā bhavati bhavyo vāsānyasca* *siḥ ranirupāṇḥgamyo bhavyah ekāgratāprakarāgamyo vāsānya* *iti* He goes on giving illustrations for the same Now both *bhavya* and *vāsānya* are more subtle as compared to the *vyakta* or expressed Out of these two *vāsānya* is more subtle Thus, we come across a clear recognition of the implied sense without however, any reference to any *vṛtti*

III 11 15 defines *kāntiguna* as—*diptarasatvaṃ kāntih* The illustration he supplies is purely that of *raṅgāra rasa* But again, as to how these *rasas* are to be gathered, is not made clear by him In all these cases, we may feel that Vāmana comes close to *vyañjanāvyaṅgāra*

Udbhata :

In Udbhata we come across some indirect or direct references to all the three *vṛttis* as below —

At 1 60 Udbhata defines *vyañjastuti* as—

‘śabdasaktiśabhāvena vatra nīndevagamya |
vastutastu stutih śreṣṭhā vyañjastutirasau mata ||

śabdasakti here refers to *abhidhāvyaṅgāra*

At I 11 Udbhata defines rūpaka as—

śrutyā sambandhavirahādyaatpadena padāntaram, |—
gunavṛttipradhānena yujyate rūpakam tu tat ||

Thus, we come across a reference to both abhidhā and gunavṛtti, as is explained by Pratibhārendurāja (approximately, — the first half of the 10th cen A D De. P 74) who says

śrutiḥ nirantarārthanisthānābhidhāyapārāh

tayā śrutyā anupapadyamānapadāntarasambandham sat
padāntaramgunavṛttih yatrāpareṇa padena yujyate tatra rūpak-
ata

At II 47 Udbhata defines paryāyokta wherein we come across a reference to both abhidhā and avagamana. The definition runs as

paryāyoktam yadanyena prakārenābhidhīyate |
vācyavācakavṛttibhyām sunyenāvagamātmanā ||

Vācakavṛtti is abhidhā and avagamana may be vyañjanā. The commentators viz Pratibhārendurāja, the author of Laghu-vṛtti and the Vivṛtikāra, identified as Rājanaka Tilaka by the editor, explain the definition of paryāyokta as follows

Pratibhārendurāja explains —vācakasya abhidhāyākasya svas-
abdasya vṛttih vyapāro vacyarthapratyāyanam vacyasya tvabhi-
dheyasya vyapāro vacyantareṇa sahakaṅksāsannidhiyos mahat-
myātsamsargagamanam योग्याता एवमविदhasca yo vācyavācaka-
yoryvyapāratamanrarenāpi prakārantareṇa arthasamarthyatmanā
avagamasvabhāvena yadavagamīyate tat paryāyena svakañ-
thanābhīhitamāpi sātareṇa sabdavyapārtaṇavagamīyamānatvāt
paryāyoktam vastu

Vivṛtikāra also explains as vācakavṛttirābhidhā, vacyavṛ-
ttih akāṅsasannidhiyogyatāvasat samsargagamanam tabhyam vinā
arthasamarthyatmanā avagamasvabhāvena ya pratipadyate tat
paryāyanyena rūpena abhidhānam iti paryāyoktam avagama-
vyāpāreṇa kathamābhidhānamiti cet paryāyoktatvamaprastuta-
prasamsavyakhyāne vaksyāmah

Thus according to the commentators, Udbhata here seems to refer to *vācakavṛtti*, i.e. *abhidhā*, *vācyavṛtti* or *tātparya* and *avagamana* i.e. possibly *vyañjana*

Rudrata

In Rudrata, we do not come across any direct reference to *abhidhā*. However, at VI 3, he defines 'asamartha', a fault, as

“*padamīdamasamarthaṃ syādvācakamarthasya na ca vaktum |*
tam saknoti tiroḍītatatsamarthyam nimittena ||

'asamartha' occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors. Herein, we may read an indirect reference to *abhidhā*. In VI 5 and 6, in the same context, Rudrata describes another variety of *asamartha* where in a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e.g. *√han* in the sense of 'going'. VI 6 says that –

śabdaprayatibetau satyamapyasamarthameva rūḍhībalat |
yangikamarthavis'eśam padam yathā vāridhā jalabhāt ||

i.e. 'asamartha' also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology but is rendered incapable to convey it on account of *rūḍhi* or usage. e.g. *jalabhāt* cannot be used for *vāridhī*.

The maxim viz. *rūḍhyogādbalīyāsi* seems to be known to Rudrata also and he thus knows a variety of *abhidhārtha*.

In VI.11, he defines *apratīta*, a fault, as,

yuktyā vakti tamarthaṃ na ca rūḍham yatra
yadabhidhānatayā |
dvedhā tadapṛtītaṃ samś'ayavadasamś'ayaṃ ca padam ||

Thus, Rudrata mentions *abhidhānatayā rūḍhamarthaṃ* i.e. a meaning fixed by the power of *abhidhā*. VI 12 gives an

illustration of apratīta involving doubt e.g. himahā etc VI. 13. gives an illustration of apratītadosa having no doubt asaṃs' ayam—e.g. as'vayosinmukhārciṣmān for vadavānala Rudrata says that here this particular word is used for the normally used yaugika or rūdha words. Here again we come across a reference to yaugika and rūdha s'abdās, which may lead to abhidhā

[padamaparamapratītam yadyaugikarūdhās'abdaparyāyāḥ
kalpitamarthe tasmīnyatbās'vayosinmukhārciṣmān || iv 13]

At VII 1, also Rudrata seems to refer to abhidhārtha very clearly when he says

arthah punarabhidhāvanpravartate
yasya vācakah s'abdah |
tasya bhavanti dravyam guṇah kṛtya
jāturiti bhedah ||

We do not come across any reference to gunavyūti or lakṣaṇā in Rudrata except at VII. 58 and here too indirectly, when he illustrates viparīta anumāna The anumāna is said to be viparīta because the sādhya is described as following the sādha akas¹ The illustration cited is :

vacanamupacāragarbham dūrādudgamanamāśanam sakalāṃ
idamadya mayi tathā te yathāsi nunāṃ priye kupitā ||

Herein 'vacana' is said to be 'upacāragarbha' Thus, there is an indirect mention of 'upacāra'

At VII 38, Rudrata defines bhāva as :

yasya vikārah prabhavaṇnapratibaddhena hetunā yena |
gamayati tadabhiprāyaṃ tatpratibandham ca bhāvosau ||

The illustration is

grāmatarunam tarunyā navavaṇjulamañjarīsauṇthakaram
paś'yantiyā bhavati muhurnitarāṃ malinā mukhacchāyā ||

¹Namisādhu explains that the bhāva of the lady is manifested here This is a case of an implied sense.

vyakhyātam bhautodbhato babhāṣe-śabdānāmbhīdhanāma-
bhīdhavyāpāro mukhyo guṇavyūttis ca itī. vāmano'pī śāḍṛs'³
yallakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ itī. manākṣpṛṣṭa itī. taistavad dhvani-
digunmilitā yathālikhitapāṭhakaistu svarūpavivekam kartumas'-
aknuvadbhīh tatsvarūpaviveko na kṛtāh, pratyutopālabhyate,
abhāgnanārikclavat yathāś'ruta tadgranthodgrahanamātreṇa itī.
(Locana)

Ruṃyaka, in the beginning of his work *alamkārasarvasva* says,

īha hī tāvad bhāmahodbbhataprabhṛtāyaś'cīrantāṇāṃkara-
kārah prattiyamānamartham vācyopaskaritayāṇāmkārapakṣa-
kṛptam manyante. tathāhī paryāyoktā prastutapras'ampśāsamaśo-
ktyākṣepavyajastutyupameyopamānanvayādau vastumātram
gamyamānam vācyo paskarakatvena, "svasīdhaye parākṣep
parartham svasamarpanam" yathāyogam dvividhaya bhāngyā
pratipūditam tathā

rudratēnāpī bhāvalāṅkāro dvīdhaivoktāh, rūpakadīpak-
pahnūtītuḥ syogaḥādāvupamāṇāṅkāro vācyopā'kṛtīvenoktāh,
rasavatpreyāūrjāsvīprabhbṛtau tu rasabhāvgdīrvācyas'obhāhetu-
venoktāh upreksā tu svayameva prattiyamānā kathītā. tadittham
trīvidhamāpī prattiyamānamāṇāmkāratayā prakhyāpitameva,

vāmanēna tu śāḍṛs'yanībandhanayā lākṣaṇayā vakroktī
āṇāmkāratvam bruvatā kas'cid dhvanībhedo'ṇāmkāratayaivoktāh

So also, Jagannātha in his *Rasagāṅgādhara* (pp. 555) says :

īdam tu bodhyam. dhvanīkāratpracīnairbhāmahodbbhatapra-
bhṛtūbhīh svagrāntbesu kutrāpī dhvanīgūṇibhūtavyaṅgyādis'abdhā
na prayuktāh itī clāvataiva tairdhvanyādayo na svikṛiyante
ityādhūnīkānāṃ vācyoyuktīrayuktāiva, yataḥ samasoktīvyū-
jastutyaprasutapras'ampśādyāṇāmkāranirūpane kīyānto'pī gūṇi-
bhūtavyaṅgyābhedastātrāpī nīrūpītāh . aparas'ca sarvopī vyaṅ-
gyaprapaṇcah paryāyoktākūksau nīkṣīptāh na hyānubhavasīddho-
'rītho bālenāpyapahnōtum s'akyate dhvanyādīpadāh parām
vyavahāro na kṛtāh itēna na hyclāvātānāṅgīkāro bhavātī

But here, we might demur The presence of vyañjanā or suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the Rv It is, however, quite a different thing to discover in poets and critics any conscious understanding of vyañjanā So, the discussion that follows, of the alamkāras and gunas in which vyañjanā seems to be subsumed, should not be taken as proof that the idea of vyañjanā or dhvani had dawned upon the minds of Bhāmaha, Dandin etc They might or might not have had the understanding of vyañjanā as a distinct function of a word

Bhāmaha

We will begin with Bhāmaha In II 35 Bhāmaha's general outlook towards all the alamkāras becomes evident when he says,

saisā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ, anayārtho vibhavyate |
yatno 'syām kavinaḥ kāryaḥ, ko'lamkāro'nayā vinaḥ ||

Thus for Bhāmaha, atis'ayokti or vakrokti lies at the root of all the alamkāras, i.e. it is implied in all the alamkāras in one way or the other. At I 30 also, Bhāmaha asserts that this vakrokti should be present in all poetry, whether it be a mahākāvya or just a stanza

Says Bhāmaha

anibaddham punargathā s'lokatratīdi tatpunah |
yuktam vakrasvabhāvoktyā sarvamevaitadīyate ||

Thus vakrokti is omnipresent for Bhāmaha In I 34, Bhāmaha is even prepared to reject the so called vaidarbha kāvya, if it is bereft of the element of vakrokti

I 34—apūṣṭarīhaṃ avakrokti prasannaṃ rju komalaṃ |
bhīṣaṃ geyamivedaṃ tu kevalaṃ s'rutipeśalaṃ ||

Bhāmaha very clearly affirms the use of only 'vakra' word and sense in poetry when he says at I 36 that—

na nītantadīmātreṇa jayate cārūṭa gīṛaṃ |
vakrabhūdbhaya'sabdoktirīṣṭā vācīmalapkrīṭā . |

Thus word and sense, charged with the element of vakratā alone make for poetry

Parallelism between Bhamaha and Dandin

It will be interesting to note incidentally, that Dandin also, like Bhamaha, holds that *atis'ayokti* is at the root of all other figures of sense

II 214 defines *atis'ayokti* as,

vivakṣā ya viśeṣasya lokasimātivartinī |
asāvatis ayoktiḥ syadalamkārottamā yathā ||

Thus *atis'ayokti*, the best of *alamkāras*, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way II 215 cites an illustration in which ladies who are secretly going to meet their lovers, are described as non-discernible in the moon-light on account of their putting on garlands of malikā flowers and silk garments and having their bodies besmeared with sandal paste II 216 says that in the above illustration there is an implied hyperbolic description of the excellence of the moon-light-candratapasya bāhulyam uktamuktasavattayā In II 217, there is an element of doubt implied This doubt, however, is not genuine but gharya

(Dandin says II 216b

śaś'iprayatis'ayāśānam vyaktiḥ kṛtsnānādaś'yaṭe,)

At II 219 the three worlds are described as enormously big enough to contain the glory of a king which is boundless The idea of the praise of a king is only implied

At II 220 Dandin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures of speech and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech—says he,

alamkāraṇtaraṇṭmapyekaśābuh pariyānam,
vāgīś'amahatāmuktumāmatis'ayābhavayam ||

Thus both Bhāmaha and Dandin seem to have an identical attitude towards alamkāras in the sense that both of them to have been struck not by the mere outward form of any alamkāra as such, but by something else that lies at the root of all the alamkāras. This element, they term as vakrokti or atis'ayokti. We will find the element of avagamana or pratyamānātā i.e. implied sense in some of the figures described by them. It may be noted here incidentally, that it is in this element of implied sense that the charm or camatkāra of the particular alamkāra lies.

Bhāmaha's Treatment of the Arthālamkāras

Now, we proceed with Bhāmaha's treatment of the figures of sense.

Bhāmaha begins with rūpaka. Rūpaka occurs when in consideration of the similarity in qualities, the upameya is identified with the upamāna (II 22). Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rūpaka, that is to say, upamā is implied in rūpaka. At II 24 Bhāmaha describes ekadesavivartī rūpaka and it is already clear that this involves some implied element. II 25 describes Dīpaka as three-fold. The element of upamā is implied in all the varieties of dīpaka as illustrated by Bhāmaha (II, 27, 28, 29) as follows

samānavastutyaśena prativastupamocyate |
yathevānabhidhāne'pi guṇasāmyapratitutah ||

(Kavyālamkāra II 34)

Thus, there is prativastupamā when, even in the absence of words such as yathā, vā, etc. which are directly expressive of upamā, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also, the idea of similarity seems to be implied only.

At II 68 ākṣepa is defined as,

-pratishedha mīṣṭasya yo vis'esābhidhatsaya |

ākṣepa itī tam santah samsanti dvividham yathā ||

Āksepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense-*vis'esābhidhatsaya*. Thus, the additional sense is implied only

II 75 defines *vyatireka* as,

upamānavato'rihasya yadvīs'esanīdars'anam |
vyatirekam īmicchanti vīs'asāpadanādyaṭhā ||

Thus *vyatireka* has also an element of similarity implied in it. In the same way in *vibhavana*, *karsanantarakalpanā* is always implied (II 77, 78)

II 80 defines *samāsokti* as,

yatrokte gamyate'nyo'rīhastatsamānavīs'esanāh |
sā samāsoktiruddistā samkṣiptārīhataya jathā ||

Samāsokti occurs when on the narration of a particular sense, another sense having similar qualities is implied. There is a clear recognition of an implied sense here.

After defining *atītyokti* at II 81, Bhamaha, as noted earlier, wants it to remain present in all the *alamkaras*. The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in *lavya* as such. Anything bereft of this element of *atītya* is only *vārtā* or a bare statement of fact and is no poetry. Thus Bhamaha rejects *hetu*, *sūkṣma*, and *les'a* as they have no element of *vakrokti* in them.

II 86-*betu's'ca suksmo les'oṭha nālamkārataya matah* |
samudāyābhidhānasya vakroktyanābhidhānatah ||

II 91 defines *utprekṣā* as,

'avivakṣitasāmānyā kñciccopamayā saha |
atadgunakriyayogādutprekṣatī'ayānvita ||

Thus *utprekṣā* has no *sāmānyā* i.e. idea of similarity as its purport, i.e. *utprekṣā* centres round *sambhavana* or probability, and not mere similarity or *sādṛśya*. But, it has again some element of *upamā*, i.e. similarity is only implied. In *utprekṣā* the *upameya* is said to possess such quality or action that normally does not go with it. Thus, it has an element of *atītya* implied in it. At II 50 also Bhamaha clearly recognises

an element of atis'aya involved in both upamā and utprekṣā. Says he—

yas'cātis'ayavānarthah katham so'sambhavo matah |
istam cātis'ayārthatvam upamotpṭeksayoryathā ||

In the third chapter, Bhāmaha begins his treatment with the alamkāras such as preyas, rasavat and ūrjasvī. We will discuss the case of these alamkāras when we deal with the treatment of rasa in earlier alamkārikas in a separate chapter later on.

Bhāmaha defines paryāyokta at III 8 a-as, paryāyoktam yadanyena prakārenābhidyate, and illustrates it at III 9. Bhāmaha holds (III 9) that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is implied in Kṛṣṇa's speech who words it differently. Thus paryāyokta has an element of implied sense. Bhāmaha does not define the figure called udatta (III. 11-12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of āsāyamahattva or vibhūtimahattva is only implied.

Bhāmaha has a totally novel connotation of śleṣa (III 14) which occurs when there is realisation of identity of the upameya with the upamāna through a guṇa or quality, kriyā or action or, proper noun i.e. nāmna. It differs from the rūpaka in this respect that in rūpaka there is a clear mention of both the upameya and the upamāna in different terms (III 15). Thus, an element of similarity is implied in śleṣa also.

III 21 defines apahnuṭi as,

apahnūtīrabhūṭā ca kīñcidantargatopamā |
bhūtarthāpahnavaḍasyāḥ kriyate cābhidhā yathā ||
Thus it has upamā which is implied

III. 23 defines viśeṣokti as,

ekadeśasya vigame ya guṇāntarāsamsthitiḥ |
viśeṣaprathanyāsau viśeṣoktirmatā yathā ||

The added sense, viz. that of karanāntarakaḥ is always implied

In the same way *tulyayogitā* (III 27) has an element of similarity implied in it. It occurs when in order to suggest some similarity in qualities, in case of two objects, one of which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected through an identical action.

III 27-*nyūnasyāpi vis'istena guṇasāmyavivaksasya |
tulyakāryakriyāyogāt ityuktā tulyayogitā ||*

III 29 defines *aprastutaprasaṃsā*, wherein there is mention of a matter not in hand implying the matter in hand.

III 29-*adhikāradepetasya vastuno'nyasya yā stutih |
aprastutaprasaṃseti sā carvaṇa kalhyate yathā ||*

Vyājastuti (III 31) has apparent censure and implied praise. It is defined as

*durādhikāḡunastotravyapades'ena tulyatām |
kincidvidhīṣoryā nindā vyājastutirasau yathā ||*

Nidars'ana has also implied similarity, because in it, without the use of *yathā*, *iva*, etc., through action only, some idea is expressed. III 34 defines *nidars'ana* as,

*-kriyayaiva vis'istasya madarthasyopadars'anāt |
jñeyā nidars'ana nāma yathevavatibhīrvina ||*

In *upameyopamā* (III 37), the idea of the elimination of any third similar object, i.e. *trītyasādṛś'avyavaccheda* is implied. In *śabokti* also (III 39) there is implied similarity. *Sasamdeha* is defined as III 43 as,

*upamānena tattvam ca bhedaṃ ca vadataḥ punaḥ |
sasamdehaṃ vacaḥ stutyai sasamdehaṃ viduryathā ||*

Thus, the idea of the praise of *upameya* is implied only.

III. 45 defines *ananvaya*

*yatra tenaiva tasya syādupamānopameyatā |
asādṛś'yavivaksātāḥ tamityāhurananvayam ||*

Ananvaya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison,

that is to say, it is unrivalled. The idea of *asādrś'yavivaksā* is implied only.

III 47 defines *utprekṣāvayava* having in itself the use of double-meaning words and an element of both *utprekṣā* and *rūpaka*. The idea of similarity between *upameya* and *upamāna* is necessarily implied.

III 53-54-define *bhāvikatva* which is a *guṇa* with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present, and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged and wherein the expression is not involved. The definition runs as :-

III. 53-54-*bhāvikatvamiti prabuh prabandhaviṣayam guṇam {*
pratyakṣa iva draṣyante yatrārtha bhūtabhāvinah ||
citrodattādbhūtarīhatvaṃ kathayāḥ svabhinataḥ ||
s'abdanākulataḥ ceti tasya hetuṃ pracaksate ||

Thus, *bhāvika* is by itself of the nature of implied only as it rests on a whole composition.

Dandin

Dandin defines *madhura* *guṇa* at I 51-52 as a statement which is gifted with *rasa* or sentiment and also when there is *rasa* with reference to the object or *vastu* described. Dandin says that such a composition, *padasatīh*, as has words that look similar when heard also are capable of conveying *rasa*.

I. 51-52-*madhuraṃ rasavadvāci vastunyapi rasasthitiḥ {*
yena mādyanti dhīmanto mathuneva madhuvrataḥ ||
yayā kayācits'rutya yat samānamanubhūyate |
tadrūpaḥ hi padasatīh sguṇaprāsa rasavahḥ ||

In the illustration viz. (I 53)

eṣa rāja yadā lakṣmīṃ prāptvān brāhmaṇapriyaḥ {
tadā prabhṛti dharmasya lokesminanutsavo'bhavat ||

It nourishes the emotion with reference to a religious king. Thus *mādhurya* has a lot of implied sense.

In I. 62, after explaining *mādhurya* *guna* in *s'abda* or word, Dandin proceeds to explain it with reference to *artha* as indicated by the words . *vastunyapi rasasthitiḥ*. Dandin says that though all the *ālaṃkāras* make for *rasa* in sense, it is *agrāmyatā* or the absence of vulgarity i.e. the *arthagata mādhurya*, which carries this burden to a greater extent. Dandin says (I.62):

kāmaṃ sarvopyālaṃkāro rasamarth enisṛicati |
tathāpyagrāmyatāvainam bhāraṃ vahaṭi bhūyasā ||

Dandin further says I. 63-64 that such statements as, *kāmayamānam māṃ na tvam kāmayase katham*-are vulgar and make for the detriment of *rasa*. Says he,

iti grāmyoyamarthātma valrasyāya prakalpate |
He observes that if the same statement is modified as,
kāmaṃ kandaṃpacandalo mayi vamaṃkṣi nirdayah |
tvayi nirmatsaro distyetyagrāmyoritho rasāvah ||

It becomes charged with *rasa* and is free from vulgar sense. This *mādhurya* is full of implied sense.

Dandin defines *udāra* *guna* at I. 76. as,

utkarṣaṇaṃ guṇaḥ kaś'cid yasminnukte pratiyate |
tadudārahvayam tena sanātha kāvyabapdhath ||

Thus, *udāra* *guna* consists of a statement which is expressed for the implication of some lofty quality; and poetry is highly dependent on it.

The illustration cited is, (I. 77).

arthinaṃ kṛpāṇā dṛṣṭiḥ tvanmukhe patitaḥ sakṛt |
tadavasthā punardeva nānyasya mukhamikṣate ||

Dandin adds (I. 78) that in the illustration cited as above, the excess of generosity is clearly indicated—*iti tyāgasya vākya-smin utkarṣaṇa sādha lakṣyate*.

I. 79 explains another variety of *udāra* which consists of significant adjectives such as *līlāmbhuja*, *kṛidāsara*, *hemāṅgada*,

etc Here also, the idea of opulence is implied

I 79—*ślaghyairviśeṣanairyuktam udāram kaus'cidisyate |*
yathā līlāmbhujakrīḍāsaroḥemāṅgadādayah ||

I 85 defines *kānti* *guṇa* as,

kāntam sarvajagatkāntam laukikarthānatikramāt |
tacca vartābhubhāntsu varṇanasvapi drś'yate ||

Kānta occurs when there is an absence of hyperbole i.e. when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts or in the description of objects, and is liked by all

Thus, *kānti* *guṇa* has a natural mode of expression and thereby implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I 86-87 as,

grhānti nāma tanyeva taporas'irbhavadś'ah |
sambhāvayanti yanyeva pāvanāḥ padapāmsubhāḥ ||

and also

anayoranavadyāṅgi stanayorjambhamānayoḥ |
avakāś'o na paryāptah tava bahulatāntare ||

In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied and in the second, feeling or love with reference to the heroine is implied

In *samādhī* *guṇa*, according to Dandin (I 93), there is superimposition of somebody else's quality on something else This is a clear instance of *lakṣaṇa* based on similarity which is implied

I 93 says,

anyadharmastato' nyatra lokasīmānurodhinaḥ |
samyagādhyate yatra as samādhīḥ smṛto yathā ||

I 94 is given as an illustration in point—

kumudānti nūplanti kamalānyunmīśanti ca |
iti netrakriyādhyāśailabdhā tadvacintī śrītiḥ ||

Dandin then adds that words such as *nīśhyuta*, *udgīṛṇa*, *vānta* etc convey a charming sense when used metaphorically.

If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar. Thus even here, we have a touch of an implied sense.

I 95 says *nisthityūtdgīrnavānīdī gaunavrttivyapās'rayam |*
ātisundaramanyatra grāmakaksāp viṅāhate ||

This *saṁādhi* *guṇa*, says Dandin is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets.

I 99—*tadetat kavyasarvasam saṁādhirnāma yo guṇah |*
kavisarībah samagro pi tamenamanugacchati ||

Thus, in his treatment of *guṇas* Dandin seems to cover implied sense. In his treatment of the figures of sense i.e. *arthālamkāras* also, he seems to have incorporated implied sense. We have already noted earlier his general attitude towards *alamkāras*. We will not discuss all the *alamkāras* such as *rupaka*, *dīpaka*, *apahnuṭi*, *vyajastuṭi*, *aprastutaprasaṁsā*, *tulyayogitā*, *paryāyoktam*, *āksepa*, etc., which have implied element as explained earlier when we dealt with Bhaṁbha. But, Dandin has given a good many varieties of *upamā* and almost all of them contain an implied sense.

Dandin defines *upamā* at II 14 as,

yathakathāncit sādṛs'yam yatrodbbhūtam pratiyate |
upamā nāma || tasyāḥ prapañco yam pradars'yate ||

Thus, *upama* occurs when similarity is gathered in anyway *yathākathānci*—i.e. in a directly expressed fashion or an implied way. Most of the varieties of *upamā* as explained by Dandin have implied similarity. Thus, *vastūpamā* (II 16) has the common quality implied only (*pratiyamānaikadharmā*). *Viparyāsopamā* has *upamāna* in place of *upameya* and vice versa. Thus it implies the superiority of the *upameya* (II, 17). *Anyonyopamā* (II 19) is the same as *upameyopamā* having the idea of *tṛtīyasādṛsya*,—*vyaṅcheda*—or elimination of a third possible similar object—as implied only. *Niyamopamā* (II 19) has the idea of restriction implied when the face is described as similar to the lotus alone.

In this *ayopamā* also (II 22), in the absence of any *upamavācaka*, the similarity is only implied. II 23 gives *utprekṣitopamā* and has an element of *utprekṣa* implied in it. *Adbhutopamā* (II 24) which is the same as what later *ālamkārikas* recognise as *yadyarthātī ayokti* has implied similarity. *Mohopamā* (II 25) has *moha* or *bhṛānti* implied. *Samsāyopamā* (II 26) is the same as *sasamdeha* of the later *ālamkārikas* having implied similarity. *Nirnayopamā* (II 27) is what *Viśvanātha* recognises as *nir'cayālamkāra* having implied comparison. II 30 gives *nindopamā* which has the same quality of implied sense. Similar is the case with *prasāmapamā* (II 31), *acikhyasopamā* (II 32) *virodhopamā* (II 33) *pratishedhopamā* (II 34) *catupamā* (II 35) *tattvākhyānopamā* (II 36) *asādhāranopamā* (II 37) *asambhavinopamā* (II 39) *bahupamā* (II 40), *vikṛīyopamā* (II 41) etc etc

Prativastupamā (II 46) is—*vastukācidupanyasya nyasanāt tatsadharmanah*

samyapratītihrastīti prativastupamā yatha ||

There is implied comparison between the statements

Tulīyayogopamā (II 48) also has the same charm of implied sense

Thus we see that in *Dandin* also, there is recognition of *pratīyamāna* or implied sense

Vāmana

For *Vāmana* the position is all the more clear for he recognises *upamā* as the basis of all the *ālamkāras* and all the rest are termed by him as *upamāprapañca*. His *kāntigūṇa* is defined as *diptarasatvam*—i.e. one in which *rasas* are aroused. This clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense. His *samādhi* is defined as *arthadṛṣṭih*—i.e. a perception of the sense (III 27). *Vāmana* goes on classifying *artha* as *vyākṛta* and *sūkṣma* (III 29) and the latter again as *bhāvya* or that which is elicited easily and *visantīya* or that which is elicited only after concentration

(III. 2,10). The illustrations of both these varieties contain an implied sense.

Udbhata

Udbhata in his K.S.S. practically follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhāmaha and seems to incorporate the element of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhāmaha. Pratihārendurāja (first half of the 10 cen. A.D. De, P. 74, *ibid*) wants us to believe that Udbhata has knowingly incorporated dhvani under alamkāras when he says :

-kais'cit saḥṛdayaṁ dhvanirnāma vyañjakatvabhedātma kavya-
dharmo'bhūhitah |
sa kasmādīha nopadistah ? ucyate, eṣa evālamkāresvantarbhavāt ||

Rudrata

Rudrata also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implied sense with reference to all the alamkāras such as rupaka, dipaka, paryāyokta etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold bhāva also in VII. 38-41, which contains an implied sense. He has an elaborate treatment of rasa but is silent about any theoretical discussion of rasa-realisation.

PART II

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RASA IN SANSKRIT POETICS

(I) Rasa in

(i) The Vedas

(ii) The Nirukta

and (iii) Bṛhaddevatā

'Rasa' in the Vedas

'Rasa is a word of frequent occurrence in Vedic and classical Sanskrit literature (1). It is well-known that rasa is derived from the √ras which occurs in the pāṇiniya dhātupāṭha and is explained as having the senses of 'to make sound' 'to taste' and 'to be oily; (ras śabde (bhāvdi), and rasa āsvādanasnehanayoḥ (curād)).¹

[The root √ras has thus three different meanings. In the first sense it is associated with the river rasā according to Yaska (Nirukta. 11.25-rasā nadiḥ bhavati, rasteh śabda-karmanah). The word rasā is used as a name of a particular river or sometimes a river in general. One may say that here too the word may be connected to the sense of being liquid. Rasa in the sense of something liquid is associated with many things like juice or the sap of plants or the milk of the cow or the virile semen of the body etc.] In fact we find lexicons giving all these various meanings. Amara for example says :

rupam śabdo gandharasaspars'āccaviṣayaḥ amṛ. (line 29), and also śṛṅgīrādaḥ viṣe viṣe guṇe rāge drave rasaḥ.

(line 2789)

and also the six fold tastes (line 295)

Hemacandra adds the following senses

gr̥he, dhātāu i.e. humours of the body, pārade i.e. mercury, premni, bhāve, ātmāni, and also in the sense of sukha

Thus the word *rasa* has a very interesting semantic history. We are here interested in finding out how the physical sense of the word gets transmuted into the experience of aesthetic pleasure or the flavour of a sentiment or emotion.

[In the Vedic *samhitās*, as we shall see below, we find not only the physical sense of something liquid but also the liquid (*drava*) or the sap that is in plants, animals etc., and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted. In the later sense of the word *kavyarasa* or *nāyārasa*, we do not find any clear reference. But in one context, we do find it associated with things literary.] Let us therefore, take a summary view of the different meanings of *rasa*, first in the Vedic *samhitās*.

In the Rv the word occurs for about fifty-one times. *Rasa* occurs for about eleven times. The Yv has nineteen and two occurrences of the words *rasa* and *rasā* respectively. The Av has about thirty-eight occurrences (1). In the later *samhitās* some of the mantras are repeated from the Rv.

Rasa is used for a river, at times a particular river, or a flow in general. At Rv. VIII 49.2 *Valakhilya* sukta) we have *rasā* explained by the commentator as 'Jalāni'. Waters are termed as the *rasas* of mountains. Here, we see that the waters of the springs that flow from the mountains are regarded as the sap of the mountains which is extracted from them by Indra and becomes water. The mantra runs as

satanīkeva pra yugati dhuṣṇuyi hanti vītrā'ni dāsuṣe |
gite'iva pra rasa' pīvire datrāni purubhojasah ||

Thus, we have the double sense of the extracted sap and water

At Yv. 9. 3—we have apām rasah and also apām rasasya yo rasah. These are explained by both Uvata and Mahidhara as vāyu and prajāpati respectively. We may add that here the word rasa seems to carry the sense of essence of soul and consequently the presiding deity. The mantra reads as below :

apā'm rasamūdvayasam sū'rye śāntam samā'hṛtam |
 apām rāsasya yo rasastām vo grhṇāmyuttamāmupayāma
 grhītōśīndrāya tvā jūstam grhṇāmyesā te yonirīndrāya tvā
 juṣtatamam ||

The same sense is repeated at Yv 19 44, 20 22 and 31.17.

Then, thirdly, we have rasa in the sense of the rasa of herbs. This may be in form of an extracted juice as in case of some, or may be just sap in the some plant

In the IX mandala of the Rv., it is mostly to be seen in these senses e.g. at Rv. IX 66—

tām gobhīrv'śanām rāsam mādāya devavitaye |
 sūdam bharāya sām sṛja || (rasa is extracted juice),

and also RV. IX. 23. 5.

-so'mo arṣati dbarnasīrdadhāna indriyām rasām |
 suvī'ro abhis'astipā'h ||

'rasa' means 'sap'.

Fourthly we have rasa in the sense of the tastes. Rv. I. 187. 4, 5 have 'rasah' explained by Sayana as the six tastes such as, sweet, sour, etc. Rasah i.e. tastes lateron become in the dars'anas the sense-quality of taste.

Rv. I. 187. 4 is

tāva tyé pito rāsā rājṣyānu vi'shṭatāh. |
 divi' vṛ'ta īva s'ṛitā'h ||

So also Yv. 39.4 has rasa in the same sense and is explained by Mahidhara as 'svādutvam.'

Yv. 39.4—is,

R. 13.

mānasaḥ kāmamākulam vācaḥ satyamas iya ।
 pas u nām rupāma nasya ra so yāsaḥ śrīḥ s rayatāpma yi
 svā'ha ॥

Fifthly, we have rasa with reference to the animals such as a cow horse etc With reference to the cow it means milk as at Rv I 37 5 which runs as--

prasamsa gosvaghnyam krīṣam yacchardho marutam
 jambhe rasasya vavrdhe ।
 rasasyagokśīratupasya (Sayana)

At Rv VII 104 10 we have rasa with reference to food, horses cows and body Now what exactly is the meaning of rasa in all these cases is not made clear by Sayana, but it may mean essence The mantra runs as

yo no rasam d psati pivo ague yo as'vanam yo gavam
 yastanu nām ।
 rpu h stenah steyakṛ ddabhrametū nī sa hīyatām tanvā
 ta na ca ॥

Rasa of the serpents obviously means poison as at Av V 13 2 and 3

At V 13 2 is,
 yāt te āpodakam visāp tāt te eta svagraham ।
 gṛhṇā mi té madhyamāmuttamam rasamutā vāmām bhīyāsa
 nes adā du te ॥

Av IV 27 3 has rasa of the horse It is explained as speed of the horse by the commentator Th s also may be the sense in Rv VII 104 10 as quoted above

Sixthly, we have rasa of the human body as seen in Rv VII 104 10 above Rv I 105 2 has rasa in the sense of virile semen It runs as

ārtham, dva u arthina ā jāyā yuvate pātim ।
 tuṅjā te vr anyam pāyah parida ya rāsam duhe vittām me
 asyā rodasi ॥

We also come across occurrences in which 'rasa' appears as an independent entity e g rasah, used in plural, means tastes

as explained by Sayana (Rv I 1874 and 5, see above) In the Yajurveda also, one occurrence is noteworthy Yv 189 reads as below

urk ca me surtā ca me pāyas'ca me rāsas'ca me gṛtam
ca me mādhu ca me sāgḍhis'ca me sāpitis'ca me kṛsis ca me
jātram ca me au dbhidyam ca me yajñēna kṣāntam }

In the above quoted mantra, several things are asked for through sacrifice The occurrence of *rasa* between 'payah' and 'gṛtam' may signify the juice of something edible or drinkable Here, it may be noted however, that *rasa* is mentioned by itself and not as of something It may also be noted that it figures along with *urj surta*, and *payas*, wherein *urja* may mean strength or vigour either of speech or body *Surta* may mean the sweet and true speech and *payas* may mean any fluid or juice or vital spirit, power etc In this context *rasa* may also be taken in a similar connotation as the best or finest or prime part of anything, essence, etc It might also mean taste or charm, pleasure delight

Av x 8 44 has '*rasena trptah*' This is a mystic hymn and *rasa* may mean the essence of the universe The mantra runs as—

akamo dbi re amr tah svayambhū rāsenā trpto na ku tas'
cano nah }
tāme vāvidva n na bibhaya mṛtyóratma nam dhī ramajāram
yuvānam }

Here it may be noted that the sense of satisfaction or fulfilment or even ecstasy is associated with *rasa* *rasa* as causing fulfilment or joy The eighth interesting use of *rasa* is seen at Rv IX 67 31 and 32 which run as below

yāh pavamaniradhyety sibiḥ sambhrtam rāsam }
sārvam sā putāmas'nati svaditām matarivana }

and also

pāvamani ryo adhyety sibiḥ sambhrtam rāsam —
tasmai sarasvatī duhe kṣīrām sarpiṁmādhudakām }

Lastly, it will be interesting to note which feelings are associated with rasa. Usually we come across the qualities of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flavour etc.

Ry IX 97 14 bas.—

rasggyah is **gsvadyah** i.e. tasteful, having flavour etc.

pávasvendo pávamāno māvobbih kánikradatpári

krī'lañcamvorā' vis'a pūyāmana indram ī= rāso madiro
mamatlu ||

Thus in the Vedas, we get rasa not only in the physical sense but we find the qualities of joy-giving, tastefulness, exhilaration, being the essence of the vedas, being the essence of the universe, etc. also attached to rasa. Thus rasa in the vedas becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence. These senses make it very easy for the aesthetes to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literature.]

Here we may refer to that famous verse of the Nā Śa (Ch I vs 17) whose purpose is to show relationship of the natyaveda with the other vedas and thereby give it vedic prestige. Taken in this light one may not bother oneself with finding any real basis for the statement. The verse runs as below

jagrāha pathyam ṛgvedād
sāmabhyo gītameva ca |
yajurvedādabhinayan
rasanātharvanādapi (NS I 17)

It is however, possible to find some connection with the vedas without stretching the meaning too far e.g. the meters of the Rv are essentially pathya i.e. recitable. This according to Abhinavaguptapāda is due to the trisvara character (i.e. udatta anudatta and svarita) of the ṛgvedic mantras. This point has been elaborated by Bharata in the chapters vāgabhīnaya (Ch XVI GOS Ed). The relation of the Yv with the sāmans of the samaveda is obvious. Yv is Abhinava says gdhvāryakarmapradhāna i.e. in the Yv activities of the adhvaryu such as movement towards right etc. are predominant. Essentially the movements of the different parts of the body have a particular significance to the Yv. As to the relation of the rasas with the hymns of the Av we do not find any obvious relationship. The text of the abhinavabhāratī on this point, which is quoted below is not quite clear. It runs as atharvanavede tu sāmānanādīkarmasu natasyeva tasyartvijah prastudavatsunād bhavānām prajās atprabhṛtinavadhānagrahanadinā lohito dernepathyasya tesu tesu ca karmasu visistaprayatnapuruṣa padymāno vastambhā tmanah sattvasya sambhavāt tato t ānāmagrahanam vacīkastvabhīnayah purvamevoktah ānyavibhavanām dhṛtipramodādīvyabhīcārinām ca parat satām samāharanam pralāhnamitu vibhavadisāmagrīrūp makacarvaṅgasambhavah itī tatastadgrahanamuktamiti (A Nā śa I 17 GOS Ed II)

The idea seems to be that priests in the various rituals of Av. such as those of *jantikarma*, *maranakarma* etc put on costumes consisting of red turban and such other things. Through *anubhavas* they express certain feelings. There is a sort of mental *avasambha* or resoluteness brought about by special efforts, and therefore there is the exhibition of such a *sattva* or mental disposition. According to *Abhinava*, this seems to be the connection of *rasas* with Av. One may imagine a scene in which one of such magical ritual is performed when everybody would be tense with emotion pertaining to a particular act. *Abhinava* seems to have taken some such performance of the *atharvana* ritual as a source of emotional ecstasy in *rasa*.

We have seen before that though the word *rasa* occurs at several places in the Av., we have no clear case of the later meaning of *nāṭyarasa* or *kāvya-rasa*. From another point of view, however, we may say that several hymns of the Av. taken by themselves are impressive love lyrics. The number of such hymns is about thirty three.

[Av. I. 34; II. 3; VI. 8; III 25, VI. 8,9, 82, 89, 102, 130, 131, 132, 139 VII. 36 (37), 37 (38), 38 (39) etc.]

A few lines from these may be quoted below : e.g.
Av. VI. 8 :

yāthā vṛkśām li'buja samantām parisasvajé |
evā' pa'ri svajasva mā'm yāthā kāmī'ny'aso yāthā mānn-
n'pagā' āsah ||

and also,

yāthā suparnāh prapātan pakṣau nibhanti bhūbhyaṃ |
evā' nīhanmi te māno yāthā mā'm kāmī'ny'aso yāthā
mānnā'pagā āsah ||

and also

yāthamé dyā'vāpṛthivī' sadyāh paryéti sū'ryah |
evā' pā'ryemi te māno yāthā mā'm kāmī'ny'aso yāthā
mānnā'pagā āsah ||

Origin and Development of Rasa in..

(1) As the creeper embraces the tree on all sides, thus thou embrace me, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me !

(2) As the eagle when he flies forth presses his wings against the earth, thus do I fasten down thy mind, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me.

(3) As the Sun day by day goes about this heaven and earth, thus do I go about thy mind, so that thou, woman shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me. (Translation-Maurice Bloomfield-Hymns of the Av. SBE. Vol. XLII.)

Av. VI 131 is a charm to arouse the passionate love of a man e. g.

Av. VI. 131.3. is,
yád dhā'vasi triyojanāṃ pañcāyojana'mṛs' vīnam |
tatastvāṃ punarā'yāsi putrā'nāṃ na asah pitā ||

"If thou dost run three leagues away (or even) five leagues, the distance coursed by a horseman, from there thou shalt again return, shall be the father of our sons !"

(Translation-Bloomfield)

The same note of a passionate woman's longing is heard also in AV. VI. 132. We quote the first mantra that runs as :
yām devā'h smarāmāsiñcaṇapsvantah s'ós'ucānam sahā'-
dhyā' |

tāṃ te tapāmi vārunasya dhārmanā ||

"Love's consuming longing, together with yearning, which the gods have poured into the waters, that do I kindle for thee by the law of Varuna."

-(Translation-Bloomfield)

Av. VII. 36 is a love-charm spoken by a bridal couple. It runs as :

akṣyaú nau mādhusamkṣ'e ānikāṃ nau mārjanan |
antāh kṛuṣva mā'ṃ hṛdi' māna janau sahā'sati ||

‘The eyes of us two shine like honey, our foreheads gleam like ointment. Place me within thy heart; may one mind be in common to us both !

(Translation-Bloomfield).

And also, AV VII. 37.

abhi’ tvā manujātena dādhami ma’ma vā’sasā ।
yāthāso nāma ke’valo nānyā’sāp kīrtāyās’cana’ ॥

‘I envelope thee in my garment that was produced by Manu (the first man), that thou shalt be mine alone, shalt not even discourse of other women!’ (Translation-Bloomfield).

Instances can be multiplied. It should be noted that scholars are in agreement when they say that the hymns, their ritualistic application apart, should be taken as individual places viewed in this light, and away from the ritualistic background, the above quoted instances can serve as beautiful love lyrics. They become the passionate expressions of love, i.e. s’rāgarāsa primarily in its vipralambha aspect (e.g. Av. VI. 8). There are a few hymns in the Rv. such as the dialogues of Pururavas and Urvaśī, Yama and Yamī, etc. which contain such passionate expressions. But comparatively speaking the Av. has more of them. Other bhāvas or feelings such as those of bhaya, utsāha, śoka also can be found in several other hymns of the Av. One may say, therefore, that the attempt to relate the later kāvyā and nāṭya rasas to Av. is not unjustified.

‘Rasa’ in the Upaniṣads .

We come across several occurrences of the word *rasa* or the different forms of the root $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$ in the Upaniṣads. Primarily they are to be seen in two or three different senses. The meaning of a liquid seems to be common to all. In the objects of five sense-organs, that which is gathered by the tongue is called ‘*rasa*’.] We come across this sense in the Prasnopaniṣad (4.8) which says : *rasas’ca rasayitavyam*, i.e. ‘when there is taste, it is to be tasted.’] So also in the Bṛh.

Up-sa yathā saindhavaghanānantaro'-bābyah kṛtsno rasaghana eva. (4 5 13)- 'just as a piece of saindhava salt has nothing like the internal or the external, but the whole of it is full of taste' In the above-mentioned occurrences rasa is seen in the sense of taste In the Pras'nopanisad (1 4.) esa hi dīṣṭā. rasayitā-, the word rasayitā is in the sense of one who tastes There are many more occurrences to this effect. In the Mundaka Upanisad, -atas'ca sarva osadhayo rasas'ca (2 1 9), we have rasa in the sense of 'sap'

Then still further, rasa is seen in the sense of the juices of the trees out of which honey is formed, as in the Chāndogya Upanisad (6 9 1)

yathā somya madhu madhkṛto nististhanti |
nānātyayānāṃ vrkṣānāṃ rasān samavahāramekatām
rasaṃ gamayati ||

[Then, we come across more and more occurrences in the sense of 'essence of things e.g. in the Taittirīyopanisad (1 12)]
esa bhūtānāṃ pṛthivī rasah, pṛthivya āpo rasah apsāmosa-
dhayo rasah osadhīnāṃ puruṣo rasah puruṣasya vāgrasah
vāca rgrasah ṛcah sāmā rasah samāno udgītho rasah ||

Now, it may be noted that along with the sense of 'essence', there seems to be other subtle shades of meanings also with reference to rasa in the above quotation It should be noted that here, the number of rasas is eight This is rendered clear in the sentence that follows-sa esa rasānam rasatamaḥ paramaḥ parardhyo stamo yadudgīthah, i.e. out of these, the udgītha is the highest and the eighth rasa Thus the eighth rasa is the 'parama', the highest and is udgītha Very often 'aum' in the upanisads suggests this udgītha, the rasa of sāmā.] We may also take note of the following from the Taittirīya Upanisad

"asadvā idamāgra āsit tato vā sadajāyata |
tadātmanam svayamakuruta tasmāttatsukṛtamucyate ||

iti yadvai sukr̥tam raso vai sah rasam hyevāyam labdhvā
 "nandī bhavati (27) i.e. Verily in the beginning was this
 asat (i.e. jagat) From it, verily was sat born. It made
 itself the ātman. So ॥ is termed sukr̥ta. Verily, it is sukr̥ta.
 Verily it is rasa. On the attainment of rasa, this, verily,
 becomes joyous."

In this quotation, sukr̥ta is rasa, and that rasa is a joy-giving factor becomes clear. But with all this one cannot say that rasa occurs in the same sense in the Upanisads as in Bharata. To a certain extent the use of rasa at one place in the Jaiminiya Upanisad seems to come close to the sense as seen in Bharata.

We will later on observe that [rasa in Bharata has in its meaning the shades of the qualities of taste, essence etc., as seen in the Upanisads.] We also see, as in the Chāndogya Upanisad that rasa is the combined taste of several ingredients like honey, which is a 'samavahara', a combination or a collection of the juices of many trees. Possibly the eight rasas in the Chāndogya might have inspired the theorists to imagine eight nātyarasas also. Finally, it may be observed that the above quoted utterance of the Taittiriya Upanisad, in which rasa is said to be the soul and by its attainment one is said to attain highest joy, may be taken as an original inspiration for the later theorists.

'Rasa' in the Nirukta :—

In the Nirukta of Yāska (circa 700-500 B.C.), we come across as many as thirteen occurrences in different forms of root $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$, or the word rasa, appearing either independently or in a compound. We also come across rasa in the sense of the name of a particular river or a river in general. In all the occurrences, $\sqrt{\text{ras}}$, or the word rasa seems to carry the same sense as that of 'to make sound', or 'juice' etc. (2)

'Rasa' in the Bṛhaddevatā :

In the Bṛhaddevatā of S'aunaka we have 'rasa' occurring either independently or in a compound (3). In all the occurrences the usual senses of fluid, juice, sap or sense-quality are to be seen. Rasa occurs in the sense of a river.

FOOT NOTES

(1) 'Rasa' occurs in the Rv. as below :

According to
Sayana

According to
Griffith

Rv.I. 23.23 : रसेन	जलसारेण	'essence'
37.5 : रसस्य	गोक्षीररूपस्य	rain
71.5 : रसम्	पृथिव्याः सारभूत इविः	Juice
105.2 : रसम्	पुरुषस्य सारभूत वीर्यं	bliss of love
187.4 : रसाः	पह रसाः स्वाद्वन्म्लादि	juices
187.5 : रसानाम्	स्वाद्वन्म्लादीनां पण्णां	savours of juices
Rv.V.43.4 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	Juice
44.13 : रसवत्	सारवत् (पयः)	sweet-flavoured
Rv.V.44.21 : रसः	रसनीयं प्रसास्यो रसवान्	
	रसात्मको वा (इन्द्रः सोम)	Juice pleasant
	सोमरसाः	libations
63.8 : रसाः	सारम्	'essence'
Rv.VII.104.10 : रसम्	रसवत्	savoury
Rv.VIII.1.26 : रसिनः	रसवतः	savoury juice
3.1. : रसिनः	रसात्मकोऽमृतमयः	Juice
3.20 : रसः	आत्मीय इव	essence
53.3 : रसम्	(सोमं)	juice
Rv.IX. 66 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	=
16.1 : रसम्	(सोमस्य)	sap
23.5 : रसम्	(सोमरसाः)	juice
Rv.IX.39.5 : रसः		

61 17	रस	—	"
61 18	रस	—	"
62 6	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	"
63 13	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	"
64 24	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	"
65 15	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	"
67 8	रस	(सोमस्य)	"
67 15	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	"
67 31	रसम्	वेदरसमूत सार	essence
67 32	रस	सूक्तसंमेष वेदसार	essence
		सूक्तसंमेष	
74 9	रस	(सोमस्य)	juice
76 1	रस	(रसात्मक सोम)	juice
77 5	रस	(रसात्मक सोम)	"
79 5	रसम्	सोमम्	"
84 5	रस	रसरूप सोम	"
85 1	रसस्य	(स्वाश पीत्वा)	"
86 10	रस	रसरूप (सोम)	"
96 21	रस	(सोमस्य)	"
97 1	रसम्	आत्मीय रसम्	juice
97 12	रसेन	(आत्मीयेन)	"
97 14	रसाध्य	रसेन आस्वाद्य	abounding in sweet flavours
97 57	रसेन	—	essence
109 11	रसम्	—	juice
109 20	रसेन	(गन्धेन)	"
113 3	रसम्	—	"
113 5	रसा	—	juices
113 5	रसिन	रसवत्	of juicy—
Rv X.9 2	रस	(स्वभूत)	sap
9 9	रसेन	(स्वरसेन)	moisture
76 5	रसम्	(सोमस्य)	sap

The Origin and Development of Rasa in...

'R'asa occurs in the Rv. as below :

Rv.I.112.12	रसाम्	रसा नदी भवति रसतः शद्वकर्मणः (निष्. ११-२५) इति यास्कः, नदी (रसने)	rasa wave Rasa
Rv.IV.43.6	रसया	सारभूता भूमिः	Rasa
Rv.V.41.15	रसा	नदीनामैतत्	river
53.9	रसा	जलानि	water-brooks
Rv.VIII.49.2	रसाः	रस आज पयसि	river
72.13	रसा	नदी	rasa
Rv.IX.41.6	रसा	(नदी)	rasa
Rv.X.75.6	रसया	वाह्यायमानायाः अतरिक्षे	rasa
108 1	रसायाः	नद्याः-	rasa
108 2	रसायाः	नद्याः-	rasa
121.4	रसया	रसो जल, तद्गती रसा नदी-	rasa

Rasa occurs in the S'ukla yajurveda as below :

Yv. I 21 रसेन पिष्टारव्यरसेन (acc. to Uvata and Mahidhara)

II.32.	रसाय	रसभूताय, वसन्ताय
IX.3	रसः	रसः सारः
IX.3	रसम्	अपां रसम्, सारम्
XI.51	रसः	अपां सारः
XVIII.9	रसः	तत्रत्य. सारः
XIX.35	रसिन	रसवतः सोमस्य
XIX.75	रसिम्	सार
XIX.79	रसम्-	-
XIX 83	रसम्-	-
XIX 94	रसेन	(अपां) रसेन
XX.22	रससे रसेन	(अ जेन)
XX 27	रसः	(सोमरसः)

XXV 9	रसेन	वीर्येण
XXV 12	रसया	नया
XXXI 17	रसात्	अद्भ्य समृत.-
XXXIII 21	रसा	नदी-
XXXVI 15	रस	(सोम)
XXXIX.4	रस	(भन्नस्य) रस सार -

The Sāmaveda has rasa at,

Sv. I. 239	रसिन
526	रसम्
558	रस
561	रसस्थ
II. 162	रसा
240	रसा
241	रस
360	रसम्
371	रसेन
381	रस
428	रसम्
578	रस
627	रस
648	रसम्
649	रसम्
650	रस
693	रसम्
743	रसिन
749	रसम्
771	रसिन
807	रसाप्य
1188	रस

The Atharvaveda has rasa as below

		Acc. to Sayana	Acc. to Whitney
Av. I 5.2	रस	सारमृतः अश	savour

The Origin and Development of Rasa in...

1.28.3	रसस्य	असृगादिस्पृश्य शरीरगतस्य ^{'sap'}	juices
Av. II.4.5	रसेभ्यः	औषधिसारमृतकाष्ठेभ्यः	sap
26.4	रसम्	उदकं च बलकरं रसमैव	sap of grain
26.5	रसम्	धान्यं रसम्	sap of what is
29.1	रसैः	सारभूते-मन्योदके	earthly
Av. III.13 5	रसः	(अपां रसः)	Whitney (pp 109) says the description in pada (almost makes us fancy some kind of mineral water to be had in view.)
28.4	रस	क्षीराज्यदिरूप.	sap
31.10	रसेन	औषधीना रसेन	sap of herbs
Av IV 2.5	रसाम्	नदी	rasa (The ocean is the atmospheric one and rasa, the heavenly river)
4.5	रसः	(अपा) असृतात्मकः	sap
15 2	रसा.	उदकानां	Juices of the waters
17 3	रसस्य	—	sap (See Av 1 28 3)
27.2	रसम्	वृष्टायुदकं लक्षणम्	sap
27.3	रसम्	द्रव (लक्षणम्)	sap of herbs
35.3	रसेन	(स्वकीयेन) (or औरन i.e अन्न) Sap	Sap
Av. V.13 2	रसम्	(poison of the serpent) Juice	Juice
13.3	रसम्	"	juice
Av. VI.16 1	रसः	(तैलात्मकः)	essence
78.1	रसेन	दधिमधुशृतादिना	
124.1	रसेन	उदकानः बिन्दुः स्वकीयेन रसः	sap
Av. VII.94.1	रसेन	(अपा)	taste
Av. VIII 4.10	रसम्	(शरीरसार)	

Av IX.4 5	रस-	अपा औषदीनां	sap
Av IX.8 2	रसम्	अपा औषधीना	sap
Av X.4 18	रस	(poison)	sap
5 46	रसेन	.	,
6 2	रसेन	"	"
6 22	रसेन	"	"
8 44	रसेन	(some ystic sense)	"
Av XII 6 4	रस	—	sap
Av XIV 2 58	रस	—	sap
Av XVIII 1 48	रसवान्	(सोम बहुरसोपेत)	full of sap
XVIII 2 24	रसस्य	दहसबन्धिन रसस्य, रुबिरादे	— Sap
4 23	रसवान्	—	rich in sap
4 81	रसाय	—	sap
Av XIX 31 4	रसा (Plu)	--	savours (connected with food)
31 5	रसम्	—	—
Av XX 51 2	रसा-	—	sap of herbs

(2) in the Nirukta of Yaska we have,

rasateh -from √ras (to make sound)

at 6 21, 9 11, 11 25,

rasadhāranam -'holding of juices'

|| 7 11,

rasam -juice

at 9 53, 11 29

rasaharanāt -from extracting juice'

|| 3 16, 11 5

rasā names of a river

at 11 25

rasāh -'juices'

at 4 27, || 19, 7 23

rasādānam -'drawing of juices'

at 7 11 ,

rasān -'Juices'

at 2.14; 4.27.; 11.23

rasāṇām :-of juices-at 10.10;

rasānti :-'roaring' at 11.25

rasānudānam :-'to release the juices; 7.10.

rasānupradānena :-'by giving juice' at 10.34.

'*rasena*' :-with juice. 6.15.; 12.1.

(3) in the Bṛhaddevatā we have.

rasa :-1.68.; 2.33.; 7.127.

rasādāna :-2.6.

rasāpāranīyāsīn :-8.24.

(*rasa* is a river.)

**RASA IN PĀNINĪ (Astādhyāyī),
PĀTAÑJALI (Mahābhāṣya), AND AŚVAGHOṢA, etc.**

‘Rasa’ in Pāṇini [circa 3rd B C (Keith)] and Patañjali [circa 150 B C (Keith)]—

With Nirukta and Brhaddevatā, we end the discussion on the meanings of rasa in vedic literature. With Pāṇini begins our discussion of the meanings of rasa in what we now call classical Sanskrit. There is one reference to rasa in Pā V 2.95—‘rasādibhyasca’. We cannot be sure as to the senses which Pāṇini might have in mind when he used the word rasādī.

In the dhātupāṭha also, √ras is explained as having the senses of ‘(rasa) sabde’ and ‘asvādansnehanayoh’ i.e. ‘to make sound’, and ‘to taste, to liquify or to make something oily’ respectively.

In Patañjali we have several occurrences of the √ras and also the word rasa, either occurring independently or in a compound. We also come across words such as ‘rasavacitva’, ‘rasavacin’ ‘rasād’, and ‘rasika’. Excepting only one occurrence that we shall take up in detail as below, in all other cases the usual senses of ‘to make sound’, or ‘to taste’ etc. and also that of a ‘sense quality’ or juice is seen (4).]

While commenting on Pā V 2.95 as quoted above, the Mahābhāṣyakāra referring to the previous sūtra i.e. Pā V 2.94 ‘tadasya’—styasmīnñiti matup’—asks the question as to why this sūtra (i.e. Pā V 2.95) is added, in as much as complete sense is covered by the previous sūtra. A possible answer is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other matup suffixes. But this is not accepted by the Bhāṣyakāra. According to him, there are examples of the use of other

matvarthīya suffixes in 'rasiko natah', 'urvaśi vai rūpini apsar-asam', 'spars'iko vāyuriti ~'The passage from the Mbh is quoted as follows

rasādibhyas'ca. 5 2 95

kīmarthamīdamucyate na tadasyāstyasminnityeva

matupsiddhah

rasādibhyah punarvacanamanyanivṛtīyartham ||

rasādibhyah punarvacanam kṛīyate'nyesām matvarthīyanām
pratishedhārtam

matubena jathā tyādye'nye matvarthīyāḥ prapnuvanti te mā bhuvanniti natadasti prayojanam, drśyante hyānye rasā-dibhyo matvarthīyāḥ rasiko natah urvaśi vai rūpinyapsar-asam spars'iko vāyuriti (Mbh on Pa V 2 95 pp 394-400 Edu Keilhorn) Kāśikā explains this by saying that the matup suffix is to be used in the qualities grasped by senses. But in the case of rūpini, rūpika etc the idea is to suggest not merely rūpa grasped by the eye but beauty. Similarly, in rasiko natah, the meaning is not that nata possesses juice tasted by the tongue, but he possesses an emotion or sentiment -bhāvayogah. The passage from the Kāśikā runs as follows

-rasādibhyas'ca pratipadikebhyo matup pratyao bhavati, tadasyāstyasminnityetasmin visaye rasavān, rūpavān kīmarthamucyate, na purvasūtreṇa matupsiddhah? rasādibhyah punarvacanamanyanivṛtīyartham anye matvarthīya mā bhuvanniti katham rūpini kanya rūpiko dārahah? prāyikameladvacanman, itikarano vivaksartho'nuvartate athavā gunadīyatā pathyate, tena ye rasanendriyagrahya gunastecāmatra pathah ita mā bhūt-rūpini rūpika itī sabbhāyogah gamyate rasiko nata īryatra bhāvayogah rasa, rūpa, gandha, sparśasabda, sneha, guṇāt, ekacah, guṇagrahanam rasādīnam vis'esanam, rasādib

This point is made more explicit by the Tattvabodhinī on the Siddhānta kaumudī. The author, Jñānendrasarasvatī says anyamatvarthīyetye-katham tarbī rūpini kanyā, rasiko natah itī atrābuh rasādīgane guṇāt itī pathyate tena guṇavācibhyā eva anyamatvarthīyasya niṣedhah rūpini nyatra tu rūpas abdena

saundaryam gṛhyate, tacca na guṇaḥ rasikam ityatra tu rasasabdena bhāvo gṛhyate na tu rasanaṅgrāhyo guṇa iti (pp 30¹-Edn. 1933 NS)

From the above discussion we cannot say whether Mahābhāṣyakāra wants to confine the use of matup suffix to the sense quality of taste only. This is however the distinction made by Kāś'ikā and later commentators. But this much is certain that the Mahābhāṣyakāra uses the word 'rasa' in 'rasiko nātāḥ' in the sense of bhāva i.e. sentiment or emotion. So, we may say that it is in the Mahābhāṣya that we meet for the first time the use of word rasa in the sense of 'natyarasa' also.

Other references in the Mbh. on Pg. III 126 show familiarity of the Mahābhāṣyakāra with dramatic performance or something akin to that. This would suggest that the word rasa in the aesthetic sense must have become current before Patañjali. How long before, we do not have at present the means to indicate.

'RASA' IN

- Āśvaghoṣa (Cir. 100 A.D.) (Keith)
 Bhāsa (Cir. 200 A.D.) (Keith)
 Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D.) (Keith).

From our search for the use of the word rasa in the aesthetic sense, we conclude that in the early vedic literature as such, there is no clear indication of it, though there are certain usages as we noted above, which associate rasa with literary works where the meaning is of flavour as such and the joy incidental to it. But when, we come to Pāṇini and Patañjali, particularly the latter, we have a very clear use of the word rasa in the aesthetic sense. Whether this specific use of the word rasa was known to Pāṇini or not, we cannot definitely say. But if the interpretation given by Patañjali also represents the view of Pāṇini, we can say that Pāṇini

also had in his mind the aesthetic sense of *rasa* to be distinguished from the sense of 'sense quality' of *rasa*. We can, therefore, assume that this specific aesthetic sense of the word *rasa* must have become current in the literary world of Patañjali and of later times.]

Earlier Poets

Let us now see from the works of earlier poets like Aśvaghoṣa, Bhāsa and Kālidāsa, whether there is any material for the formation of *rasa* theory in the famous sūtra to be found in the Nāṭya Sāstra of Bharata. By our study, we mean just to indicate how works of great poets might have guided Bharata in the formation of the theory. As the date of Nāṭya Sāstra falls between second Cen A.D. to still later times after Christ, the authors under consideration can be said to fall in a period of fluidity regarding the formation of the theory. We can not say of the authors that they follow theory in the same vein as done by Harsa, the author of Ratnavali, Priyandars'ikā etc. By our study we mean just to indicate how works of great poets lying before Bharata might have guided him in the formation of the theory. The works before Bharata may be necessarily those of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc.

It is almost accepted fact that literary theory draws upon literary practice just as grammar does upon linguistic usage. That the definitions of mahākāvya and the like as found in poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. were formulated in view of the master-pieces of Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa etc. is an accepted fact. On the same analogy we may say that probably the formation of the famous *rasasūtra* in Bharata also might have been guided by the same fact as that of the careful observation and study of the actual practice of the literary giants who might have preceded him. In view of this we may try to study the works of Aśvaghoṣa, (Cir 100 A.D.), Bhāsa (Cir 200 A.D.) and Kālidāsa (Cir 400 A.D.). We will try to find out if there is any mentioning or clear usage of the

so called vibhāva, anubhāva, sāttvika and vyabhicārinś etc. which make for the actual rasa realisation in their particular piece and which might have thus been useful in the formation of a theory of rasa both in nāṭya and kāvya

Asvaghosa

In the *Bu Ca* of Asvaghosa at III 7, we have the description of king S'uddhodana bidding farewell to his son Sarvārthasiddha who was starting for his first excursion. The verse reads as below

atho narendrah sutamāgatās'roh
 s'irasyupāghrāya cīram tīrikṣya |
 gacchati cāṇḍapayati sma vācā
 snehanna cainam manasī mumoca || (Bu Ca III 7)

The S D has discussed vatsala rasa sneha or vatsalatā is the sthāyin putra i.e. son and the like are the ālambana vibhāva the cesta vidyā saurya etc. of the son are the uddīpanas śīṣṇana (embrace) aṅgasparśa (touching the limbs) sīrasācumbana (kissing the head) etc. are the anubhāv as anustās aḥlā (imagining the calamity) harṣa (joy) etc. are the sāñcārins. We have practically all this in the stanza quoted above

Bu. Ca III 13 22 describe the feelings of women eager to see the prince. The vyabhicārin called āvega (impatience) is to be seen in these verses

Bu Ca IV 25 describes the anubhāvas that accompany śṛṅgārarasa in the following words

ta bhṛnbhī prekṣitāṣṭhāvarhasāśīrladitairgataiḥ |
 cakruśākṣepikāś ceṣṭā bhītabhīṣī tvāṅganāḥ ||

Bu Ca IV 54 61 describe the state of the prince who did not respond to the gestures of the beautiful ladies. We find herein the delineation of sama and the realisation of śānta rasa. The verse reads as below

evamākṣipyamaṇo'pi sa tu dhairyaṁvṛtendriyah |
 martavyamiti sodvego na jaharsa na vivyathe ||

(Bu. Ca. IV. 54)

His friend Udayi finds him thus lost in contemplation and in order to deviate him from it, starts addressing the prince—

iti dhyanaparam drṣtvā visayebhyo gatasprham |
 udayi nīti-śāstrajñastamuvāca subhṛttaya || (Bu. Ca IV.62).

The feeling of nirveda finds beautiful expression in the words of Buddha who says :

jarā vyadhis'ca mṛtyus'ca yadī na syādidaṁ trayam |
 mamāpi hi manoḥjesu visayesu ratirbhavet || (Bu. Ca, IV.86)

Bu. Ca, V. 29. describes the anubhavas of vatsala rasa as below :

iti tasya vaco nis'āmya rājā karinevābhīhato drumas-
 cacāla |
 kamalapratiṁśalau gṛhṭvā vacanam cedamuvāca
 bāspakanthah ||

Bu. Ca, V. 45 describes the uddīpana and ālambana vibhāvas of śṛṅgāra as follows :

tata uttamamuttamaṅganāstam nis'itāryairupatasthurind-
 rakalpam |
 bhūmavacchirasīva candragāure dravinendratmajamapsaro-
 ganaughah ||

Bu. Ca, VII. 1-10 describe the effects on human beings, beasts, etc. when the prince makes an entry into the forest. We come across a beautiful delineation of the sthāyibhāva vismaya giving rise to adbhuta rasa.

Bu. Ca, VII. 7. says;

kaccidvaspṛṣṭamāmaṣṭamah syāt
 syādas'vinoranyataras'cyuto vā |
 ucceturuccairiti tatre vācas-
 taddars'anādvismayaḥ munīṇām ||

Bu. Ca. VIII, 21,22 provide all the required factors that make for karunarasa.

vilambakes'yo malināmbaṅga
nirāṇjanairbaṅgahateksanairmukhibh i
striyo na reṣumṛjaya vīṇakṛtā
diviva tātā rajanīksayarunah || 21

and also, araktatāṃtrās'caranairanūpuratāh

akundalairgrjavakṣodharairmukhibh i
svabhṅvapinairjagbhanairamekhalai-
-rahṅtayoktrairmusitairiva śtanatāh || (22)

ṛvega born of calamity is beautifully illustrated in Bu. Ca. VIII, 20 as below

atiprabhāṅgātha s'okamūrchitāh
kumārmaṃdars'analolalocanāh i
gr̥hadvīnis'cakramurās'rayā striyāh
s'aratpayodādiva vidyutās'calāh ||

The sāttvikabhavas such as śāmbhā, vaivarṇya etc. that go with the karuna rasa are to be seen in the following :

hataśvīso'nyāh s'nibhāmsabhāvāh
striyo vīṇādēna vicetanā iva i
na cakrasūrnāsru jāburna śas'vasur-
na celurāsūlikhṇā iva śthitāh || (Bu. Ca VIII, 25)

The anubhavas of karunarasa, such as dāḥvanindā (censure of fate) bhūpātā (falling on the earth), kranditā (weeping) etc. are seen in yasodharāvilāpa in Bu. Ca. VIII, 31-42.

Bu. Ca, VIII, 31 is—tatastu roṣapraṇiraktalocanā
viśādasambandhikaṣyagadgadāh i
uvāca . nis'vāsacalatpayodhara
vigādhās'okāśīrudharā yas'odharā ||

So also, Bu. Ca. VIII, 70,—it̥ha devī patīs'okamūrchitā,
rurōda dadhyau vilāpā caśakṛt i
svabhāvadhīrāpī hi s̥ā satī s'uccā.
dhīrīṇā na sasrōṣa cakrā na hrīyan ||

Falling on the earth due to grief is described in Bu Ca VIII. 73, and the wailings on the part of king Suddhodana are described in Bu Ca VIII 75-80. Jadata (Stupour), the sāttvika finds expression in Bu Ca VIII 81-

Iti tanayaviyogajātaduhkhah
kṛtīsadrś'āṃ saha-jam vibhaya dhairyam (
das aratha iva ramaś'okavas yo
bahu vilalapa nṛpo viśamjñakalpah ||

Krodha, the sthāyibhāva of raudra and the anubhāva that accompany it are described in XIII 28-30

Bu Ca XIII 30 is,—mahābhūto dharmaparās'ca nāga
mahāmūnervighnamamāyācānāh (
māram prati krodhavivṛttanetrā
nibh as'vasuh caiva jāyambhūre ca ||

The material for bībhatsarasa is supplied in the description of hell in Bu Ca XIV

Bu Ca XIV-14 says

kecitkṣīnairayodamāstrairbhakṣyante dārunaiḥ svabhūh (
kecid dhṛṣṭairayastundairvāyasairāyasairiva ||

so also in the Vth Canto wherein the charms of ladies are described as being infective,

Bu Ca V 61-reads,

vivṛṭāsyaputā vivṛḍbhagātī prapatadvaktṛajalā
prakāśa guhyā (
aparā madaghūrṇiteva śīśye na babhāse vikṛtāṃ vapuḥ
poposa (f

śṛṅgāra finds beautiful expression in Sau IV 36-

athāpyanās'yānavisesakāyāṃ mayyesyasi tvaṃ tvaṇitāṃ
tatastvāṃ (
nīpīdayiṣyanti bhujadvaṇena nīrbhīsanenārdraṇīlepanena ||

The vyabhicārīn called vitarka finds beautiful expression in Sau IV 42

tam gauravam buddhagam cakarsa
bhāryānurāgaḥ punarācakarsa |
so'nis'cayānnāpi yayau na tasthau
turamstarangasviva rājahamsah ||

The anubhāvas of karuṇa are found in Sau, VI. 4,

sā khedasaṁsvinnalalātakena
nīśvasanīpīṭavis'ekakena |
cīṇācalakṣena mukhena tasthau
bhārataramanyatra viśāṅkamānā ||

and also VI 5—tates'cīrasthānaparīs'ramena

sthitaiva paryankatāle papata |
tīryakca śīṣye pravibhīṇabārā
śapadukaikardhaviṇa ṁbapada ||

avega, is seen in the verses that follow Vilāpa or wailings are seen in verses 12-19. So also the anubhāvas of kṣobha, krandana etc are seen in Sau. VI 24-26.

Sau VI 34 describes vividly all the anubhāvas that go with karuṇarasa as below

rurōda mamāu vīruṅva jūglau
babhṛāma tasthau vilāpa dadhyan |
cakāra roṣam vicakāra māyām
cakarta vīkṛāma vicakarṣa vāstram ||

Thus in Aśvaghoṣa we come across the actual description of different vibhāvādīs that give rise to different rasas and thus providing enough material for the theorists to draw their own conclusions.

Bhāsa

In Bhāsa's Svapnavasavadattam, we have the vyabhicārīṇ called smṛti illustrated in V. 5 and 6 which read as below :

smarāmyavantyaḥpateḥ sutāyaḥ
prasthānakālā svajanam smarantyaḥ |
bāṣpam pravṛttam nayanāntalagnam
śneḥāṁmamaivorasi pātayantyaḥ (Svapna V. 5)

and also—bahus'o'pyupades'esu yaya māmiksamānaya |
hastena srasṭakoṇena kṛtamākāśavāditam ||

and also in the following

Rāja—śrutisukhaninade katham nu devyāḥ

stanaḥ ugaḥ jaghanasthale ca sūptā |
vibhagaganarajovikṛtānāḥ
pratibhāyamabhusitāsyaranyavāsam ||

api ca, asnigdhāḥ ghoṣavatī yā tapasvinyā na smarasi,
stonisamudvahanepārs'vanīpiditāḥ
kheḍastanāntarasukhānyupaguhitāḥ |
uddis'ya mām ca virāḥe paridevitāḥ
vādyāntaresu kaṭhitāḥ ca sasmṛitāḥ ||

2 (Svapna VI 1-2)

and also in *Avimśaka* II 1, which runs as,

adyāpi hastikaras'ikaras'itāḥ
bālāḥ bhayākulavilolavāsādanetrāḥ |
svapneṣu nityamupalabhyā punarvibodhe
jāṭisamrāḥ pratibhājatīmiva smarāḥ ||

All these instances evoke *vipralambha śṛṅgāra*

We may be able to read the material for *karuṇa* in the speech of Das'aratha in *Pratima* II, for whom Rāma is lost for ever

Rāja—bhṛatāḥ 'sumantra'

kṛame jyeṣṭho rāmaḥ
nabī nabī yuktamabhusitam mayā |
kva te jyeṣṭho rāmaḥ priyasuta, sutaḥ sū kva duḥitā,
vidhehāṇām bharturmitatīśayabhaktigurujane |
kva vā saumitritmāḥ hatapitṛkāśāsannamarāṇām
kṛmāpyāḥ kṛm te sakalajanasolāṇavakaram ||

The *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc of *hāsyā* are seen in the speech of Vasantaka in *svapna* V, where he starts telling a story to Udayana

Vidūṣakah -bhodu, annam kahaissam atthi naaram bambhadattam
nāma tahaṃ kīḷa rāḥ kampillo nāma.

Rāja -kimiti kimiti

Vidūṣakah -(punastadeva pathati)

Rāja -murkha! rāḥ brahmadattabh nagaram kampilayam
ityabhidhiyatam.

Vidūṣakah -kim rāḥ bambhadatto naa raṃ kampilam

Rāja evametat

Vidūṣakah -tena hi mubuttaam padivāḷḷedu bhavam, java
otibagaam karissam rāḥ bahamadatto naaram
kampilam (iti babus'astadeva pathivā) idānim
sunodu bhavam

Raudra with krodha as its sthāyin and the enemy as
ālambana, the activity of the enemy its uddīpana, etc is seen
in the following passage from the Madhyama Vyāyoga

Bhīmah - aha ko'yaṃ bhīmo nāma vis'vakartā sivaḥ kṛṇah
śakrah saktidhara yamah |
etesu kathiyatam bhadra kena te sadṛśaḥ pita ||

Ghaṭotkacah -sarvaḥ

Bhīmah -dhibhāṣtametat

Ghaṭotkacah -katham kathamaṣṭamityaha kṣipasi me gurum,
bhavatvimaṃ sthulam vṛksamutpātya praharāmi
(utpātya praharati) kathamanenāpi na sakyate
hantum kiṃ nu khalu kariṣye bhavatu, dṛṣtam
etadgirikutamutpātya praharāmi etc etc

or as in Duṭaghaṭotkaca wherein we have,

Ghaṭotkacah -(sarosam) kiṃ data iti māṃ pradharsayasi
mātvadbhoh na duṭo ham.

alam vo vyavasāyena praharadhvam samāhataḥ |

jyāchedāddurbalo nāhamabhimanyurīha sthitaḥ ||

mahānasa kaisorako'yaṃ me manorathah api ca,

daṣṭosto rṣṣṭimuddiyama tīṣṭhatyesa ghaṭotacah |

uttīsthatu pumān kascidgantumicchedyamālayam ||

etc etc.

Vīrarasa, with *garva* as its *vyabhicārin* is beautifully illustrated in *Dutavākya* I 24, wherein *Duryodhana* says,

-bho dūta na jānati bhavān rājyavyavahāram
rājyam nāma nṛpātmajaiḥ sahrdayaiḥ jtvā nṛpūn bhuṃyate
talloke na tu yācyate na tu punaridināya vā diyate |
kāṅksā cenṛpatitvamāptumacirāt kurvantu te sāhasam
svairam vā pravṛsantu sātamatibhirjustam samāyāsramam ||
(*Dutavākya* I 24)

or in the following

Duryodhana:-a kasya vijñāpyam madvacanādevam sa
vaktavyah,
kim vyatibam bahu bhāsase, na khalu te pārusya sadhya
vayam,
kopānnarhasi kimcideva vacansamyud dham yada dāsyasi |
niryāmyesa niranteram nṛpasatacchatravalibhirvṛta
stisthatvam saha pāṇḍavaiḥ pravivaco dāsyami te sāyakaibḥ |
(*Dutaghatotkaca* I 15)

Dharmavira can be read in the following

Śalyah -bho angarāja vañcitah khalu bhavān
Kānah -kena
Śalyah -sakrena
Kaṇah -na khalu sakrah khalu mayā vañcitah
anekayjñāhutitarpito divjaih
kṛittmān dānavasamghamardanah |
suradvīpāspḥālanakarkaśāṅgulir-
mayā kṛittrih khalu pakaśāsanah || (*Kaṇabhāra* I 23).

and also,

Śalyah :-āṅgarāja na dātavyam
Kaṇah -salyarāja alamalam vārayitum, pasya,
śikṣā kṣayam gacchati kālāparyayat
subaddhamulāḥ nīpatanti pādapāḥ |
jalam jalāsthānagatam ca śuṣyati
butam ca dattam ca tattharva tisthati || (22)
tasmāt gṛhyatam. (nikṛtya dadāti) (*Kaṇabhāra* I)

Bhayanaka is illustrated in the following -

Dāmodarah -

etā mattacakorasāvanayanāḥ prodbhinnakamrastanāḥ
kāntāḥ prasphuritādharaśtarucayo viśrastakesasrajāḥ |
sambhṛāntā galitottariyavaśanāstrāsakulavyābṛtāḥ
trastā māmannyānti pannagapatim dṛṣṭvaiva gopāṅganāḥ ||
(Bālacarita, IV. 1)

Bibhatsa is evoked in Ūrubhanga I 11, as below :

gbṛdhṛā madhūkamukulonnatapiṅgalakṣā
daityendrakuṇjaranataukusatikṣnatundāḥ |
bhāntyambare vitatalambavikṛmapakṣā
māmsaiḥ pravalacitā iva talavṛtāḥ ||

Thus we come across illustrations in the plays of Bhāsa, that might have been a source of inspiration to the theorists

Kālidāsa

In Kālidāsa also we observe the same. We come across the delineation of different bhāvas, anubhāvas etc that are associated in theory with particular rasas. We find them here also in the same context. Thus, avahitthā, the vyabhicārīn of śṛṅgāra finds expression in Kum Sa VI 84 as,

evaṃ vadinī devasau pārśve pīturadhomkhi |
līlakamalapatrāṇi ganayitṛmāsa pārvatī ||

The vyabhicārīn called mati is seen in Sakuntala I 21-
asamśayam ksatraparigrahaksamā
yadāryamasyāmabhiḥ sa me manah |
satām hi sandehapadesu vastusa
pramāṇamantahkarānapravṛttayah ||

'Svapna' is the vyabhicārīn that goes with vipralambha śṛṅgāra. It finds its expression in Megha (uttara, 49)-
māmākṣapranīhitabhujam nīrdayāśleṣahetoḥ
labdhāyāste kathamapi mayā svapnasandars'anesu |
pas'yantrīṇāṃ na khalu bahus'o na stihāḥ devatānāṃ
muktasthulāstarukisalayesvas'rules'āḥ patantī ||

All the paraphernalia of vipralambha śrṅgāra is supplied in Megha (uttara 47)–

tvāmālikhya pranayakupitāṃ dhaturāgāḥ silāyāmātmānaṃ
te caranapatitam yavadicchāmi kartum |

asraistāvanmuhurupacitairdśuralupyate me krūrastasmīn-
apī na sāhate saṃgamam nau kṛtāntah ||

Herein, the heroine is the ālambanavibhava, tatpranayakopa is the uddīpanavibhava, the desire to fall at the feet is the anubhava, censure of destiny is the vyabhicārīn and ratī or love is the sthāyīn

The uddīpanavibhava for sānta is met with in Śakuntala I 7

ulvāṅ s'ukagatbhakormukhabharastāḥ etc

Unmādatīś'aya, a vyabhicārīn of vipralambha is seen in Vikramo-IV in the verse viz –

sarvasitibhītam nātha etc and also in tarangabhṛubhaṅga,
etc.,

and also in-tanvī meghajalāradrapallavatayā etc Vītarka is seen in (Vikramo IV)

tisṭhetkopavas'at prabhavapibhāṭṭā etc

Instances can be multiplied as we find the vibhavadis of karuṇa in ajavilāpa and rativilāpa, of smṛta in Ku Sam vasantavarṇana etc Vīra finds expression at Raghu III 51,

tataḥ prahasyāpabhaṃyāḥ purandaraṃ
punarbabbhāse turagasya rakṣitā |
gṛhṇa sastrāṃ yadī sarga eśa te
na khalvanirjyā raghum kṛtī bhavaṇ ||

or dharmavīra as in Raghu II 57,

kīṃpyabhiṃsyāḥ tava cenmatōham
yas'ahs'arīre bhava me dayāluḥ |
ekāntavidhvamsiṣu madvidhānām
pīṇc-ṣvanāsthā khalu bhantikeṣu ||

Thus, it is precisely such clear instances in the works of literary masters that might have been the original source of inspiration for the theorists to formulate their principles of literary criticism

We will now try to study the occurrences of the word 'rasa' in Asvaghosa, Bhaṭṭa, and Kālidāsa and we will try to see if there is a clear reference to the aesthetic sense of rasa in any occurrence

In the Bu Ca of Aśvaghosa, we come across two occurrences of rasa and one of rasa(5) None of it carries the technical sense of nāṭyarasa or kāvyarasa

Rasa at Bu Ca V 5 means 'the earth' However, Bu Ca V 62 is noteworthy

Bu. Ca V 62, is

Iti sattvakuṭānūrupam vividham sa pramadaḥjanah
s'ayanah |
sarasaḥ sadrs'am babhara rupam
pavanavarjitarugnapuskārasya ||

'sarasaḥ' obviously means 'charged with srogrāsa'

In the Sau, we have five occurrences of rasa (6) Sau V 24 has,

śraddhāśāhanam śreṣṭhataman dhanebhyah |
prajñārasaḥ tīptikaro reṣebhyah ||

Rasa in prajñarasa does not carry any technical sense but rasa in 'reṣebhyah' i.e. among all the rasas, may refer to the rasas such as as śṛṅgāra, vira, etc. or tastes in general

Sau XI. 2 has anīstanaiḥkramyārasaḥ i.e. one who was not interested in inaction, and also virasaḥ, 'without interest'

Sau IX 49 has 'rasan' in the sense of 'marking noise'.
Sau XVI 93 has 'rasan' in the sense of 'taste'

Thus in Aśvaghosa, we do not come across 'rasa' in the technical sense of kāvyarasa or nāṭyarasa, excepting perhaps at Bu Ca V 62, as above

In the Trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we have four occurrences of *rasa* (7) But none of it is seen in its technical sense

In Kālidāsa, we come across several references of the word *rasa* 8 and some of them are definitely referring to the technical sense of a *nāṭyarasa* or *kāvya-rasa*

These are as below

Kum Sa VII 91 reads as below

tau sandhisu vyanjītavṛttibhedam
rasāntaresu pratibaddharagam |
apasyatām apsarāsām mubhūrtam
prayogamādyam laṅkāṅgabāram ||
'sandhi' refers to the pañcasandhis
'vṛtti' refers to *kāśīkī*, and the like
and *rasāntaresu* refers to various *nāṭyarasas*

Kum Sa V 82 is also noteworthy It has '*bhavaikrasam manasā*' obviously in the sense of *sṛṅgarārāsa*

The *Mālavikāgnimitram* has the following occurrence of '*rasa*' in its technical sense

Mā I, 4 reads as below :

devānāmīdamāmanantī munayah kṛāntam kṛatam cakṛuṣam,
rudrenedamumakṛtavyatikare svāṅge vibhaktam dvidhā |
traigunyoḍbbhavamātra lokacaritam nānārasam drsyate,
nāṭyam bhinnārccerjanasya bahudhapyekam samarādhanaṁ ||

Mā II 8 is,

angalrantarāhita vacanāḥ sūcitāḥ samyagarthah,
pādanyāso layamanugatastanmayatvam raseṣu |
sākhayonirmrḍurabhīnasyastadvikalpānuvṛttān,
bhāvo bhāvam nudati viśayādrāgabandhaḥ sa eva ||

Mā IV. 13—

tamāsṛitya sṛutīpathagatāṃśsayābaddhamūlah
samprāptānām nayanaviśayam rūḍharāgapravālah |
hastasparsairmukulīta iva vyaktaromodgamatvāt
kuryātkantam manasijatarurmām rasajñām phalīśyaḥ ||

R 15

In these occurrences 'rasa' carries the technical sense of nātyarasa.

In the Vikramorvasiya we have rasa in its technical sense, at,

I 8. : asyah sargavidhau prajāpatirabhuccandro nu kāntipradah |
 śṛṅgārāikarasaḥ svayam nu madanah māsō nu
 puṣpakarḥ ||
 vedabhyājadah katham nu viśayvyāvṛttakautubalah |
 nirmātum prabhavenmanoharamimam rupam
 putano munih ||

III. 18. munioḥ bharatena yah prayogah
 bhavattṣvaṣṭarasaśrayo niyuktah |
 lalitābhinayam tamadya bhartā
 maruṭam draṣṭumanah salokapalah ||

and, Act, III—dvitīyah—tasmin punah, sarasvatīkṛtakabandhe
 lakṣmīsvayamvare tesu tesu rasāntaresu tau-
 mayyāsīt |

Thus in Kālidasa, we come across occurrences of 'rasa' in the aesthetic sense.

Foot-Notes

All the references are to the Edn. of Dr. Keilhorn.

(1) In Patañjali we have

√ras-Pā. Sū. 2.4 85 line No. 16, 17, 17, 17, 20, pp. 500.

√ras-Pā. Sū. 1 3 10, Line 8.8, Page 268; 4/269.; 2.4 85;

17,18/19/22-499.; 5 6.7.8.9.11.18 24/500.; 2.2.3 4.5. 6.8.10/502.

rasa-1.4.110, 18/356.; 3 9/357.; 4.3.155.; 9. 15/325.

rasa-1.2.64. 5/246; 4.1.3. 7/198.

rasa-1.2.64. 3.4/246.; 4.1.3. 4-6/198.; 5.1.9. 24/366.

rasavacitva—Pā.Sū 4.4.24 line 18, page 330.

rasavacin—4.4.24. $\frac{18/19}{330}$; 5.2.107. $\frac{5/5/6}{397}$.

rasadi—(ga) 5.2. 95. $\frac{19/21}{394}$;

rasika 5.2.95 $\frac{21—}{394}$;

- (2) The Bu. Ca. has,
 'rasa' at II. 8.; III. 51.; V. 52 (sarasaḥ)
 and 'rasa' at V. 5,
- (3) The Sau. has rasa at
 V. 24.-prajñārasaḥ, rasebhyah;
 IX. 48-'rasa'
 XI. 2.-rasa,
 XI. 49-rasaṇ (=making sound)
 XVI. 93-rasena,
- (4) The trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhaṣa have,
 rasanā-pra. yau, III, pp. 84. Edn. Prof. Déodhar)
 bhayarasam-Avi. I. 2; (pp. 110);
 adhikarasam-Avi. V. 4. (pp. 168)
 guṇarasajñasya-Cā. 1. 2. (pp. 197);
 kṛdārasesu-Cā. III. 1. (pp. 223)
- (5) Kālidāsa has,
 rasam-Raghu I. 18;
 samarasa Raghu IV. 18;
 rasaṇ- " IV. 66;
 rasavat- " VIII. 68;
 rasakhandana varjitam.-Raghu. IX. 36;
 abalāikarasāḥ- Raghu IX. 43;
 rasātārāṇi } = X 17;
 ekarasam }
 kṛdārasam-Kum. Sa I. 29.
 rasāt- " " III. 37.
 rasātmakasya = " V. 22.
 bhāvāikarasam manah- Kum. Sa. V. 82;
 " " VII. 91,
 jātārāparasa- " " VIII. 36;
 mūlasekaśarasaiḥ- " " VIII. 38;
 dhāturasā- " " VIII. 58;
 prabhārasam- " " VIII. 70.

anan̄garasaprasaṅge- Ku. Sam. IX, 1;
 rasena- " " IX. 41; and XI.
 rarāsa virasam- " " XVI. 12;
 sara+ap- Rtu. Sc. I. 2. (grismavarnanam)-

The *S'akuntala* has,

-sadayam sundari gr̥hyate raso'sya-III.
 lūksārasah-Ss, IV. 4.
 (bhavanesu) rasadhikesu-S'a. VII, 20,

The *Vikramo* has

Śrngaraikarasah-I, 1,
 astarasas'rayah-II, 18;
 rasaddite- II, 22;

rasāntaresu Act III-dvītiyah speaks,

Malavikā-has,

nānārasam-I. 4;
 rasesu- II. 8,
 rasajñam-IV. 1

Megha has,

rasabhyantarah- I. 28 (-pūrvamegha)
 sarasakadali -II, 36 (uttaramegha)

CHAPTER VIII

‘RASA’ in Bharata (Nā Śa Cir 400 A.D.)

[The earliest technical discussion of rasa is to be found in the Nā Śā, attributed to, Bharata (Cir. 400 A.D.)] In fact Nā Śā is also our earliest authority on such topics of sanskrit poetics as alaṃkāra, guṇa, doṣa, etc I now, therefore, present here a discussion on rasa as found in this work. The textual criticism of this work on dramaturgy is not yet fully carried out This much, however, is clear that it contains several strata belonging probably to different ages and probably also to different schools of thought The major part of this work is in verse There are, however, a few prose passages also It is likely that the prose portion containing the famous rasa-sūtra may be an early discussion on the subject However that may be, I take the whole portion, prose and verse, as one unit for the discussion here. The anuvamśya śrīyaḥ and ś'lokaś quoted in support of the main text in prose and verse, clarify what is said in the body of the text.

Having described in the first five adhyāyaś of the Nā Śā, the mythical origin of the science of dramaturgy, its first production, the construction of the different types of theatre buildings, the ceremonial worship of the theatre, the different aspects of pūrvarāṅga, the difference between abhinaya, nṛtta and the different varieties of nṛtta etc, Bharata comes to some of the main themes relevant to the art of dramaturgy.

In the sixth adhyāya, the sages ask Bharata five questions. Of these the first and the foremost are—

—ye rasaḥ ke paribhāṣante nṛpaḥ nṛpaḥ avicakṣanaḥ |

rasaḥ kvaṃ kena vai teṣāṃ etadākhyaṭumarhasi || (VI. 2)

and,

bhāvaścaiva katham proktaḥ kiṃ vā te bhāvayantyapi |

(VI. 3a-b)

Thus, the understanding of the rasas and the bhāvas occupy prominent place in the *Nāṣa*. The eight rasas and the sthāyī, sañcārī and sattvikabhāvas are enumerated in verses 16-23 of the VI the Chapter. Later on, after having enumerated abhinayas, vṛttis, pravṛttis, siddhis, four types of musical tones, four types of musical instruments, five types of singing and three types of theatre building, the author proceeds to explain the subject of rasa in prose

Here comes the famous rasa-sūtra viz “vibhāvanubhāva-vyabhicārisamyogādrasanīspatīḥ”—] In this sūtra, the meaning of the word ‘nīspatīḥ’ derived from the root nīspad has caused a great controversy. It may be expressed in English, following Monier Williams, as something which comes about, or arises out of, or results from something else. This sūtra is translated by Raneiro Gno: as follows—“Out of the union of determinants (vibhāva), the consequents (anubhāva), and the transitory mental states (vyabhicārīn), the birth of rasa takes place.” He translates, ‘nīspatīḥ’, by ‘birth’, which may be regarded as a colourless word not tending to any particular view regarding the psychological progress of this birth. This sūtra is followed by an explanation in prose supported by traditional verses

[Here, an attempt is made to explain three points : (i) How rasa comes about ? (ii) What is rasa ? and (iii) What feeling accompanies it ? The first point is explained on the analogy of a beverage. In a beverage there is one principal ingredient which combined with other tasteful ingredients becomes in an integrated form a rasa like *śāḍava* and others. Similarly, when the permanent mental states like *rati* or love, *bhaya* or fear, etc., are combined with various bhāvas, specified in the sūtra as vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārīs, they become rasas. The second point, as to why these are called rasas is also explained on the same analogy viz that these also, like the material beverages, are capable of being tasted. The third point, viz

the feeling which accompanies the taste, is that of pleasure. Thus, all the three points involved in the sūtra are explained on the analogy of material rasas.]

This analogy is made clearer in the traditional verses quoted after this. Just as experts in taste, while eating the cooked things combined with many dravyas and vyañjanas enjoy it, similarly the wise or the connoisseurs enjoy with mind-manasā-the permanent mental states which are combined with the abhinayas of bhāvas. It is for this reason that these are called nātyarasas. In these verses, two more points are added by way of clarification. One is that it requires an expert or a connoisseur to be able to discern and enjoy the taste properly, both in matters of food and drink as well as in the enjoyment of the taste in poetry and art. The second point is that it is with the mind that taste in poetry and art is perceived and enjoyed, as distinct from the physical sense of taste in the mouth.

As to why the sthāyibhāvas alone attain the state of rasa is explained in the VII Chapter. Here also, the explanation proceeds by way of analogy. Eventhough, men have similar characteristics, have similar bodies, yā, there are some who by their noble family, character, learning, artistic proficiency, attain to the state of kinghood, while other persons of inferior talent become their followers. Similarly, vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārin become subordinate to sthāyibhāvas. This means that in the psychological theories of the ancients, the eight or nine permanent moods, sthāyibhāvas, viz. rati or love, hasa or laughter, śoka or grief, etc., were taken to be perpetual moods of living creatures in contrast to the fleeting moods such as nirveda, glāni, etc.

Thus, from these two passages, we gather that Rāsa is a matter of tasting of permanent moods with mind by men who have proficiency in such tasting. The sthāyibhāvas attain to this mental tastefulness, rasatva, not by themselves but when connected with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and the vyabhicārin.

This connexion is of a generative nature. The knowledge of the relation of feelings emotions and sentiments with events and circumstances of life becomes so to say transformed in poetry and drama into what are called vibhāvas and anubhāvas. It is this connexion which is the stuff of what becomes rasa. ☞

Now let us see what the Na Śa means by the term 'vibhava anubhavas and vyabhicaribhava

The meaning of the term 'vibhava is given as below
 -atha vibhava iti kasmāt ucyate vibhavo vijñānārthah, vibhavaḥ
 kāraṇam nimittam heturiti paryāyan vibhavyante nena vāganga
 sattvābhīnayaḥ ityato vibhavaḥ yathā vibhavitam vijñātamity-
 atarthāntaram-(Na Śa VII pp 346) (G O S Ed)

[Vibhava is primarily taken in the sense of knowledge (vijñāna). It is however a piece of knowledge which reveals something else also. Therefore, in relation to that something else which it reveals, it is also called kāraṇa nimitta and hetu, i.e. there are other words for vibhava. It is by means of vibhava that vācika, śāṅgika and sāttvika abhinayas are so to say, understood or grasped specifically. Thus vibhavitam is said to mean vijñātam.] Thus rather not quite clear exposition in prose is clarified in the verse quoted as authority viz.,

bahavo rithā vibhavyante vāgāṅgabhīnayaśrayāḥ |
 anena yasmāntenāyam vibhava iti saṃjñitah ||

(Na Śa VII 4)

Because (many meanings coming from vācika and śāṅgika abhinayas are made clear or capable of being grasped or understood, it is called vibhava. Thus vibhava is really a type of knowing which is responsible for other meanings culminating in the perception of mental states.]

Anubhāva is explained as follows

-anubhava iti kasmāt ucyate anubhavyantēnena vāgāṅgasattva
 kṛto bhīnaya iti (Na Śa VII, pp 347)

◁Anubhāva is the expression of these mental states by means of vācika and āṅgika abhinayas. The anubhavas may be identified with bodily expressions, including vocal expressions which show the mental states produced by the vibhāvas. ▷ The sloka is

—vāgāṅgābhinayencha yatastvartho'nubhāvyate |
sākṣāṅgopāṅgasamyuktastvanubhāvastataḥ smṛtāḥ
(Nā Śā VII 5)

Vyabhicārin or transitory state is explained as,

vi abhi ityetaṇvupasargau cara iti gatyartha dhātuh
vividhamabhimukhyena raseṣu carantīti vyabhicārinah vāgāṅ-
gasattvopetāḥ prayoge rasānnayanti iti vyabhicārinah
(Nā Śā VII pp 355)

—i.e. 'vi' and 'abhi' are prefixes, and the root is 'cara' meaning 'to go', 'to move'. Here the word vyabhicārinah means, 'those mental states, which in a variety of ways move towards the principal sentiments. That is, they are the mental states which play the part of accessories which reinforce the permanent moods. ▷

The rasa theory of Bharata may be interpreted in the following way. [The vibhāvas are statements and presentations which give rise to emotions and sentiments. The expressions of the sentiments and emotions thus born was anubhāvas. The fleeting emotions caused and expressed in a similar way are the vyabhicārins. These unite into a unitary whole like the honey gathered from different plants. When this unitary whole becomes tasted by one who can taste it with discernment, it is the state of rasa.

It may be noted that theory of rasa is based upon the psychological analysis of the human mind in ancient times. The results have been put into a formula which has become traditional. It has eight (or nine) permanent states of mind, i.e. sthāyibhāvas, thirty-three transitory states i.e. vyabhicārins, and the eight sattvikabhāvas. This group of forty-nine

mental states in the material out of which eight or nine rasas are formed. These are, *sr̥ṅāra* (love), *hāsyā* (laughter), *karuṇā* (tragic), *vīra* (heroic), *raudra* (furious), *bhayanāka* (terrific), *bībhatsa* (odious), and *adbhuta* (marvellous), the *natyārasas*, and to which later on is added the *santa rasa* (quietistic). The *Nāṭya* being essentially a work on dramaturgy, enumerates, the different *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *sancāryas* that constitute these rasas, in the sixth and seventh adhyāyas. All this material in the *Nāṭya* has more or less become traditional in the later works on Sanskrit dramaturgy and poetics.

It may also be noted that in the 16th adhyāya of the *Nāṭya*, dealing with the concepts of *lakṣaṇa*, *guṇa*, *dosa*, and *alamkāra*, it is stated (vs. 113-114) that the *guṇas* and the *alamkāras* have to be used in poetry, in consonance with the delineation of different rasas. Here, it may be noted, *rasa* is visualised in connection with poetry i.e. *kāvya* in addition to drama or *nāṭya*.

CHAPTER IX

'RASA' in the earlier authors in Sanskrit Poetics

- (i) Bhāmaha
- (ii) Dandin
- (iii) Vāmana
- (iv) Udbhata
- (v) Rudrata

The comparatively simple rasa theory of the Nāṭya-śāstra becomes the subject-matter of fine analysis and recondite discussion in the later writers. The different dāśanika views have entered into this discussion and made it complicated. These different views have been given by Abhinavaguptapāda-cārya in his commentary on the rāsasūtra before he gives his own subtle theory. The same subject has been touched by him in his commentary on Dhvaṇyaloka. Before we come to this later development, it will be appropriate to study the treatment of rasa as given by writers on poetics earlier than Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

In the earlier ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc we do not come across any adequate discussion on rasa-realisation. It seems, these earlier writers on poetics had their own notion of kāvyā or poetry as word and sense taken together in general. All that rendered charm to poetry was termed 'ālaṃkāra' in the wider sense of the term. Bhāmaha called it 'vakrokti' in general (II 85) (1). Dandin also takes the term ālaṃkāra in a wider sense and applies it to anything that may render charm to poetry. (II 1) (2). Vāmana, at I 1 2, takes the term ālaṃkāra in a wider sense and defines it as 'saundarya' or 'charm' in general (3). Thus, whatever is a source of charm in poetry, is broadly termed ālaṃkāra by the earlier writers on poetics. These writers must not have been unaware of the theory of

characterises a muktaka, while rasa is a characteristic of a mahākāvya. Rasa as an alamkāra, as observed above, would find place even in a muktaka.

Dandin

Dandin also, from the theoretical point of view, seems to hold an identical position with reference to the topic of rasa. He also tries to incorporate rasa, bhava, etc., under such figures as rasavat, preyas, etc. (10).

But, as compared to Bhamaha, Dandin seems to have given more importance to rasa. This is seen in his treatment of the figures such as rasavat, preyas, etc. (11) Dandin treats of these figures at II. 280-291. He talks of śṛṅgāra at II. 281, of raudra at II. 282, and of vīra at II. 284. karuṇa is illustrated at II. 286. Bībhatsa, adbhuta and bhayanaka are illustrated in II. 288, 289, and 291, respectively. Abhinava in his Abh. (272, Vol. I Nā Śā. G.O.S. Ed. II) while explaining the causal view of rasa held by Lollata, says that earlier writers such as Dandin also held a similar view. (12) The commentators try to read a fully worked out rasa theory in Dandin. (13) But as to the theoretic position of rasa in kāvya, Dandin says at II. 287. that thus, karuṇya which is enhanced, is taken as alamkāra (14) Thus, even for Dandin, rasa is only an alamkāra in poetry. (15).

Preyas is defined as, 'priyatarākhyana' at II. 275 Preyas is felicitous expression and rasavat happens where rasa abounds. Ūrjasvi is where pride dominates or that which has appropriate excellence (16) From the illustrations cited by Dandin, it becomes clear that for him, preyas occurs in case of the suggestion of some bhāvas. (17). In the same way, ūrjasvi exhibits the bhāva of 'garva' or pride. Both preyas and ūrjasvi exhibit a bhāva as a 'kāvyasobhakaradharmā', i.e. alamkāra which serves to render charm to poetry. Rasavat, on the other hand, as seen above, exhibits fully developed rasas in form of an alamkāra. (18)

Dandin, like Bhāmaha, while describing the characteristics of a mahākāvya says that a mahākāvya should be full of rasa and bhāvas (rasabhāvanirantaram), and should also have well-defined sandhis. He also, like Bhāmaha, refers to other works for a description of drama.

Vāmana

Vāmana does not treat these alamkāras. He, however, has tried to incorporate rasa in his own way in the arthaguna called kanti, which is defined at III. 2.15. (19). It should be noted that Vāmana seems to make an advance over his predecessors in subsuming rasa under gunas, which, for him, forms the essential of poetry-nitya dharmāḥ-as compared to alamkāras which are accedental or impermanent-i.e. anitya, a distinction which does not seem to have been made by Bhāmaha and Dandin.

Udbhaṭa

Udbhaṭa treats of the topic as below. In the fourth varga of his Kavyālamkāra, he mentions these figures in the first kṛtikā. He defines preyasvat as, "Poetry which is composed so as to contain the indications of bhāvas like rati, by means of anubhāvas and the like, is said to contain preyas" The suggestion of these bhāvas such as rati and others, would lead us to rasavat. So, Vivṛtikāra says that here, rati or love is to be taken only with reference to God, king, etc. In case of rati or love with reference to the beloved, it is rasavat. (20). Rasavat is defined at IV. 3 as "that in which the development of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and the like, is clearly shown, and which are included (the indicators such as), a verbal statement of the sentiments, the sthāyin, the sañcārius, vibhāvas and abhinaya (21). Ūrjasvi (IV. 5) is, "the delineation of sentiments (rasas) and feeling (bhāvas), which hurt the sense of propriety in their depiction, or which are expressed in passion, anger, etc., (22). This is entirely a novel explanation of ūrjasvi, not to be seen either in Bhāmaha, or

in Dandin. Again, the use of the terms such as, 'kamakro-dhādikaranāt' probably suggests that 'rasa' according to Udbhata is caused by factors such as kama or sex desire, krodha or anger etc. Abhinava, as seen above tried to read the causal view of Lollata in Dandin.

Here also, probably we may read the same with greater confidence. Samāhita is defined at IV 7 as, "the description of the quelling of sentiments (rasa), feelings (bhava), or their semblances (abbhasas), quite unmixed with accessories (such as anubhava) (23)

Thus it appears that Udbhata treats of rasa as a part of alamkāra. But he has made a greater advance in discussing rasa eventhough as an alamkāra as can be seen in the definitions of preyasvat and the like. He mentions terms such as anubhava and refers to the 'svas'abdavācya' of rasa. Thus, probably he is the first amongst the earlier writers to have incorporated Bharata's theory. He also adds one more aspect of rasa theory viz. that whether rasa can be svas'abdavācya i.e. expressed by its own name or not. For him, rasa can be expressed by its own proper name, a position, generally controverted by authors like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and others. Udbhata also mentions śantarasa

Rudrata

When we come to Rudrata we find a still greater advance in the incorporation of ideas pertaining to 'rasa'. The first point to be noted is that he does not include rasavat, preyas, urjasvat etc. in the enumeration of alamkāras. He however, in I 4 characterises kāvyā by the word 'sarasa'. Whether this is for Rudrata a general characteristic of kāvyā or merely as in Bhāmah and Dandin a characteristic of a mahākāvya is not quite clear because the kāvyā to which he refers is one which a mahākāvī is supposed to compose. In the later adhyāyas viz. XII to XVI, we find the subject of rasa discussed

along with the discussions on the *nāyakas*, *nāyikā*s etc. In fact, this section incorporates the relevant material of the *Nāṣā*. His justification for bringing in this topic of *rasa* is as follows. He says that poetry should incorporate *rasas* because those who have an aesthetic bent of mind are frightened by the dry teachings of the *sāstras*. They can learn wisdom about the four ideals of life from poetry which is full of *rasas* (XII 12) (24). *Namīśudhu* says that *rasas* are not considered while dealing with the figures of sense, because poetry has word and sense for its body and *vakrokti*, *vastava* etc. as literary embellishments, while *rasas* are like beauty, the natural quality (*sabajāḥ guṇāḥ*), and therefore are excluded (25).

Thus as noted earlier, *rasas* are treated by *Rudrata* with reference to (*kāvya-phala* or) the object of poetry as derived by the connoisseurs. He then directly proceeds with the enumeration of *rasas*, viz. *śṛṅgāra*, *vīra*, *karuṇa*, *bībhatsa*, *bhayanaka*, *adbhuta*, *hasya*, *raudra*, *sānta* and *preyaṇ* (XIII 3). At XII 4, he says that *rasas* are so termed because they are relished as such—*rasanādrasatvameśam*. *Namīśudhu* says that the *ācāryas* such as *Bharata* have called *śṛṅgarādī* to be *rasas*, because the *sthāyibhāvas* are so relished. Thus, it seems that *Rudrata* here treats of *rasa-nispatti* as seen in *Bharata* and tries to correlate it with the *sahṛdaya* who relishes *rasa* as a *kāvya-phala*. Then he gives two varieties of *śṛṅgāra* viz. *sambhoga* and *vipralambha* and proceeds with the different types of *nāyakas* and his companions. From verses XII 6 onwards, he describes the different types of *nāyikā*s. The XIIIth *adhyāya* is devoted to a description of *śṛṅgāra* and the XIVth to the *vipralambha*. In the XVth *adhyāya* he describes *vīra*, *bībhatsa*, *bhayanaka*, *adbhuta*, *hasya*, *raudra*, *sānta* and *preyaṇ*. Then he gives a verse about the *ritis* that are appropriate to different *rasas*. The last *adhyāya* is devoted to the different types of *prabandhas*.

It should be noted that, as seen above in the light of the remarks of Namisādhū, Rudrata is inclined to take rasa as 'sahaja guṇa' or natural quality of kāvyā or poetry, as against alampkāra which is an external ornament. Vāmana was the first to say that guṇas are the permanent qualities of kāvyā, as against alampkāra, which is 'anitya dharma' or impermanent quality. Vāmana incorporated rasa under kanti-guṇa which formed one of the essentials as compared to mere alampkāra, which forms the external element in kāvyā. Thus we see that the tendency to make rasa as something essential as compared to mere alampkāra (in its narrower connotation), first originated in Vāmana, and then was carried on further in Rudrata.

Moreover, Rudrata talks of preyas as a separate rasa in XV. 17. Rati or love with reference to a friend gives rise to this rasa. Thus, what in Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa appears as alampkāra called preyas, appears in Rudrata as an independent rasa.

Rudrata, in the last chapter of his work treats of the various types of prabandhas or literary compositions. He says that the four objects of life should be treated in prabandhas mixed with rasas—(samyak tva abhidadhyat rasas-ammis'ṛṣṇ prabandheṣu) Then he refers to the varieties of prabandhas in poetry, viz. (mahā) kāvyā, kathā, ślokyāyikā, etc. These are of two kinds—(i) imagined by the poet or (ii) based upon tradition. They may be (mahat) long, or short. (XVI-2). He describes the longer variety in verse 5. Those are the great poems in which all the four objects of life are depicted at length, and in which all the rasas are also depicted. While the smaller poems are those in which only one of the objects of life is depicted. As to rasas, all of them are not expected in them, while one rasa is completely depicted (XVI. 5-6). It may be karunarasa or vipralambha (i.e. pravasa śṛṅgāra) or prathamānuraṅgam. (XVI. 34).

We have seen above that in the *ālaṃkārikas* earlier than Ānandavardhana, *rasa* is depicted as one of the *ālaṃkāras* or *gunas*, which, so to say, in their view, is a prominent characteristic of poetry. These authors, however, are not unfamiliar with the *nāṭyārasas*, discussed in the *Nāṭya Śāstra*. As we have seen, they bring them in while defining the *mahākavyas* and by implication also in *kathās* and *ākhyayikās*. Thus, it would appear that for these authors, *rasas* and *bhāvas* have their proper place in the *prabandha kavyas*, great or small. We may note here the well-known lines about the *muktakas* of Amaru, wherein it is said that each verse of his is equal to a hundred *prabandhas*, implying thereby that one verse of Amaru has as much *rasa* as can be found in hundred *prabandhas*.

Ānandavardhana

With Ānandavardhana, we enter into a new era of *sanskrit* poetics.

He seems to have fully realised the importance of *rasa* both in drama and poetry, and tries to give *rasa* a prominent place while incorporating it in his general scheme of *vyañjanā*. For him, the soul of poetry is *dhvani* or the suggested sense which is derived through the function of word called *vyañjanā*. This *dhvani* or the principally suggested sense, is three-fold according to Ānanda, viz *vastudhvani*, or the suggestion of a matter of fact or idea, *ālaṃkāradhvani*, or the suggestion of a poetic figure and *rasadhvani* or the suggestion of sentiment. This *rasadhvani* is virtually regarded as the highest type of *dhvani* by Ānanda. For him, *rasa* is never *svaśabdavācya* i.e. expressed through its own proper name, but is always suggested through *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārins*. Thus Ānanda seems to have achieved a great point while harmonising the concepts of *rasa* as seen in *dramaturgy* and that of *vyañjanā* in poetry. Abinava has elaborated the point in his *Abbha* as well as *Locana*.

Thus we¹ have seen that the earlier *ālaṃkārikas* such as *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin* etc do not totally ignore the fact of *rasa*. But they try to incorporate it under *ālaṃkāra*, a source of charm to poetry. *Dandin* is more elaborate in his treatment. *Udbhata* also seems to be better informed about the concept of *rasa* and its position in *kāvya*. He is probably the first to take *rasa* as *svasabda vācya* i.e. expressed by its own name. But one point is clear that for all of them the ultimate 'ālaṃkārya' is *kāvya* itself and *rasa*, *bhava*, etc., are only *ālaṃkāras*, in the wider sense of the term as 'kāvya's' *obhākara dharma*.

In *Vṛmāna* and *Rudrata* we noticed a new trend to incorporate *rasa*, *bhava*, etc. under *guṇa*, the essential or eternal quality of *kāvya* (*nityadharma*). *Rudrata* also speaks of several *rasas*, in fact any *bhava* for him can be *rasa*. *Ānandavardhana* with his theory of *dhvani* and *vyañjana* gives a new orientation to the whole theme. *Abhinavagupta*, as we will see later on, elaborates the position taken by *Ānanda* and himself, in his *Locana* and *Abh*. We will consider his views on *rasa* realisation later on.

Foot notes

- 1 भागह II 85 सैषा सर्वैव वक्त्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यं कोऽलङ्कारोऽनया विना ॥
- 2 दण्डिन् II 1 काव्यसोभाकरान् धमान् अलङ्कारान् प्रवक्षते ।
- 3 वामन I 1-2 : सौन्दर्यमलङ्कार ।
- 4 भागह III 6 रसवद्दर्शितस्पष्टशृंगारादिरस यथा ।
देवी समागमदुर्धर्ममस्करिष्यतिरोहित ॥

Bhāmaha does not choose to go into any detailed treatment of *Rasa*. At I 21 he says that the *Mahākāvya* should be युक्त लोकस्वभावेन रसैश्च सकलैः पृथक् । At ३, he says स्वादु काव्य सोन्मिथ सास्त्रमप्युपयुज्यते ।

5. Bhamah III. 5 : प्रेयो गृहागत कृष्णमवादीन्विदुरो यथा ।,
अथ या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वमि गृहागते ।
काळेनैषा भवेत्प्रोतिस्तवैवागमनत्वनः ॥

This has been quoted by Dandin also. Appayya Dikṣita takes it as an example of *ananvaya dhvani*.

6. Bhamaha, III 7 : तर्जस्वि कर्णेन यथा पार्थाय पुनरागतः ।
न्दिः संदधाति किं कर्णः शस्त्रेणहिरपाकृतः ॥

7. Bhamah, III 10. . समाहितं राजमित्रे यथा क्षत्रिययोपितो ।
रामप्रसन्नै यान्तोर्ना पुरोऽदृश्यत नारदः ॥

8. S. D. X 86 . सप्ताधिः सुक्रे कार्ये दैवादस्तयन्तरागमात् ।

9. At II. 85 : Bhamaha uses the term 'vibhāvyaṭe', Abhinava tries to explain it in a technical sense of 'vibhavana'.

10 Dandin speaks of *Rasa* elsewhere also. He defines *mādhurya* (I. 51) as, माधुर्यं रसवद्वाचि वस्तुन्यपि रसस्थितिः । i.e. the establishment of *rasa* in word and in object. 'At II.292 he explains 'mādhurya' as 'agamyatā' or 'absence of vulgarity'.

(II 292 is - वाक्यस्याग्राम्यतायोनेर्माधुर्यं दर्शितो रसः ।

इह त्वष्टरसायत्ता रसवत्ता रस्यता गिराम् ॥

तद्वत् वाचस्पति explains as - एव शृङ्गारादिभिः अष्टभिः रसैः पूर्वदर्शितेन च अग्राम्यतोरूपेण रसेन नवधा रसस्त्वम् इति रसवदलङ्कारम् रूपसद्वरति वाक्यस्येति । This is not very clear. हृदयगमा probably explains it in a clearer way when it says माधुर्यगुणे प्रदर्शित.

सद्दार्थयोः अग्राम्यतया जातः रसः वाक्यस्य भवति ।

अलङ्कारतया निर्दिष्ट रसवत्त्वं अष्टरसायत्तमेव ।

Dandin does not seem to take *rasa* in any technical sense, but only in the general sense of 'kavyarasa' alone, in those occurrences. Hemacandra says the same when he says

श्रुतिवर्णानुप्रासाभ्यां वाचसं अग्राम्याभिधेयतया तु वस्तुरसः । भाणिक्यचंद्र also agrees to this He says (MS 180. आनन्दाश्रम ed.)

श्रुतिवर्णानुप्रासाभ्यां वाचसः अग्राम्यतया तु वस्तुरसः । इत्थं रसो द्वेधा । At, III. 149. again गिरा रसः is explained by Taruṇavācaspati as

साधुत्वम् only At I 62 also 'rasa' does not carry any technical connotation I 62 reads —

काम सर्वोप्यलङ्कार रसमर्थे निधियति ।

तथाप्यप्यम्यतैवेन भारं वहति भूयसा ॥

11 Dandin also expects like Bhamaha, the Mahakavya to depict, without exception, rasa and bhava (see I 81 अलङ्कृत असंक्षित रसभावनिर्न्तरम् ।) तरुणवाचस्पति and हृदयगमा take 'rasa' and 'bhava' here in their technical sense But we may take this, with Dr De in the general sense of 'kavyarasa'

12 अभिनव भा (m 272, Vol I Ns) — चिरन्तनानां वायमेव पक्ष । तथा हि दण्डिना स्वार्थं कारुण्येऽभ्यर्थाय । रतिं शुद्ध्युत्पत्तिं यता रूपवाहुस्य योगेन । इति (काव्यादर्शे ॥ 281) अथिरस्यरा कोनी कोपो रौद्रात्मतां गत (॥ 283) इत्यादि च ।

13 तरुण० says at II 281 तदिदं रसवत् । रूपवाहुस्ययोगेन विभावानुभाव-व्यभिचारियोगेन इत्यर्थः ।

The हृदयगमा adds — रत्याभिधान एव स्थायी भाव भूतेत्यादिना वागारम्भानुभावेन अनुमीयमानै हर्षपुतिस्मृतिवितर्कप्रभृतिभि व्यभिचारिभिः संयुज्यमान कश्चिन्नन्तरां शृङ्गाराख्या लभते । तेन अन्वितमेतत् रसवत् ।

रंगाचार्य रेड्डी also follows तद्वा He says that herein, वासवदत्ता in the 'विभाव' her sweet words, smile etc are the anubhavas and हर्ष, विस्मय व etc are the vyabhicaribhavas The स्थायिभाव called रति is enhanced to the state of शृङ्गाररस

14 दण्डिन् II 287 इति कारुण्यमुद्रितमलङ्कारतया स्थितम् ।

15 Dr De observes (pp 212 Sanskrit Poetics) — "But the Rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself to which it serves as a means of embellishment अलङ्कारतया स्मृतम्, in other words, the rasa is developed not for its own sake, but as increasing the beauty of expression" I fail to agree with this By 'अलङ्कारतया स्मृतम्' what Dandin means is that here karuna rasa becomes the alampkara of kavya The term alamkara is to be taken, as noted above, in its wider sense of a काव्यशोभाकरधर्म. For, otherwise, we fail to

trace any other अलङ्कार in these illustrations, to which the particular rasa can be subordinated. Again, Dandin calls rasavat to be that which is 'rasapeśala' i.e. that which causes delight due to rasa (II 275)

16 दन्दिन् II 275 प्रेय प्रियतरारुहान रसवद्रपेशलम् ।

उर्जस्वि स्वाहकारं युक्तोत्कर्षे च तद्व्रयम् ॥

17 तरुण says देवगुरुपित्रादिविषय प्रीतिप्रकाश प्रेय ।

18 Some modern commentators such as Reddi seem to overread things when they observe that rasavat, preyas and urjasvi are grouped together because all of them form the varieties of what is called असलक्ष्यकमध्वनि (त्रयाणां असलक्ष्यकमध्वनिकर्मत्वात् एकत्र निर्देशः)

It is doubtful whether Dandin could be held to be conscious of the classification of Dhvani as above

19 धामन III 11 15 दीप्तरसस्व कान्ति ।

20 विवृतिकार-रतिरिह देवगुरुपित्रादिविषया गृह्यते । कान्ताविषयाया तु रते सूचने रसदवलङ्कारो वक्ष्यते ।

21 उद्भट IV 111 रसवद्दर्शितस्पर्शशृङ्गादि रसादयम् ।

स्वशब्दरथायितन्यारिविभावामिनयास्पदम् ॥

22 IV 6 अनौचित्यप्रवृत्तानां कामक्रोधादिकारणात् ।

भावानां च रसानां च बन्ध उर्जस्वि कथ्यते ॥

23 उद्भट IV 7 रसभावतदाभासवृत्ते प्रथमबन्धनम् ।

अस्यानुभाषनि शून्यरूपं यत्तत्समाहितम् ॥

24 ननु काव्येन क्रियते सरसानामवगमयतुर्वर्गे ।

लघु सूदु च नीरसेभ्यस्ते हि प्रत्यन्ति शास्त्रेभ्यः ॥ रुद्रट XII

25 नमिसाधु 011 रुद्रट XII 2- अर्थात्स्वरूपमध्य एव रसा अपि हि नोक्ता उच्यते-काव्यस्य हि शब्दाद्यौ शरीरम् । तस्य च वक्रोक्तिपास्तबादय-कटककुण्डलदय इव कृत्रिमा अलङ्काराः । रसास्तु सौन्दर्यादय इव सद्गुणा गुणा इति भिन्नतत्प्रकरणार्थम् ।

PART III

CHAPTER X

Some Observations.

Thus far we have traced the two streams of thought, one, pertaining to *śabdavṛtti*, with particular reference to *vyañjanā* and *dhvani*, and the other pertaining to the origin and development of the concepts of *rasa* and other cognate ideas. In *Dhvanyaloka* we find these two currents meeting and merging with each other and bringing forth an integrated theory of *rasa* and *dhvani*.

So, let us study this integrated theory of *Ānandavardhana* in detail.

We come to discuss the theory of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* as propounded in the *Dhvanyaloka*. As I said in the beginning, the inspiration for the investigation came from the following verse

kavyasyatmā dhvaniriti budhaiḥ yā samāmnatapurvāḥ
tasyābhāvam jagadurapare bhāktamāhustamanye |
kecidvācām sūtramavisaṃśaye tattvamucustadiyam
tasmādbṛūmah sabdāyamanahpṛīṭṭaye tatsvarūpam ||

This verse makes us understand that *dhvani* was accepted as the soul of poetry by earlier teachers. It was this very *dhvani* that was called to be *bhākta* or secondary sense by other teachers. There were some who said that even though *dhvani* was experienced, it was beyond expression in words. There were some, however, who definitely negated it. It was to remove this state of doubt and negation of *dhvani* that *Ānanda* undertook to write this work.

In our search of these earlier theorists, we have not succeeded in discovering any teachers of poetics who had a clear theory of *vyañjanā* before them. There might have been critics in old times as there are in the present days who might

have said that though they experience the soul of poetry, it was incapable of being expressed in words

As we have not been able in finding the earlier theorists of dhvani, similarly we have not found any theorists who have negated it. We have, however, found theories about the two functions of the word, viz the primary and secondary i.e. bhākta and we have found the seeds of laksanā and vyañjanā in these

It seems that Abhinavagupta also had undertaken such an investigation and has practically come to a conclusion similar to ours. In fact he says that there have been no books in which this theory is embodied. Says he—*avicchinnena pravāhena taire-taduktam vināpi viśiṣṭapustakesu vinivēsanādityabhiprāyah* (Locana on Dhv I 1)

Considering, however, Ānanda's arguments and illustrations to prove the independent verbal function of vyañjanā, we cannot deny the possibility that there might have been a tradition amongst the teachers of poetics which embodies affirmation and denial of vyañjanā. These teachers might have been his contemporaries or near predecessors. Ānanda quotes the following verse with the introduction viz—*tathā ca anyena kṛta evātra s lokah*

—*yasminnasti na vastu kīñcana manahprabhlādī sālamkṛtī
vyutpannairacitam na caiva vacanair, vakroktisunyam*

ca yat |

*kāvyaṃ tad dhvanīṃ samanvitamiti prītya prasamsaṃjato |
no vidmōbhīdadhātī kim sumatinā prstah svarūpam*

dhvaneḥ ||

Abhinavagupta explains 'anyena' by the words—*grantha-kṛtsamāṃśakālabhavinā manorathanāmna kavina*. If Abhinavagupta is right in this identification, we may conclude that amongst the contemporaries of Ānanda, the theory of dhvani must have been propounded, denied, and stoutly defended. But, as to teachers earlier than this, of dhvani, we have no independent corroborative evidence.

Let us now consider Ānanda's views

We find that Ānanda by three progressive stages comes to regard rasa as the ātman or soul of poetry. The first stage is found in the second *karikā* of the first *udya* of the *Dhv*. Herein he says *arthah sahrdayas'laghyah kavyātmā yo vyavasthītaḥ* i.e. the meaning that is commended by the aesthetes—sahrdaya—is the soul of poetry. *Vācya* in poetry is disposed of by saying that it is explained by many poeticists in the form of various figures of speech like simile and others (*karikā* I 3). The idea of *pratyamāna* in the poetry of great poets is explained on the analogy of beauty in the fair-sex (*Dhv* I 4), which is something over and above the beauty of several parts of the body. He seems to suggest that beauty is something which comes out of the whole. So does *pratyamānārtha* or implicit sense in a poem. This is the second stage in which the importance of the *pratyamāna* is established.

This is followed by a discussion in the *vṛtti* establishing the difference between *vācya* and *pratyamāna*. This discussion, as we note from the *vṛtti*, pertains to what is technically known as *vastuvyāṅgya*. The second variety of *vyāṅgya* that he refers to is *ālapkāra-dhvanī*. The third variety of *pratyamāna* is what he calls '*rasādīlakṣaṇaḥ*' i.e. *rasa*, *bhava*, etc. About this variety it is said that it is absolutely different from the *vācya*. This third variety of *pratyamāna*, viz. *rasa* is presented as the soul of poetry in the following *karikā*:

kavyasyātmā sa evārthah tathā cādīkaveḥ purā |

krauñcadvandvavīyogottbah sokah ślokatvaṁśgataḥ ||

(*Dhv* I 5)

This is third stage. Thus in the *karikās* 2-4 and the *vṛtti* thereon, we find the philosophy of Ānanda, regarding the soul of poetry, in a nutshell. Meaning is the soul of poetry. In the meaning it is *pratyamāna*, which is important. And in the three varieties of *pratyamāna*, *pratyamāna rasa* is the soul of poetry. This *rasa* is explained in the *vṛtti* thereon.

as *kavyasya sa eva arthah satrabhatah*—, thus carrying forward the traditional meaning of *rasa* as essence in poetry.

This implicit sense is something quite different from the direct meaning of words. This point he proves by giving illustrations. If, for instance, the explicit sense is of a positive nature, the implicit sense is of a negative nature; or if the explicit sense is of a negative nature, the implicit sense is of a positive nature, or if the explicit sense is either of a positive or negative nature, the implied is neither positive nor negative in nature. In some cases the subject-matter of the implicit sense is different from the explicit with reference to different people. These are illustrated by the verses such as, '*bhama dhamma*' etc., '*atta ettha nīmajja*', etc., '*vacca maha vva ekke*', etc. and '*de a paria*' etc.

CHAPTER XI

‘RASA AND DHVANI AS LAID DOWN BY ĀNANDAVARDHANA

The Three dhvanis :

Ānanda takes up the three main types of implicit sense, viz vastudhvanī, alamkāradhvanī and rasadhvanī i.e. the cases in which some bear fact or idea is implied, or alamkāra is suggested or rasa is evoked. He has illustrated vastudhvanī in the verses such as bhama dhammā etc. as discussed above (see ch. X). Here it may be noted that Ānanda clarifies the point that vastu and alamkāra can be expressed both by direct meaning i.e. vācārtha or vyangyārtha i.e. suggestion. In the case of rasadhvanī however, there is a complete break with abhidhā.

Alamkāradhvanī

In order to explain alamkāradhvanī Ānanda introduces the idea of noticibility between the expressed sense and the implicit sense. That there is a sequence between the expressed meaning and the implicit meaning the latter following the former is not questioned. In poetry, however the fact of the degrees of noticibility is a matter of importance. Where the sequence is so quick that it does not attract the attention of the reader or hearer as in rasadhvanī it is regarded by Ānanda as the *mode of dhvani par excellence*. There are other cases however in which the sequence between the expressed sense and the implicit sense is clearly observed as in some of the illustrations of vastudhvanī.

These are the well known divisions of samplakṣyakrama and asamplakṣyakrama of dhvani.

It appears that the sequence or *krama* is a necessary item in *alamkāradhvani*, e.g. in the verse—

unnataḥ prolāsaddharah kalāgurumalīmasaḥ |
payodharabharastanvyāḥ kam na cakare bhīḥśīnam ||

In this particular verse, the expressed meaning with reference to the monsoon season comes first. Then, on the strength of double meaning words, the implicit with reference to a young lady also shines forth. The sequence between the two senses is apparently noticable. The result is *upamādhvani*.

Ānanda explains and illustrates *alamkāradhvani* when he discusses the nature and scope of *saṃlakṣyakramavyāṅgya* or that in which the sequence between the expressed sense and the implicit sense is noticeable (II 20). This particular variety of *dhvani* is subdivided into that which is based on either *śabda* i.e. word (*śabdaśaktyuttha*) or an *artha* i.e. meaning (*arthasaktyuttha*). The *śabdaśaktyuttha saṃlakṣyakrama* is again subdivided into two viz. *vastudhvani*, explained already, and *alamkāradhvani*.

Ānanda makes it clear at the outset that *alamkāradhvani* occurs only when an *alamkāra* is implied on the strength of the power of a word. Thus, when in a poem, *alamkāra* alone, and not *vastumātra* or idea, is implied on the strength of *śabdaśakti*, it is said to be *dhvani* based on *sabdasakti*.

(Says Ānanda II, 21 —

ākṣipta evālamkārah śabdasaktyā prakāśate |
yasmīnnanukūlah śabdena śabdasaktyudbhavo : hi sah ||

yasmādalamkāro, na vastumātram yasmīn kāvyē śabdasaktyā prakāśate sa śabda-saktyudbhavo dhvanirityasmākam vivakṣitam) He holds that if, an *alamkāra*, even when it is implied, becomes expressed by some other word, then also it falls out of the province of *dhvani* (sa cākṣiptā lamkāro yatra punaḥ śabdāntareṇābhūtatasvarūpaḥ tatra na śabdasaktyudbhavaṇurananarūpavyāṅgyadhvanirvyavahārah) This is illustrated in the verse viz. *dṛṣṭyā keśava* etc. In this particular verse,

the word 'salesam' turns the table and the verse instead of becoming an illustration of dhvani, peters out into an alamkāra called s'leṣa. But, says Ānanda, if on the strength of implication another alamkāra is suggested, it becomes an illustration of dhvani as in—

atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasampharannajymbhata grīmā-
bhūdhanaḥ phullamallikadhavalatūhāso mahākalah —, or in
the verse unnataḥ prolāsaddharaḥ etc. or in case of dattānan-
dāḥ prajānām etc. Ānanda says that in these illustrations, we
have to imagine on the strength of implication, the relation
of upamāna and upameya between the two vākyārthas and
thus in these illustrations, upamādhvani is based on śleṣa.
Ānanda, then proceeds to illustrate different alamkāradhvanis
such as virodhadhvani, vyatirekadhvani etc. These are instances
of alamkāradhvanis based on word (śabdāsaktyudbhava). At II.
25 Ānanda points out the variety of alamkāradhvanis based
on arthasakti. Says he,

arthasakteralamkāro yatapyanyah pratiyate |
anusvānopamavyāngyah sa prakāroparo dhvaneḥ ||

Thus when an implied alamkāra, which is other than the
expressed alamkāra is suggested on the strength of meaning, it
is termed as arthasaktyudbhava-anusvānarūpavyāngya (Vācya-
śamkarav yatiriktayatrananyōśamkarārthasāmartyat pratiyamāno-
vabhasate śārthasaktyudbhavo nāmānusvānarūpavyāngyōnyo
dhvaniḥ-on II 25) Ānanda holds that all the alamkāras such
as rūpaka and the like that can be directly expressed, can take
the form of the implied also (II. 26). He says that such
implied alamkāras are exhibited variously by alamkārikas such
as Udbhata and the like. Thus in samdeha, there is an implied
element of upamā, rūpaka and atīṣayokti. Thus, it is not difficult
to indicate the fact that some alamkāra is implied by some
other alamkāra

(rūpakādīralamkāravargo yo vācyatām śrītaḥ |
sa sarvo gamyomāntvaṁ bibhṛat bhūmnā pradarsitah) ||

anyatra vācyaivenap rasddiho yo rupakadiralamkārah so'nyatra pratyamānataya bahulyena pradarsitastatrabhavabdhirbhattod-bhatadibhih. tathā ca sampadehādīsupamārupakatisayoktīnāṃ prakāśamānatvaṃ pradarsitamityalamkārantarasyālamkārantare vyaṅgyatvaṃ na yatnapratipadyam.

But Ānanda adds (II, 27) that even when we come across some other implied alamkāras as seen above, we do not call them to be dhvani till the expressed sense is not subordinated to the implied.

But when the expressed becomes subservient to the implied, then only it becomes the province of dhvani. Ānanda then goes on illustrating such cases. In prāptaśrīresa kasmāt etc. we have rupakadhvani. So also in lavanyakantīparīpūṭīdivimukhe'smin smere'dhūṃ etc. upamadhvani is seen in virāṭa ramai etc. or in tam tana etc. Ākṣepadhvani is seen as in-sa vakūmakhīṇa sakto etc. He also illustrates two cases of arthāntaranyāsadhvani as based on both śabdasakti and arthasakti, Vyatirekadhvani utpreksadhvani etc. are also illustrated and explained. Ānanda, winds up the discussion with the remark that (II 28)–

evamalamkāradhvanimārgaṃ vyutpādyā tasya prayojanavattīṃ sthāpayitumidamucyate

–śarīrikarāṇāṃ yeśāṃ vācyaive na vyavasthītam |

tēlamkārah parāṃ cohāyāṃ yānti dhvanyāngatāṃ gataḥ ||

Thus, the alamkāras that have no sound position in the body of a poem when they are only expressed, attain to beauty when implied. He also adds that these implied alamkāras become dhvani only when purport is principally to that effect–vyaṅgyatvāpyalamkāraṇāṃ pradhānyavivakṣayāmeva satyāṃ dhvanāvantah pātaḥ.

Ānanda, then says that these alamkāras become principally implied in two ways. They become so either on the strength

Thus rasa is the subject of *vyañjanā* par excellence.

Ānandavardhana treats this third variety of *rasādihvani* under the subdivision called *asamlakṣyakramadhvani*. He holds that the *vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani* i.e. *abhidhāmula-dhvanī* is subdivided into two varieties such as *asamlakṣyakrama* and *samlakṣyakrama* i.e. one in which the sequence is either perceptible or not perceptible. The *asamlakṣyakrama* or that in which no sequence is perceptible includes in itself the varieties of *rasadhvani*, *bhavadhvanī*, *tadābbāsadhvanī*, *bhāva-sandhi*, *bhāvodaya*, *bhāvasabalatā* etc. (II 3). These are subdivided into innumerable sub-varieties. But all these are just termed as one i.e. *asamlakṣyakramadhvani*. (3). If it is principally suggested, it becomes *dhvani*. But when *rasa*, *bhāva* etc. become subservient to the expressed sense, it becomes the province of the *alamkāras* such as *rasavat* and the like (II 5) i.e. *guṇibhūtavyañgya*.

Ānanda is of the opinion that the *asamlakṣyakramadhvani* is to be found with reference to *varṇa* i.e. syllable, *pada* i.e. word, *vākya* i.e. sentence, *saṃghatana* i.e. diction and *prabandha* i.e. the whole composition. Abhinava explains that it is to be seen with reference to a fraction of word (*padakādeśa*) or two words (*pada dvitaya*) etc. also.

The *varṇa*¹ or syllables also suggest *rasa* and the like. Ānanda explains this by saying that letters such as *s, g, r*, *yukta varṇas*, *t*, etc. do not promote *srōgarasāsa*, while they are conducive to *bibhatsa* and the like (III 3-4). The suggestion of *rasa* through *pada* or a word is illustrated in—*utkampinī bhayapariskhalitāmsukantā* etc. Herein, the word '*te*' makes for the suggestion of *karuṇa* *rasa* (iti *smṛtyaṃśaṃśaṃ* *teḍiṇyaṃ* *saundaryamīdanāṃ* *sāttīyāsokāvesavibhāvātāṃ* *prāptamiti* Abhinava). Suggestion through a fraction of a word is seen as in, *vṛddhyogānnatavadanayā sannidhāne* etc. '*tribhāga*' in the word '*cakṛtāharinīhṛtmetratribhāga*' is suggestive. Suggestion based on the whole sentence is seen as in *kṛtakakupitā* *h* *bāṣṇambhobhū* etc.

This is an illustration of vipralambha śṛṅgāra. At times this suggested sense of the type of rasa is mixed with some alamkāra also, as in smaranavanadīpārenodbhāḥ punargoruse-tubhiḥ' etc. Ānanda mentions three types of samghatana or diction viz. asamaśa madhyamasamaśa and dirghasamaśa. He adds that this threefold samghatana rests on guṇas such as mādhurya and the like and suggested rasas, and the propriety of the speaker and the subject-matter is the regulating factor in its case.

(III 6-guṇānāśritya tisthanti mādhuryādya vyanakti sa (rasān tanniyame hetuḥ aucityam vaktṛvācyayoh II)

He points out further that in case of karuṇa and viprayoga, asamaśa samghatana i.e. diction involving no compounds is favourable. In raudra however, it can be either madhyamasamaśa or dirghasamaśa. He observes that in all the types of diction the prasādaguṇa is, a must. Samghatana may vary with reference to the form of literature such as muktaka, and the like.

The whole composition also becomes suggestive of rasa as illustrated by the Rāmāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata. The theme should be historical or imagined as the case may be. But it should be properly beautified with the propriety of vibhava, anubhava and sañ-jāti (III 10). If the theme is historical the poet should let go situations as are not inducive to rasa and should also make innovations to evoke rasa (III 11). He should go in for sandhis and sandhyāṅgas not according to the instructions of the science of poetry or drama alone, but according to their ability to evoke rasa (III 12). The poet should delineate the different rasas at proper places in parts of the composition, in such a way as to promote the main rasa (II 13). He should use alamkāras aptly (II 14). These five factors govern the suggestiveness of rasa with reference to a whole composition. He duly illustrates all this.

A whole composition thus not only by itself suggests rasa, but successively by degrees also, through instances of

samlakṣyakramadhvani contained in it, (na kevalam prabandhena sakṣadvyañjyo raso yavatpāramparyenāpiti darsayitumupakramate—Locana on III 15) This is illustrated as in the speech of Pāñcājanya in Madhumathanavijaya, or as in Viśamabāṇalīla when kamadeva meets his friends. Abhicava explains fully how these speeches of Pāñcājanya, Yāuvana etc ultimately help the evocation of the principal rasa. It is also found illustrated in the famous gr̥dhragomāyusamvāda in the Mahabharata (Abhinava says sa cābhīprāyo vyākīśa santarasa eva parinīśhītatam praptah Locana III 15). Ānanda says that the rasāḍi dhvani is also suggested by sup tīra vacana, sambandha, kararakasakti kṛt, taddhuta, and samāsa (III 16). Nipāta, upasarga kala etc also suggest it. All this is duly illustrated by him.

Obstacles in rasavyāñjanā

Ānandavardhana then proceeds to mention certain factors that tend to obstruct the realisation of rasa. He says that a good poet should take pains to avoid such factors as may obstruct the rasa being realised in a big composition or even in a single stanza (III 17). The factors that may cause obstruction in rasa realisation are as below

(i) sketching the setting and the like of a sentiment that is of a nature quite contrary to the one in hand,

(ii) giving a very lengthy description of something even though it be connected with the main statement,

(iii) abruptly cutting off the delineation of the sentiment or its untimely evocation,

(iv) frequent delineation of a sentiment even if it is fully roused, and

(v) impropriety with reference to behaviour

(virodhirasasambandhivibhāvādīpatīzrahah ।
vistareṇānvītyāpi vastunonyasya varṇanam (II 18)

Ānanda says that in the instances cited above there is a clear breach of propriety and it can not be saved by pointing out that the hero is eclipsed by ill fate !

(nacaivāpavidhe viṣaye daivavyāmohitatvam kathāpuruṣasya pariṣharo, yato rasabandha eva kavcḥ prādhānyena svapravṛttinibandhanam yuktaṃ || 19 Dhv)

Ānanda says that the poets should be solely devoted to the suggestion of sentiment and the like. We have taken pains for all this and not merely for the establishment of dhvani alone ! (rasādīpavyaṅgyatātparyamevāisām yuktaṃ yato smābhīna-rabdhō na dhvanipratipādanamatrābhīnīś-ṇa)

(iv) The fourth difficulty arises when rasa that is already fully aroused is repeatedly described as such. Rasa after being fully aroused by its constituents and after being relished, tends to fade away in the fashion of a fading flower if evoked repeatedly.

(v) Vyavahatanaucitya occurs e.g. when a heroine directly mentions her desires to the hero and not indirectly through proper gestures and the like.

Or, it happens when vṛttis, such e.g. karuṇā and the like, as laid down in Bhāṣya are described not with reference to their proper conditions.

Ānanda cites some parikara verses to support his statements and observes that whatever is laid down by him is in harmony with the opinion of great poets such as Vālmīki and the like.

He further elaborates the topic and gives instruction as to delineate factors as are connected with sentiments of the opposite type. He says

vivakṣite rase labdhapratisthe tu virodhinam ।

bādhyanam āgabhāvam va prāptikāntakūṭracchala ॥ 20

i.e. After the intended sentiment has been established on a sound footing there will be no defect in including even hindrances provided that these come either as foils (bādhyā) or ancillaries.

Ānanda is of the opinion that after the intended *rasa* is fully realised, the hindrances can be delineated in a two fold way as said above. The *badhyatva* i.e. serving as foils of the hindrances is said to be there when they are positively overcome by the intended sentiment and not otherwise. Thus delineated they only tend to enhance the intended sentiment or, these factors cease to be hindrances when they are subordinated. They can be subordinated either in a natural way or in an imagined way. In case of natural subordination, there is no case for hindrance e.g. in the description of disease with reference to *vipralambha śṛṅgāra*. But if one describes things that are not natural ancillaries e.g. death with reference to love in separation it will create hindrance. Ānanda is of the opinion that even if a poet thinks that death can be possibly described in case of love in separation, he should not do so. For, if the substratum of the sentiment is lost, sentiment itself will be totally blasted. And you are not up to promote *karuṇā* here. If the poetry is centred round *karuṇa-rasa*, such description is unobjectionable. Or, at times description of death, in case of *śṛṅgāra* is unobjectionable, if there is a chance for an immediate reunion. In case of a prolonged reunion, the evocation of proper sentiment is retarded. The poet should avoid this.

Ānanda illustrates the case of *badhyatvena ukti* i.e. narration as foils of the hindrances in the verse *viz kvākaryam śasala-kṣamanah* etc., or as in case of the advice given by the other sage, when *Pundarikā* is lost in love for *Mahāśveta*. The natural subordination is illustrated as in, *bhramam aratim alasa-brdayatām* etc., superimposed subordination is seen as in, *pānduksāman vadanam*, etc. or as in *kopāt kamalalola* etc.

Opposite Sentiments

Ānanda then proceeds to explain how opposite sentiments are to be delineated in a whole composition.

He is of the opinion that even though it is accepted that the whole work of poetic compositions should abound in

different sentiments, the poet, desirous of achieving the greatness of his works, should delineate only one sentiment as the principal one

(prasiddhepi prabandhānām nānārasanibandhane ।
eko raso ṅgikartavyaḥ tesāmutkarsamuccatā ॥ III 21.

Ānanda is of the opinion that eventhough different rasas are fully aroused, one of them can be principal, if it is delineated right from the beginning of the work and is being referred to again and again (III 22)

(prabandhesu prathamatarām prastutāḥ 'an punaḥpunaranu
sambhīyamānatvena sthāyī yo rasastasya sakalabandhavyāpino
ra'antarairantargīavartibhiḥ samāveso yat sa nūnātāmupabanti)
Dhv On III 22

Just as there can be principal action or plot of a composition even if it gets mixed with other sub-plots, in the same way there can be one principal sentiment (III 23) Ānanda is of the opinion that not only sentiments such as vīra and śṛṅgāra or śrīrāra and hāsyā, or raudra and śṛṅgāra, or vīra and adbhuta or śṛṅgāra and adbhuta can be correlated as principal and subordinate, but also opposite type of sentiments such as śṛṅgāra and bibhatsa, vīra and bhayānaka, śānta and raudra or śānta and śrīrāra also can be correlated as such, if when one sentiment is principal, the other one is not fully aroused

(avirodhi virodhi vā raso'ṅgini rasgatare ।
pariposam na netavyastatha syādavirodhitā) ॥ III 24,

Thus, a rasa not of the opposite type as in case of śrīrāra and hāsyā, need not be fully aroused as compared to the main sentiment. Even if they are equally developed, there is no contradiction, e.g. in, ekato rūpa etc., or as in kantihātechitva etc

Or, the vyabhicāribhāvas with reference to a rasa opposite to the main sentiment, should not be described at length. And in case they are described at length, should there be an

immediate reversion to the vyabhicāribhavas of the principal sentiment. Or, even when a subordinate sentiment is treated fully, it should be, at all events, kept only as a subordinate by constant attention, such other escapes should also be imagined.

In case, the subordinate sentiment is of the opposite type, it should be slightly less developed as compared to the main sentiment e.g. in case of *sānta* and *śṛṅgāra*.

Ānanda then proceeds to lay down the specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposite sentiments. He says

viruddhaikāśrayo yastu virodhi sthāyīno bhavet ।

sa vibhinnāśrayaḥ kāryastasya poṣeṇyadosatā ॥ (III 25)

i.e. if an opposite sentiment is delineated with reference to the same substratum as that of the principal one, the opposite sentiment should be given a different substratum and thus even if the opposite sentiment is fully treated, there will not be any contradiction, e.g. in case of *vīra* and *bhayanaka*. If *vīra* is defined with reference to the hero, *bhayanaka* should be delineated with reference to the enemy. The opposition between sentiments arises in a two-fold way e.g. as already seen above, sentiments such as *vīra* and *bhayanaka* cannot reside in the same substratum. The opposition between sentiments may arise when certain sentiments come side by side. Now in such cases, some other sentiments should intervene in between (III 26), e.g. in *Nāgaśānta* *sānta* and *śṛṅgāra* are delineated with *adbhuta* intervening between the two. Thus, the contradiction between two sentiments in one and the same sentence also can be remedied (III 27), e.g. in *bhūrenudigdhānānavapariṣāta* etc.

Ānanda says that these instructions should be carefully observed more in case of *śṛṅgāra* which is the most delicate type—*sukumāratamo hyaśau* (III 28). If the poet is slightly

negligent in the delineation or rasa, it is immediately noticed and therefore he should be all attentive in this task (III 29).

Other Topics

Having thus disposed of the main topic of rasadhvani, Ānanda has to find place for other traditional topics of poetics. This he has to do under his scheme of vyañjanā. For example, he treats the topic of vṛttis such as parusā upanāgarikā etc. as given by Udbhata, Rudraṭa, etc. and ritis such as gaudī and vaidarbhī as given by Dandin, etc. in the following way. Ānanda holds that the main task of a great poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of the sentiments and the like—

vācyaśūm vācakaśam ca yadaucityena yojanam |
rasādivisayanastat karma mukhyam mahākaveḥ ||

(Dhv III 32)

This observation, says Ānanda is corroborated by the fact that even Bharata has laid down vṛttis with reference to artha such as kaisikī and the like and with reference to śabda such as upanāgarikā and the like, with the same purpose, that is, rasa in view. Says he

etacca rasāditatparyena kāvyānibandhanam bharaṭadāvapi
suprasiddhamevena pratipādayitumāha—

raṅgdyanugūnatvena vyavahāro'rthasabdayoh |
aucityavān yastā etā vṛttayo dvividhaḥ sthūṭh ||

(Dhv III 33).

Ānanda vārdhana further adds that vyavahāro hi vṛttirity-ucyate—i.e. modes of employment are themselves given the designation of 'mode'. The mode of employing sense in conformity to sentiment as well as to the considerations of propriety underlies the various (dramatic) modes such as kaisikī and the like. Similarly that which relates to sounds underlies the modes such as upanāgarikā and the like.

like Thus *môdê*, properly employed with the sole intention of conveying sentiments and the like, will lend charm to dramatic as well as poetic works. Sentiments and the like constitute life-essence of both these modes. Plots and the like serve only as the body. Says he,

-vyavahāro hi vīrtityucyate tatra rasānuguna aucityavañ
vācyaśrayo, yo vyavaharastā etāh kaisikyādayaḥ hi rasāditā-
pāryena sannivesitāh kāmapi nātyasya kāvyasya ca obhāyāmā-
vāhanti rasādayoḥ dvayorapi tayorjvabhutāh stīrtitādi tu
sarīrabhūtamēva

Ānanda clearly states (III 48) that once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so called 'modes' relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible. He adds that when this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes like *kaisiki* and *upangarika* will become quite intelligible. Otherwise modes will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience—says he,

sabdatattvāstayaḥ kāścāditatattvayūjo'paraḥ |

vṛttayopi prakāśante jñāte'smin kāvyalakṣane || (Dhv III 48)

asmin vyangyavyañjakabhāvavivecanamaye kāvyalakṣane jñāte
satī yaḥ kāscitprasiddhā upanāgarikādyāḥ sabdatattvāstaya
vṛttayo yaścāditatattvasambaddhāḥ kaisikyādayastāḥ samyag
rītipadaviṃ avataranti anyathā tu tāsāmadrstārthanāmiva
vṛttināmāsraddhēcyatvameva syānnanubhavasiddhatvam

Ānanda also incorporates the topic of *alamkāra*, *guṇa* and *dosa* in his scheme of *vyāñjanā*

In his opinion, figures like metaphor and the like, become truly significant (i.e. will be real ornaments) when they are employed in instances of *śrīgāra* which is the soul of suggestion, with great discrimination

two important varieties of prabandha kavya. But Ānanda makes the importance of rasa more comprehensive or universal in all the varieties of poetry of which prabandha is only one, as seen above. Thus we may say that as far as our knowledge goes, it is in Ānanda that we find the element of rasa becoming the soul of all poetry, a thing which was made explicit by Viśvanātha in his famous utterance viz vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam.

Classification of Poetry

Ānandavardhana, after having shown the nature and scope of vyañjanā in a comprehensive way, naturally comes to regard it as the principal element in poetry. However there are literary compositions in prose and verse, in which vyañjanā may be subordinate to the expressed sense or may not be apparent at all in conveying the charm of the literary piece. Such compositions however, cannot be altogether thrown out of realm of poetry. So, Ānanda has recourse to a sort of classification of poetry, on the principal of vyanjana. He does this in the following way

Dhvanīkavya -

The class of poetry in which the suggested element is principal and in which the expressed word subordinates its sense and the expressed sense subordinates itself and suggest the implicit sense is termed dhvani. Ānanda says,

yatrarthah sabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtavarthau |
vyāñktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvanīriti sūtrībhīḥ katibhāḥ ||

(Dhv 1 13)

He adds that the kind of poetry wherein both meaning i.e. specific meaning, and word i.e. specific word, go to suggest only the said (i.e. implicit) meaning, is signified by the name dhvani or suggestive poetry—

yatrartho vācyaviśeṣaḥ vācakaviśeṣaḥ sabdo vā tamartham
vyāñktaḥ, sa kāvyaviśeṣo dhvanīriti)

Abhinavagupta adds that the dual in 'vyāṅktaḥ' is not for nothing. It goes to imply that when it is said that a word is suggestive of a particular implicit sense, it is always a particular word accompanied by its particular sense or else any word will suggest any sense. In the same way, when a meaning suggests the implicit sense, it is not divorced from the word-element. Thus in fact both word and meaning operate simultaneously in all types of suggestion. But at times the word element is more important in bringing about the result viz the suggestion of the implied sense, or at times the meaning aspect is more important. Thus on consideration of the greater importance of either this element or that in bringing about the required effect, it is so called that either word or meaning becomes suggestive. Thus Bhāṭṭa Nṛpa is off the mark when he criticises the dual in 'vāṅktaḥ'—Abhinava says—

—vyāṅktaḥ iti divācananēdamaha-vadāpyavivakṣitavācyo sabda
eva vyāṅjakat tathāpyarthasyāpi sabhakartitā na trutvati,
anyaitha ajñātārthopī sabdastadvāṅjakah syāt vivakṣitavya-
paravācyo ca sabdasyāpi bhavatyeva viśiṣṭasabdābhidheyataya
vina tasyarthasyāvyaṅjakatvādūi sarvatra soddhārtahayorubhayor
api dhvananam vyāpārāḥ tena bhāṭṭanṛpakena divācanam
dūṣitam tadgajanimilikayaiva (Locana On I 13)

Ānanda illustrates avivakṣitavācyo or that with unmeant
expressed sense, in which word element is more important
in the suggestion of the implicit sense, in the verse

suvārṇapuspāṃ pṛthivīm cinvanti puruṣāstrayaḥ |
sūrasa kṛtavidyasca yasca jāgṛtī sevitur ||

Abhinava says that herein word is primarily suggestive
and meaning is but an accessory. In it—saddōtra pradbhānataya
vyāṅjakah arthastu tatsahakartayeti catvāro vyāpārāḥ

Ordinarily, the implicit sense would be derived from the
explicit sense of a work. There are, however, cases in which
the explicit sense is not at all intended by the poet so that

the implicit sense cannot be derived from it e.g. in the verse *suvarṇapuspām pṛthivīm* etc., the poet not intend to convey the explicit sense in such a way to make possible the derivation of the implicit sense through it. He only uses the word *suvarṇapuspām pṛthivīm* etc. because by the use of these words he wants to imply the sense that it is persons who are brave, learned and who are good servants that can acquire wealth. It is to bring to relief the idea of great wealth that the poet uses the word *suvarṇapuspām*. So, this is a case in which the explicit sense is not at all intended. Yet, the implicit sense is intended by the use of these usual words. It is with reference to such cases that Ānanda says that *śabda* conveys implicit sense.

Vivakṣitānyaparavācya or that with meant but further extending expressed sense is illustrated by the verse,

*śikharinī kva nu nama kṛyacciraṃ
kṛmabhidhānamasāvalarottapah |
tarunī yena tavadharapāṭalam
daś'atī bimbaphaṣam Sukasavakah ||*

In this particular instance, the expressed sense is primarily suggestive of the implicit sense viz. the praise of the *nāyikā* and the personal feeling of the *nāyaka*. Abhinava says that here there are only three functions viz. *abhidhā*, *tātparya* and *dhvanana*, and *lakṣaṇā* is absent here. Even if somehow or other on account of the unusual question on the part of the questioner *lakṣaṇā* is admitted in this instance, the *prayojana* or intention remains only implied and rests only in the fourth stage. He holds that in the variety of *dhvani* called *asam lakṣyakramavyaṅgya* or that in which sequence is not noticeable, there is no scope for *lakṣaṇā* at all—*asamlakṣyakramavyaṅgye to lakṣaṇā samuomeṣamātramapi nāsti*—(Locana on I 13). Thus, in it only the meaning becomes primarily suggestive.

Ānanda has subdivided the *vivakṣitābhidheya dhvani* into two viz. *samlakṣyakrama* and *asamlakṣyakrama* (Dhv II 2)

These are based on abhidhā, i.e. on the expressed sense primarily

Asamlakṣyakrama is of the type of rasādīdhvani Samlakṣyakramadhvani is again two fold, viz (i) that which is based on word and (ii) that which is based on sense

Samlakṣya based on word is illustrated as in, *atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasamharan* etc (ii) the same based on sense is illustrated in *evam vadimī devaṛṣau* etc He says, "*atra hi līlakamalapatragāṇānamupesaṛjanīkṛtasvarupam sabdavyāpāram vīnaivaribhāṇataram vyabhicāribhavalakṣaṇam prakṣayati*"

The Guṇibhūtavyāngya

Another variety of poetry is seen when the artistic excellence of the expressed sense is greater than that of the suggested, though the latter is also present along with the former This is termed as guṇibhūtavyāngya or poetry in which the suggested sense is subordinated to the expressed

(prakāro'nyo guṇibhūtavyāngyah kāvyasya dṛṣyate |
yatra vyāngyānvaye vacyacgrutvam syāt prakarsavat (I)

Dhv III 35

It is illustrated as in 'lavanyasindhubhāpara eva', etc or as in, 'anurāgavatsaśmadyā', etc In the alampkāras such as rasavat and the like, the rasa, bhāva etc. are subordinated to the expressed sense as in case of a king who is subordinated to his servant when the servant is marrying - *vivāhanapravṛttibhṛtyānuyayirājavat* (III 35 Dhv) Implied alampkāras are subordinated as in case of *dīpaka* and the like Ānanda is of the opinion that in all poetic compositions that look delighted by reason of their lucid and elegant words, only this variety of poetry should be recognised by the intelligent critics (III 36 Dhv), as in *lakṣmī dubidā* etc. The whole host of figures is seen mostly to put on a new charm when brought into

touch with the implicit sense (vyangyāṁś'ānugame satī-Dhv. III 37) Ānanda supports himself by the famous quotation from Bhāmaha viz saīṣā sarvaiva vakroktī etc. (II 85. Bhāmaha) All the figures such as rūpaka and the like fall under this variety

The guṇibhūtavyaṅgya may have thus implicit sense subordinated to the expressed sense, and the implicit sense itself may be of the form of alampkāra, or vastu or rasādi as the case may be (guṇibhūtavyaṅgyasya ca prakāraṇtarenāpi vyaṅgyārthānugamalakṣaṇena viśayatvamastyeva) Thus, this second variety, which is the essence of dhvani dhvaninīsyanda rūpaḥ is to be recognised by the cultured Ānanda observes that there can be no poetry without a touch of the charm of the implicit This is the great secret of poetry and the learned should make a note of it (tadayam dhvaninīsyandarūpo dvitīyopī mahākavi viśayo tīrmanīyo lakṣaṇīyah sahrdayaḥ sarvaibhū mstyeva sahrdaya hrdaya hrīmah kavyasya sa prakāro yatra na pratyamānārthasampars'ena saubhāgyam tadidaṁ kavyarabasyam paramitī sūribhīh vibhāvanīyam Dhv on III 37)

Ānanda is of the opinion that even in the presence of figures and the like, it is this element viz. the shade of the implicit sense, which is a great source of charm as is bashfulness in case of women (III 38 Dhv)

The realisation of second meaning with the help of kaku or change in the accent is also to be put under this variety. (Dhv III 39)

Ānanda has already called this variety as dhvaninīsyanda He categorically declares that this variety also can be termed as dhvani, when viewed from the standpoint of the main purport of rasa-saya he

prakāro'yaṁ guṇibhūtavyaṅgyo'pi dhvanirūpaṇam ī
dhatte rasādiratparīsparyalocanaya punah || (Dhv III 40)

This is illustrated as in, *patyuh śīrah candrakalam*, etc., or as in, *prayacchata nīcalh*, etc., or as in, *durārādha radha*, etc

Citrakavya

Finally, Ānanda describes the third variety of poetry called *citra*. He holds that the two varieties mentioned above have implicit sense either as the principal sense or the subordinate one. But anything else than those two is *citra*. Thus *citra* (Dhv III 42-43) has no touch of the implied sense and is two-fold with reference to word and sense. In fact there can be no poetry without the touch of the implied. But when a poet, having no intention with reference to *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc., goes on producing figures of word and sense, then that poetry is said to be bereft of *rasādi*. Thus, in such instances, the apprehension of *rasādi* when the poet does not mean it, is very pale and therefore the poetry is said to be '*nīrasa*'-

(vivaksopārudha eva hi kāve sabdānāmarthah vūcya-sāmarthyavasena ca kavivivakṣavirahe'pi tathāvidhe viṣaye rasādipratīturbbhavanti paridurbalā bhavatītyuena'pi prakārena nīrasatvam parīkalpya citravaiśayo vjavasitḥapyate)

It may be noted here that Ānanda does not call these varieties by the terms '*uttama*', '*madhyama*' and '*adhama*'

Ānanda in the earlier part established the full significance of *vyāñjan* in its three-fold form viz. *vastudhvani*, *ālamkāradhvani* and *rasadhvani*. However, it is *rasadhvani* which he particularly emphasises. He asks the poets not to falter in *rasadhvani*. The touch of *rasa* so vitalises the old familiar things that they seem to have freshness of new life, just as the trees do by the touch of Spring (Dhv IV. 4). He observes that though several varieties of the *vyāñgya-vyāñjakabhāva* are possible, the poet should be intent upon one of them in particular viz. that related to the delineation of sentiment and the like (Dhv IV 5). Abhinava in his *locana* also seems

to drive in the same direction when he observes that *rasa-dhvanī* alone is principally the soul of poetry and that *vastudhvanī* and *alamkāradhvanī* ultimately merge into it

Ānanda is of the opinion that through *dhvanī* and *guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya* an infinite variety opens to the poetic genius (Dhv IV 1) The sentiments and the like, whose course is very wide, should be followed along the said instructions The limited range of poetry thus becomes boundless (Dhv IV 3)

The expressed is also of infinite variety with reference to the consideration of place, time, etc (Dhv IV 7) But it shines forth only when associated with *rasa* (Dhv IV, 8) Ānanda says that the theme of poetry will remain inexhaustible as nature herself, if it is charged with *rasa*

Foot-notes

1. *Brahmanasramananygya*, i e the analogy of one who was formerly a brahmin and has now turned a sramana After turning a sramana he ceases to be a brahmin and the like. But, on account of his former status, he is known as a *brahmana sramana* In the same way, *alamkāradhvanī* is so termed because it is supposed to have a former status of an expressed *alamkāra*

2. *Abhinava* says that this experience of sentiments and the like is of the nature of supreme joy In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as *rati*, *hasa*, etc engraved and born of the experience of everyday life When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the *vibhava*, *anubhava*, etc. and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of *rasa* or a sentiment and the cultured man experiences supreme joy This *rasa* then, is of the form of *relish* and is recognised as the soul of poetry. (See *Locana* on Dhv. I 4) -

(yastu svapne'pi na svasabdavyācya na laukika vyavahārapatitaḥ
kintu sabdasamarpyamānāḥ dayasaṃvādasundaravibhāvānubhāv-
asamucitapragvīnivistatatyādivasanānūrāgasukumarasvasaṃvidā-

nandacarvanāvyāpārarasaniyarupo rasah sa kavyavyāpāra-
kagocaro rasadhvanirīti, sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyatay-
ātmēti—Locana on Dhv I 5)

3 Ānanda uses the word *dhvani* to indicate *vyāñjanā* in general as well as to indicate a poem in which *vyāñjanā* predominates i.e. becomes the main source of charm. Abhinavagupta, and later on Mammata and others, confine the use of *dhvani* to those poems in which implicit sense predominates and do not use it for *vyāñjanā* in general.

The fact of the undetectability of the sequence of the expressed and implicit sense is interpreted in another way by saying that both are as if grasped simultaneously.

CHAPTER XII

THE PURVAPAKṢA AGAINST VYĀṆJANĀ IN THE DHVANYALOKA

As already noted by us, the Dhvanyāloka in the very first verse of the first udyota takes note of some of the views which negativate the theory of vyāñjanā. Furtheron in the third udyota also, Ānanda tries to establish rasa or dhvani as the soul of poetry and rejects the suggestion of the relation of quality and qualified (i.e. guṇagunībhāva) between rasa or sentiment and itivṛtta or subject matter in a poem. The relation can only be of the type of the suggested and the suggestor i.e. vyāñgyavyāñjakabhāva. Ānanda goes on to prove this and distinguishes carefully between vyāñjanā and abhidhā, vyāñjanā and lakṣaṇā, vyāñjanā and tātparya and vyāñjanā and anumāna or inference. To do this, he refutes the views of Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākranas and Naiyāyikas. Let us consider these arguments.

The Abhāvavādinā

First of all, Ānanda takes up the ālambikāśikas who either deny vyāñjanā or try to subsume it under other poetic categories.

Ānanda puts the views of the pūrvapakṣa as below.

Some people are of the opinion that poetry is constituted of word and sense. Sources of charm with reference to both word and sense such as śabdālamkāras and arthālamkāras or figures of word and sense are well-known. So also are the guṇas or qualities such as mādhubhya, prasāda etc. Riti or styles like vardarbhy gaṇḍī, etc., vṛttis or modes like upanṅga-rikā, paruṣā, etc., are also recognised sources of charm in poetry. So, what could this dhvani or suggestion be, which is different from the said sources of charm in poetry ?

Others hold that suggestion does not exist indeed, for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry. Poetry can not be defined only as that which is made up of such word and sense as will delight the mind of the critic. This definition will not hold good to a procedure which deflects from all well-known canons mentioned. Thus, even if the designation of poetry were brought into currency to convey *dhvani*, it could not be universally accepted.

There are again those who hold that it is impossible to think that suggestion or *dhvani* can be something unknown before. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the cause of charm already noted. Just by coining a novel designation for one of them only, something of note will have been declared at the most. Moreover, since the ways of speech are endless, even if there should be an insignificant element left unexplained by the earlier writers, persons should not close their eyes under self-assumed illusion of being 'cultured critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered 'suggestion' therein. So many great critics have been expounding figurative elements of speech. But they see nothing in it to boast about. Suggestion can be one more *śaṅkara* or *guṇa*, if you like.

Ānanda here quotes a verse in support of the above view which runs as, *yaśminnasti na vastu* etc. Abhinava says that it is composed by some *Manoratha Kavi*. This, we have already noted.

Some others hold that suggested sense is something only indicated i.e. *bhāṅga*. Still others take it as something indescribable (1).

While explaining the theory of *vyāṇṇa* as given in *Dhv.* I, 13 (viz. *yatārthah s'abdo vā* etc.), Ānanda refutes the opposing views.

Refutation of the Abhāvavāda

Ānanda's main argument in the refutation of the *abhāvavāda* is that while the *guṇas* and *śaṅkaras* etc. rest on the

relation of the expressed and the expressor, dhvani or suggestion is based on the relation of the suggested and the suggestor i.e. vyangyavyaṇjakabhāva. Thus, dhvani or suggestion can not be subsumed under it. He quotes a verse

vyangyavyaṇjakasambandhanibandhanataya dhvanē |
vācyavācakacārutvabhetvantahpātita kutah || (Dhv. I.)

Ānanda also clarifies that the alamkāras such as samāśokti and the like do possess a touch of the implicit sense. But dhvani or suggestion cannot be subsumed under these alamkāras because in them the expressed sense is the principal source of charm and the implicit sense is only subordinate to it. Thus, in the verse-upodharāgena violatārakam etc., which is an illustration of samāśokti the expressed sense with reference to moon and night is more charming and the implicit sense with reference to the hero and the heroine is subservient to it. So, Ānanda observes that when the suggested sense is not the principal source of charm, and when it only follows i.e. subserves the expressed sense, as in samāśokti and the like, it is said to be the province of alamkāras and the like. Or, when the suggested is just observed and where it is not held to be principal, it is not said to be dhvani. But only when word and sense have the suggested as their purport, it is said to be the province of dhvani (2).

Bhaktivādins refuted

Ānanda's main arguments against the bhaktivādins proceed as below :

Dhvani cannot be identical with bhakti or secondary sense on account of difference in form-rūpabhedā-, and bhakti cannot be the lakṣaṇa or definition of dhvani as both the fallacies of too wide i.e. ativyāpti and too narrow i.e. avyāpti would result in that case. At the most it might serve as a pointer-upalakṣaṇa to some of the species of dhvani or suggestion.

(bhaktyā bibharti naikatvaṃ rūpabhedādayaṃ dhvaniḥ |
 ativyāpterathāvyāpterna cāsau lakṣyate tayā || (Dhv. I, 14)
 (... kasyacid dhvanibhedasya sa tu syādupalaksanam |
 (Dhv. I, 19. a)

The difference in nature or form between dhvani and bhakti i.e. between suggestion and indication is that while suggestion lies in the implication of a meaning other than the expressed and in a way in which the suggested sense forms the purport and is principal, bhakti is mere metaphorical expression. (3)

Bhakti or secondary sense can not be the lakṣaṇa or definition of dhvani or suggestion on account of the faults of ativyāpti and avyāpti. The fault of ativyāpti or too wide occurs because bhakti exists even in the absence of dhvani e.g. in case of verses such as, parimlāṇaṃ pīna...etc. or cumbijai sa abhutam etc. Words such as 'lavanya' and the like do not fall in the province of dhvani Ānanda is of the opinion that if one gives up the primary expressive power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through its indicative power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily).

(mukhyāṃ vṛttim parityajya gunavṛtyārthadarsanam |
 yaduddis'ya phalaṃ, tatra śabdo naiva skhalogatiḥ) ||
 (Dhv. I, 17)

Gunavṛtti or indication is based on vacakaiva or the primary power of expression of words. Thus, it can not be a definition of suggestion or dhvani which is solely based on suggestivity. Thus, suggestion i.e. dhvani is one thing and indication quite another—tasmādānyo dhvaniḥ -anya ca gunavṛttiḥ.

Avyāptidosa or the fallacy of too narrow definition also walks in if one tries to define dhvani or suggestion as

Indication For, indication, does not cover instances of suggestion like, 'that with meant but further extending expressed sense' i.e. *vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani*. Thus, Indication or *bhakti* cannot be the definition of suggestion or *dhvani*.

Ānanda is of the opinion that at the most indication or *bhakti* might serve as a pointer to some of the species of suggestion or *dhvani* i.e. it may be an *upalakṣaṇa* of *dhvani*.

Finally Ānanda makes a reply to those who took *dhvani* or suggestion as indescribable. Ānanda says that even those, who declare that the nature of suggestion is only within the experience of cultured critics and that it is inexpressible, betray only their lack of discernment. The definition of *dhvani* or suggestion has been already propounded (Dhv I 13) and so also the definitions of its several varieties will be set forth in the sequel. In spite of all these, if it should be thought of as inexpressible or *anirvacanīya* then this would be true of every thing in the world. If, on the other hand, they are only giving expression to the all surpassing nature of suggestion or *dhvani* by means of this exaggeration, then they also might be regarded as stating the truth itself (4).

Thus, Ānanda first refutes the views of the opponents and clears the way for his theory.

Vyañjana as distinguished from other *sādhavṛttis*

Ānandavardhana brilliantly distinguishes between the nature and scope of *vyañjana* on one hand and that of *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇa*, *tatparya* and also *anumāna* on the other.

The objector seems to hold that there is the relation of quality and substance between *rasa* i.e. the implied sense in general and the *vācya* or the expressed sense (*guṇaguṇīvyavahāro rasādīnāmīvṛttādibhiḥ saba yukto, na tu jīvas arīra-vyavahārah rasādīmayam hi vācyaṃ pratibhasate, na tu rasādibhiḥ prthagbhūtam iti*) (Dhv III 33). One can perceive the

expressed only as full of sentiment but never the expressed as an entity separate from sentiment

Ānanda does not seem to accept this position. In his opinion, the expressed is not full of sentiment in the same way as is the body full of whiteness and the like. Moreover, all do not seem to perceive *rasa* along with the expressed is whiteness and the like perceived along with the body. It can not be argued that the presence of sentiment in the expressed can be discernible only to the cultured, as is the preciousness of a jewel being discernible only to some. For in that case, the sentiments would have to be discerned as something not different from the determinants i.e. *vibhava*, consequents i.e. *anubhavas* etc., as is preciousness in case of diamonds—(naivam, yato yathā jatyatvena prātibhasamāne ratne ratnasvarūpānātrīkṭatvameva tasya lakṣyate, tathā rasādīnamapi vibhāvānubhāvādīrupavācyavyatirīkṭatvameva lakṣyate) (Dhv III 33). On the otherhand, it is well-known that *vibhava*, *anubhava* etc. are not identical with *rasa*. The apprehension of determinants and the like is only an invariable condition of the apprehension of sentiments and the like. Thus, as there is the possibility of cause-effect relation between the two, sequence becomes inevitable. It is however, not noticeable on account of quickness. Thus, the position stands that sentiments and the like, with unnoticeable sequence, are suggested. The objector holds that the word itself aided by context and the like, produces a simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested, and therefore the problem of sequence does not arise at all, and that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not inevitable for gathering the suggested sense, as in case of song and the like. To this, Ānanda has the following reply. That the word is suggestive of a particular sense only when aided by context and the like is acceptable to us also. But this suggestiveness is sometimes due to their specific nature itself and sometimes due to the denotative power of words—(kṛpṭa tadvyāñjakatvam teṣāṃ

because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other sense, they are incapable of being conveyed by anything else, and all their accessories work together with lightening-quickness—(yesāmapī svarūpavis'esapratīpattinimittam vyākṛtākatvam yathā gītādīs'abdanām, teṣāmapī svarūpapratiṭerlangyapratītes ca nīyamabhāvi kramah tattu s'abdasya kriyapaurvāparvam ananyasādhyaatphalaghat-anāsvas'ubhāvinis'u vācyenavirodhinyabhīdhayanantaravilaksane rasādau na pratiyate (Dhv III 33)

But in some contexts, the sequence is noticeable also, e.g. in case of resonance-like suggestion (anurananarūpavyāṅgyapratītiśu—Dhv III 33). In this type of suggestion, there will be apprehension of two senses viz (i) the expressed sense, and (ii) the sense suggested by the power of sense, but quite distinct from the other expressed sense. As nobody can conceal the cause effect relation between the apprehensions of the two senses, the temporal sequence between them is obvious e.g. the prakṛta gāthās such as bhama dhammā etc (atyantavilaksane ye pratīti tayorasakyanīhnavo nimittanimitubhāva itī sphuṭameva tatra paurvāparyam Dhv III 33)

In the instances such as bhama dhammā etc it is impossible to affirm that the apprehension of the one is identical with that of the other. Even in instances of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of word (i.e. śabdasaktimulānurananarūpavyāṅgyadhvani), such as gavo vah pāvanāṅgī etc also, wherein we have the apprehension of the two senses from the same words, similitude, between the two senses will be found suggested. Since we do not have any word openly expressing similitude, we will have to agree that it is suggested only by the power of sound. Thus it is clear that there is sequence between the apprehensions of the expressed sense and that of the suggested figure even here. Similar is the case with padaprakāśaśabdasaktimulānurananarūpavyāṅgya : c. In the variety of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of sound, viz that which shines out in individual words,

Ānanda holds that in suggestion based on unmeant expressed sense i.e. *avivakṣitavācya* *dhvani*—, the suggested sense comes only after the apprehension that the conventional meaning is inapplicable (in the context), and therefore, the temporal sequence is present as a rule. It is therefore clear, that even the apprehensions of the expressive word and the expressed sense involves a cause effect relation and a temporal sequence. It may be noticeable or otherwise

—(tasmādabhidhānābhidheyapratityoriva vācya-vyaṅgya-pratityornimittanimittibhāvānniyamabbhavi kramah sa tulya kvacillakṣyate kvaciana laṣyate)

Ānanda after having established that the two apprehensions viz. those of the expressed and of the suggested senses are not simultaneous but as the latter following the former, now proceeds to establish the distinction between the expressed (*vācya* *artha*) and the suggested (*vyaṅgya* *artha*) on different grounds

The *purvapakṣa* is given as below

First objection of the *purvapakṣa* is that *artha* or meaning can neither suggest (*vyañjaka*) nor be suggested (*vyaṅgya*), because the existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word, and the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense, and therefore, it is a case of arguing in circle. The answer to this would be that the suggested sense is already established earlier by independent meaning and hence this fallacy does not arise (5). This position is not accepted by the *purvapakṣa*. According to it there is nothing like suggested sense of a word. Whatever is expressed immediately or in sequence is really the expressed sense of the word i.e. *abhidhā*. Thus, *vyañjana* is in no way established. Hence, it is futile to speak of a relation called '*vyaṅgya-vyañjakabhava*'. In cases where one meaning leads to another the first is only a means-upayamātra-to the second. This, however, in no

way proves the existence of vyākṛāṇā as something other than abhidhā. This happens as in case of word sense and sentence-sense (6)

The name or the school of this objector is not mentioned by Ānanda. Abhinavagupta, however, says that this objection is based upon the Mīmāṃsaka and Vaiyākaraṇa theories, which he explains as follows (7)

upayamātramityanena sadbhāranoktyā bhāṭṭam prabhā-
karam vaiyākaraṇam ca pūrvapakṣam sūcayati bhāṭṭam hi,
vākyaarthamīṭaye tesāṃ pravṛttāu nāntaryākam ।
pāka jvāleva kāśāṇāṃ padārthapratipādanam etc ॥
(Locana, on Dhv II 33)

The śloka-vārtika says the burning fuel has preparation of food as its goal, itself being only a means to this end. The fuel cannot do it in the absence of fire. Thus, fire is nāntaryākā hetu or the immediate cause in the act of food preparation. So, fuel is the hetu or cause of fire and fire brings about pāka i.e. food preparation. Ultimately fuel has 'pāka' for its end (hetu). Similarly, the words intend to give meaning. But for that meaning śabdārtha (word-sense) becomes the nāntaryākāhetu i.e. the immediate cause.

The prabhākaras have a different analogy. They cite the analogy of an arrow that, when discharged by a powerful man, cuts through the armour, pierces the vitals and takes away the breath. Thus, the arrow has 'prāṇapaharaṇa' i.e. 'taking the life' as its object, but gātrapaṅkṣa i.e. cutting the vitals is the means. In the same way, in going from a pada or word to a vākya-rtha i.e. sentence sense, padārtha i.e. word-sense serves as a means only.

The Vaiyākaraṇas also share this view. The only difference is that while the prabhākaras hold sakti in the 'kāryānvita', and therefore they do not stand in need of separate tālparyā-vṛtti, and the intermediate padārthas are taken to be tattvika

or real, the Vaiyākaranas consider the padārtha as unreal-atattvika—in the sense in which the vedāntins hold ghata, pata etc to be atattvika i.e. unreal, due to avidyā or nescience. Thus, for the Vaiyākaranas, intermediate padārtas are unreal, the Sphota or S'abdabrahma is the only reality.

The arguments of the Siddhāntin are based on the assumption of the characteristics of distinctness (bheda) as such. Those things can be said to be distinct which are different in nature (i.e. svarupabheda), and different in scope (i.e. viśayabheda). This dictum is applied to the expressed sense i.e. vācyārtha and the implied sense i.e. the vyaṅgyārtha. If the vyaṅgyārtha (implicit sense) can be proved to be different from vācyārtha (expressed sense) both in svarupa and viśaya (i.e. nature and scope), they should be accepted as distinct from each other. This is the siddhāntin's argument in a nut shell. He elaborates it as follows.

In case of a word giving another meaning after conveying the primary meaning, will the objector accept any difference between these two functions or not? Does the objector recognise these two functions viz. expression of the primary meaning and implication of the suggested sense as identical? The view that these two are identical can not be accepted. There is difference in the scope as well as nature of these two (i.e. viśayabheda and svarupabheda), e.g. the scope of the function of expression in a word is confined to the primary sense, and the scope of the function of implication involves a sense other than the primary sense. The objector can not say 'no' to the fact that the expressed sense (vācyārtha) is 'its own' sense of the word, while the implicit sense (vyaṅgyārtha) is, 'one belonging to the other'. The expressed (vācyārtha) is directly related to the word. The apprehension of the implied sense (vyaṅgyārtha) can be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense (vācyārtha). If the implicit sense (vyaṅgyārtha) is also considered as directly related to the word, and not as indirectly related

through the medium of the expressed sense (*vacyārtha*), then, in that case, it should not be recognised as another sense at all. Thus the difference in the scope of these two functions becomes clear by itself.

The difference in nature, too, is equally obvious. The two functions can never be identical, for we find suggestiveness even in sounds of music etc. and even in gestures, which are not even sounds.

Again, the analogy of word-import and sentence-purport also does not quite apply to the expressed and the suggested senses. In the opinion of certain philosophers, the very concept of word-import is unreal. Even those who take it to be real, will have to agree that the analogy of pot and its material cause (i.e. *ghata, tadupādānakārananyāya*) will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of pot cannot be separately recognised after the pot is made, so also, word and its sense are not recognised as distinct, once the sentence-sense is gathered. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and the suggested senses. When the suggested sense is gathered, the expressed is not driven away. The apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the gathering of the expressed sense. Thus, the analogy of the pot and lamp is more applicable. So, the remarks in the first *udya* viz. that 'just as the purport of a sentence..... etc.' at Dhv. I. 10-alms only is pointing out that there is some similarity between the two in the fact that both are means to some other end. The analogy ends in this, and need not be pursued in greater details (10)

The objector now advances a fresh argument as below :
'Now, in this case there arises the contingency of there being two senses simultaneously following from one and the same sentence. In that case, it ceases to be sentence itself' To this,

Ānanda's reply is that this fault cannot be there as the two senses are related as principal and subordinate. Either of the two senses can be principal or subordinate as the case may be (11)

Ānanda observes that when the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense is subordinate, and the *vācyārtha* is principal, according to the maxim—*yaiparah sabdah sa sabdārthah* i.e. a word means only that for which it is ultimately used, and it is said to be case of the *s'abda* or word being '*vācyaparaka*'. When the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense is principal the word is said to be '*vyāṅgyaparaka*'. Now, in the first instance, when the *vyāṅgya* or, suggested sense is subordinate, the word is not '*vyāṅgyaparaka*', but the *vyāṅgyārtha* or the suggested sense is *madhyavartī* i.e. intermediary. So, it will have to be recognised as something different from *vācyārtha* or the expressed sense (12)

Vyāñjanā, necessity for the Mīmāṃsakas

After having established the distinctness of *vācyārtha* or the expressed sense and *vyāṅgyārtha* or the implicit sense, i.e. of *abhidhā* and *vyāñjanā* Ānanda gives other arguments showing how it is necessary for the Mīmāṃsakas to accept *vyāñjanā*, in order to make their distinction between *laukika* and *śādikā* *vākyas* (i.e. between sentences in ordinary speech and those in the *vedas*) logical

Ānanda observes that the adherents of the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy will have to accept perforce the conclusion that words have also incidental power of the nature of suggestiveness. For the Mīmāṃsakas, the relation between word and meaning is eternal. This is true both of the popular word and the *vedic* word. For this reason, both the popular and *vedic* word would be equally eternally correct. But this is not agreed to by the Mīmāṃsakas. For the popular speech is fallible, while the *vedic* is not. The reason lies in the fact

that the human speech is motivated by several considerations i.e. it is 'sopādhika'. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas have to accept the 'sopādhikasambandha' i.e. the element of intention in the popular speech in addition to direct relation between word and meaning. The suggestion of this intention is vyāñjanā. So the Mīmāṃsakas cannot escape this contingency. (13)

This however does not mean that every sentence falls under the category of vyāñjanā. In cases where intention is identical with the directly expressed sense, there is no need to bring in vyāñjanā. We have to bring in vyāñjanā only when the intended sense in the form of vastu, alamkāra and rasa cannot be expressed by the direct sense. (14)

Lakṣaṇā-Vyāñjanā

After having thus disposed of the question of the identity of abhidhā and vyāñjanā, we now take up lakṣaṇā.

The pūrvapakṣa holds that vyāñjanā is not different from lakṣaṇā because both are dependent upon word and sense.

To this, Ānanda's answer is that both differ from each other on account of the difference in nature and scope i.e. because of svarūpabheda and viśayabheda. The rūpabheda or difference in nature or form consists in the fact that gunavṛtti or indication is reputed to be not principal (i.e. amukhya), while vyāñjakatva i.e. suggestivity is principal or mukhya. (15)

There is another difference in respect of their natures. Indication (gunavṛtti) is practically abhidhā or expression itself, with the difference that it is a subordinate verbal function; suggestion (vyāñjanā) on the other hand is something far removed from expression. (16)

Again, when another meaning is gathered through indication (gunavṛtti), the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes one with it, e.g. in 'gaṅgāyam ghoṣah' a hamlet on

the Ganges'. But when the other sense is derived through suggestion, the first sense retains its individuality while conveying the other, in the fashion of a lamp 'Līlakamala-patrāṇi gaṇayāmasa parvatī-īc Parvatī counted the petals of her play-lotus, etc.—are illustrations to the point. If the name 'indication' (lakṣaṇa) were to be given to those instances also where one sense conveys another sense without losing its own importance, then it would be tantamount to saying that indication (lakṣaṇa) itself is the primary verbal function. For, usually, every sentence possesses the power to convey a purport over and above the expressed senses of individual words (17)

It may be asked by the objector, that, "when a word conveys another sense, what is the precise verbal function involved?" The *Locana* elaborates this argument as follows: the function of a word is two-fold, either principal or subordinate. Now, in the instances cited by the *Siddhāntin*, if he calls it to be principal function, it is nothing else but *abhidhā* and if he calls it a subordinate one, it is *gunavṛtti* or secondary sense. There is no third alternative. So, when *vyañjana* operates, how will it be called by the *Siddhāntin*, *mukhya* or *amukhya*? (principal or subordinate?)

The reply is that even in case of *vyañjana* (suggestion) the function involved is the principal one, but owing to difference in conditions, it cannot be called *abhidhā*. *Abhidhā* depends on convention. *Vyañjana* depends on context and the like. Suggestion takes into consideration the importance of a particular word also, and therefore the word-element is also important (18)

Again, the difference in scope (*vīkṣyābheda*) is also quite clear. The scope of suggestion is three-fold viz. (i) sentiments and the like, (ii) specific figures of speech, and (iii) suggested ideas. Of these three, the apprehension of sentiments and the like can never take place through *lakṣaṇa* or indication

Same is the case with the suggested figures also. And, so far as the suggested idea is concerned, only that is suggested therein, which is intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than *abhidhā* or expression. All this cannot be included in the scope of *lakṣaṇa*, since we can see several examples of *lakṣaṇa* based merely on convention or usage i.e. *rūḍhi*. If at all there is any touch of beauty instanced in *lakṣaṇa* or indication, it is entirely due to the element of suggestion or *vyāñjana*, involved in it. Hence, *lakṣaṇa* (indication) and *vyāñjana* (suggestion) are widely different from each other. Suggestion, in fact, is not only different from *abhidhā* or expression and *lakṣaṇa* or indication, but it is also based upon each of them. Thus it is impossible to regard suggestiveness (*vyāñjakatva*) which is assisted by both these, to be wholly identical with either. As it derives assistance from *lakṣaṇa*, it cannot be identical with *abhidhā* and as it gets assistance sometimes from *abhidhā* (expression) it cannot be identical with *lakṣaṇa* (indication) alone. As it partakes the characteristics of both, it cannot be comprehended by either.

The objector may raise the following point, viz. that there may be no element of *lakṣaṇa* (indication) in suggestion with meant but further extending expressed sense. But what difference is there between suggestion with unmeant expressed sense and *lakṣaṇa*? (19). The reply is that there is no scope for any fault even here. Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense (*lakṣaṇātmulaka dhvani*) might walk in the foot-steps of *lakṣaṇa* (indication) but it does not assume the form of *lakṣaṇa* (indication) itself. It is possible to have an instance of indication (*lakṣaṇa*) which is devoid of suggestiveness. But we never come across suggestiveness devoid of the beauty of suggestion. Whenever we come across instances of indication (*lakṣaṇa*) that become a source of apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty, we find that it is all entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness in case of expression

(abhidhā) So, in both the divisions of suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, we see that indication (lakṣaṇa) is tinged with a shade of suggestiveness. This certainly will not appear identical with lakṣaṇa (indication), but quite separate from it and brings delight to the minds of the cultured (20)

Ānanda further tells of resources of vyañjana other than words. Sounds without meaning also suggest emotions just as notes of music. Gestures without sounds, also can convey meaning and emotions.

Thus, Ānanda establishes the three-fold division of the verbal function, viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇa and vyañjana (21)

Ānanda in conclusion also makes a note of the fact that he has based his theory of vyañjana on the authority of those who are masters of the principles of śabdabrahma. He refers to the Vaiyākaranas upon whose Sphota theory he draws (22)

Having shown the distinctness of the three functions of word viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇa and vyañjana, Ānanda takes up the arguments of those who regard vyañjana as inference.

Vyañjanā and Inference

The logicians argue as below

In fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication, and implication is the same as the state of an inferential process. The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus identical with the inferential knowledge of the probandum (pakṣa). So, to put it otherwise the relation of the suggester and the suggested is none other than the relation of līṅgalingī i.e. probans-probandum. There is also another reason which substantiates this conclusion. The Siddhāntin has explained that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker's intention, and this element of the speaker's intention is only inferable (23)

~ Ānanda replies that any way, the Nāyāyika accepts the fact that over and above the meanings given by abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, there is a third process which gives its own peculiar meaning. However, this process cannot be regarded as inference, because there is no proper inference at all. An inference depends upon the relation of liṅgalingibhāva which is absent in this process. In a logical inference, there is no doubt about the sādhyā which is proved by means of hetu, e.g. when fire is inferred on the basis of hetu i.e. smoke, no doubt remains about the inference of the predicate i.e. sādhyā. Such a logical sādhyasādhana relation does not exist in the case of the implied sense or vyāṅgyārtha. No logical relation between sādhyā and sādhanā is meant in vyāṅgyārtha i.e. suggested sense. Hence though vyāṅgyārtha or suggested sense is grasped indirectly, the mental process is not that of logical inference. Hence vyāṅgyārtha is to be regarded as the function of word as such.

How vyākṛāṇatva is different from liṅgatva or how vyāṅgyapratīti and liṅgapratīti are dissimilar and non-identical, is explained by Ānanda as follows. The objector has really made a clever use of the words of Siddhāntin in substantiating his position. He has remarked that the speaker's intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of inferential probans (i.e. liṅgatva). But in fact the true meaning of the statement is as below—The scope of words is two-fold, (i) inferable and (ii) expressive of which, the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention. This intention of the speaker, once again, is two-fold—(i) desire to utter words for their own sake and (ii) desire to convey meanings through words. Between these, the first type of the speaker's intention does not play any part in verbal discourse. It only serves to distinguish an animal from a non-animal. But the second type of speaker's intention plays the part of approximate cause in verbal discourses, though it is rendered rather remote due to several other

Intervening factors between the utterance of the word and the apprehension of its meaning. Both these types of speaker's intention are inferable from words (24)

But the expressive scope of words is related to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meanings. It is also two fold (i) The expressed and (ii) the suggested (25). The speaker may use words in a view to convey his meaning directly by means of them (and then we get the *vacyārtha*), or he may use words which do not directly convey his meanings, with a view to achieving some purpose (and thus we get the *vyāṅgyārtha*). Both these aspects are far from appearing as probandum of any inference based on words. On the other hand, the relationship between word and such expressive content is something other than inference, whether it be a conventional or unconventional relationship. It is only the aspect of intention on the part of a speaker to employ words or meaningful words that is inferable and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words. If it were true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all, whether any meaning is right or otherwise, e.g., when the probandum viz. fire, is inferred from the probans, viz. smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt about the existence of fire (26).

Ānanda then goes on to explain that the *vyāṅgyārtha* as it is conveyed by the power of the expressed itself (*vācya-sāmarthyākṣiptatayā*), it too, is related to the word, just as the expressed meaning is related to the word. Directness or indirectness is not the differentiating condition of a relationship (*sakṣādasakṣādbhavo hi sambandhasya aprayojakah*). That suggestiveness is related to expression has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indisputable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves

which are signified by the words are due to the verbal power of expression and not inference (27)

Now, we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word. These may be of the nature of intention and may not be as well. Can we say that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of expression alone in words? or Should we postulate some other function? It has been already shown that the power of expression alone cannot explain the suggested meaning. Hence we will have to admit another function and that function itself is called suggestiveness by us. The nature of suggestiveness is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent (28). Just as the expressed content of words is not identical with the probandum of an inference, so also suggested content is not identical with it (29). On the contrary, that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does not constitute what is expressed but constitutes only an adventitious attribute of what is expressed (30). If the expressed meaning too were to be gathered by inference, there could be no scope for any difference of opinion regarding it in the world, which we do come across in our daily life.

It is true doubtless, that at times, one does not resort to inference and other instruments of knowledge while deciding the truth of even an expressed meaning. Though it falls within the scope of other instruments of knowledge, its being simultaneously an object of the verbal power of expression does not suffer in the least. The same is the case with the suggested meaning also (31). Again, as a matter of fact, the question of logical truth and falsity in regard to suggested sense in poetry, is entirely futile. Therefore, it is ridiculous to indulge in discussions regarding different instruments of knowledge applicable therein (32). So it is impossible to identify the apprehension of the suggested meaning with the apprehension of the inferred probandum in every case.

Thus Ānanda establishes the theory of vyañjana and shows how vyañjana is different from abhidhā, tatparya, lakṣaṇa and anumāna

Foot note

(1) बुधे काव्यनिरविविद्धि, काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति संज्ञिन परम्परया य समान्तात्पूर्वं सम्यक् आ समन्तात् ज्ञातं प्रकटितं तस्य सहृदयजनमन-प्रकाशमानस्याप्यभावमये अगदु । तदभाववादानां चामी विकल्पा सम्भवन्ति । तत्र केचिदाचक्षरिन् । शब्दार्थशरीरे तावत्काव्यम् । तत्र च शब्दगताश्वा-स्वहेतवोऽनुप्रासादयः प्रसिद्धा एव । अर्थगताश्चोपमादयः । वर्णसघटनार्थाश्च ये माधुर्यादयस्तेऽपि प्रतीयन्ते । तदनतिरिक्तवृत्तयो वृत्तयोऽपि या कैश्चिदुपमा-गरिकाया प्रकाशिता ता अपि यता भवणगोचरम् । रीतयश्च वैदर्भीप्रभृतयः । तद्व्यतिरिक्तं कोऽयं ध्वनिमिति ।

अन्ये ज्ञयु -नास्तथैव ध्वनि । प्रसिद्धप्रस्थानगततिरेकिण काव्यप्रकारस्य काव्यत्वहाने सहृदयहृदयाह्लादि शब्दार्थमयमेव काव्यलक्षणम् । न चोक्ते प्रस्थान-यतिरेकिणो मार्गस्य तत्सम्भवति । न च उत्तमयान्त पातिन सहृद-यान् काश्चित् परिकल्प्य तत् प्रसिद्ध्या ध्वनौ काव्यव्यपदेशं प्रवर्तितोऽपि सकल विद्वन्मनोमाहितामवलम्बते ।

पुनरपरे तस्याभावमन्यथा । कथयेयु -न सम्भवत्येष ध्वनिर्नामापूर्वं कश्चित् । कामनीयकमनतिवर्तमानस्य तस्योक्तेष्वेव चास्वहेतुध्वन्नर्भावात् । तेषामन्यतमस्यैव वा अपूर्वसमाख्यामानकरणे यत्किञ्चन कथनं स्यात् ।

किं च वाग्विकल्पाणामानन्वयात् सम्भवत्यपि वा कस्मिंश्चित् काव्यलक्षण विचारिणि प्रसिद्धैरप्रदर्शिते प्रकारलेशे ध्वनिध्वनिरिति यदेतदलोकसहृदयत्व-भावनामुकुलितलोचनैर्गृह्यते तत्र हेतुः न विद्यते । सहृदयो हि महाममिलङ्कार प्रकारा प्रकाशिता प्रकाश्यन्ते च । न च तेषामेषा दशा भवते ।

तस्मात्प्रवादमान ध्वनि । न त्वस्य सोदक्षम तत्त्वं किञ्चिदपि प्रकाशयितुं शक्यम् । तथा चान्येन कृत एवात्र श्लोकः ।

यस्मिन्नस्ति न यस्तु किञ्चन मनः प्रह्लादि सालाङ्कृतः व्युत्पन्नैरचिन् न चैव वचनैर्वक्त्रोक्तिशून्यं च यत् । काव्यं तद्ध्वनिना समन्वितमिति प्रीत्या प्रशस्तम् नो नो विद्वमोऽभिदधाति किं सुमतिना पृष्टं स्वरूपं ध्वने ।

भावतमाहुस्तम-ये । अन्ये तु ध्वनिसंज्ञिन काव्यात्मानं गुणवृत्तिरित्याहुः ।

यद्यपि ध्वनिशब्दसंकीर्तनेन काव्यलक्षणविधायिभिः गुणवृत्तिरन्यो वा न वक्ष्यत् प्रकारः प्रकाशितः तथापि अमुस्यवृत्त्या काव्येषु व्यवहारं दर्शयता ध्वनिमार्गो मनाकुस्पृष्टोऽपि न लक्षित इति परिकल्प्य एवमुक्तम्—भाक्तमाहुस्त-
मन्ये इति ।

केचित्पुनर्लक्षणकरणशालीनबुद्धयो ध्वनेस्तत्त्व गिरामगोचरं सहृदयमन-
संवेद्यमेव समारब्धातवन्तः । तेनैवविधायु विमतिषु स्थितास्तु सहृदयमन प्रती-
तमेव तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूमः । /

तस्य हि ध्वने स्वरूप सकलकविकाव्योपनिषद्भूतमतिरमणीयमणीयसीभिरपि
चिरन्तनकाव्यलक्षणविधायिनां बुद्धिभिरनुन्मीलितपूर्वम् । अथ च रामायण महा-
भारतप्रभृतिभिः लक्ष्ये सवेन प्रसिद्धव्यवहारं लक्षयता सहृदयानामानन्दो मनसि
रुभता प्रतिष्ठामिति प्रकाशयते । Dhv I :

(2) Adhinava puts them as,

(i) तत्र समवायेऽप्येन शब्दोऽर्थप्रतिपादक इति वृत्ता वाच्यव्यतिरिक्त-
नास्त्येव व्यङ्ग्यम्, (ii) सदपि वा तदभिधावृत्त्याक्षिप्तं शब्दागतार्थबलादाकुष्ट-
त्वात् भाक्तम्, (iii) तदनाक्षिप्तमपि वा न वक्तुं वाक्य कुमारीधिव भवृषुखम-
तद्विस्तृति इति त्रय एवैते प्रबानविप्रतिपत्तिप्रकाराः ।

(3) लोचन on Dhv I : reads तत्राभावविकल्पस्य त्रय प्रकारा —
शब्दार्थगुणालङ्काराणामेव शब्दार्थशोभाकारित्वास्लोकशास्त्रातिरिक्तमुद्देशशब्दार्थरूपस्य
काव्यस्य न शोभाहेतु कश्चिदन्योऽस्ति योऽस्वाभिर्न गणित इत्येक प्रकारः ।
यो वा न गणित स शोभाकार्येव न भवतीति द्वितीयः । अथ शोभाकारी
भवति तर्हिस्मदुक्त एव गुणे वाऽलङ्कारे वाग्तमेवति, नामान्तरकरणे तु कियदिद-
पाण्डित्य, तथापि किञ्चिद्विशेषलेशमाधिस्य नामान्तरकरणमुपमाविच्छिन्नप्रका-
राणामसम्पत्तत्वात् । तथापि गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरिक्तत्वाभाव एव । तावन्मात्रेण
च कृतम् ? अन्यस्यापि वैचित्र्यस्य शक्योत्प्रेक्षत्वात् । चिरन्तनैर्हि भरत-
मुनिप्रभृतिभिर्यमकोपमे शब्दार्थालङ्कारत्वेन इष्टे । तत्प्रत्यदिष्टप्रदर्शनं त्वन्येरात्वा
रिके कृतम् । तद्यथा कर्मण्यणू इत्यत्र कुम्भकाराशुदाहरणं श्रुत्वा स्वयं नगर-
क्षरादिवाद्वा तन्प्रेक्ष्यन्ते । तावना क आत्मनि बहुमानः । एव प्रकृतोऽपि इति
तृतीयः प्रकारः । एवमेक त्रिधा विकल्पर, अन्ये च द्वौ इति पञ्च
विकल्पा इति तात्पर्यार्थः ।

(4) व्यङ्ग्यस्य यथाप्राच्यान्य वाच्यमात्रानुयायिनः ।

समाप्तोक्त्यादयस्तत्र वाच्यालङ्कारतयः स्फुः । ॥

व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्रतिभामात्रे वाच्यार्थानुगमेऽपि वा ।

न ध्वनिर्यत्र वा तस्य प्राधान्यं न प्रतीयते ॥

तत्परावेव शङ्कार्था यत्र व्यङ्ग्यं प्रति स्थितौ ।

ध्वने स एव विषयो मन्तव्यः सहस्रोऽङ्गितः ॥ (Dhv I)

(5) अयमुक्तप्रकारो ध्वनिर्भाषाया नैकत्वं विभर्ति, भिन्नरूपत्वात् । वाच्य-
व्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य वाचकाभ्यां तात्पर्येण प्रकाशनं यत्र व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्ये स
ध्वनिः । तत्परात्मात्रं तु भवति । (Dhv I 14)

(5) येऽपि सहृदयहृदयमवेद्यमनाख्येमेव ध्वनेरप्रमानमाप्तासिपुस्तेऽपि न
परीक्ष्यवादिनः । यत् उक्तया नीत्या वक्ष्यमाणया च ध्वने सामान्यविशेष-
लक्षणे प्रतिपादितऽपि यद्यनाख्येव तत् सर्वेषामेव वस्तुना तत्प्रसङ्गम् ।

यदि पुनर्ध्वनेरतिशयोक्त्यानया काव्यान्तरातिशयाय तै स्वरूपमाख्यायते
तत्तेऽपि युक्ताभिधायिन एव । (Dhv I 19)

(6) तदेव व्यञ्जकमुखेन ध्वनिप्रकारेषु निरूपतेषु कश्चिद्वृत्तात् किमिदं
व्यञ्जकत्वं नाम ? व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रकाशनम् ? न हि व्यञ्जकत्वं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं चार्थस्य ।
व्यञ्जकसिद्ध्यधीनं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं व्यङ्ग्यापेक्षया च व्यञ्जकवसिद्धिरित्यन्योन्यस-
म्भवादव्यवस्थानम् । Dhv III 33

(7) तस्मात् तत्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थः स तावन्मुख्यतया वाच्यः । या
तन्वरा तथाविधे विषये वाच्यान्तरप्रतीतिः सा तत्प्रतीतेरुपायमात्रं पदार्थप्रतीतिरिव
वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिः । Dhv III 33

(8) एवञ्चा III 33 अनु वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य व्यङ्ग्यस्य सिद्धि-
प्रागेव प्रतिपादिता तत्तिद्ध्यधीना च व्यञ्जकसिद्धिरितिः कः पर्यनुयोगावसरः ।
सत्येमेवैतत्, प्रागुक्तयुक्तमभिर्वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तस्य वस्तुनः सिद्धिः कृता, स त्वयो-
व्यङ्ग्यतयैव कस्मादव्यङ्ग्यसिद्धये ? यत्र च प्राधान्येनावस्थानं तत्र वाच्यतयैवासौ
व्यपदेशः युक्तः, तत्परात्वात् वाक्यस्य । अनन्तं तत्प्रकाशिनो वाक्यस्य वाचकत्वं
एव व्यापारः । किं तस्य व्यापारान्तरकल्पना ? तस्मात् तत्पर्यविषयो योऽर्थः
स तावन्मुख्यतया वाच्यः । यातन्वरा तथाविधे विषये वाच्यान्तरप्रतीतिः सा
तत्प्रतीतेरुपायमात्रम् पदार्थप्रतीतिरिव वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिः ।

On this, the Locana reads —कश्चिदिति । मीमांसकादिं स्मरति ।
अस्त्वसौ द्वितीयोऽर्थः तस्य यदि व्यङ्ग्य इति नाम कृतम्, वाच्य इत्यपि
कस्मान्न कियते ? व्यङ्ग्य इति वाच्याभिमतस्यापि कस्मान्न कियते ? अवगम्य-
मानत्वेन हि शङ्कार्थत्वं तदेव वाचकत्वम् । अभिधा हि यत्पर्यन्ता तत्रेवाभिधा

यत्त्वमुचितम्, तत्पर्यन्तता च प्रधानभूते तस्मिन्नर्थे इति मूर्धाभिधित्वं ध्वनेर्यदुप निरूपितं तत्रैवामिषाव्यापारेण भवितुं युक्तम् । तदाह—यत्र चेति । तत्प्रकाशिन इति । तद्व्यङ्ग्याभिमर्त प्रकाशकत्ववत्स्य तद् वाक्यं तस्येति ।

उपायभात्रमित्यनेन साधारणोक्तया भाट्टं प्रामाकरं वैध्याकरणं च पूर्वपक्षं सूचयति । भाट्टमते हि

वाक्यार्थमितये तेषां प्रवृत्तौ नान्तरोयकम् ।

पाके उवाचैव क्वाष्ठानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् ॥

इति शब्दावगतैः पदार्थैः तात्पर्येण योऽर्थः व्यप्यस्यते स एष वाक्यार्थः । स एष वाच्य इति । प्रभाकरदर्शनेऽपि दीर्घदोषो व्यापारो निमित्तिनि वाक्यार्थे पदार्थानां तु निमित्तभावः पारमार्थिक एव । यैयाकरणानां तु सोऽपारमार्थिकः इति विशेषः । एतच्च अस्माभिः प्रयमोद्योत एव वितत्य निर्णीतमिति न पुनरायस्यते प्रयमोजनैव तु क्रियते । तदेतन्मतप्रय पूर्वपक्षे योग्यम् ।

(10) ध्वन्यालोक On III 33.

अत्रोच्यते—यत्र शब्दः स्वार्थमभिधानोऽर्थान्तरमवगमयति तत्र यत्तस्य स्वार्थाभिधायित्वं यच्च तदर्थान्तरावगमहेतुत्वं तयोरविशेषो विशेषो वा ? न तावदविशेषः अस्मात्तौ द्वौ व्यापारौ भिन्नविषयो भिन्नरूपौ च प्रतीयेते एव । तथा हि । वाचकत्वलक्षणो व्यापारः शब्दस्य स्वार्थविषयः, यमकत्वलक्षणस्वार्थान्तरविषयः । न च स्वपरव्यवहारो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्यवोरपहेतुः शक्यः । एकस्य सम्बन्धिपत्वेन प्रतीतेः । अपरस्य सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धित्वेन । वाच्योर्थः साक्षात् शब्दस्य सम्बन्धी, तदितरस्त्वभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षितः सम्बन्धिसम्बन्धी । यदि च स्वसम्बन्धित्वं साक्षात्तस्य स्वास्तदर्थान्तरव्यवहार एव न स्यात् । तस्माद्विषयमेदस्तावत्तयोर्व्यापारयोः सुप्रसिद्धः ।

इपनेदोऽपि प्रसिद्ध एव । न हि यैवामिधानशक्तिः सैवावगमनशक्तिः । अवाचकस्यापि गीतशब्दादे रसादिदृश्याव्यवगमदर्शनात् । अशब्दस्यापि चेष्टादेरर्थविशेषप्रकाशनप्रसिद्धेः । तथा हि, कीदायोगान्नतवदनया इत्यादि श्लोके चेष्टाविशेषः सुकथिनार्यप्रकाशहेतुः प्रदर्शित एव ॥

तस्माद्विन्नविषयत्वाद्भिनङ्गपवाच्च स्वार्थाभिधायित्वमर्थान्तरावगमहेतुत्वं च शब्दस्य गतयोः स्पष्टः एव नेदः । विशेषत्वेन्न तर्हीदानोभवगमनीयस्याभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षित्वस्वार्थान्तरस्य वाच्यत्वेन व्यरदेयता । शब्दव्यापारणोचरत्वं तु तस्यास्माभिरिष्यत एव; तत्तु व्यङ्ग्यत्वेनैव न वाच्यत्वेन । प्रसिद्धाभिधानान्तरसम्बन्धयोग्यत्वेन च तस्यार्थान्तरस्य प्रतीतेः शब्दान्तरेण स्वार्थाभिधादिना यद्वि-

पयोकरणं तत्र प्रकाशनोक्तिरेव युक्ता । न च पदार्थवाक्यार्थन्यायो वाच्यव्यङ्ग्य-
योः । यतः पदार्थप्रतीतिरसत्त्वैवेति कैश्चिद्विद्वद्भि आस्यितम् । यैरप्यसत्यम्
मस्या नाभ्युपेयते तैः वाक्यार्थपदार्थयोर्घटतदुपादानकारणन्यायोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, यथा
हि घटे निघ्नन्ते तदुपादानकारणानां न पृथगुपलम्भस्तथैव वाक्ये तदर्थे वा प्रतीते
पदतदार्थानाम् । तेषां विभक्ततयोपलम्भे वाक्यार्थबुद्धिरेव दूरीभवेत् । न त्वेष
वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोर्न्यायः, न हि व्यङ्ग्ये प्रतीयमाने वाच्यबुद्धिः दूरीभवति, वाच्याव-
भासापिनाभावेन तस्य प्रकाशनात् । तस्मात् घटप्रदीपन्यायस्तयोः, यथैव हि
प्रदीपद्वारेण घटप्रतीतावुत्पन्नाया न प्रदीपप्रकाशो निवर्तते तद्वद्व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतौ
वाच्यावभासः । यत्तु प्रथमोद्योते यथापदार्थद्वारेण इत्याहुस्त तदुपायमानात्
सान्ध्यविवक्षायाः ।

(11) ध्वन्या III 33.—नन्वेव गुणपदार्थद्वययोगेन वाक्यस्य प्राप्त तदभावे
तु तस्य वाक्यतैव विघटते, तस्या पदार्थलक्षणरत्वात् नैव दोषः, गुणप्रधानभावेन
तयो व्यङ्ग्यस्थानात् । . तस्मात् स्थितमेतत्—व्यङ्ग्यपरत्वेऽपि वाक्यस्य न
व्यङ्ग्यस्याभिधेयत्व अपि तु व्यङ्ग्य्य वमेव ।

(12) ध्वन्या III 33 किं च व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्रधानेन अविवक्षाया वाच्य-
त्व तावद् भवद्भि न अभ्युपगन्तव्यं अनतरत्वात् शङ्क्यः । तदस्ति तावद्-
व्यङ्ग्यं शङ्कानां कश्चिद् विषय इति । यत्रापि तस्य प्राधान्यं तत्रापि किमिति
तस्य स्वरूपमपहन्यते ।

(13) ध्वन्या III 33 स च तथाविध औपाधिको घर्मः शङ्कानामौ-
त्पत्तिकशङ्कार्थसेवकवादिना वाक्यनिरविविदा पौरुषेयापौरुषेययोर्वाच्ययोर्विशेषम-
भिध्वत्ता नियमेनाभ्युपगन्तव्यः, तदभ्युपगमे हि तस्य शङ्कार्थसम्बन्धनित्यत्वे
सत्यपौरुषेयपौरुषेययोर्वाच्यशोरर्थप्रतिपादने निर्विशेषत्वं स्यात् । तदभ्युपगमे तु
पौरुषेयाणां वाक्यानां पुरुषेच्छानुविधानसमारोपितौपाधिकव्यापारान्तराणां सत्यपि
स्वाभिधेयसम्बन्धापरित्यागे मिथ्यार्थतापि भवेत् । दृश्यते हि भावानानपरित्यक्त-
स्वभावानामपि सामान्यान्तरसम्पादितौपाधिकव्यापारान्तराणां विरुद्धकियत्वम् ।
तथा हि—हिममयूखप्रभृतीनां निर्वापितसकलजीवलोकां शीतलत्वमुद्रहतामेव
प्रियाविरहदहनदक्षमानमानसैर्जनैरालोक्यमानानां सतासन्तापकारित्वं प्रसिद्धमेव ।
तस्मात् पौरुषेयाणां वाक्यानां सत्यपि नैसर्गिके अव्ययसम्बन्धे मिथ्यार्थत्वं समर्थ-
यितुमिच्छता वाचकव्यतिरिक्तं किंचिदुपौपाधिकं व्यक्तमेवाभिधानीयम् । तत्र
व्यञ्जकत्वादते नान्यत् । व्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशनं हि व्यञ्जकत्वम् । पौरुषेयाणि च वाक्यानि

प्राधान्येन पुरुषाभिप्रायमेव प्रकाशयन्ति । स च व्यङ्ग्य एव मत्वभिधेयः, तेन सहाभिधानस्य वाच्यवाचकत्वलक्षणसम्बन्धमावात् ।

(14) ध्वन्या III. 33. नन्वेन न्यायेन सर्वेषामेव लौकिकानां वाक्यानां ध्वनिव्यवहारः प्रसक्तः । सर्वेषामप्यनेन न्यायेन व्यञ्जकत्वात् । सत्यमेतत्; किन्तु वक्त्रमभिप्रायप्रकाशनेन यद् व्यञ्जकत्वं तत् सर्वेषामेव लौकिकानां वाक्यानामविशिष्टम् । तस्तु वाचकत्वान्न भिद्यते व्यङ्ग्यं हि तत्र मान्तरीयकतया व्यवस्थितम् । न तु विवक्षितत्वेन । यत्र तु विवक्षितत्वेन व्यङ्ग्यस्य स्थितिः तत्र व्यञ्जकत्व ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य प्रयोजकम् । यत्त्वमभिप्रायविशेषरूपं व्यङ्ग्यं शब्दाधीनां प्रकाशते तदभवति विवक्षितं तात्पर्येण प्रकाशयमानं सत् । किन्तु तदेव केवलपरिमितविषयस्य ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य न प्रयोजकमप्यपकृत्वात् । तथा दर्शितमेदत्रयहपं तात्पर्येण द्योत्यमानमभिप्रायरूपमभिप्रायरूपं च सर्वमेव न ध्वनिव्यवहारस्य प्रयोजक इति यथोक्तव्यञ्जकत्वविशेषे ध्वनिलक्षणे नातिव्यतिनि चाम्याति । तस्माद्वाक्यतरवविदा मतेन तावद् व्यञ्जकत्वलक्षणः शब्दो व्यापारो न विरोधी प्रायुतानुगुण एव लक्ष्यते ।

(15) ध्वन्या III. 33 रूपमेदस्तावदयम्—यदमुख्यतया व्यापारो गुणवृत्तिः प्रसिद्धा । व्यञ्जकत्व तु मुख्यतयैव शब्दस्य व्यापारः । न हि अर्थात् व्यङ्ग्यग्रन्थप्रतीतिर्या तस्या अमुख्यत्वात् मनापि लक्ष्यते ।

(16) ध्वन्या III 33 अथ चान्यः स्वरूपमेदः यद् गुणवृत्तिरमुख्यत्वेन व्यवस्थितं वाचकत्वमेवोच्यते । व्यञ्जकत्व तु वाचकत्वादत्यन्तं विभिन्नमेव । एतच्च प्रतिपादितम् ।

(17) ध्वन्या III 33 अयं व्यापारो रूपमेदो यद्गुणवृत्तौ यदार्थोऽर्थान्तर-सुरक्षयति तदोपलक्षणीयार्थात्मना परिणत एवासी सम्पद्यते । यथा गङ्गाया घोषः इत्यादौ । व्यञ्जकत्वमार्गे तु पदार्थः पदार्थान्तरे द्योतयति तदा स्वरूप प्रकाशयन्नेवासावान्यस्य प्रकाशकः प्रतीयते प्रदीपवत् । यथा लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती इत्यादौ । यदि च यत्र अतिरस्तृप्तस्वप्रतीतिरर्थोऽर्थान्तरं लक्षयति तत्र लक्षणाव्यवहारः क्रियते तदेव सति लक्षणैव मुख्यः शब्दव्यापारः इति प्राप्तम् । यस्मात् प्रायेण वाक्यानां वाच्यव्यतिरिक्ततात्पर्यविषयार्थावभाषितम् ।

(18) लोचन ०३ ध्वन्या III. 33. कीदृश इति मुख्यो वा न वा प्रकाशान्तरामावात् । मुख्यत्वे वाचकत्वमन्यथा गुणवृत्तिः, गुणो निमित्तं सादृश्यादि, तद्वारिका वृत्तिः शब्दस्य व्यापारो गुणवृत्तिरिति भावः । मुख्य एवासी व्यापारः सामर्थ्यमेदाच्च वाचकत्वात् व्यतिरिच्यत इत्यभिप्रायेणाह—उच्यत इति ।

रूपम् । यदि हि लिङ्गितया तत्र शब्दानां व्यापारः स्यात् तच्छब्दार्थे सम्यग्-
मिथ्यादिबिवादा एव न प्रवर्तेरन्, धूमादिलिङ्गालुमिङ्गालुमेयान्तरवत् ध्वन्या III.

(27) तस्मादवकुत्रमिष्यारूप एव व्यञ्जयेत् लिङ्गितया शब्दानां व्यापारः ।
तद्विषयोक्तये तु प्रतिपाद्यतया । ध्वन्या III. 33.

(28) न च व्यञ्जकत्वं लिङ्गत्वस्यमेव, आलोकादिध्वन्यधातुं दृष्ट्वात् ।
ध्वन्या III. 33

(29) तस्मात् प्रतिपाद्यो विषयः शब्दानां न लिङ्गत्वेन सम्बन्धो वाच्य-
वत् । ध्वन्या III 33

(30) हि लिङ्गत्वेन तेषां सम्बन्धो दर्शितो विषय, स न वाच्यत्वेन
प्रतीयते, अपित्वाचित्वेन । ध्वन्या III 33

(31) यथा च वाच्यविषये प्रमाणान्तरानुगमेन सम्पदप्रतीतौ क्वचित् क्रिय-
माणाया तस्य प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वे सत्यपि न शब्दव्यापारविषयताहानिस्तद्वत्
व्यञ्जयस्यापि) ध्वन्या III 33

(32) वाच्यविषये च व्यञ्जयप्रतीतिनां सत्यासत्यनिरूपणस्य अप्रयोजनक-
त्वमेव इति तत्र प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरीक्षोपहासायैव सम्यग्यते । तस्मादलिङ्गप्रती-
तिरेव सर्वत्र व्यञ्जयप्रतीतिरिति न शक्यते वक्तुम् । ध्वन्या. III 33

CHAPTER XIII

SOME ANTI-DHVANI THEORISTS

While starting the exposition of dhvani as expounded in Dhv we raised the question of the earlier writers, who did not accept dhvani and against whose views Ānanda was trying to establish his theory. We noted that we have not been able to discover specific works of authors who hold views opposed to the dhvani theory. Consequently, we relied upon Dhv and Locana for the opposing views (Ch 24). We do, however, find works posterior to Dhv which carry on their polemics against the dhvani theory. In order to complete the discussion on dhvani we now take up these views.

Among these works, we come across *Abhidhāvṛttimāṭṛkā* (AVM) of Mukul Bhatta (circa 9th-10th Cen A D), *Valrokti-jivita* (VJ) of Kuntaka (circa middle of 10th-11th cen A D), *Das'arūpaka* (DR) of Dhananjaya (last quarter of 10th Cen) with *Avaloka* of Dhanika, *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhatta (circa 11th A D-12th A D) and *S'mgāraprakāśa* (Sr Pra) of Bhoja-(Circa 11th A D).

Before we start with Mukula Bhatta, it should be noted that Bhatta Nāyaka's name also should be mentioned first as he is said to have composed his *Hṛdayadarpana* with an object of *dhvanīdhvāṃsa*. Pratihārendurāja also mentions Udbhata as one who did not accept dhvani and knowingly incorporated the same under various figures of speech. One Manoratha Kavi, a contemporary of Ānanda, is also mentioned by Abhinava. He (i.e. Manoratha) wrote the famous verse viz. *yasminnasti na vastu* etc to ridicule dhvani.

Mukulā Bhatta

We begin with those *ālapkṛtīkās* who seem to include the suggested sense under *lakṣaṇā*. In this context, we may mention the names of Mukula Bhatta and Kuntaka.

Mukula Bhatta, like the older grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas, satisfied himself with only two modes of expression, viz. *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. All implicit sense is put under *lakṣanā* by him. In his *Abhidhāvṛttimāṭṭkā* (AVM), Mukula incorporates all the examples of the implicit sense under *lakṣanā*. He discusses the nature of *abhidhā* in his AVM. He also treats of *lakṣanā* therein. *Lakṣanā* is treated only as a subdivision of *abhidhā* and virtually he believes only in one *śabdavṛtti* viz. *abhidhā* (1). He seems to incorporate the implicit sense under *lakṣanā* which is only a part of *abhidhā*.

He considers *lakṣanā* to be three-fold on the basis of *vakta* i.e. speaker, *vakya* i.e. sentence, and *vācya* i.e. the meaning or context. On the basis of these three factors, *suddha lakṣanā* and *upacāra lakṣanā* both become three-fold. Thus we arrive at six sub-divisions of *lakṣanā* (2). The illustrations cited are as below.

Vaktrābandhana lakṣanā is that in which the *lakṣyārtha* is gathered with reference to the type of the speaker. The illustration is *dhṛtīm he pratīvesini* etc. The speaker is a woman and the *lakṣyārtha* is gathered with reference to her. Mukula holds that the future 'ratagopana' is the *lakṣyārtha* here. (For *dhvanivādin*, however, it is an example of *vyañjanā*, based on *vaktṛvāsistya* or peculiarity of the speaker, and herein we derive through *vyañjanā* some 'vastu' or idea from another 'vastu' or idea).

Vakya-bandhana lakṣanā is based on a particular type of a sentence. The illustration is, *prāptastīh eṣa kasmāt* etc. Here, the natural movement of the ocean is taken to be due to something else. Here the superimposition is due to a particular *vakṣyārtha* or the meaning of a sentence. Thus, the 'upacāra' is 'gauna' or subordinate. The superimposition of Viṣṇu on the king is the *lakṣyārtha* (3). (For the *dhvanivādin*, this is 'rupakalamkāradhvani' i.e. suggestion of the figure called *rupaka*.)

The vācyañibandhana lakṣanā occurs when the lakṣyārtha is gathered on the perusal of the vācārtha or the expressed sense. This is illustrated as in *durvārā madanśavo diśi* etc. Herein the vācārtha or the expressed sense of the sentence is that as agni i.e. fire is superimposed on vasantā i.e. spring, Kāmadeva or the god of love etc., they become unbreakable. On perusal of this expressed sense, vipralambha śrngāra is gathered through aksepa or implication. Thus, it is a case of upadanalakṣanā with Mukula (4). Thus, Mukula seems to incorporate rasadhvani under lakṣanā. He says lakṣanāmārgavagahitvam tu dhvaneḥ nūtanatayopavarṇitasya vidyata itī disarp unmilayitūp idamatroktam (AVM pp 22)

Kuntaka

Kuntaka accepts only one mode of verbal expression viz. abhidhā. The implied meaning which poems convey are for him so many different twists of abhidhā. So, he, instead of postulating the new mode of vyañjanā, would explain everything by abhidhā and the several twists to which it can be subjected. For Kuntaka, dyotaka and vyañjaka words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning (arthapratīṭikāritva) may be termed as vācaka, metaphorically. Thus the dyotyā and vyañjyā arthas i.e. suggested meaning in general, also are vācya or expressed on account of their quality of being gathered by us. He accepts only abhidhā but he does not reject either lakṣanā or vyañjanā as they are but the extension of abhidhā only (5).

Kuntaka tries to incorporate some of the implicit sense under upacāravakratā. He subsumes some other implicit sense under some other variety of vakratā. He does not seem to include the whole of vyañjanā in lakṣanā. However, Vidyādhara, the author of *Ekavālī* holds that Kuntaka incorporates all dhvani under bhakti or lakṣanā (6). Dr Harichandra Śāstri (*Kālidāsa* in *Art Poétique de l'Inde* pp 96-97) suggests that bhakti stands for vakrokti and that Kuntaka therefore, is a bhaktivādin. Dr Kane does not agree with this

vrttis of the ancients (i.e. Udbhata) are the same as varnavinyāsavakratā. He says (V J II 5)

“varnacchāyanusārena gunamargānuvartint |
vṛttivaicitryayukteti saiva proktā cīrantanāh ||
yamaka is also a variety of the same

He says ‘yamakam nama kopyasyah prakarah paridṛsyate |

sa tu sobhantarabdhavat iva natī pratanyate || V J II 7)

Padapurvārdhvakratā has several varieties, such as rudhivaicitryavakratā, paryāyavakratā, upacāravakratā, visesānavakratā, samvṛtivakratā, vṛttivakratā, līḡgavaicitryavakratā, and kṛiyāvaicitryavakratā

Rudhivaicitryavakratā is defined as

(V J II 8 9)

yatra rudherasambbhavyadbharmādhyaropagarbhatā |
sadbharmātisāyāropagarbhatvaṃ vā pratīyate ||
lokottaratīraskāślaghyotkarābbidhitasāy |
vacyasya socyate kēpi rudhivaicitryavakratā ||

There are two varieties of rudhivaicitrya. Examples of the first variety are the word ‘kamalāim’ in ‘tala janti’ etc., and ‘ramah’ in ‘anigdhasyāmala’ etc. Examples of the second variety of rudhivaicitrya (i.e. vidyamanadbharmātisāyavacyādhyaropagarbhatva) are, talaḥ prahasyāha etc. (Raghu III 51) and rāmo’sau bhuvaneṣu etc. (quoted in A. P. IV)

From the illustrations quoted as above we can see that the lakṣaṇāmūla arthāntarasamkramitavācyā variety of dhvani seems to have been covered in rūdhi vaicitrya

Paryāyavakratā (V J II 11, 12) is defined as

“abhidheyaṅtaratamastasyātīśayapozakāh |
ramyacchāyāntarasparśattalampkartumīśvarah ||
svayam viśesānenāpi svacchāyotkarāpes’alah” ||
paryāyastena vaicitryam ||

An example is nābhīyoktum anptatvaṃ īśyase etc., wherein the word ‘ajñānah’ cannot be replaced by ‘indrasya’ without killing the charm. By this variety, paryāyadhvani or

what is technically termed as śabdajaktimūlaka anuranana rūpavyaṅgya padadhvani seems to have been covered (130). Kuntaka himself says this very clearly.

Then follows upacāravakratā defined as (V J.II.13-14) :

yatra dūrāntarenyasmāt sāmānyamupacāryate |
 leśenāpi bhavatkāmcid vaktumudrīktavṛttitām ||
 yanmūla sarasollekhā rūpakādirālamkṛtib |
 upacārapradhānāsau vakratā kaciducyate ||

Examples of this are, snigdhaśyāmālā etc., gacchantīnām ramanavasatīm etc., and gagaharṇ ca matītyamehaṃ etc. The first and the last are cited in the Dhv. as examples of arthāntarasamkramitavācya and atyantatīrasakṛtavācya varieties of dhvani.

As already noted earlier, probably this inspires the author of Alamkārasarvasva to say that . upacāravakratādibhiḥ samastō dhvaniprapañcābh svikṛtāh.

Viśeṣanavakratā and samvṛtīvakratā are defined as :

(V J.II.15.16)

viśeṣanasya māhatmyāt kriyāyāḥ karakasya vā |
 yatraollasati lāvanyam sa viśeṣanavakratā ||
 yattu samvṛtiyate vastu vaicitṛyasya vīvakṣayā |
 sarvaśāstrādibhiḥ kaścitsoktā samvṛtīvakratā ||

The examples are śuciśītālā etc., and nīvāryatām|| kīmapyayam batuh (Kumāra. Sam. V. 83). This also partially covers what is technically termed as arthāntarasamkramitavācyadhvani.

Vṛttivaicitṛyavakratā includes vakratā with reference to kṛt, taddhita, samāsa, ekaśeṣa and sannanta. This covers all dhvani derived by kṛt, taddhita etc. (Dhv. III. 16) (14). Dhv. III. 16 also refers to dhvani based on nipāta, kāla, upasarga, liṅga etc (15). This is covered by Kuntaka's other varieties of padaparārdhavakratā such as karakavakratā, vacana, upasarga, pratyaya, nipātavakratā, puruṣavakratā, etc.

In the third unmeṣa the author comes to the discussion of vākyavaicitryavakratā. In connection with this he speaks of vastuvakratā at III 1 (16)

The vastu may be 'sahaja' or 'āhārya' (i.e. kavisaktivyutpattiparīpakapraudha). The example for both these is asyaḥ sargavidhau etc. This variety includes some vastudhvani as the delineation is with reference to 'vastu that may be not vacya or expressed only, but also vyangya i.e. suggested (17)

Kuntaka's vākyavakratā covers alamkāradhvani as well as the normal figures of speech. He recognises the pratiyamgna variety of rūpaka, vyatireka etc., where these figures are implicit. The illustration is 'lāvanyakāntiparīpuritadinmukhe' smin etc. Rūpakadhvani of Ānanda is also hereby covered (18)

He also gives instructions here as to how sentiment and other objects can be used in a poem to yield charming results and how to lend charm to poetry by nourishing appropriate rasas bhāvas etc. The verse tīṣṭhet kopavaśāt etc. is cited as an example of vipralambha and the lamentations of Vatsarāja (in Tāpasavatsarāja Act II) as examples of karuṇa

In the 4th unmeṣa he gives the treatment of prakaraṇavakratā and prabandhavakratā. Prakaraṇavakratā is illustrated by several verses from the Rāghu (V), with the remark—kuberam prati samantasambhavanayā jayadhyavaśyāḥ kamapī sahādayā hlādakṛitāṃ pratipadyate. The introduction of the curse of Durvāsā is also an instance to the point. Yet another illustration in prakaraṇavakratā is the mṛgayāprakaraṇa or the episode of hunting in Rāghu (IX). The episode introduced with the words tataḥ pravṛtāḥ rajjuhastāḥ puruṣāḥ (Mudrā rākṣasa (VI) is also an instance to the point

Prabandhavakratā is defined as—

itivṛttānyathavṛttarasasampadapekṣayā ।

rasāntareṇa ramyena yatra nirvahanam bhavet ॥

kathamūterāṃlonmīlitas'riyah ।
vinayānandanīspatyaḥ sā prabandhasya vakratā ॥

The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata are the examples . Thus prabandhavakratā covers prabandhadhvani (19) Another variety of prabandhavakratā is,

"trilokyābhinavollekhanāyakotkarsāposinā ।
itihāsaikadesena prabandhasya samāpanam ॥
taduttarakathāvarṭivirasatvajhāsaya ।
kurvīta yatra sukaviḥ sā vicitrāsya vakratā ॥

An example is Kīrtārajuṇya He says that great poets show their imagination even in giving names to their works e.g. Abhijñānaśākuntala, Mudrārākṣasa, etc etc. It is genius that makes all the difference, though the plot may be the same (20) Again, at IV 26, Kuntaka reads—In all the compositions of poets, which are composed in different ways and which speak of the path of truth, there is a sort of vakratā (uncommon to others). (21) Compositions based on the same source acquire individuality due to vakratā Thus, Kuntaka covers prabandhadhvani by prabandhavakratā

Kuntaka's approach to the fact of rasa is also noteworthy. For him, rasa is the highest factor in the poetic art which is of the form of vakrokti. Vakrokti is related to rasa in the same way in which it is related to dhvani. Thus, just as for the dhvanivādin dhvani is the soul of kāvyā and rasādhvani is the highest form of dhvani; in the same way, vakrokti is the soul of kāvyā and rasa is the most important aspect of vakrokti.

Kuntaka seems to pay great importance to the fact of rasa. He wants poetry to be tadvidāhlādakāruṇī i.e. such as would delight the critic. (22) At I.5, in his VJ., while dealing with kāvyāprayojana he refers to rasa (23) Again, while talking about sukumāra mārga, he says that a sahrdaya or tadvid is 'rasādīparamārthajña' (rasādīparamārthajñāmanahṥtāmvāda-sundarāḥ I.26 VJ) and while dealing with saubhāgyaguna, the critics are described as 'sarasātma' i.e. 'ardracetas'. (24)

He also seems to take *rasa* as the soul of *kāvya*. He declares it categorically that *prabandhavakratā* = that highest form of *vakrokti* (25). These *prabandhas* or compositions on which the fame of great poets rests, are full of *rasa*—*‘nirantararasodgaragarabhasandarbhānirbharāḥ’* (V J IV 11). They do not depend upon *kāthamātra* or story element or content alone (26). Thus, for Kuntaka *rasa* is the soul of a *prabandha* or = composition and is one of the aspects of *vakrokti*. Kuntaka thus seems to cover *rasadhvani* of the *asāṃplakṣya* variety.

Rasa for Kuntaka is not *vācya* or expressed. While dealing with the problem of the *alampakas* such as *rasavat*, *preyas*, etc. he laughs at Udbhata's theory of *rasa* becoming *‘svasabdavācya’* or being expressed by its own proper name (27).

While considering the nature of *kāvya* or poetic context, Kuntaka takes *rasa* to be very important. Thus, in V J III 11 (vṛtti) he says that *‘rasānirbharatā’* or the condition of being drenched in *rasa* is the principal aspects of poetic context. He divides *kāvya* or poetic context as two-fold, *cetana* or sentient and *jada* or insentient, and takes the first one as principal and for that *rasapariṣosa* or the enhancement of sentiment = inevitable (28). Then he gives many examples of *vipralambha* and *karuṇa* *rasas* and leaves other *rasas* to the readers (29). For him, the description of *jada* or insentient object becomes interesting on account of its ability to evoke *rasa* (30). In the same way and for the same purpose i.e. to evoke *rasa*, the description of the unimportant sentiment object such as birds and the like is also welcome (31). He adds that (V J III 10 Vṛtti) *kāvya* or poetic context is two fold on account of its being *‘svabhāvapradhāna’* or *‘rasapradhāna’* and that both should be embellished on account of both of them being *‘sahajasaukūmyasarasa’* or full of *rasa* on account of natural beauty (32).

While discussing different *mārgas* also Kuntaka refers to *rasa*. The *Sukūṃṛa mārga* = charming (V J I 26) on account

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of its being favourable to the mental aptitude of those who know the highest object called *rasa* (33) The *vicitramārga* is also 'sarasākuta' i.e. accomplished by *rasanirbharābhīprāya* (34) The *madhyama mārga* being a combination of these two, must be necessarily charged with *rasa*-*rasapusta*

Thus we see that with his theory of *vakrokti* or a striking mode of speech differing from and transcending the ordinary everyday mode of speaking about a thing, and such that charms by the skill of the poet, Kuntaka seems to cover up all the sources of charm in poetry, beginning with *alamkāra* and ending with *dhvani* and *rasa*. As already noted earlier, even *dyotaka* and *vyāñjaka* words, on account of their quality of the ability to give meaning, -*arthapratīṭikarīva*-are termed 'vācaka' i.e. expressive of meaning, metaphorically. Thus, broadly speaking, Kuntaka may be termed as an *antar-bhāvavādin* and a *bhaktivādin* to a certain extent.

Dhanāñjaya and Dhanika

We will now consider the views of Dhanāñjaya and Dhanika, (Circa 10th Century A.D.) the authors of *Dastupaka* and *Avaloka* on it, respectively. These are also well-known anti-dhvani theorists who try to explain the fact of suggested sense through *tatparya* or purport.

In the fourth *prakāśa* of the DR the authors touch the problem of *rasānubhūti* or the experience of sentiment in poetry. Dhanika's elaborate commentary brings out their views clearly. They accept the fact of *rasādi* but they fail to accept the proposition that *rasādis* are conveyed by *vyāñjana*. They hold that the *vyāñgya* or suggestion of the *dhvanivādins* can be explained with the help of *tatparya s'akti* or purport alone. In order to get the suggested sense through *tatparya s'akti* or purport, we will see how Dhanika expands the limits of *tatparyārtha* or purport-sense. The line of argument proceeds as below -

The *laukika vakyas* or sentences in day to day usage

such as 'gāmabhyāsa', where the *kriyā* or action is clearly heard of, and sentences such as 'dvāram dvāram' in which the *kriyā* or action is not heard of, but is gathered through *prakarana* or context, only *kriyā* or action can be considered as the *vākyārtha* or the sense of a sentence. In the same way, even in *kāvya* or poetry, *rasa* which is the ultimate purpose of *kāvya* or poetry, forms the *vākyārtha*. Thus *rasa* becomes the ultimate *vākyārtha* i.e. *kāvya-vākyārtha* and therefore, is at times expressed in clear terms such as 'prītyai navodhā prīyā,' or is at times brought about by the particular *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhicārins* etc. It should not be argued that as *ratyādi* and the like, is an *apadārtha* (i.e. not the direct meaning of a *pada* or word), it cannot therefore be gathered by *vākyārtha* or sentence-sense. For, ultimately, our *tatparya* *sakti* or purport rests in the final *kriyā* or action—'kāryaparya-vasāyitvat tatparyas'akteh'—i.e. the action of enjoyment. Now, *sa* sentences, *pauruseya* i.e. used in human speech and *apauruseya* i.e. divine, alike, have some action in their motive. If it is not so, any sentence would be as useless as the uttering of a mad man. With reference to the words in poetry, it can be said with the help of positive and negative concomitance, that they aim only at the generation of its own unique joy. *Kāvya* or poetry sets about to achieve this end only. There cannot be any other end in view, except this. So then, in a *kāvya*, the *vibhava*, *anubhava* etc. stand for the *padārthas* (i.e. word sense) and the *ratyādi* brought about by them is the *vākyārtha* (or purport). Thus, a *kāvya-vākya* is formed. It should not be argued that as in case of song and the like, there is no *vācyavācaka-bhava* or the relation of expressor and the expressed here (In a song, the meaningless notes make for the experience of joy.) Because here, in the field of *kāvya*, the experience of a particular *rasa* is felt by those alone who are conversant with *vibhava*, *anubhava* etc. Now in the realisation of such a *rasa*, which is the *vācyārtha* of a *kāvya-vākya*, only *abhidhā* and *tatparya* *sakti* are quite sufficient and therefore, it is gratuitous to postulate the theory of *vyañjana*.

Thus, the tatparyavādin comes to the conclusion that whatever is supposed to be conveyed by vyañjanā is really conveyed by abhidhā and tatparya. Surely, in case of 'anyoktis' wherein the purport is not expressed in clear terms, dhvanī cannot be resorted to.

The dhvanīvādin cannot say that in case of sentences such as 'vīṣam bhuṅkṣva' etc., the purport lies in the principal suggested sense, viz. 'do not take food at his place', gathered by vyañjanā, and not by tatparya. For, in this case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not at all over till the last limit of the full purport is reached. If at all there is any further sense left to be gathered later on, in that case, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense is not to be taken as complete in itself. It becomes complete i.e. visrānta-only when the ultimate sense meant to be brought out by the speaker is gathered by the bearer. Thus, on the acceptance of the fact of tatparya, it is redundant to assume dhvanī or vyañjanā.

A limit to the sense gathered from a sentence can not be put. A particular sentence can not be restricted to a particular sense only. Tatparya or purport rests in the ultimate action. So far as the so called desired sense is not gathered, the expressed sense or vācyārtha can not be said to be over. Tatparya is not to be measured on scales—tatparyam na tulādyatam—so as to limit its extent, and is not to be determined as just this much and not that much !

The pūrvapakṣa (i.e. dhvanīvādin) may argue as follows. The sentences viz. bhrama dhārmika etc., gives only the sense 'bhramanākriyā'. There is no word giving the sense of prohibition and therefore, after giving the meaning in form of an injunction, the vācyārtha or the expressed sense finds its completion. Then, on account of the peculiarity of the speaker viz. the wanton girl, the sense of negation flashes forth on the mind of the cultured critic. Thus, vyañgyārtha i.e. the suggested sense, flashing forth only after the expressed sense is completely gathered—vācyavisrānti—will have to be accepted.

But, the *tatparyvādin* explains away the negative suggested sense from the positive expressed sense in *bhrama dharmika* etc., with the help of *tatparya* alone, because the *vācyārtha* or the expressed sense can be said to have been completed only after the intention of the speaker is fully conveyed. If the intention of the speaker is not fully conveyed, the expressed should be taken as incomplete only. Thus, if the sense of negation is not conveyed then for the speaker, viz. the particular wanton girl, the expressed sense remains incomplete.

The sentences of human speech—(*pauruseya*)—are spoken with some idea in mind, i.e. with a desire to convey something—(*vivakṣā*),—and therefore, the full meaning of the speaker, i.e. his intention should be termed as '*tatparya*' in poetry. Till this is not gathered, the sense cannot be said to be complete. If the sentence is said to convey the full sense, then in that case, how and why should it give another sense? And, in case if it goes for it, it is clear that the sentence sense is not complete.

Finally, *Dhanika* explains that the *rasādi* and the *kāvya* are related by way of '*bhāvyabhāvaka*' relation and not by '*vyāṅgyavyaṅjakabhava*' (35).

Mahimabhatta

Mahimabhatta points out the following ten blemishes in the definition of *dhvani* as given in *Dhv* I 13, which has been noticed previously. For the sake of understanding the polemic of *Mahimā*, I repeat it as under:

yatpārthasabdo vā
tamārthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau |
vyāṅktas kāvyaṅśaḥ
sa dhvanīrīti sūtrīḥ kathataḥ || (Dhv I 13)

The blemishes as pointed out by *Mahimā* are enumerated as below:

- (i) *arthasya viśiṣṭatvam*
- (ii) *sabdah*

- (iii) (Śabdah) savisesanah
- (iv) vyaktih
- (v) dhvanih
- (vi) 'vā' sabda
- (vii) 'divivacanam' in 'vyaktah'
- (viii) tadah pumstvam
- (ix) the term 'kavyavisesah' and
- (x) vacanam ca kathanakartuh : e 'suribhih

The first fault according to Mahima is that the particular adjective viz. *upasarjanikṛtasva* is redundant with reference to 'artha'. An adjective is one that is shown to be variable. Now, *'upasarjanikṛtasva* or 'rendering one's own self subordinate' is an adjective which does not possess variability. For the expressed sense, being an indicator of the suggested sense is necessarily and always subordinate. Says he :

uktam guṇikṛtmatvam
yadarthasya viśesanam |
gamakatvānna tattasya
yuktamavyabbicaratah ||

(Vy V I 7)

The purport of Mahima's argument seems to be as below. Adjectives are generally used to indicate a variable quality, e.g. lotuses may be white, blue or red. But that adjective which merely repeats the nature of the thing invariably connected, is logically speaking redundant. This is exactly the case in qualifying 'artha' by the adjective *'upasarjanikṛtasva*, because it is always so.

It may be noted that the first fault as indicated by Mahima seems to be of the type of 'avācya-vacana' or mentioning of something when it is not absolutely required.

The second blemish in the definition of dhvani as given by Ānanda consists in the mentioning of the word 'śabdah'. A word has no other function save expressing its own meaning.

Thus, it cannot suggest any other sense—*śabdaḥ punarānupādeyaḥ eva tasya svābhīdhanamantarena vyāpārantarānupapatterupapādayiṣyamānatvāt* (Vy VI)

Thus, it seems that the second fault pertains to making *śabda* the conveyor of the implicit sense, because the sole function of the word is to express its own meaning. The second fault reiterates the position of *Mahimā* viz that the word has one continuous meaning and there is no room for anything else like *vyakti*.

The third fault lies in qualifying *śabda* by the adjective 'upasarjanīkṛtārtha'. In the opinion of *Mahimā*, *śabda* is always subservient to its meaning just as a jar is subservient to water that it is meant to contain. *Śabda* can be said to be principal, if at all, when there is verbatim repetition in a quotation. So it will bring in 'asambhava' if word is qualified by the adjective, 'upasarjanīkṛtasyārtha'.

Here therefore, there is the fault of 'asambhava' because the word being always subservient to meaning, there can be no contingency in which its meaning would be subservient to it, which would happen if its meaning is to be subordinated to itself in order to convey *vyangyārtha* or the suggested sense.

Even if the two faults previously shown are repudiated, *Mahimā* says that it would be still open to the fault of 'punarukta' or repetition—*(vyabhicārasambhavayorapī vā yat svārthayorupasarjanīkṛtatvavacanam tat punaruktaṁ tayorarthā ntarābhivyaktiārthamupattayossāmarthyādeva tadavagaterī tyuktaṁ* (Vy VI)

It may be noted here that the blemish as pointed out here is merely of a formal nature.

Further, in continuation of the third fault discussed as above, *Mahimā* tries to find the fault of *avyāpti* in this definition, because the *dhvani* which is suggested in such figures as *dīpaka* would be out of the perview, in as much

as these figures are varieties of abhidhā and because 'abhidhā' is not mentioned in the definition, therefore they remain left out. If it is contended that the mention of abhidhā is included in the mention of śabda and artha, then the mention of śabda also would be redundant, because it is implied by mentioning artha.

The fourth fault mentioned by Mahimā refers to vyakti or vyañjanā itself. He holds that it is wrong to say that word and sense 'suggest' further sense. The fourth fault thus refers to the very doctrine of vyañjanā. According to him, the word has only one sense and whatever else comes out of it is a matter of inferential process. In this philosophy of word, word is a means to an end, -sādhyaśādhanaabdhāva-and the end is what the hearer is supposed to do or not to do. The understanding of this sādhya becomes possible through the process of inference. So, for him, whatever follows the direct meaning of the word is a matter of inference - 'sarva eva hi śābdo vyavaharāḥ sādhyaśādhanaabdhāvagarbhatayā prāyeṇa numānarūpo' bhyupagantavyah, tasya parapravṛttauṣṭi-bandhanatvāt tasya ca sampratyaयāsampratyaयātmanoranyathā kartumasakyatvāt na hi yuktīmanavagacchan kaścidvipaścidvacanamātrāt sampratyaयabhaḥbhavati) (Vy VI)

Having thus substituted inference for vyañjanā, he comes upon a two-fold division of meaning viz. 'vācyārtha' and 'anumeyārtha'. Says he-arthōpi diviḍho vācyānumeyasca tatra śābdavyāpāraviṣayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate. (Vy VI) With reference to the second, one may incidentally point out that Mahimā really gives up his case by calling it 'artha'. Says he arthōpi diviḍbah vācyānumeyasca tatra śābdavyāpāraviṣayo vācyah sa eva mukhya ucyate. (Vy VI.) Having thus established to his satisfaction anumeyārtha, he explains how vyāngya or suggested vastu, ālambkāra and rasa are cases of anumeya vastu, ālambkāra and rasa respectively. He adds that while the first two can be directly expressed also, the third is

only inferred—(sa ca trividhah : vastumātramalamkāśādayasceh tatrādyau vācāvāpi sambhavataḥ anyastvanumeya eveti) (Vy VI)

Here, Maḥimā has to face a great difficulty. According to the accepted definition of valid anumāna, his inferential processes in poetry do not confirm to the canon of (logical) inference. His opponents naturally show that what follows the direct meaning of words in a poem is not inference in any logical sense. Maḥimā's answer to this is as follows:

The meaning that comes to the mind as a sequence of direct meaning of a word is 'anumeya'. This later manifestation of meaning is supposed to be due to three causes. They may be described in the accepted dāśanika terminology as *kāraṇahetu*, and *jāpakaḥetu*, under which also comes the third viz. *anumāna hetu* or *liṅga*. The illustration of the first is curds resulting from milk, the second, the appearance of a jar by a lamp in a dark room, while the third is the inference of fire on a mountain by the appearance of smoke. Now, the meaning following from the direct sense is not discovered by the first two, but by the third, and therefore, it is a process of *anumāna* or inference.

As to the validity in some cases of knowledge, he quotes a passage which says that even an illusory knowledge may become valid in a particular context. He quotes in his support from *pramāṇa vārtika* II 5 574. Says he,

śaṅktaṁ-bhṛāntirāpi sambandhataḥ pramāṇaḥ iti
 manīpradīpaprabhayoḥ manībuddhyābhīdhatoh
 mithyājñānaviśeṣe'pi viśeṣo'ṛthakriyām prati || iti ca
 (Vy VI)

"Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp, (without being conscious of what they really are, but) with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of casual efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition." (Translation pp. 36

The esthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta—Ranciro Gnoli—SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA, XI 1956)

The purport of the verse is that the two persons see two lights of which the one is that of a lamp and the other is that of a jewel. Both of them do not know whose light it is—but they run with a belief that it is a jewel. Here the ignorance of both is equal, yet the one who gets at a jewel has his purpose fulfilled.

Thus, even though the *liṅga* may be illusory, the inference may be valid if the purpose is served.

Mahimā, however, before he goes into these arguments turns round his opponents and says that it is absurd to seek logical validity in what he calls *kāvyaśūnī* and he waxes eloquent on the poetic charm of it—

tenātra gamyagamakayoh śacetasām satyāsatyatvavicāro niru-
payogo eva kāvyaśūnī ca vācyaavyangyapratītiḥ satyāsatya-
tvavicāro nirupayoga eva iti tatra pramāṅgataraparīkṣopahā-
sāyaiva sampadyate ||
(Vy V I)

In modern terminology, one might say that the inferential process in poetry is more of a psychological nature than of a logical type.

Having proved to his satisfaction that the relation between a word's immediate meaning and the meaning that follows, is not of the nature of *vyangyavyaṅjaka* but of the nature of inference, he explains all the fine points worked out by Ānanda in the terminology of inference. In fact he gives the same illustrations and practically follows the same mode of argument.

The fifth fault arises as below. 'Dhvani' is said to be there when the *vācya* or expressed sense is said to be suggestive. But in that case an inferred sense, even if it is suggested, does not become *dhvani*, for there is absence of expressed sense in it. Thus in 'dhvani' there is gathering of the implicit sense through *vācya* or expressed alone. But if this is the

connotation of dhvani, then it brings in the fault of the definition being 'too narrow' In the illustrations such as, 'evam vāḍinī' etc., there is first the suggestion of a bhāva called 'lajjā' or 'avahitthā' Through that suggested bhāva, love of Parvatī is suggested This is a case of suggestion based on suggestion Now 'dhvani' as explained earlier has its scope limited to suggestion based on expressed sense only (Mahimā shows how 'artha' can mean the expressed sense alone)

(kim ca yatra vācyaśārtḥasya vyañjakatvam sa ced dhvanistārḥ tadapūmitasya vyañjakatve dhvanitvam na syāt, tasya vācyaṭvābhāvat tata-ca, 'evam vāḍinī devarsau' ityadau dhvanitvamistam na syāt ityavyāptirlakṣanadosaḥ) (Vy V I)

Mahimā holds that if the word 'arthah' in Dhv I 13 means both vācya and vyañgya i.e. expressed and suggested sense, then also ativyāptidosa or the fault of 'too wide' follows He holds charm only with reference to implicit sense that follows immediately without any vyavādhāna or intermediary, or a vyavādhāna i.e. intermediary only in form of a vyābhicārī-bhāva or an ālambkāra. If it is else than this, it is without charm But the definition of dhvani embraces such instances also Mahimā says

"yadyartha itī vācyō rtho bhūmato'vyāptireva sū |
yenaivamvāḍinīyadavarṭṭhasyarthāntarādgatīḥ ||
ātibhau tarḥyatrivyāptirdivitravastuvyavasāyini |
prahelikadīrūpēti kāvyē dhvanyātmataḥ jataḥ ||

(Vy V I 21 22)

In this, his fifth argument, Mahimā shows two faults viz. avyāpti and ativyāpti, the first, by confining the meaning or 'artha' to vācyaṭṭha alone, and the second by including vyañgyaṭṭha also

Sixth fault lies in the mention of 'vā' Vā suggests either option (vikalpa) or collection (i.e. samuccaya) || cannot mean option, for earlier 'śabda' is explained as not to be suggestive And even if it is accepted to mean option, then it cannot be construed with the dual in form of 'vyāñkīś' If it means

collection then suggestivity will rest only on both sabda and artha taken together only. Thus, such cases of dhvani resting on only 'śabda' or only 'artha' will be excluded and avyāpti-doṣa will follow :

-(kimcatra vāśabdo vikalpārtho vā syāt samuccayārtho vā na tavadvikalpārthah pakṣāntarasambhavasya vyutpāditatvāt sambhave vāśya dvivacanānupapattih, tayoh samuccayaśbhavāt ... samuccayārthatve'pi yatra śabdārthayorekākasya vyañjakatvaṃ tatra dhvanitvaṃ iṣtam na syāt (Vy V I)

The seventh fault follows from the sixth and touches the use of dual in 'vyanktah'. Here, Mahimabbhatta takes the substance of his argument from the discussion between Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta as given in the latter's work-'Locana'. Abhinava says that objections of Bhattanayaka are due to carelessness because in the act of suggestion the word does it as related to meaning and meaning does it as related to word, and therefore, the dual is justified. Mahimā simply rejects this defence of Abhinava (37).

Eighth fault results from the use of the pronominal stem. Here it refers to 'pratyamānam vastu' (Dhv I 5). It is used in masculine instead of neuter, which would be grammatically correct (kimca tamiti tadah pumstvena nirdeśānupapannah - Vy V I). It may be noted that this argument is merely verbal and does not refer to the substance.

In the ninth blemish, the objection is against 'kāvyaviśeṣah'. Mahimā says that according to Dhvanikara, a poem becomes a poem only if there is dhvani, and if there is no dhvani there is no poem. Therefore it is pointless to use the word 'kāvyaviśeṣah'. Taking this verse (i.e. Dhv I 13) in conjunction with 'kāvyasyātmā sa evārthah' etc (Dhv I 5), Mahimā argues further that where there is no rasa there is no poetry and therefore, to specify a composition as peculiar poetry is useless. Thus, it is useless to circumscribe the sphere of dhvani by qualifying the term kāvyā by 'viśeṣa', in as much

as it gives rise to the false notion that there are other specimens of *kāvya* besides what can be properly subsumed under *dhvani* –

(*api ca kāvyavisesa itī kāvyasya visistatvamanupapannam kāvyamātrasya dhvani vyapadesavisesanātvena istatvāt, tasya rasātmakatvopagamāt tadabhāve casya kāvyataiva na syāt kimuta visesah itī anārambhanīyameva etat preksāvatam syāt vaiphalīyāt* (Vy VI)

There can be no varying degrees of charm in aesthetic realisation which can be made the basis of this differentiation implied by the expression-'*kāvyaavisesah*', for, in each case the final blissful experience is interminate in its character and does not admit of any determinate analysis leading to comparison *inter se* (38)

It might be argued that there are nine different sentiments (*rasa*) and, the distinction implied might have reference to any particular *rasa* amongst them. But such a course of argument would lead to the exclusion of poetic compositions from the category of *dhvanikāvya* that do not suggest that particular sentiment (39). One might however contend that there are other varieties of suggested sense besides *rasadhvani* which is raised to the status of the soul of literary art, viz *vastu-dhvanī*, and *alamkāradhvanī*. Thus, when *rasadhvani* would be characterised by the suggested *vastu* and *alamkāra*, severally or jointly, then and then only would it be regarded as a specimen of *dhvanikāvya*. But this defence too would be of no avail, for when a piece of poem manifests exclusively a particular emotion without suggesting either *vastu* or *alamkāra* the designation of *dhvani* would not be applicable—a ridiculous position indeed! So, the qualifying word '*viseṣah*' is indefensible (40)

Tenth fault is *avācyavacanadoṣa* as seen in '*suribhīḥ kathitah*'. The specific mention of the nominative viz *suribhīḥ*,

of the particular form 'kathitah' is needless and therefore unjustifiable.

(kṛpca 'sūribbhī kathitā'ni kathanakṛiyākārṇirdeśah paksadvaye'pyavācyā eva : kārṇmātravivaksāyām kṛiyāyāh kartravjabbhīcārāt : kartrvīśasavivaksāyāmanantaroktakramena vjāpāravīśasasambandhādeva : tadvīśasāvagatīśiddherityavācyā vacanāṃ dośah)

The tenth fault—avācyavacanadośa—is mentioning something which need not be mentioned. If merely the agents of 'kathitah' are implied in general, they are already implied in the very use of the word 'kathitah'. If some particular authors are implied, these are already referred to formerly. Thus the mention of sūribbhī is redundant.

Mahimā, having thus refuted dhvani to his satisfaction, and being indisposed to bother himself with minor items, improves upon the definition of dhvani as follows:

vācyastadanumīto vā
yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāśayati :
sambandhatah kutascit
sa kavyānumitirityukta || (Vy.V I 25)

And adds,

etacca anumānasyaiva lakṣaṇam nānyasya yaduktam
trirūpalingāt parārthānumānamīti kevalam samjñābhedaḥ.
(Vy.V I)

The ten faults shown by Mahimā are not all of equal importance. As we have noted, some of these are mere verbal and some are mere quibbles. His main argument seems to be that the word 'artha' should be limited to the first direct meaning—vācyārtha—of the word. Therefore, whatever else follows this vācyārtha in the mind of the saḥdaya should be regarded as anumeya. He has this much justification in his view that the indirect thoughts and feelings arising out of the direct meaning can be psychologically regarded as of an inferential

nature. This however, is in no sense a logical anumāna or inference. In fact, Mahimā, as we have noted, laughs at those who while having 'kavyānumiti' think of the 'tarkika' anumiti.

He, like Ānanda tries to elaborate this point, and show how the several categories of poetics can be subsumed under this. In fact in this part of the treatment of the subject, he practically takes the analogy of Ānanda's vyañjanā e.g. Mahimā has his asamāhāsyakrama and samāhāsyakrama so also vastu anumiti, alamkāranumiti and rasādi anumiti etc. The illustrations that he uses are mostly taken from Dhv. Thus kavyānumiti takes the form of vyañjanā for Mahimā.

Bhoja

Now, in order to understand Bhoja's position, let us consider briefly his S K Ā, and the published fragments of Sr Pra, as well as Dr Raghavan's learned and critical thesis on Sr Pra. Dr De seems to say that Bhoja does not accept the dhvani theory of Ānanda in toto, though he does quote many of the kārīkas of Dhv and appropriates some of its other matter (41).

Dr Raghavan in his Bhoja's S'r Pra tries to refute at length Dr De's views on this point. We have, while tracing the earlier indications of vyañjanā pointed out that the idea of vyañjanā is to be found in some of the alamkāras discussed by Bhamaha and Dandin (Vide Ch pp.). We can concur with the opinion that in S K Ā and Sr Pra there are alamkāras and guṇas which embody vyañjanā. This however, does not necessarily make him a vyañjanāvādī, though we may concede that as Dr Raghavan says, Bhoja may be called an autarbhāvavādī.

We have seen that both Dhañjaya and Dhanika, in DR and its Avaloka, refute the theory of vyañjanā and substitute the tatparyā vṛtti in its place to do for vyañjanā. Bhoja,

Munja's successor, seems to follow the tradition of his learned assembly in not giving importance to vyañjanā. In this respect we can agree with Dr. De when he says, that Bhoja's school, ".....stands in many respects apart from the kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana", but we cannot agree with him when he says...., "and appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani theory". As to the use of Ānanda's *katikās* and some of its matter of Bhoja, we may point out that even the greatest opponent of Ānanda viz. Mahimabhatta also does the same. But thereby he does not become a vyañjanavādin. In contrast to this we may say that Hemacandra, the author of *Kavyaśūśana* (Crica, 11th Cen. A.D.), who lived in the time of Siddharāja and Kumārapaṇa accepts the views of the kashmirian authors Abhinava and Mammata, and is an ardent vyañjanavādin (see Ks. Śā I sn, 20-25)

However, it may be added that a discordant note is struck by Ramacandra and Gunacandra, the disciples of Hemacandra, who in their *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* (III, 109 sn 163) take *rasa* to be 'spṣṭānubhavanīśevah' and add that the term 'spṣṭa' qualifying 'anubhava' means well determined. For, only the well determined object serves as a mark or *liṅgam*.—*Spṣṭāḥ itī spṣṭāḥ samyag nirṇītāḥ. asamdigdhaḥ hi liṅgam bhavati*. Thus the authors seem to lean more towards Sri. S'āṅkula.

Mammata who follows Ānanda in his theory of vyañjana, after refuting the views of anumānavādin and the like, takes up the view of advaitavādins. Advaitavādins as they are, they assume an akhandabuddhi, i.e. the sense of the whole as responsible for the elucidation of meaning. Even they, however, have to accept the division of *pada*, *padārtha* etc. And so, in the illustrations discussed in this context, they cannot escape vyañjana, if they have to arrive at the implied sense in those verses.(42)

Viśvanātha, the author of S D (circa 1300-50 A D) discusses the views of those who try to incorporate vyañjanā in the means of knowledge called 'arthapatti'. Viśvanātha is of the opinion that as in case of anumāna, so also in case of arthapatti the basis is vyāptijñāna or the knowledge of vyāpti. Now vyañgya or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on vyāpti. Now vyañgya or the suggested sense can not be said to rest on vyāpti on account of vyabhicāra and samdeha. So, it can not be gathered by arthapatti (43)

Viśvanātha further adds that the suggested sense is not even 'śūcanabuddhiḥśradhya' i.e. gathered by signs and symbols (śūcana). Even this depends on an earlier popular samketa. When it is already understood between the two parties concerned that the raising of the forefinger means a particular number, then only that particular gesture suggests that number. Thus, even this śūcanabuddhi is in a way a sort of loose anumana and the suggested sense cannot be gathered by it (44)

He also adds that the vyañgyavārtha cannot be gathered by 'smṛti'. Others hold that the suggested sense can be gathered by smṛti or memory because the knowledge of rasādi is caused by saṃskāra or impressions. But in this case there will be 'ativyāpti' in 'pratyabhijñā' i.e. recognition also, for pratyabhijñā is also born of saṃskāras but is not of the form of smṛti (45)

The above review of the opponents of dhvani school shows that they are not opposed to pratiyamānatā or implied sense as a source of charm in poetry. The difference arises as to how this implication is grasped. Ānanda regards this as one of the functions of word but this function is not, according to him, fulfilled by either abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. He therefore, posits a third function of word viz vyañjanā. His opponents see no necessity of adding a third function of word because the implied sense can be grasped by inferential processes of thoughts, by meanings yielded through abhidhā and lakṣaṇā.

So for them, to accept *vyañjanā* would lead to what is called *gaurava dosa*. Thus, the question resolves itself into the acceptance or non-acceptance of this additional function of word. Modern logicians who discuss the function of language do accept, what they call the emotive use of language in addition to its scientific function. The various emotive association a word has, become, so to say, prominent in poetic language. But if one considers the psychological processes of the emotive function, one has to agree that they are of an inferential type. In fact, as Mammata says, those who experience and enjoy *rasa* have to be keen in the inference of *sthāyin*—(loke *pramadadibbūḥ sthāyānumāne'bhyaśapa-tavavataim...*" etc. K.P.IV 28) Thus it is not impossible to reconcile both the opposing views

Foot-notes

(1) इत्येतदभिचारतं दशवात्र विवेचितम् । अ. वृ. मा. का. ३२ (अभिचारुतिमातृका)

(2) वक्तुर्वाक्यस्य वाच्यस्य रूपेमेदावधारणात् ।

रक्षणा त्रिप्रकारेणा विवेक्तव्या मनीषिभिः ॥ अ. वृ. मा. (का. ६)

(3) आकम्प्यमानस्यापि समुद्रस्य कम्पनार्थत्वेनाप्यवसितं तत्राप्यवसान-वर्मेणैवोपचारः । अ. वृ. मा. (PP 13).

(4) ह्ययं हि रमरशरप्रभृतीनां पक्ष्यानामप्यारोपितवह्निभाषानामसङ्ख्य वाक्यार्थभूतम् । अतः तस्य वाच्यता । तात्पर्यान्वोचनसामर्थ्याच्च विप्रलम्भशृङ्गा-रस्य आक्षेप इत्युपादानात्मिका लक्षणा ।—अ. वृ. मा. PP 14.

(5) व. जी. 1 8 (वृत्ति)~

यो वाचकः ॥ शब्दः, यो वाच्यः च अभिधेयः सोऽर्थ इति । ननु च योतकम्यञ्जकावपि शब्दौ सम्भवतः । तदसंग्रहान्नाव्याप्तिः । यस्मादर्थप्रतीति-कारित्वसामान्यादुपचारात्तावपि वाचकावेव । एवं योत्यव्यङ्ग्यमोरार्थयोः प्रत्येक्य-सामान्यादुपचाराद् वाच्यत्वमेव । तस्मात् वाच्यत्वं वाचकत्वं च शब्दार्थदोर्लोक-मुपसिद्धं यद्यपि लक्षणं, तथाप्यस्मिन् अलौकिके काव्यनामे वाच्यवर्त्मनि, वाच्य-तयोर्वैक्यमाणलक्षणः परमार्थः, किमप्यपूर्वं तत्त्वं इत्यर्थः ।

(6) एतेन यत्र कुण्ठकेन मयावनभावो तो ध्वनिस्तदपि प्रत्याख्यातम् ।
-एकावली, इदानीं यदप्यन्यैरस्य भक्त्यन्तर्भूतत्वमुक्तं तदपि दर्शयितुमाह
वक्त्रोक्तोऽस्यादि । PP 51 (B S S Ed) See also Jayaratha (PP 8)

(7) यत्रदूरान्तरेऽन्यस्मात् सामान्यमुपचर्यते ।

लेखेनापि भवेत् काचिद्वक्त्रमुद्रिक्त्वस्तुताम् ॥

यन्मूला सरसोत्प्लेखा रूपकादिरलङ्कृतिः ।

उपचारप्रधानासौ वक्त्रा काचिदुच्यते ॥ V J II ka, 13 14.

(8) यथा मूर्ते वस्तु दर्शनस्पर्शनसंवेद्यस्नेहनगुणयोगात् (स्निग्धमि)स्युच्यते
तथैव कान्तिरमूर्ताप्युपचारात् स्निग्धेत्युक्ता । V J II 13

(9) अत एव य प्रत्ययान्तरे अस्मिन्नुपचारे न वक्त्राव्यवहारः, यथा
गौषांहीक इति । V J II 13

(10) शास्त्रादिप्रसिद्धशब्दार्थोपनिबन्धव्यतिरेकि- V J I

(11) शब्दार्थो सहितो वक्त्रविव्यापारशालिनि ।

बन्धे न्यवस्थितौ काव्ये तद्विदाहदकारिणि ॥ V J I 7

(12) उमावेतावलङ्कायी तयो पुनरलङ्कृतिः ।

वक्त्रोक्तिरेव वैदग्ध्यभङ्गोभणितिर्ह्युच्यते ॥ V. J I 10

and also उमी द्वावप्येतौ शब्दार्थौ अलङ्कायी अलङ्कारणीयौ केनापि शोभाति-
शयकारिणालङ्कारणेन योजनीयौ । किं तद् तयोरप्यलङ्कारणमित्यभिधीयते, तयो
पुनरलङ्कृतिः । तयोर्द्वित्वसंज्ञा विशिष्टयोरप्यलङ्कृतिः पुनरेकैव, यथा द्वाव-
प्यलङ्कियेते ।

काऽप्यौ वक्त्रोक्तिरेव । वक्त्रोक्तिः प्रसिद्धाभिधानव्यतिरेकिणी विचित्रै
शोभाति । कीदृशी, वैदग्ध्यभङ्गोभणितिः । वैदग्ध्यं विदग्धभावः, कवि
कर्मक्षौशल तस्य भङ्गो विच्छिन्नति, तथा भणितिः । विचित्रैशोभाति वक्त्रोक्ति-
रित्युच्यते ।

तदिदमत्र तात्पर्यम् । यद् शब्दार्थो केनापि व्यतिरिक्तेनालङ्कारणेन योज्यते ।
किन्तु वक्त्रवैचित्र्ययोगितयाभिधानमेवानयोरलङ्कारः । तस्यैव शोभातिशय
कारित्वात् । एतच्च वक्त्राव्याख्यानावसर एव उदाहरिष्यते ॥ V J I 10

(13) एष एष शब्दशक्तिगूलाप्युपचर्यते पदध्वनेर्विषयः V J
II 12 (इति)

(14) ध्वन्या III 16 -सुगतिवचनसम्बन्धेस्तथा कारकशक्तिभिः ।

कृत् तद्विषयमाश्रयं श्रोत्योऽलङ्कयन् क्वचित् ॥

(15) ध्वन्या III. 16 —च शब्दात् निपातोपसर्गकालादिभिः प्रयुक्तेः अभिव्यज्यमानो दृश्यते ।

(16) व. जी (V. J.) III 1 —उदारस्वपरिस्पन्दसुन्दरत्वेन वर्णनम् । वस्तुनो वक्रशब्दैकगोचरत्वेन वक्ता ॥

(17) V. J. III i (वृत्ति) —

वस्तुनो वर्णनीयतया प्रस्तावितस्य पदार्थस्य यदेवविधत्वेन वर्णनं सा तस्य वक्ता वृत्तविच्छिन्तिः । किंचिद्वत्वेन इत्याह—उदारस्वपरिस्पन्दसुन्दरत्वेन । उदारः सौकर्यः सर्वातिशयो यः स्वपरिस्पन्दः स्वभावमहिमा तरय सुन्दरश्च सौकुमार्यातिशयेन, व्यत्यन्तरमणोयस्वाभाविकधर्मयुक्तत्वेन, वर्णनं प्रतिपादनम् । कथम् वक्रशब्दैकगोचरत्वेन । वक्रो योऽसौ नानाविधवक्ताविशिष्टः शब्दः कश्चिदेव वाचकविशेषे विवक्षितार्थसमर्पणसमर्थः, तस्यैकस्य केवलस्य गोचरत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यतया विषयत्वेन । वाच्यत्वेनेति नोक्तं, व्यक्त्यत्वेनापि प्रतिपादनसम्भवात् ॥

(18) ध्वन्या. II. 17—इत्येवविधे विषयेऽनुरणनरूपरूपकाश्रयेण काव्य-स्वरूपव्यवधानात् रूपकव्यतिरिक्तिरूपदेशो न्यायः ।

(19) व जी on I. 21 —प्रबन्धे वक्रभावो यथा—कुत्रचिन्महाकविर्विविचिते रामकथोपनिबन्धे नाटकादौ पञ्चविधवक्तासामग्रीसमुदायसुन्दर सदृश्यहृदयहारि-महापुरुषवर्णनमुपक्रमे प्रतिभासते । परमार्थतस्तु विविचिन्नेषात्मकधर्मोपदेशः पर्यव-स्यति, रामवद्वर्तितव्यं न रावणवदिति ।

(20) कवोन्मेषसमानेऽपि ध्रुवीव निजैर्गुणैः ।

प्रबन्धा प्राणिन इव प्रभासन्ते पृथक् पृथक् ॥ इत्यन्तरालोक । (४२)
on IV 25 व. जी.

(21) नूतनोपायनिष्पन्दनयवर्णोपदेशिनम् । महाकविप्रबन्धानां सर्वेषा-मस्ति वक्ता ॥ V. J. IV. 26.

(22) व जी. I. 10.—see foot-note No. 10.

(23) व. जी I. 5 —चतुर्वर्गफलस्वादमध्यतिक्रम्य तद्विदाम् ।

कान्यामृतरसेनान्तश्चमत्कारो बितन्वते ॥

(24) व. जी I. 6 —सर्वसप्तपरिस्पन्दसम्पाद्य सरसात्मनाम् ।..... सरसात्मनाम् आर्द्वचेतसाम्..... ।

(25) व. जी. I. 6 अन्तर्लोकः—

प्रबन्धेषु कवीन्द्राणां कीर्तिकन्देषु किं पुनः ।

(26) व. जी. IV. 11—निरन्तरसौन्दर्यारमसन्दर्भनिर्भेदाः ।

गिरं कवीनां जीवन्ति न कयामात्रमाश्रिताः ॥

(27) व जी III. 1 —तदिदमुक्त भवति यत् स्वशब्दैः अभिधीयमाना ध्रुतिपयमवतरन्तेरचोनाना चर्वणचमकारं कुर्वन्तीत्यनेन न्यायेन पृतापूपप्रमृतय पदार्था स्वशब्दैरभिधीयमाना तदास्वादसपद सम्पादयन्तीत्येव सर्वस्य कस्य चिदुपभोगसुखार्थिनस्तेरुदारचरितैरत्यन्तेनैव तदभिधानमात्रादेव त्रैलोक्यराज्य सप्तलोक्यसमृद्धि प्रतिपाद्यते इति नमस्तभ्य ।

(28) V J III 7 (वृत्ति) —मुख्य मत्प्रधान चेतनसुरासुरादिमम्बन्धी-स्वरूप तदेवविध सत्कवीना वर्णनास्पद भवति स्व-व्यापारगोचरतां प्रतिपाद्यते । कीदृशम्-अक्लिष्टरसादिपरिपाद्यमनोहरम्-अक्लिष्ट कर्तव्यताविरहित इत्यप्रणा मनोहरो यो रत्यादि स्थायिभाव तस्य परिपोष भ्यञ्जकप्रभुतिरसत्वापादन स्था प्येव तु रसो भवेत् इति न्यायात् ।

(29) एष विप्रलम्भभ्यञ्जककरणोऽसौकुमायात् उदाहरणप्रदर्शनं विहितम् । रसान्तराणामपि स्वयमुपप्रेक्षणीयम् । V J III 7

(30) अद्यानामचेतनानां सलिलतदुत्पुसुमसमयप्रमृतीनामेवविध रसोद्दीपन सामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबधुरे वर्णनीयतामवगाहते । V J III 7

(31) रसोद्दीपनसामर्थ्यविनिबन्धनबधुरम् ।

चेतनानां अमुकस्याना अद्याना चापि भूयसा ॥ V J III. 8.

(32) व जी III 10 (वृत्ति) —तदेवविध स्वभावप्राच्यान्येन रस-प्राप्तायेन द्विप्रकारं सहजसौकुमार्यसरसं स्वरूपं वर्णनाविषयवस्तुनः शारीरमल्लहा-यतामेवार्हति ।

(33) रसादिपरमार्थज्ञानं संवादसुन्दर । V J I 26

(34) व जी I 41 स्वभावसरसाकूतो भावानां यत्र वध्यते ।

केनापि कमनीयेन वैचित्र्येणोपबृंहित ॥

and also

विविधमेव स्वरूपान्तरेण प्रतिपादयति । स्वभाव इत्यादिदो । यत् यस्मिन् भावानां स्वभावः स्वपरिस्पन्द सरसाकृत रसनिर्भरामिश्राय पदार्थानां निबध्यते निवेद्यते etc etc

(35) अवलोक of धनिक on दृश IV.

यथा लौकिकवाक्येषु श्रूयमाणक्रियेषु गामम्याजेषादिषु अश्रूयमाणक्रियेषु च द्वार द्वारमित्यादिषु स्वशब्दोपादानात् प्रचारणादिपञ्चात् बुद्धिसंश्लेषिनी क्रियेव

कारकोपस्थिता वाक्यार्थस्तथा काव्येष्वपि स्वशब्दोपादानात् क्वचित्, प्रीत्यै नवोढा प्रियेत्येवमवादी, क्वचित् च प्रकरणादिवशात् (नियताविहित-NS) नियत-विहितविभावाद्यविनामावाद् वा साक्षाद्भावकचेतसि विपरिवर्तमानो रत्यादि स्याद्यो स्वस्वविभावाजुभावव्यभिचारिभिस्तत्तच्छब्दोऽनीति सस्कारपरंपरया (परै-परा प्रौढोमानोयमानोरत्यादिवाक्यार्थं । नचाऽऽदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । कार्यपर्यवसायित्वात् तात्पर्यशक्ते । तथा हि पौरुषेय अपौरुषेय वाक्य सधे कार्यपरम् । अतस्परत्वेऽनुपादेयत्वादुन्मत्तादिवाक्यवत् । काव्यशब्दानां चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्या निरतिशयसुख स्वादव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपाद्यकयो प्रवृत्तिविषययो प्रयोजनान्तराजुबलाद् (स्वानन्दो) स्वादोद्भूतिरेव कार्यत्वेनावधार्यते । तदुन्मत्तिनिमित्तत्वं च विभावादिसमूहस्य स्थायिन एवाकगम्यत । अनौ वाक्यस्याऽभिपानसक्तिस्तेन रसेनाऽऽकृष्यमाणा तत्तत् (स्वार्था) स्वादा-पेक्षितावान्तरविभावादिप्रतिपादनद्वारा स्वपर्यवसायितामानोयते । तत्र विभावा-दय पदार्थस्थानीयास्तत् संसृष्टौ रत्यादि वाक्यार्थ । तदनेन काव्यवाक्यम् । (यदीय) यदीयो ताविमौ पदार्थवाक्यार्थौ । न चैव सति गीतादिषु सुखजनकवैऽपि वाच्यवाचकभावाजुपयोग । विशिष्टविभावादिसामग्रीविदुपमेव तथाविध रत्यादिभावावतामेव स्वादोद्भूते । तदनेन अतिप्रसङ्गोऽपि निरस्त । ईदृशि च वाक्यार्थनिरूपणे परिकल्पिताभिधादिशक्तिवशेनैव समस्तवाक्यार्था व्रगते शक्यन्तरपरिकल्पन प्रयास यथाऽवोचाम काव्यनिर्णये ।

तात्पर्यान्तिरेकाच्च व्यञ्जकत्वस्य न ध्वनि ।

किमुक्त स्यादधुतात्पर्यतात्पर्येऽन्वोक्तिरूपिणि । १॥

विष भक्षय (पूर्वो यश्चैव) वाक्ये यच्चैव परमुक्तादिषु ।

(प्रसङ्गते) प्रयुज्यते प्रधानत्वात् ध्वनिव केन वार्यते ॥२॥

ध्वनिश्चेत् स्वार्थविधान्त वाक्यमर्थान्तराश्रयम् ।

तत्परस्य त्वविधान्तौ तान् न विधान्त्यसेमत्वात् ॥३॥

एतावत्येष विधान्तस्तत्पर्यस्येति किं कृतम् ।

यावत्कार्यप्रसारित्वात् तात्पर्यं न तुलापृतम् ॥४॥

अमभार्मिक विधन्वमिति भूमिकृता (स्पदे) स्पद ।

निर्व्यावृत्ति इव वाक्य निषेधमुपसर्पति ॥५॥

प्रतिपाद्यस्य विधान्तिरपेक्षापूरणाद् यदि ।

वक्तुविपक्षित (प्रप्त) प्राप्ते अविधान्तिर्न वा इयम् ॥६॥

पौरुषेयस्य वाक्यस्य (विशेषा परतन्त्र) विवक्षा परतन्त्रता ।

वक्त्रभिप्रेततात्पर्यमन काव्यस्य युज्यते ॥७॥

इति । अतो न रसादीनां काव्येन सह व्यञ्ज्यव्यञ्जकभावः । किं तर्हि भाव्यभावकसम्बन्धः, काव्यं हि भावकम् । भाव्या रसादयः ।

The NS Ed reading are bracketted () It contains numerous mistakes. A revised text, with the corrections made by MM Kuppaswami Sastri is given here as quoted by Dr Raghvan, Sr Pra (pp 181-182)

(36) अयस्य विशिष्टश्च शब्दः सविशेषणं तद् पुरुषम् ।

द्विवचनवाशद्दो व्यक्तित्वनिर्माणं काव्यवैशिष्ट्यम् ॥

वचनं च कथनकर्तुं कथिता ध्वनिरूपमणीति दश दोषाः ।

ये त्वन्ये तदुद्देशप्रमेदलक्षणमता न त गणिता ॥ व्य वि I

(37) अभिनव observes—

व्यक्त इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह—यदप्यविवक्षितवाच्ये शब्द एव व्यञ्जक तभापि अर्थस्यापि सहकारिता न पुन्यति, अन्यथा अज्ञातार्थोऽपि शब्दः तद् व्यञ्जक स्यात् । विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये तु शब्दस्यापि सहकारित्वं भवत्येव, विशिष्टशब्दामिधेतया विना तस्यार्थस्याव्यञ्जकत्वादिति सर्वत्र शब्दार्थयोर्द्वयोरपि ध्वननं ध्यापारः । तेन यद् भट्टनायकेन द्विवचनं कथितं तद्गजनिमीलिकया एव । —शेषेण on Dhv I 18

See also, Mahima—

अत्र केचिन्विद्वन्मानिनो द्विवचनसमर्थनामनोरथाक्षित्वविस्तृतया वाच्यवाचकयोर्विस्तृतसुप्रसिद्धप्रतीतिक्रमभावात् तथोक्तकालिकनां शब्दस्योत्पन्नयनिरस्तामपि व्यञ्जकतां पश्यत तन्निबन्धानां ध्वनिमेदयोरविवक्षितवाच्यविवक्षिताय परवाच्ययो ध्वननम्यापारं प्रति पर्यायेण अन्योन्यसहकारितां तदपेक्षा चानयोः प्राधानेतरतानुपपत्त्यै सहकारितया व्यक्तिक्रिया प्रयुज्योरपि कृतकर्तृत्वात् तदपेक्षो व्यक्त इति द्विवचननिर्देशः, प्राध्यायापेक्षत्वं—यस्य शब्दो वेतिविकल्प इति मयमाना व्यक्त इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह—अर्थः शब्दो वेति विकल्पामिधानं तु प्राधान्यमिप्रायेय इति यद्वाहु, तद् अन्तिमूलं न तत्त्वमित्यलमवस्तु निर्बन्धनेन । व्य वि I

(38) अपि च काव्यविशेष इति काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमनुपपन्नम् । काव्यमात्रस्य ध्वनिरूपदेशविशेषत्वेन इष्टत्वात्, तस्य रसात्मकवापगमात् । यतः स एवाह काव्यस्यात्मा न एवार्थः तथा चादिकवे पुरा । श्रीशङ्करभट्टविरचोक्तः

शोक इत्येकत्वमागत ॥ न च तस्य विशेष सम्भवति निरतिशयसुखास्वाद-
लक्षणत्वात् । यदाहु —

पाठ्यदम धृवागानाऽ तत संपुरिते रसे ।
तदास्वादपरैकामो हृष्यत्यन्तमुत्तमं क्षणम् ॥
ततो निर्विषयस्यास्य स्वरूपावस्थितो निज ।
व्यज्यतेऽह्लादनिष्यन्द येन तृष्यन्ति योगिन ॥

तदभावे चास्य काव्यतैष न स्यात् । किमुत विशेष एति अनारम्भणो-
यमेवैतत् प्रेक्षावता स्यात् वैकल्यात् । व्य वि I

(39) न च रसाना वैशिष्ट्ये तदरमन काव्यस्य विशिष्टत्वमिति युक्त
वक्तु अव्याप्ते । एष हि प्रतिनियतरसात्मन एव तस्य ध्वनित्व स्यात्,
नान्यस्य अनवरसात्मन, वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । इष्यते च तत्रापीत्यव्याप्तिर्लक्षणदोषः ।
व्य वि I

(40) न च रसात्मन काव्यस्य वस्तुमानादिभिः विशेष शक्य भाषातुम्,
तेषा विभ वादिरूपतया रसाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वोरगमात् । न च व्यञ्जनकाना वैचित्र्ये
व्यङ्ग्यस्य विशेषोऽभ्युपगन्तुं युक्तः काव्यदेयादिनामिव गोत्वस्य । ततोऽस्य
विशिष्टत्वोपगमे वा यत्र तयो उभयोरैकैकस्य वा व्यङ्ग्यता तत्रैव ध्वनि-य-देश
स्यात् न तु केवलरसात्मनि काव्ये वैशिष्ट्याभावात् । (व्य वि I)

(41) Dr De (Sanskrit Poetics II, pp, 229) says

‘It will be convenient in this connection to take up the
school of opinion represented by the writer on poetics in
the Agnipurāṇa and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects
apart from kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana and which
appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications
of the Dhvani theory’

on pp 261 he says ‘He i.e (Bhoja) even appropriates
karikas from the Dhvanyāloka, although he does not accept
the theory”

(42) अविशिष्टमपर्यायानेकाद्वयप्रतिष्ठितम् ।

एक वेदान्तनिष्पन्नानास्तमखण्ड प्रपेदिरे ॥ K P II वाल्बोधिनी

also बादरायण,

अनवयवमेव वाच्यमनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितालोक्यदवर्णविभायमस्या निमित्तम् ।

and also —अखण्डबुद्धिनिर्मातो वाक्यार्थ एव वाच्य वाक्यमेव

च वाचकम् इति येऽप्याहु तैरप्यविद्यापयपतितै पदपदार्थकल्पना कर्तव्येवेति तत्प्रक्षे अप्यवश्यमुक्तोदाहरणादौ विख्यादि व्यञ्जय एव । K P V.

see also —परिनिश्चिननिरूपप्रशङ्गाद्वद्वाणा विपश्चिता मतमाश्रियैव प्रवृत्तोऽय ध्वनिव्यवहार इति तै सह किं विरोधाविरोधौ चि त्येत । ध्वन्या III
see also Adhinava on this quoted earlier.

(43) एतेनार्थापत्तिवेद्यत्वमपि व्यञ्जयानामपास्तम् अर्थापत्तेरपि पूर्वसिद्ध व्याप्तिरुक्ताया उपजीव्येष प्रवृत्ते यथा यो जीवति स कुत्राप्यवतिष्ठते जीवति चात्र गोष्ठ्यामविद्यमानश्चैव इत्यादौ । S D. V.

(44) किं च, वल्लविक्रयादौ तर्जनीतोलनेन दशसंख्यादिवत् सूचन-
बुद्धिवेशोऽप्यय न भवति । सूचनबुद्धेरपि संकेतादिकौटिकप्रमाणमापेक्षयानुमान
प्रकारताङ्गीकारात् । S D V

(45) यच्च सस्कारजन्यत्वात् रसादिबुद्धिः स्मृति इति केचित् ।
तत्रापि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अनैकान्वितया हेतोरामासना । S D V.

CHAPTER XIV

DHVANI IN ABHINAVAGUPTA

Abhinavagupta follows the Dhvanyaloka in his theories on dhvani and rasa. His two important works on this subject are a commentary on Dhv known as Locana and a commentary on the Nāṣa of Bharata, known as Nāṣavedavivṛti or Abhinavabharatī (A bh). The merit of his work lies in clear elaboration and at times subtle explanation and original insights to a certain extent. He was a great philosopher of pratyabhijñā school, and has implicitly taken certain ideas peculiar to that school for granted in his discussions. So his works on the pratyabhijñā school of thought, viz Tantraloka, and Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivarṇanā incidentally throw some light on some aspects of his theory of poetry.

As the Locana and the A bh are commentaries, much of their content is naturally the same as that of Dhv and Nāṣa. For these reasons, much of their treatment is bound to be piece-meal. In the discussion of the contents of Dhv and Nāṣa, I have, as far as possible, confined myself to the works themselves. Here while considering Abhinava's comms, I will note the points which have been clarified, elaborated and sometimes improved upon by him. In the treatment of these points some repetition would be unavoidable though I have tried to avoid it as far as possible. As noted just now, the treatment of various topics in these comms, particularly in Locana, is piecemeal, and so, in order to give a coherent account, I have brought together the pieces bearing on the same topic and tried to give a connected account. Let us now first consider the Locana.

The Tradition (Āmnayā) of Dhvani

Abhinava holds that the theory of dhvani was laid down by so many intelligent people. He, however, fails to mention any concrete name of an ālankārika who must have called dhvani to be the soul of poetry. He records an unwritten tradition of the dhvanivādins in the words —*avicchinnena prava-hena tairretaduktam vīṇā'pi vīṇāśapustakesu vīṇāvesanādity-śabhiprāyah* (Locana on Dhv I 1). Thus, it seems that Abhinava seems to have failed in discovering the names and the works of the original propounders of dhvanivāda.

Definitions of Dhvani

Abhinava accepts the definition of dhvani as given in the Dhv I 13. He tries to explain the *duel* in 'vyāṅktaḥ'. By this, according to him, what is meant is that in both the varieties of *śabdasaṁskṛtā* and *arthaśaktimūla* of dhvani, both word and meaning (*śabda* and *artha*), have a role to perform. Thus, Bhaṭṭanāyaka was wrong in criticising the *duel* ending in 'vyāṅktaḥ'.

Says he *vyāṅktaḥ iti dvivacanenedamāha-yadapyavivak-ṣitavacye śabda eva vyāṅjakah tathāpyarthasyāpi sahakṛtā na trūṣyati, anyathā ajñātartho pi śabdastadvyāṅjakah syāt vivakṣitānyaparavacye ca śabdasyā'pi bhavatyeva viśiṣṭa-śabdābhidheyatayā vinā tasyarthasyāvyanjakatvāditi sarvatra śabdarthayorubhayorāpi dhvananām vyāpārah tena bhāṭṭa-nāyakena dvivacanap duṣitam tadgajanūmikayaiva arthah śabdo vā iti vikalpābhidhānam pradhanyābhiprāyena* (Locana on Dhv I 13).

Two meanings of the term dhvani and its five-fold application

Abhinava derives the word *dhvani* in two different ways giving two different meanings. One is *dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ* i.e. that which sounds, reverberates or implies a *dhvani*, the

second is—*dhvanyate* in *dhvanih*—i.e. that which is sounded, reverberated, or implied is *dhvani*. The first refers to *śabda* which implies some meaning, and also to meaning (*vācārtha*) which implies further meaning and also to the process i.e. *śabdāna* or *dhvanāna* of a word which implies something. The second derivation explains *dhvani* as something which is implied. This, we might say, is *dhvani* proper.

In addition, a poem, which consists of all these four, is also known as *dhvani*. Thus he explains *dhvani* in such a way as to cover all the five accepts. Says he

sa iti artho vā śabdo vā vyāpāro vā artho'pi vācyo vā
dhvanatīti, śabdo-pyevam vyaṅgyo vā dhvanyate iti vyāpāro vā
śabdārthayordhvanānamīti karikayā tu prādhānyena samudāya
eva kāvyarūpo mukhyatayā dhvanīrīti pratipāditaṃ

Further on, he explains this point in greater detail. He elaborately discusses the *Sphotavāda* of the *vaiyākaranas* and tries to correlate it with the theory of *dhvani*. He says
asmābhirapi prasiddhebhyaḥ śabdavyāpārebhyo'bhidhātāt-
paryalakṣaṇārūpebhyo'ūrikto vyāpārah dhvanīrītyuktah evaṃ
catuskamaḥ dhvaniḥ tadyogācca samastamapi kāvyam dhvaniḥ
(Locana on I 13 Dhv). He adds —tena vācyopi dhvaniḥ,
vācakopi śabdo dhvaniḥ, dvayorapi vyanjakatvam dhvanatīti
kṛtvā sammisṛyate vibhāvanubhāvasamvalanayen śabdanam
śabdah śabdavyāpārah, na cāśvabidhādīrupah, apītvātmabhūtah,
so'pi dhvanānam dhvaniḥ kāvyamīti vyāpadesyasca yo'rthah
so'pidhvanīḥ, uktiprakāradhvanīcatustayamayatvat ata eva
śādhāraṇaśāstramāha—vyanjakatvasāmyādīti vyaṅgyavyāñjaka-
bhāvah sarvesu pakṣeṣu śādhārāṇa ityarthah

This double derivation of *dhvani* makes it necessary to keep the two meanings apart to avoid confusion. The one suggests an agent or the process of suggestion, the other, what is suggested. There are three main types of *dhvanis* accepted by both Ānanda and Abhinava, viz. *vastudhvanī*, *ālampāra-dhvanī* and *rasadhvanī*. All the three must come under

'dhvanyate' derivation. The other derivation viz 'dhvani' (and dhvanana) appear to have been given in conformity of the vāyākaranas for whom sabda or word is 'dhvani' which reverberates Sphota

The three types of Dhvani

Abhinava accepts the general three fold classification of dhvani as given by Ānanda. However, he adds some further explanation. For him, the *pratiyamāna* or implied sense is described as two-fold, (i) *laukika* or the one that is met with also in ordinary discourse and (ii) *kāvyaavyāpārakagocara* or one which is met with only in poetry. This means that the first is possible in poetry as well as ordinary discourse, while the second is possible only in poetry.

The first viz *laukika dhvani* in poetry is of two types, (i) that which suggests vastu or some matter—i.e. *vastudhvani* and, (ii) which suggests a figure of speech i.e. *alamkaradhvani*. This *laukika dhvani* in its two varieties can equally be expressed directly by its own words as one might ask the mendicant not to go to the place of rendezvous because the dog is killed by a lion. *Alamkaradhvani* is so termed on the analogy of *brāhmana śramaṇa*.

The variety of dhvani which is possible in poetry is *rasadhvani*. Only this *rasadhvani* is dhvani in the opinion of Abhinava. This alone is being pre-dominant, is the soul of poetry. *Rasadhvani*, says Abhinava can never be expressed by its own name. He holds that this alone is primarily the soul of poetry, and that both *vastudhvani* and *alamkaradhvani* finally terminate into *rasadhvani*. Says he *sa ca dhvanireveti, sa eva mukhyataya atmeti vastvalamkaradhvanyo rasadhvani paryantatvameveti vayameva vakṣyamastatra tatte tyastam tavat* (Locana on Dhv. I. 4)


Says he *pratiyamānamātre'pi prakrānte tṛtiya eva rasadhdhanirīti mantavyam itihāsabalāt prakrāntavyatigraha*

balācca tena rasa eva vastuta ātma, vastvālakṣṇādhvaniḥ tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyādutkṛṣṭau tavitayabhl-prāyena dhvanīḥ kāvyasyātmicīśāmanyenokīah

Experience of Rasa : Abhinava has elaborately discussed the nature of the experience of rasa in his A bh Here, however, he gives a brief account of it. Rasa is recognised to be of the form of svasamvid. Abhinava holds that the experience of sentiments and emotions etc. is of the nature of Supreme Joy. In the minds of all the individuals, there are certain permanent impressions such as rati, bāsa, etc. engrained and born of the experience of everyday life. When one looks at some dramatic performance, or reads a poem, one experiences the vibhāva, anubhāva etc. and the permanent fixed emotions are roused to the status of rasa and the cultured man experiences supreme joy. This rasa, then, is of the form of relish and is recognised as the soul of poetry. We will deal with Abhinava's views on rasa-realisation in greater details later on. We, may, however, note his words : yastu svapne'pi na sva-sabdavācya na laukika-vyavahārapatītaḥ kintu sabdasamarpyam-ānāhṛdayasamvādasundaravibhāvasamucitaprāgviniṣṭa-vyāpār-arasaniyartūpo rasah sa kāvyavyāpārīkagocaro rasadhvanirīti, (Locana on Dhv I 4)

The possible varieties of dhvani

Abhinava has also tried to give the possible varieties of dhvani under Dhv II 31, and Dhv III 43 in a mathematical way on the basis of varieties given in Dhv. At Dhv II, 31 he gives thirtyfive basic varieties of dhvani. It can be explained as below



All these when multiplied by the subvarieties of guṇibhuta-
vyangya, alampkāra and dhvani through the relation of
saṁstṭi and saṁkara, tend to be 7420. Abhinava tries to
illustrate some of them. It has been pointed out by modern
writers that Abhinava's calculation of the number of dhvanis
is not correct. It should be 9940 and not 7420.

The abhāvavādins or the opponents of dhvanī

Abhinava also treats the views of some dhvanī-abhāvavādins :— those who do not accept vyañjanā and dhvanī. He tries to classify them, and then in his own way tries to refute the views of the advocates of abhīhātānvayavāda, anvitābhīdhanavāda, etc

In this matter also, Abhinava has given us more detailed and elaborate discussion. He says that the abhāvavādins are virtually of five classes though apparently Ānanda has counted only three. The first variety of abhāvavādins are subdivided into three as below—*tatrabhāvavikalpasya trayah prakārah—sabdārthaguṇālamkāraṇāmeva sabdarthasobhakārvilokaśāstrā-tiriktasunderasabdārtharupasya kāvyasya na sobhahetuh kaś cidanyo stī yo'smābhīna ganita ityēkaḥ prakārah yo vā na ganitah so sobhakāryeva na bhavati dvitīyah stha sobhakari bhavati tathyasmadukta eva guṇe vā'lamkāre vāntarbhavati namāntarakarane tu kīyadīdam paṇḍityam athapyuktesu guṇālamkāresu vā nāntarbhāvah, tatbāpī kīncidviseśalesamasritya namāntarakarānamupamaḥ vicchittiprakārgāmasamkhyatvāt tatbāpī guṇālamkāravatīritatvābhāvah eva tāvannātreṇa ca kim kṛtam? anyasyāpī vacitrasya śakyotprekṣyatvāt cīrantanairbhi bharatamuniprabhītibhīryamakopame eva sabdarthālamkāratveneste tatprapañcadikpradarsanam tvanyāśālamkāra kāraḥ kṛtam tadyathā 'karmānvan' hyatra kumbhakāradīudābarānam śrutvā svayam nagarakārādī sabdā utprekṣyante tāvāt ka nīmanī bahumānah evam prakīrptī itītyah prakārah evamekaśtridhā vikalpah, anyau ca dvāvīti pañca vikalpāḥ itī tatparyārthah (Locana on Dhv 11)*

Thus Abhinava classifies these opponents of dhvanī as below (a) those who hold that dhvanī does not exist at all or *nāstīyeva dhvanīh*, (b) those who say that dhvanī is only *bhakti* or secondary sense—i.e. *bhaktireva dhvanīh* and (c) those who maintain that dhvanī is *undescribable* i.e. *anirūpyo dhvanīh*. The first variety is subdivided into three types. Thus in all we have five varieties of abhāvavādins.

Abhinava then points out that the theory of the absence of dhvani is a matter of past, while the bhaktavāda is a continuous tradition - bhāktavādaśtāvavicchinnaḥ puṣṭakesvitya-bhīṣṭayena bhāktamahurīḥ nityapravartamānapeksayābhīdhanam. He does not mention any specific name of those abhāvavādins. However, as noted earlier he mentions one Manorathakavī who ridicules dhvani.

Abhinava tries to correlate bhāktavāda with the earlier poeticists such as Bhāmaha, Udbhata, Vāmana, etc. He says - darsayateḥ-bhāttodbhata-vāmanādinaḥ (Locana on Dhv. I. 1)

He goes on to establish vyanjana and dhvani and tries to silence the abhīhitānvayavāda, anvitābhīdhanavāda, etc. in the following way :

Abhīhitānvayavāda refuted

The argument of the abhīhitānvayavāda proceeds as below : The tatparyavṛtti, in case of bhama dhammā etc has not ended in form of the intended sense. The words such as dṛpta, dharmika, tad, etc cannot be correlated and therefore there is mukhyārthabādha or contradiction in the primary sense. Thus, there is scope for viparīta lakṣaṇā having virodha or contradiction for its 'nimitta'. This viparīta lakṣaṇā makes for the sense of negation in this particular illustration viz bhama dhammā etc. This sense of negation is derived thus only on the strength of word (śabdasaktimula eva) and therefore, there can not be any sense other than the expressed

(nanu tatparyasaktiraparyavasitā vivaksyaḥ dṛptadharmī-katadadīpadārthanānvayarūpamukhyārthabādhābalena virodhanimittayā viparītalakṣaṇayā ca vāk्यārthibhūtanīṣedhapratī-timābhīhitānvayadrīḥ karoti śabdasaktimula eva sorthaḥ, evamanekāmiti hi vyavahārah tanna vācyaḥ śrīkṛṣṇaḥ 0'rtha ita (Locana, Dhv I. 4)

Abhinava, in the refutation of the above view explains the nature and scope of abhīdha, tatparya and lakṣaṇā. He holds that in the particular illustration viz bhama dhammā

etc as there is no mukhyārthabādhā or contradiction in the primary sense, correlation is not impossible. So there is no scope for lakṣaṇa at all (ata eva mukhyārthabādhō nātra saṅkya itī na viparītalakṣaṇāyā avasarah)

Abhinava considers the point whether the suggested sense can be gathered in the third stage, viz lakṣaṇa. For him suggestion comes at the fourth stage. He holds that in instances such as gaṅgāyām ghoṣah or simho batuh, the sense of coolness, purity etc. with reference to the hamlet, or the sense of the heroic quality of the batu, is gathered by vāñjana, the fourth power and can not be gathered by anumāna or inference on account of the faults of anaiḥśāntikatva and the like, or by remembrance, as it is only with reference to experienced objects, or by abhidhā in the absence of convention or by tatparya as it is over with correlation only, or by lakṣaṇa in the absence of 'skhaladgatitva' or faulting movement of words, or lakṣṇalākṣaṇa which involves the contingencies of ānantya i.e. endlessness and vyabhicāra i.e. discrepancy. Thus, the suggested sense is gathered only by suggestion, the fourth power of word.

(yattvīdāp ghoṣasyālipavitrāvatvāstalatvasevyatvādīkāp prajojanamāśabdāntaravācyaṁ pramāṇāntarapratipannam batorvā parākramāṁśayaiślitvāp tatra śabdasya na tāvanna vyūpārah, tathā hi-tasasāmpyattaddharmatvanumānamanaikāntikam, Sīṁhasabdavācyaṁ ca batorasiddham aha yatra yatraī vamsābdaprayogastatra tatra taddharmayoga ityanumānam, tasyāpi vyūptigrahakāle maulikāp pramāṇāntarān vācyaṁ, na c'asti na cā smṛitīyam, ananubhūte tadayogāt, nīyamapratipattirakturetadivāḥṣitamityadhyavasāyabdhāva prasthāceta ityastī tavadatra śabdasyaiva vyūpārah vyūpārasca nābhīdhattma samayābhāvat na tatparyātma tasyānavayapratītiḥeva parikṣyāt, na lakṣaṇasīmā ukṣādeva hetoh skhaladgatitvābhāvat tatrāpi hi skhaladgatitve punarmukhyārthabādhā nītam prajojanamit-janāvasāhā syāt ata eva yat kenacillakṣṇalākṣaṇetī nāma

kṛtam tadvyasanamātram : tasmādabhidhātatparyalakṣaṇavya-
tīkṛtāścaturtho'sau vyāpāro dhvananadyotanavyaṇjanapratyāy-
anāvagamanādisodaravyapadesanirūpito'bhyupagantavyaḥ -
Locana on Dhv I 4)

Abhinava is of the opinion that difference in the functions of word is gathered on the strength of the difference in the accessories. Abhidhā rests on convention, tātparya on correlation, lakṣaṇā on the contradiction of the primary sense-mukhyarthabādha, and the like. Vyaṇjana or suggestion is different from these, as it rests on the meaning gathered through these and also on the intelligence of the hearer. It subordinates the first three and is termed as the soul of poetry (tena samayā-pekṣā vācya-vagamanasaktirabhidhāsaktiḥ tadanyathānupapattisahayavabodhanasaktistātparyasaktiḥ mukhyarthabādhadīśa-akṛtyapekṣārthapratibhāsasaktirlakṣaṇā saktiḥ tacchaktitrayo pājanīrīghvagamamulajātataipratibhāsapavitṛtapratīpatī prati-
bhāsaḥāyarthadyotanasaktīrdhvananavyāpārah, sa ca prāveṣitam
vyāpāratrayaṁ nyahkurvan pradhānabbhūtāḥ kāvyatmetyasayena
nīśedhapramukhatayā ca prayojanavisayopī nīśedhavisaya
ityuktam (Locana-Dhv I 4)

Anvītabhidhānavāda refuted

Abhinava also silences the anvītabhidhānavāda. He argues in the following way. The upholder of anvītabhidhānavāda, on the strength of the maxim viz yatpataḥ śabdah sa śabdārthah, believes in abhidhā alone which operates like an arrow shot by a great hero, and gets at the suggested idea also. Abhinava holds that when the objector expects abhidhā to go further and further, he cannot take the whole process as one and identical, on account of the difference in subject-matter. If the subject-matter is not one but many, then on account of the difference in accessories it is bound to be non-identical. For when the subject-matter is identical, with reference to word, buddhi : understanding and karma or action, the fact of intermittent operation is discarded. If the subject-matter is different, our position viz that the functions are different, stands.

(yópyanvitābhīdhanavṛdī 'yatparah śabdah sa śabdarthah' itī hrdaye grhītvā śaravadabhīdhavyapārameva dīrghadīrgham-
cchatī, tasya yadī dīrgho vyāpārastadekosvṛtī kutah ? bhīnna-
viśayatvāt athānekosau tadviśayasahakāribhedādasajṣṭiya eva
yuktah. sajṣṭye ca kārye viramya vyāpārah śabdakarmabud-
dhyādinām padārthavidbhīh nīśiddhah. asajṣṭye cāsmannaya
eva) (Locana on Dhv. I. 4)

Sphotavāda silenced

Abhinava also tries to meet with the upholders of Sphota. He holds that those who accept the non-divisible Sphota, or non divisible sentence, also have got to accept, on empirical ground, the existence of individual words i.e. padas and the like. Thus, even for them vyañjana should be acceptable on empirical ground. When one crosses the bounds of empirical ground, one may accept the maxim-sarve sarvārthavācakah, and may do away with the difference of abhīdhy, lakṣaṇa etc. And this position at transcendental level is not unknown to our author i.e. Ānandavardhana who also composed Tattvaloka, a work on philosophy.

(yepyavibhaktam Sphotam vikram tadartham cāhuḥ,
tairapyavidyāpadapatitaiḥ sarveyamanusarantiyā prakriyā,
tadūlīrṇaive tu sarvaṁ paramesvarādvayaṁ brahmetyasma-
cchṛītrakareṇa na na vidītam tattvalokam grantham viracayate-
tyastam) (Locana Dhv. I. 4)

Rasādi Dhvani

Now we will consider the topic of rasādi dhvani as treated in the Locana (on Dhv. II 1-4). In the udjota II, kārīkās 1-4, the subjects of rasa, bhāva, rasābhāva, bhāvābhāsa, bhāvasānti etc., is treated. Abhinava, in Locana on these kārīkās elaborately explains and illustrates these topics. He says a poem lives by its rasa. Even then, some particular element of it happens to charm more and therefore gets projected in some poems. These give rise to bhāvadhvani, bhāvodaya, bhāvasānti, etc.—(yadapi ca rasenaiva

Abhinava then says that thus these bhavadhvanis are just the drippings (nisyanda) of rasadhvani and on account of the special source of charm they are separately cognised. (evam rasadhvanerevāṁṣi bhavadhvaniprabhṛtayo nisyandā āsvāde pradhānam prayojakamevāṁsam vibhajya pṛthagvyavasthapyate (Locana on Dhv. II 3)

Rasadhvani

Rasadhvani occurs there only when for the connoisseur, tasting is brought about by the relish of sthāyin combined with vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin—rasadhvanistu sa eva yo'tra mukhyataya vibhṛtvānubhāva-vyabhicārisampyojanodita-sthāyipratipattikasya pratipattuh sthāyāmīacarvanāprayuktah evāsvādaprakāśah—Locana on Dhv II 3) This is illustrated as in kṛcchrenoruyugam vyatitya etc Abhinava holds that when this rasa is principally suggested, it becomes the province of asaṁplakṣyakramadhvani. When rasādi is suggested in a subservient way, it is rasādi ālamkāra. Says he tatrabhi vyaktih pradhānataya bhavatvanyathā vā pradhānatve dhvaniḥ, anyathā rasādyālamkārah (Locana on Dhv II 4)

Like Ānanda, he also maintains that the ālamkāras such as upamā, utprekṣā etc indirectly, through the body in form of word and sense, embellish rasa, the soul. Rasa is the ultimate ālamkārya. Just as a dead body cannot be decorated, in the same way, poetry without rasa cannot be embellished.

etaduktam bhavati-upamayā yadyapi vācyārtho'lamkriyate tathāpi tasya tadvalāmkaranam yadvyāngyārthābhivyañjanasamarthavadhānamiti vastuto dhvanyātmaivalāmkāryah katakake-yuradibhirapi śarīrasamavāyibhīscetana ātmaiva tattaccittavṛttivīśesaucityasūcanātmatayālamkriyate—(Locana on Dhv II 5)

Here, it may be pointed out that the later writers like Mammata, Hemacandra etc absorb all these ideas regarding bhavadhvani, rasābhāsa etc in their works. We may say that the ideas of Dhv regarding vyāñjana and rasa are, to say,

given completeness by Locana and the *Abh* on the *rasasūtra* of the *Nā Śā*. The later writers draw upon all the three as one source.

The *Sahridaya*

This *rasa*-realisation is experienced only by '*sahridaya*' and not by all ordinary people. He explains the term '*sahridaya*' as follows: *yesām kavyānusīdanābhyāsavaśadvāsadibhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdaya-samvādadbhājah sahrdayah*-(Locana, on *Dhv* I 1), *yathoktam*-(*Nā Śā*) (VII 10):-

*yo'rtho hṛdayasamvādī
tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ |
sarīram vyāpyate tena
suskam kṛsthamivāśninaḥ ||*

i.e.-The faculty of self-identification with the events represented (the determinants, consequents, etc.) demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with the practice of poetry. The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are those who have this faculty. For it has been said "the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the *rasa*. The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire." The mind and the heart must be mirror-like (*viśada-vimala*), ready to receive all the images which are reflected in them. *vimalamukurakalpībhutanījāhṛdayah* (*Abh* p. 37). In the *Tantrāloka* III 200, Abhinava says

*tathā hi madhure gīte sparse vā candanādīke |
madhyasthyaviḡame yāsau hṛdaye spandamānatā ||
ānandasaktiḥ saivoktā yataḥ sahrdayo janāḥ |*

"When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal wood, etc. the state of indifference (non participation, impersonality, etc.) disappears

and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration (spanda mānata) Such a state is precisely the so-called beatitude, thanks to which man is, 'gifted with heart'. According to the Sarva philosophy of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc (Gnolly)

In his A bh (p 280) he defines the 'adbhikara 'as-adbhikṛt cātra vimalapratibhānasalīhṛdayah'-ie The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition (pratibhāna) Elsewhere (A bh Vol II p 339) Abhinava says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavīhṛdaya tadatmyapattiyogitā)

Abhinava has tried to record his views on rasa realisation in the locana on Dhv II. 4 He has also recorded and refuted the views of Lollata, Āṅkuka etc However, we will discuss this in the following chapters wherein we will consider the relevant portion of his Abb on the rasa-sūtra of Bharata in Na.Śā VI Ch

It may be noted in the end that like Ānanda, Abhinava also holds that rasa, bhava, etc are always suggested and can never be directly expressed Says he : rasabhavatadabbhasatā-prasamāḥ punarṇa kadacidabbhidhīyante, atha cāsvādyamanānā-pranātayā bhānti tatra dhvananavyaparādṛte nāsti lalapanātaram Locana on (Dhv I 4)

CHAPTER XV

THE NATURE OF RASA-EXPERIENCE AS EXPLAINED BY

- (i) **Bhaṭṭa Lollata**—Cir 815 A D De Sk Poetics P 36, Edn. '60—
Second and third quarter of the ninth cen
A D—Pandey—Abhinavagupta p 128, 3rd
Edn (1935) 750-800 A D Kane, History
of Sk Poetics
- (ii) **Śrī Śaṅkuka**—9th A D, De Sk. Poetics p. 36, ed. 850
A D—Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p 128, Ed.
'35 840 A D identified with poet Śaṅkuka—
Kane
- (iii) **Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka**—End of 9th and beginning of 10th Cen
A D De—p 41, 883-902 A D—Pandey
p 130 900-925 A D Kane, p 43
- (iv) **Abhinavagupta**—1015 A D De, 950-'60 to 1015 A D K C
Pandey (Abh p 8), 980-1030 A D Kane,
p 43

We noted in the earlier chapter the *rasasūtra* and its prose explanations given in the *Nāṣa*. This forms the first stage in the development of rasa theory. The second stage is found in the relation established between *vyañjanā* and *rasa* as in the *Dhv*. The third stage can be seen in the relevant portion of *Locana* and the *Abh* of Abhinavagupta. We now study this third stage.

We may start the discussion by stating again the *rasa-sūtra* of the *Nāṣa* viz. '*vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyoga-drasanīpattih*'. It appears from the works of Abhinava that this *sūtra* was much discussed and debated upon and was variously explained e.g. by Lollata, śrī Śaṅkuka, etc. [The

names of the other commentators are Udbhata and Kirtidhara, see Saṅgitaranākara of Saṅgadeva (I P. 19) Unfortunately, the works of those authors are not yet discovered. We have, therefore, to rely upon references in Abhinavagupta's works for their views. Even though, Abhinava has tried to be as objective as possible in presenting their views, we cannot say that these are given in their completeness. Much therefore in their views remains obscure. With this proviso in mind, we will now take up the views of these writers in the order as given by Abhinava.

For the sake of classification, we may note that the main points of controversy refer to, (i) the absence of the mention of 'sthāyibhāva' in the sūtra, (ii) the meaning of the term 'samyoga', and (iii) the meaning of the term 'nispattih', and the psychological and epistemological problems arising out of these.

Abhinava has adopted the method in vogue amongst the later darsanikas. It is to present the views which are farthest from the opinion of the author and get them refuted by the later critic. This in turn is refuted by another one, and so on till we reach the last but one view which is refuted by Abhinavagupta himself before stating his own position. (1)

We will now first take up Bhaṭṭa Lollata (2)

Bhaṭṭa Lollata adds the term 'sthāyīn' in the sūtra to make the meaning clear. He explains the sūtra to mean that the relation of sthāyīn or the permanent mental state with vibhāvādīs, i.e. determinants, consequents, etc., causes rasa. Lollata accepts the normal happening in ordinary life. As in ordinary life the permanent mental states such as delight or rati and the like are caused due to some factors, and this delight which is caused is expressed through its own actions or effects and is nourished by some accompanying factors, in the same way it so happens in poetry also. Abhinava says

that this view of Lollata seems also to be the view of Dandin who says, 'kopo raudrātmatām gatah', or 'ratih' śṛṅgārātām gata', etc i.e. 'anger when heightened becomes the furious', or 'delight becomes love' etc Thus, for Lollata, as in normal life a particular feeling caused by certain factors, expressed through certain effects and enriched through ancillary factors reaches its own height, in the same way, in poetry or drama rasa is the product of this union. More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the mental state (cittavṛtti) that is the permanent mental state (sthayibhāva). In using the term consequents Bharata does not mean the consequents arising from the rasa (since these obviously cannot be considered as causes of the rasa) but only the consequents arising from the mental states. Even though the transitory mental states, in so far as they are mental movements, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent mental state, Bharata in this sutra means that the permanent mental state remains nevertheless in a state of latent disposition (vāsana). Rasa, therefore, according to Lollata is simply permanent mental state intensified (upacita) by the determinants, the consequents, etc. The permanent mental state by itself is in a dormant state anupacitaḥ.]

Thus according to Lollata, the śṛṅgārārasa, for example is the one between the original Rāma and Sītā. The actor, and we may add, the poet, by what Lollata calls 'anusandhāna' are able to present this rasa. Dr Pandey interprets this word 'anusandhāna' in the technical sense of 'yojana' current in the Śaiva Āgama(3) (Indian Aesthetics p 39-40 Ed. '59). With this interpretation of anusandhāna Dr Pandey puts a new view about Bhatta Lollata's theory. For him, rasa is concerned with the artist and is an object itself. According to Dr. Pandey, Bhatta Lollata does not have the spectator or the reader in his mind (Indian Aesthetics p 40-Ed '59 see foot-note no 3). But Mammata, Hemacandra and later writers and commentators take pratiti

also to be a part of the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and thus take cognisance of the spectator also in rasa experience. Dr Pandey, however, says that Mammata has amended the text of Abhinavagupta slightly by adding the word 'pratyamāno' (see p 40-ibid). But, if we however presume that Lollaṭa's view is not fully quoted by Abhinava, and also assume that Mammata, Hemacandra, etc. probably had the original text of Lollaṭa's commentary on the Nāṣā before them, it may not be necessary to regard the pratyamānatā as an amendment on the part of Mammata. Whatever it may be, the utpatti and the pratīti view of Lollaṭa has been traditionally accepted. So, Lollaṭa with his theory of utpatti-paripustī-pratīti, just transforms the fact of ordinary life to the realm of poetry. He may, therefore, be called in modern terminology, a realist (4).

Śrī Śaṅkuka

Śrī Śaṅkuka opposes this view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa on several grounds. His first argument pertains to the text of the sūtra itself. Śaṅkuka holds that if the sthāyins generated by the vibhāvas, suggested by the anubhāvas and nourished by vyabhicāriṇas become rasa, then Bharata should have first mentioned and defined the sthāyins. But this he has not done. On the contrary he first mentions and defines rasa in the sixth chapter of the Nāṣā, and then deals with the bhāvas in the seventh adhyāya. Moreover, if rasa is just the nourished or intensified (upacita) stage of the permanent mental state, it would be useless, after having given the cause of the generation of the sthāyibhāva, to give again, in a separate sūtra, the cause of rasa, which is merely an intensified sthāyīn. This would make the sūtra redundant (5).

Śaṅkuka next takes up another aspect of Lollaṭa's theory for refutation. Lollaṭa said that rasa is an intensified form of the sthāyibhāva. Śaṅkuka argues. If the different stages

of the permanent mental state were to be taken into consideration, such stages would be innumerable and therefore we would have to recognise infinite stages of rasa. This would contradict the text of Bharata which recognises the six varieties of hasya and the ten stages of śṛṅgāra. But his most important argument against Lollata's upacitivāda is that sentiments such as sorrow, anger, etc. are intense to start with and gradually they tend to be less and less. Thus the upacitivāda contradicts this fact of experience.

So, Sankuka interprets the sūtra thus—

tasmāt hetubhir vibhāvākhyaiḥ, kāryaiscānubhāvātmaḥ
 saha-carirupaisca vyabhīcaraiḥ prayatnārjitataya kṛtrimairapi
 tathānabhimānyamānairanukartīsthatvena līngabalataḥ pratiya
 mānāḥ sthāyī bhavo mukhyarāmadigatasphāyanukarāṇarupāḥ
 anukarānarupatvādeva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadyāto rasāḥ
 —(A bb p 272 Na Sa Vol I Ed 1956) (6)

We may analyse Śrī Sankuka's above interpretation as follows. The kāraṇa (cause), kārya (effect) and the saha-caris (accompanying mental states) of the real world become in poetry, drama, etc. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhīcaribhāva respectively. In his seventh adhyāya Bharata explains vibhāva as 'vijñānarthah' (p 346 ibid), i.e. that which brings about knowledge. Anubhāva is that which enables one to experience, i.e. the four fold abhinaya (p 367-ibid). The vyabhīcarinaḥ are the fleeting emotions (7) which accompany the main permanent mental state. These three are achieved by the artist through effort and therefore they are artificial. In actual life these are natural. But even though they are achieved by effect and are artificial, yet by the art of the imitator or the poet, they are not taken as such by the spectator or reader. It is of course the imitator (8) who exhibits these three. For the spectator they become the līnga i.e. the characteristic mark which enables him to apprehend inferentially the permanent mental state as being inherent in the imitator. The sthāyī bhāva here is understood in the form of imitation of the

permanent mental state of the original Rāma and the like. Such a perception of *sthāyibhāva* is called *rasa* for the only reason that it is in form of imitation (9). This theory of Saṅkuka is known to tradition as *anukṛti-anumitivāda*.

The *vibhāvas* are ascertained by the power of poetic speech. The significance of *anubhāva* is grasped through training. The *vyabhicārin*s are grasped through the artificial evocation of one's own experience. But the *sthāyin* cannot be ascertained even by poetic speech. The words such as *rati*, *hāsa*, etc., merely name these *sthāyins*. These words i.e. *rati*, *hāsa* etc. do not evoke in the mind the sentiments as would be done by the verbal representation i.e. *vācika abhinaya* (9). Verbal representation—*vācika abhinaya*—is not merely speech, but something artistically accomplished by it. What is obtained in the mind by *vācika abhinaya* i.e. known or grasped, is called 'avagamana'—communication by Śrī Saṅkuka. This power of *avagamana* or communication and evocation, is other than mere verbal function. It is something achieved by the actor's art. Precisely for this reason, Bharata does not mention the term *sthāyin*, not even in a different grammatical case (A bh p 275, *ibid*) It would serve no purpose.

Thus, the natural *sthāyin* is not *rasa*. So, concludes Saṅkuka, that the *rati* or delight imitated by the actor is *śṛṅgāra*, the sentiment of love. It is quite proper to say that *śṛṅgāra* is of the nature of imitated *rati* and is born of it. Here, a question would arise—how an unreal knowledge can achieve the purpose of the real knowledge? i.e. how the knowledge of the imitated feeling that is unreal, can give rise to the experience of a real feeling? In answer to this question, reference is made to *manipradīpaprabhānyāya*. (A bh p 275, *ibid*) (10)

Śrī Saṅkuka also raises the question as to the nature of this *rasa* experience. He has before him the following categories, valid knowledge, the invalid knowledge, doubt and

similarity. None of these holds good when one witnesses a play. What actually one sees on the stage is that the actor is happy. This is valid knowledge. But one does not see it in this way. The actor who is personifying Rāma is not Rāma. Thus what appears is false. But one does not see in it this way. Similarly, one does not doubt whether the actor is or is not Rāma. Nor one has the knowledge of the actor's similarity with Rāma. So, none of the logical modes of knowledge holds good of this experience and yet there is a real experience (*sphurannanubhavaḥ*). So, in what way this throbbing experience be understood? Here, Śrī Sankuka adds a new mode of cognition which he calls '*citraturaganyāya*' or the mode of perceiving the painted horse. Just as one reacts to a painted horse not in any one of the recognised logical categories, so does one in a drama, or a piece of poetry. In modern terminology, we would say this the creation of imagination. But the point to be noted here is that in the opinion of Sankuka, the experience of the creation of imagination is real in its own right even though, it may not fall under any recognised logical category. In other words, the reality of aesthetic experience is established by Śrī Sankuka.

Śrī Sankuka's interpretation of the *rasa-sūtra* may be put in the following way. [Bharata has intentionally omitted the mention of *sthāyin* in the *rasa-sūtra*. The mere mention of it would have served no purpose. *Rasa* is the imitation of *sthāyins* as portrayed in the art of the actor. The psychological process in the mind of the spectator who experiences *rasa* resembles the inferential mode. Then Śrī Sankuka raises the important question as to the nature of this *rasa* experience. It does not fall under any of the recognised logical categories and yet is it as real as anyone of these modes of cognition. To explain this, he introduces the '*citraturaganyāya*'. One reacts to the presentation on the stage as one reacts to the painted horse. Just as we call the painted horse to be a horse, in the same way the character of Rāma in poetry of

drama is called Rāma. Thus Śrī Śaṅkuka tries to explain poetic experience with the help of imitation and inference. The vibhāvādīs for him are not the *kāraṇahetus* but the *śāpakahetus* (11)

Lollata took both the experiences of day-to-day life and the world of poetry as belonging to the same plane. Śaṅkuka puts both of them on a different plane.]

Abhinavagupta gives the refutation of the views of Śrī Śaṅkuka through his teacher Bhaṭṭa Tota (12)

The first point that is taken up for refutation is the *anukṛti* or imitation part of Śaṅkuka's theory. When art is regarded as imitation, logically the question of its origin arises.

Bhaṭṭa Tota takes up the *peoposition-ratyānukarah śrāṅarah* for refutation. He puts forth four alternatives for whom *rasa* is imitation?—(i) It is for the spectator? Does the spectator apprehend *rasa* as imitation of something? Or, (ii) It is for the actor? Does the actor imitate somebody? or (iii) Is it merely the opinion of the critics and commentators? or (iv) has Bharatamuni said that *rasa* is an imitation?

Bhaṭṭa Tota bases his argument on the assumption that there must be something similar between the original and the imitation. He shows that there is absolutely no similarity between the mental state of *rati* and what one sees in the actor. These two are totally different. To show their extreme difference Bhaṭṭa Tota uses the philosophical arguments of what constitutes difference. These are, (i) *svarūpabheda* or the difference in nature, (ii) perception by different senses and (iii) difference of substrata. These are applied as below.

(i) The body of the actor, the costumes, his horripilation, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of them, etc. his frowns, his expressive glances, etc. are physical, *rati*, *krodha*, etc. are mental. Thus they differ in nature. (ii) The body of the actor, his costumes, etc. are seen by the physical sense of the eye, while *rati*, *krodha*, etc. are perceived

by the internal sense—*antahkarana*. Thus, these are perceived by different senses (iii) The substratum of the body, costume, etc. and the substratum of *rati*, *krodha*, etc. are different. Thus they differ in substrata also. Thus there is total difference between the original and its supposed imitation.

The purport of Bhatta Tota's argument seems to be this. What the imitator shows—his body, his costumes and his gestures, are physical. These cannot imitate *rati* or delight which is purely a mental state. So, it would be absurd to say that *srīgāra* is the imitation of *rati*.

In the above argument of Bhatta Tota, the body, costumes, etc. are taken as *srīgāra* and then the absurdity of these as imitation of the mental state of *rati* is shown. The protagonist of Śrī Śaṅkuka corrects this misunderstanding or misstatement. His contention is that it is the mental state of the actor made known by the above items as the imitation of *rati*, which is called *srīgāra*. To this, the answer of Bhatta Tota is that what is thus apprehended is the mental state of the actor, i.e. the *rati* of the actor, and it is not apprehended as an imitation.

Now, it is not his natural mental state that the actor represents by gestures etc., but that of the original persons. That is why the *vibhavadis* are called artificial (*kytrima*)—This is the next position which Bhatta Tota attacks. If these *vibhavadis* are understood as artificial by the spectator, how would they make the spectator comprehend it as *rati*? To this the answer would be that what the spectator comprehends is '*ratyanukāra*'. This is done through an inferential process. So Bhatta Tota now argues to show the absurdity of inferring the imitation of *rati*. One can infer *rati* from these causes. But one cannot infer something which is not the effect of these causes viz '*ratyanukāra*'. Similarly here it would not do. One cannot infer from mist which resembles smoke, a japa-flower which resembles fire.

Further, the theory of imitation (*anukāra*) cannot be supported on the observation of similitude. The actor who is not really angry appears to be so. This is in a way true. But in fact the actor appears similar to one who is angry by raising his eye-brows and the like. But this much similarity does not constitute imitation of the original. Even if for the sake of argument we take this to be *anukāra* or imitation, it goes against what the spectator perceives. Bhaṭṭa Tota says as such. He says that the impression of the spectator is not that of similarity. Such a preception would be without any emotion (*bhāvasūnya*-p. 275 *ibid*). While the spectator feels emotion when he sees the performance of the actor.

Next to this, Bhaṭṭa Tota tries to refute the opinion of Śrī Saṅkha that in the cognition of *rasa*, there is neither valid knowledge, nor invalid knowledge, etc. When the spectator perceives Rāma in the actor how can it be said that it is not valid knowledge? Similarly, after the show is over and one knows the actor in his proper person, one's previous knowledge that the actor was Rāma proves false. So it would be *viparyaya* i.e. invalid also.

Then, to say that through the power of poetry *vibhavadis* are ascertained, is absurd. No actor who speaks—*seyam mamaṅgesu* etc.—ever feels that *Sita* is his somebody. If it is meant for the spectators, it would be easier for them to connect it with the original *sthāyin*. Thus Tota refutes the view that *rasa*, for the spectator, is an imitation of *sthāyin*.

After this, he takes up the second alternative viz. imitation in the case of the actor or *nata*. No actor when he acts, does it with consciousness that, 'I am imitating Rāma or his mental state'. Even then, if *anukāra* or imitation is insisted upon, the following difficulties would arise. Here the most obvious argument is that whom does the actor imitate? The original Rāma can not serve as his model because

'anukarana' There is another meaning also of 'anukarna', and that is doing something after it has been done by somebody else (pasatkaranam) This would hold good in the case of everybody in life It is not something special for the actor or nāta Thus anukarana or imitation in any of the two senses, is not possible for the actor

The followers of imitation theory would not accept this interpretation of their view They would rather say that while depicting Rāma they are imitating the sorrow of some excellent person But here, the old difficulty would arise With what would they imitate the sorrow of that excellent character? The actor has not before him the mental state of sorrow of the excellent character If he imitates his sorrow by imitating the anubhāvas such as tears and the like, of the excellent person, then the old difficulty of 'vairākṣanya' or total difference between the physical anubhava and the mental state of sorrow would arise

If in answer to this, it is said that the actor imitates only the anubhāvas of the excellent character, then that excellent character will have to be particularised Without such particularisation, one cannot understand whose anubhāvas are imitated If to defend their position it is said that the actor imitates a person who weeps as he weeps, then the personality of the actor enters into it and then it will not be imitation but his own sthāyin

Having thus refuted the theory of anukārya-anukārtr bhāva (p. 275, *ibid*), Bhaṭṭa Tota has to explain anukāra in as much as nāṭya has been defined as bhāvanukīrtana (Naṭa I 107), and lokaṇvīṭānukarana-(I 112), by Bharata in the first adhyāya Abhinavagupta has discussed this point (p 35-37 *ibid*), quoting the authority of the Kāvya-kautuka of his Upadhyāya Bhaṭṭa Tota who interpreted anukīrtana as meaning 'anuvyavasāya' i.e. re-orientation Reference to this is made here also (p 276, *ibid*). What the actor does is explained in the following way. The

Bhatta Nāyaka says that the same objections would apply if we accept the theory that *rasa* is simply generated. Thus he makes short-shift of *utpattivāda*

He also briefly refers to the *abhivyativāda*. *Abhivyakti* means manifesting something which exists potentially. Here, the manifestation would naturally depend upon the means of manifestation. Now if we assume that *rasa* exists potentially and is later manifested by means of *vibhāvādis*, this would result in many degrees of *rasa*-manifestation. And this is surely not what happens in *rasa*-experience. This general argument can be applied both with reference to oneself and to someone else, as before. Thus Bhatta Nāyaka rejects *abhivyaktivāda* also (p 276, *ibid*)

Now before we consider the views of Bhatta Nāyaka we may refer to the brief presentation of *rasa* theory from the Sāṃkhya point of view, Sāṃkhyadṛṣṭi, p 276 (*ibid*). According to this view, the nature of *rasa* consists of happiness (*sukha*) and misery (*duḥkha*). We may say, this has reference to the *sattvaguna* and the *rajo-guna*. The aggregate of objects which have potentiality of creating happiness and misery is external. And, in this aggregate, the *vibhāvas* perform the role of *dātā* i.e. *upādāna*-or material substratum, while the *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārin*s are refining agents. The *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states caused by the appropriate aggregates are internal and have the nature of happiness and misery. Abhinava does not take the trouble to refute these views but simply says that those who say that such propositions of Bharata viz. as '*sthāyivibhāvan rasatvaṃ upaneṣyamah*' are to be taken metaphorically (*upacāra*), and not literally, knowingly contradict the text. Arguments of such people need not be taken seriously. This is rather laconic and we cannot clearly understand why the *sāṃkhya* views are not properly considered.

In the views of Bhatta Nāyaka, we have some terms which remind us of the *sāṃkhya* terminology and some *sāṃkhya*

theory also Whether he has something to do with the above sāmkhya views, we cannot say Let us now consider Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka's theory.

His explanation of rasa is given in the A bh. as below (p. 278, *ibid*) "bhāṭṭanāyakaśvāha raso na pratsyate, notpadyate, nābhivyaajyate svagataivena hi pratītau karuṇe duḥkṛitvam syāt, na ca sā pratītiḥ yuktā sitāderavibhāvāt, svakāntāsmṛtya-samvedanāt, devatādaḥ sādharanīkarnayogyatvāt, samudrollaṅghaṇāder asādharanyat na ca tadvato rāmasya smṛtiḥ rūpala-bdhatvāt tasmāt kāvyē doṣābhāvagunālamkāramayatvalalakṣa-nena, nātye caturvidhābhīnāyarupenā nīvidanīyamohasa-mkatatānīvaranākārinā vibhavadisādharanīkarnātmanābhīdhātō dvītyenāṁsena bhāvakatvavyāpārena bhāvyaṁāno rasōnu-bhava-smṛtyādivilakṣanena rajastamōnuvedhavaicitryabalād dṛṣṭivistaravikasātmajā sattivodre kaprakāśānanda māyanījasa-mvidvisrāntilakṣanena parabrāhmaṣvādasavidhena bhogena param bhujyāta iti etc. (16)

In the sāmkhya view the buddhi or the citta consists of three qualities *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* This *tamas* in relation to buddhi is also called *moha* or stupour As long as this stupour predominates, one is unable to perceive fineness, nor one can have a clear understanding of anything The function of art is to narrow down or remove the narrowness caused by this quality of *tamas* A poem does this by its characteristic viz. the absence of defects (*doṣa*) and the presence of *guṇa* and *alākāra* (i.e. excellence and figures of speech) Drama does this by its four fold *abhinaya* i.e. representation When this thick veil on the mind is thus removed, the power of revelation *bhāvakatva* which is the next step after the first denotative power *abhidhā* of the word, operates This operation consists of generalising the *vibhāvas* of the poem or the drama It is this power which makes one aware of *rasa* The *rasa* is enjoyed by what is technically known as *bhoga*—enjoyment This 'bhoga' is technically understood in the Sāmkhya philosophy as arising out of the Union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, in buddhi, the finest

evolute of prakṛti, the former as being reflected in the latter. Here, ॥ would mean that the puruṣa reflected in buddhi enjoys the rasa-buddhi. This bhoga is regarded as different from direct experience (anubhava), memory (smṛti), etc. On account of the persistence of rajas and tamas in buddhi, it assumes variety. This variety gives it the characteristic of dr̥ṣṭi, vistara and vikāsa (i.e. fluidity dilatation, and expansion respectively). This bhoga reposes (vīṣṇanti) in one's own sāmvit-consciousness, which becomes pervaded by enlightenment-prakāśa and joy-i.e. ānanda on account of the predominance of sattva. On this account it becomes like the enjoyment or taste of parabrahma.

The purpose of Bhaṭṭa Nayaka seems to be this—Words in poetry do not rest with merely giving the denotation. They have the capacity to give a generalised sense i.e. they generalise the vibhavadis. This means that rasa which is the resultant of vibhavadis is also grasped the by generalised way. To put it in another way, the sthāyibhavas aroused with reference to an imaginary particular person, time, place, etc., become generalised by the generalisation of the vibhavas so that their limitation disappears and so the percipient can become aware of them as a part of his own consciousness. Because the consciousness is fully awakened by the power of poetic speech rasa is enjoyed. Thus one may say that the function of the poetic speech reaches the last stage of bhoga also.

We will see later on that many of these ideas are appropriated in Abhinava's philosophy of rasa also. But for the present, we are concerned with what Abhinava refutes in Bhaṭṭa Nayaka's theory. His main objection is against introducing the new term of bhoga in rasa philosophy as against pratīti or apprehension and such other forms of knowledge. If Bhaṭṭa Nayaka means rasana i.e. tasting by bhoga, it is also a form of knowledge—pratīti. Because of its meaning being different, a separate name may be given to it, as in case of dr̥ṣana or perception, anumati or inference, śruti or

verbal knowledge, upamiti or knowledge through similitude, and pratibhāna or intuition etc, etc

Abhinavagupta's second objection is against the rejection of both utpatti and abhivyakti with reference to rasa. It is said that rasa, which is a fact of experience, is not caused or brought into being, then it must be existing for ever. And, if its manifestation is also rejected, then it will have to be accepted that rasa does not exist for there is no third alternative. A thing which is not apprehended in any way, cannot be the subject of discourse, i.e., it cannot be asserted that rasa exists.

The third point of attack is the recognition of the three mental states of druti fluidity, vistara or dilatation and vikāsa or expansion. Abhinava holds that if it is asserted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka that by 'pratiti' or apprehension is meant the power of generating enjoyment and that it consists of the nature of druti i.e., fluidity, vistara i.e. dilatation, etc we accept it. But then, why only three states as mentioned above? There will be as many pratitis or apprehensions of the nature of tasting as there are rasas. And there will be all generating bhoga. In fact there will be infinite permutations and combinations of the three guṇas viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, on the principal of predominance and subordination, then why accept only three?

Abhinavagupta would accept 'bhāvanā', if it is understood in the following sense, viz. to make anything the subject-matter of cognition in the form of tasting, consisting of chewing caused by vibhāvādis.

Abhinava accepts the opinion of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka expressed in the verse.

bhāvasaṃpyojanāvyaṅgyaparasaṃvittigocarah |
rasvādanātmānubhavo rasah kāvyārtha ucyate ||

because it makes the meaning of a poem rasa, which is manifested by vibhāvādis

Here ends the refutation of the views of Bhatta Lollata, Śrī Saṅkuka and Bhatta Nāyaka in *Abhidavabhāratī*. In it, the theory of Lollata, that *rasa* is caused by the *vibhavadis* and that it is only an intensified state of *sthāyin* has been refuted through the mouth of Śrī Saṅkuka. Śrī Saṅkuka's view that *rasa* is an imitation of *sthāyin* is rejected through Bhatta Tota. His inference theory is ridiculed by comparing it with the type of pseudo-inference in which one might infer from mist resembling smoke, a red japa flower resembling fire. His analogy of *citraturaga* is also discarded. The main point of objection in Bhatta Nāyaka's theory is his bringing in *bhoga*, a category different from all kinds of *pratyis* or apprehensions.

All these thinkers, however, have something important to contribute to the development of the theory of *rasa*. The relation of the poet's world with reality enables one to grasp the inherent emotion in the person's event and things of the world. This may be said to be Lollata's contribution. The semblance of the poet's world with reality and the inferential process psychologically involved in the deducing of emotions from the imitated world are elements in aesthetic perception, emphasised by Śrī Saṅkuka. Bhatta Nāyaka contributes the important element of '*sādharaṇīkarana*' which is an inevitable precondition in all aesthetic experience. His three forms of *rasa-pratyis* viz. *druti*, *vistara*, etc. are important to understand the states of mind behind specific *rasa*-experience. We shall see that Abhinavagupta has drawn upon some of these ideas in the formation of his *rasa* theory.

RASA EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA (1015-A D. De, 950-60 A D -1015 A D. K C. Pandey; *Abb* p. 8, 980-1030 A D -Kane P. 43)

In this chapter, we will now try to understand and discuss Abhinavagupta's ideas which go to form his theory of *rasa*. The first thing that he asserts is *kāvyaṛtho rasah*

(p 278. A bh - Nā S'a second Ed GOS), and quotes as his authority *kāvyaārthan bhāvayanti* (Nā S'a VII p 342 *ibid*) In the A bh on this in *adhyāya* seven, it is explained that *artha* here does not mean the direct sense (*na tvārthasabdō'bhīdhe-yavāci*), but what is principally sought after And what is principally sought after is *rasa*

Rasa as Kāvyaārtha

He says that in a poem the meaning of a word and that of a sentence ultimately ends in *rasas*. Therefore, on account of their uncommonness and predominance the meaning of poem is *rasas-kāvyaārthah rasah* (p 343, *ibid*) (17) This emphasis on *rasa* as the meaning of a poem is to keep out such terms as *bhoga* and the like

Sādhāranīkarana

[Bhaṭṭa Nayaka had shown that the *sādhāranīkaranavya-pāra* i.e. the process of generalising or universalising is an important function of poetic speech. Abhinava finds an analogy for this process in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. He gives two illustrations from *śruti* to show this *rātrīmāsata*, they lay by night, and *'tāmagṇau prādāt* —he gave it to fire.]

In these two sentences, the meaning is limited by person, number and tense. Now when someone with a purpose and qualifications to understand and interested in doing something related to this hears these sentences, he derives another meaning which removes the limitations of person, number and tense and has the general idea of sitting by night or offering something to the fire. And because he is interested in doing some such thing, he will understand the meaning such as 'I will sit for the night', 'I will sacrifice this for the fire' etc. Now this process consisting in transference of meaning is called by different *darsanas* by different names such as *pratibha* or intuition, *bhāvān* or propulsion, *vidhi* or command, *niyoga*

or order etc. The same sort of transference of meaning takes place in a qualified person from the poetic speech. This is the basis of *sādhāraṇīkarana*.] The idea seems to be that in a person with a pragmatic outlook, hearing, and we may add, seeing something in which he is interested, becomes generalised i.e. the original limitations of time, person, etc. are eliminated. This may be applied to a person who is interested in poetry, and has the capacity to understand and appreciate poetry. When such a person reads a poem, the person, the number and the tense etc. in the poetic speech become, so to say, eliminated for him, after the first stage of understanding it in a direct way is over. The object presents itself to a *sahṛdaya* in unlimited form.

The Sahṛdaya

[This means that the *sādhāraṇīkarana* *vyāpāra* is possible for a *sahṛdaya* alone. So, the first prerequisite to appreciate poetry or to enjoy the joy of aesthetic feeling is *sahṛdayatā*. Consequently, it is but natural that Abhinava should lay so much emphasis on *sahṛdaya*. He defines the *adbhikārin* or the qualified person as follows: *adbhikāri catra vimalapratibhāns'g-līḥṛdayaḥ* (A bh p 280 *ibid*) i.e. the qualified person here, is one whose heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition. All do not have this intrinsic capacity to taste a poem. Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart. They are those who have the concord of heart (*sahṛdaya*, *hṛdayasampvādabdhak*).] He defines the *sahṛdaya* in the *Locana* as follows: *yesāṃ kāvyānusīlanābhyāsavasat viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanāyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasampvā-dabhājah sahṛdayaḥ, yathoktam* (Nā Śā VII 10)–

yōrtho hṛdayasampvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ |
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śukam kāsthamivāgninā ||

The nature of Rasa

[Abhinava starts his discussion on *rasa* by describing how the process of *sādhāraṇīkarana* takes place and how *rasa*–

experience arises in a *sabrdaya* by taking three illustrations from Kalidāsa,—one from *Śaṅkuntala*—viz. *grivābhaṅgābhīramam muhuh* etc. (I.7) and the other two from *Kumāra Sam.* viz. *umāpi*, etc. (III. 62), and *harastu kiñcit ...* etc. III 67.

The first is an illustration of *bhayanaka rasa*, and the other two of *śṅgāra*. This is how the process takes place. First, one becomes aware of the usual sense of the sentence viz. *grivābhaṅgābhīramam* etc. After this, another apprehension takes place. This is of the nature of mental visualisation. In this second stage of mental visualisation, the tense, person, etc. become eliminated. The young-one of the deer which is visualised in this apprehension loses its particularity and therefore, the idea that some particular deer is frightened becomes unreal. Consequently, fear as such, unlimited, freed from time and space, appears, so to say, before mind. Thus far, we may add, that the poetic speech is in the analogy of the illustrations quoted before. But from here it goes a step further. The fear, untouched by time and space, is a fear which does not frighten the first person of observer (*bhūtoham*), nor does it refer to a third person, nor has it a reference to an enemy, friend or a neutral person. This means that the fear has reference to no person as such. And because no one is involved, there is neither the sense of unhappiness nor happiness, and consequently, there is no reaction to avoid or take it (*hānopādāna*). These latter, as we shall see, are the *vighnas* or obstacles which come in the way of aesthetic experience. So, this experience is different from experiences in which these reactions take place in ordinary life. Therefore, here, the sentiment of fear is grasped by an apprehension, free from such obstacles. Consequently, as it were, this sentiment of fear itself enters the heart (*sukṣādiva*) and revolves before our eyes. This is *bhayanaka rasa*. We may add that the same procedure will apply to the experience of *śṅgāra* from the other two illustrations.

In such an experience of *rasa*, one's own self is not very much suppressed, nor it is allowed particularly to emerge. This

holds good about any other person, who witnesses the soka, and we may add, reads a poem. Therefore, the cognition of *sādhāranya* or the generality is not limited to any person, It is extended (*vitata*) like the cognition of *vyapti* i.e. universal pervasion, acquired by competent person, from the relation of smoke and fire, or like the knowledge of the relation between trembling and fear.

After thus describing the process of generalisation and pointing to the universally cognisable nature of this generality, Abhinava tells us that it is the assemblage of actor and such other things that help the process of visualisation. In this assemblage, the generality becomes very much nourished, because the limiting factor of time, space, knower, etc. and those given by the poem totally disappear on account of mutual elimination. Therefore, all the competent persons in an audience are capable of apprehending it in one compactness (*ekaghanatā*), and this helps in the nourishment of *rasa*. This happens because there is concord of *vasanā* i.e. latent dispositions amongst persons whose minds are full of varied *vasanās* i.e. innate dispositions (p. 279 *ibid*). The *avighnāsamvit* or unimpeded consciousness, brought about in this way is *camatkāra*. These are the technical terms of the *pratyabhijñā* philosophy, which we shall try to understand later.

It may be regarded as cognitive determination (*adhyavasāya*) or the mental power of putting ideas together and forming whole,—this latter may be translated as 'imagination' (*samkalpa*). This visualisation may be regarded as remembrance (*smṛti*) also but it is not to be taken in the sense in which the dialecticians take it. The sense is similar to '*accetasā smarati nūnamabodhapūrvam*' etc. (*Abhi. Sā. V. 2*). This memory is not dependent on any previous experience. So, whatever term one might apply, this is apprehension (*prāpti*) of the nature of testing in which *rati* or delight, particularly the erotic delight as such, appears. This apprehension

of delight is not conditioned by any other particularity. For this reason, it is not the experience of common place delight (*laukikā ratiḥ*). But for that, it is not false (*mithyā*); nor it is indescribable (*anirvācya*). It is also not similar to the common place apprehension of delight (*laukika tulya*), nor is it of the nature of superimposition of the popular experience (*tadgropādītulya*). However, from another point of view, this apprehension of *rati* or delight as such, may be regarded as a state of intensification of *sthayibhāva* or the permanent mental state (*upacayavasthā'stu*) (18), because there is no restriction of time, space and person. It may be regarded as imitation (*anukāra*), because it is done following the original state of mind. And, if we follow the *viśānavāda* in which all percepts are mental, we may regard this experience as a collection of mental elements, which are of course the *vibhāvādī*. Here we see how Abhinava interprets and appropriates the theories of former *ācāryas*. Taken as one may, from all points of view, it is the mental state (*bhāva*) which, grasped by the apprehension from which all obstacles have been eliminated, and of the nature of tasting is *rasa*. (P. 280 *ibid*) Such a consciousness, *saṁvitti*, freed from obstacles, is called among people as *camatkāra*, *nirveśa* (immersion), *rasana* (tasting), *āsvādana* (sampling), *bhoga* (enjoyment), *saṁāpatti* (accomplishment), *laya* (lysis), *visrānti* (rest), etc (19) Abhinava says *loke sakalaviḡhavinirmukṭā saṁvittireva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanābhogasamāpattilayavistrāntyādiabdhairabhidhyate*. (*ibid* P. 280)

We might say, the above in a way gives a complete view of Abhinava's theory of *rasa*. In this the principle of *sādhārāṇīkārṇa* or generalisation is taken from *Bhaua Nyāyaka* as far as we know though, of course, Abhinava tries to see its root in the *Pūrvaṁmīmāṃsa*. Abhinava's own contribution may be said to lie in his concept of *rasa* as an entity grasped by *nirviḡhāra saṁvitti* or unimpeded consciousness. Naturally therefore, he devotes good space to the discussion of these

This discussion, over and above giving us the knowledge of the mental stuff which is to be tasted as *rasa*, has another significance. The *sthayins* or the permanent mental states being *vāsanās* or latent dispositions are to be found in all beings. For this reason, when an aesthete or *sahṛdaya* witnesses a play or reads a poem, he finds his own mental disposition coming into his consciousness. As Abhinava says later on, this is the reason why an aesthete even though he is not concerned in a worldly sense with what he reads and witnesses, finds himself a part of the total experience (p. 285 *ibid* *yasyām svātmaṅ'pi tadvāsanāvattvādanupravistah*)

The Vighnas

Abhinava says, — (*tatbāhi-laukikenānumānena samskṛtāḥ pramadgḍinā (dina) tāsthyena pratipadyate. api tu hrdaya-sampvādātmakāsahṛdayatvabalatpūrnibhaviyadrasāsvādānkuribhāvena-mṛtyādisopānamanāsubyaiva taumayibhāvocitacārṇā-prānatayā na ca 'ā carvanā prāṇ māṇōtarād yendhunāsmṛtiḥ syāt na cātra laukikapratyaksādi-pramānavyāpārah. kṛtvā-laukikavibhavadisampyogabalopanataiveyam carvanā s ca pratyaksānumānagamopamagḍilaukikapramānajanitaratyadyavabodhataḥ tathā yogipratyaksajanitataisthaparasampvittijānātsakajavaiṣayikoparāgasunya suddhaparayogigatasvātmaṅgandakaghaṅgubhavacca viśiṣyate etcāṁ yathāyogamarjanādivighnāntarodayattisthyena sphuṭatvaviṣayāvesavaivasyakṛta saundaryavirabāt atra || svātmaikagatatvanīyamāsambhavat (na viśayā-vesavaivasyam) svānupravesātparagatatvanīyamābhāvāt (na tāsthyāsphutatvam) tadvibhāvādisādhārāṇyavasasamprabuddhōcitanijaratyādivāsanāvesavasācca na vighnāntarādinaṁ sambhava ityavocāma bahusah (Abh. Vol. I p. 284-285)*

We might say in a general way, that those things which come in the way of the cognitive chewing of the permanent and transitory mental states are the *vighnas* or obstacles. Abhinava mentions seven such obstacles (21)

The first is called *sambhavanāvīraharūpa pratīpattāvayogyatā* the second, *svagataparagatatvanīyamena desakālādivistsāvesah*, the third, *nījasukhādivivasābhāvaḥ*, the fourth, *pratītyupāyavat-kalyaṇaḥ*, the fifth, *sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ*, the sixth, *apradhanatā*, and the seventh, *samśaya-yogaḥ*

The first may be called improbability. When the matter of a poem or a drama or a piece of art appears improbable, one's mind cannot rest on it and consequently, we may add, one is unable to reach the state of rasa-experience. For this reason, the subject matter of a poem or a drama must appear as probable. The second may be called the intrusion of the space-time particularly. This would arise when a reader or a spectator takes the subject-matter as either referring to himself or to someone else. Such personal factors would bring in the obstruction of the particularity of space and time. This, we may add, results in obstructing *sādhāranīkaraṇa* or generalisation. The third may be called helplessness, due to arising of personal considerations of happiness and the like. This also would be due to the bringing in of the element of personality. This would cloud the *samvit*-or consciousness and make the grasping of *sādhāranīkaraṇa* or generalisation impossible. The fourth may be called the lack of means of apprehension. A work of art which is defective in its presentation cannot create apprehension of its meaning in the mind of the reader and the spectator. We may explain this as below. A poem, which does not use correct language, would not be properly understood or a singer who does not indicate the *vādī* and *samvādī* etc would not be properly understood. The fifth may be called lack of clarity (*sphuṭatva*). A poem may use correct language and yet it would lack clarity. In a poem or drama, or a work of art, one expects one's apprehension to be like visualisation (*parītyakṣocitapratīyayasakāṅkṣatva*). Abhinava quoted the authority of Nyāyabhāṣya and says that all cognition has for its end direct perception or visualisation. This applies to the aesthetic cognition also. Abhinava says that, this is why *abhinaya* or

representation and the like, are required for a play. In short, each art has its own technique of making its contents as if visualised. The sixth obstacle may be called the lack of emphasis on the principal element. In the *rasanispatti*, for the experience of *rasa*, these agents viz. *vibhāvādis* are mentioned. But none of these by themselves, can be the principal object of delineation. The *uddāna vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are insentient and therefore, they cannot be principal. The *vyabhiçārins* or the transitory mental states, even though of the nature of consciousness, are always dependent. So, they also cannot be principal. For these reasons, *sthāyins* alone can be the principal. In a poem or a drama, in which the delineation lacks this quality of making the *sthāyins* or permanent mental states a principal matter of delineation, would create an obstacle in the experience of *rasa*. We have seen before, why the *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states are the universal dispositions of living creatures and why the *vyabhiçārins* are only the transitory mental states. Even amongst the *sthāyins*, Abhinava would choose four, viz. *rati* or delight, *krodha* or anger, *utsāha* or heroism and *nirveda*, born out of philosophical knowledge. Even these would be subservient to one another. According to the variety of the drama one of these would be principal and the rest subservient.

We may here point out a very important element in Abhinava's theory of art. *Rasa* being the final aim of a poem or any other piece of art, one cannot have a proper aesthetic experience if the principal *rasa* is not brought into relief by making others subservient. Therefore, this is a *vighna*. The seventh may be called the obstacle of doubt.

A poet who does not provide a proper combination of *vibhāvādis* would create doubt into the mind of the reader as to which *rasa* is conveyed. The *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhiçārins* or the determinants, consequents and the transitory states respectively, by themselves cannot lead to a

to remove these obstacles—*tatra vighnāpasgrakāḥ vibhāvaprabhr̥tayah* (p. 280. *ibid*) This may be interpreted in a simple way. A poem, or a drama, or any other work of art, consists of the *vibhāvadis*. So, if the creation of a poem or a play or any other art is done in a proper way, these obstacles would not arise and it would lead to the aesthetic experience.

Abhinava's interpretation of *rasa-sūtra*

Abhinava says : (*tatra lokvyavahāre kāryakāranasahacaratmakalīṅgadersanesthāyīyatmaparacittavyūṭṭyanumāṅgabhyāsapāṭayādadhunā tatrevidyānakataksavikṣānadibhirlaukikīm karanatvādibhuvamatīkrāntairvibhāvanubhāvasamuprajakatvamātrapranāh, ata evālaukākavibhāvādivyapades'abhaḡbhūh pratyakāranādīrupasamśkaropajīvanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādīnāmādheya-vyapadesyairbhāvādhyāyepī vaksyamānasvarūpabhedairguna-pradhānatatparyeṇa samajīkadhyī samīyagyogam sambandhamāikāgrjamaśāditavadbhirlaukikanīrvighnasamvedangīmākacārvanāgocarataṁ nīto'stibhāscārvyamānataikāśāro na tu siddhasvabhāvah tatkalīka eva na tu cārvanāturīktakalāvalambī sthāyīvilā (yū)ksana eva rasah (A bh Vol I, p. 284)*

This may be elaborated as below

[After all this preliminary discussion, Abhinava comes to the interpretation of the *rasa-sūtra*. First he explains the particular significance of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*. One may say, these are cognitive elements. In the common place experience, one is able to infer a permanent mental state of any other person by the observation of the concomitant relation between the permanent mental states and the collocation of its cause, effect and accessories. The quickness of inference which comes out of practice goes beyond the necessity of the causal stage (*atīkrānta*), in enabling to perceive the *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states, by the presentation of a garden or the casting of glances and the like, in poetry or drama. These cognitive processes are no longer causative elements of the *sthāyins* or the permanent mental states. For

this reason, the *kāraṇa* (cause), the *kārya* (effect) and *sahakāri* (the accessory), are termed as *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāris* respectively. These three, in order of principal and subordinate, have to reach a proper union (*samyag yoga*), or relation (*sambandha*), or one-pointedness (*aikāgya*), in the mind of the audience. This is, what is called, "*vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisamyoga*" : From such a *samyoga* of these, comes a meaning which is the subject of the cognitive chewing (*samavedana*), from which the obstacles have been removed and which makes this cognitive-chewing an extra ordinary experience. The meaning thus grasped is *rasa*. It is of the essence of cognitive chewing, and not something whose existence has been accomplished before (*siddhasvabhāva*). It is immediate (*tatkālika* *eva*), and not something which exists in time other than the cognitive chewing. Thus *rasa* is something different from natural *sthāyin* or the permanent mental state.]

Srī Saṅkuka said that because *rasa* is the imitation of *sthāyins* or the permanent mental state, the word *sthāyin* was not mentioned in the *sūtra*. But it is the *sthāyin* or the permanent mental state, known by the *vibhāvas*, which is *rasa*, because it is so tasted. To this, Abhinava replies that in that case even such a popular experience would be *rasa*, because when one tastes a mental state which really does not exist in the actor, why one should not taste it when it is actually there. Therefore, inferential cognition of *sthāyin* or permanent mental state is not *rasa*. If *sthāyin* were mentioned in the *sūtra* it is inferred from the *vibhāvas* such a contingency would arise. For this reason the word *sthāyin* is not mentioned in the *sūtra*. However, we find such references in the *Nāṭya* as '*sthāyi rasibhūtaḥ*,' etc. Abhinava would say that there is a propriety in this, because the '*sthāyi*' material which was known in the world by the causes etc., is now useful for cognitive chewing by recourse to *vibhāvas*.

Abhinava also objects to the inference theory by saying that there would be no taste (*rasa*) in the inference of

common place mental states. Therefore, the taste of rasa, whose nature is that of extraordinary *camatkāra* is different from common place cognitions like memory and inference.

Rasa Experience by the Aesthete

After thus explaining the *rasasūtra* in an abstract way, Abhinava describes how an aesthete experiences rasa. His mind is cultivated in the process of common place (*laukika*) inference. This means that a mental state would immediately arise in his mind with its corresponding affection. So, he does not, therefore, perceive a handsome young lady in a poem or on the stage with indifference (*anasthyena*), but he does it with the sprouting of the taste of rasa which is going to be fuller later on. He is able to do this by the force of his *sahdayatva* which is of the nature of concord of the heart (*hrdayasamvāda*). He has this experience, without climbing (22) the steps of inference, memory, and the like, because the essence of such an experience is cognitive chewing and this cognitive chewing corresponds to the sense of identification with what is perceived (P 284, *ibid*). What is meant is that the spectator's mind becomes identified with what he perceives and this gives rise to the appropriate *carvanā* or cognitive chewing.

In Abhinavagupta's theory, this *carvanā* or cognitive chewing is a condition precedent to rasa experience, and because it is of the nature of cognition, he has to distinguish this *carvanā* or cognitive chewing from other forms of cognition.

The epistemological nature of rasa-experience

This *carvanā* or cognitive chewing cannot be of the nature of remembrance, because it was not known before through some other *pramānas* or means of knowledge. It cannot be identified with the other *laukika* or common place means of knowledge such as sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) and the like. This *carvanā* is brought about by the force of collocation of

extra-ordinary vibhāvas or determinants and the like. Therefore, this carvanā is to be distinguished from the knowledge of rati or delight and the like, born from ordinary worldly pramānas or means of knowledge like direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), scriptural authority (āgama), analogy (upamāna) etc. It is also to be distinguished from the indifferent consciousness generated by the extra-sensory perception of a yogin, and also from the experience of the uniform compact joy of the ātman of the higher yogin, because it is void of the colouring of the sense object.

The reason of this distinction in each case is given thus. In the case of the knowledge of rati or delight, and the like acquired through worldly means of knowledge, there is always the contingency of personally acquiring or abandoning the thing (hānopādāna). And this is an obstacle in rasa experience. In the case of an ordinary yogin, on account of indifference (tīkṣṭhya), there is haziness of experience, while in carvanā or cognitive chewing, there is clear visualisation (asphuṭatvena). In the experience of the higher yogin, there is lack of beauty (saundaryaviraha), because all the colouring of the sense objects is absent. In the case of cognitive chewing or carvanā, there is no vaivasya or helplessness before the objects of sense, because the cognition is not necessarily taken in relation to one self. There is no indifference because in a way, one's self is there in the experience, and there is no necessary reference to somebody else. And therefore, there is no consequent jealousy. In carvanā or cognitive chewing there is vāsana or latent disposition of one's own rati or delight and the like, awakened by the force of the generalised determinants and the like. So, there is no rise of obstacles in rasa-experience.

For this reason, the vibhāvādīs or the determinants and the like, are not the efficient causes of rasa, because in that case, even when they are not there, there will be the existence of rasa, just as a jar might exist even though the potter and the like do not exist. They are not also the causes

of cognition, and therefore, do not come under the category of means of knowledge i.e. *pramāṇas*. The *pramāṇas* or the means of knowledge enlighten only what exists previously. But *rasa* does not exist previous to the *vibhāvādīs* and therefore, is not a *prameya* i.e. something to be known. Naturally then, the question arises,—what are these *vibhāvādīs*? This usage of the *vibhāvādīs* is useful for the understanding of *carvanā*—the cognitive chewing—, and for this very reason, it is an unusual usage—*alaukika vyavahāra*. If it is asked, “where do you find such a thing at any other place in the world?”, we may say that it is a tribute to our proving that it is extraordinary as far as the worldly matters go. But if an analogous example is required, we would say that we do not find the taste of a drink in its ingredients taken separately.

Here, we may point out that when the *rasa* experience is called something other than *laukika* i.e. common place in the world, it is here opposed to the experience in poetry, drama, in short, in art. *Abhinava* has been trying all along that aesthetic experience cannot be compared or evaluated with the other experiences of worldly matter.

But when *rasa* is lifted out of the usual categories of knowledge, logic would say that it is an unknowable (*aprameya*) entity. *Abhinava* would accept this position, because for him the very life of *rasa* lies in its *rasayata* i.e. in its being tasted and this experience is not of the nature of *prameya* (i.e. a knowable entity) and the like. This would contradict the thesis of the *sūtra* which says that *rasa* is a ‘*nīṣpatti*’, which is neither generation nor knowledge. Here, *Abhinava* makes a fine distinction. The reference of ‘*nīṣpatti*’ in the *sūtra* is not to *rasa* as such but to ‘*rasanā*’ or the process of cognitive chewing or tasting whose object is *rasa*. In this way, the life of *rasa* is solely dependent upon *rasanā*. And therefore, on account of the ‘*nīṣpatti*’ of *rasanā* or cognitive chewing, *rasa* may also be called as caused. This *rasanā* or cognitive chewing is neither due to the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*—

vyāpāra), nor to causal process (kāraṇa vyāpāra) But then, this does not make it a false experience (apramāṇikā), because it is proved by its very consciousness (svasaṃvedana-siddhatvāt) Therefore, rasa-experience is sui generis

Abhinava, after having distinguished rasana or cognitive chewing from other forms of cognition, does not deny to it knowableness as such In fact he says that rasana is of the nature of knowledge (bodha) It is only different from other forms of knowledge usually recognised The difference lies in its means, viz. the vibhavadis, being different from other means of knowledge in common practice (laukika-vailaksanyāt)

So, the purport of the sūtra, according to Abhinava is that rasa is an extra-ordinary entity which is the object of rasana or cognitive chewing, and that this rasana is born of the collocation of vibhavadis

Abhinava summarises (P 285 *ibid*) this lengthy discussion thus — The make-up of the actor hides the identity of the actor We also do not think that he is Rāma, even though that thought is forcibly brought before us by the poem The reason for this is the intense previous impressions which do not allow us to think of him to be Rāma The result of this state of mind is that the spectator gives up the time and the space both of the actor and of Rāma We see on the stage horripilation and the like These make us cognise rati or delight as such But this cognition is freed from the restraint of time and space. In this cognition, one's self also enters because one possesses the latent dispositions (vāsana) of rati or delight, and the like. And so, one's cognition of rasa is not of an indifferent person But one does not cognise rati or delight as an effect of a determinate cause-niyata-kāraṇatayā—for oneself Therefore, there is no possibility of one's becoming attached (abhisvāṅga) or making an effort to obtain One does not cognise rati or delight as of somebody else benefiting from it as a result of definite cause And so, one does

not feel any pain or enmity etc (duḥkhadvesādyudaya) So, the generalised rati or delight, when it is cognised in one movement of consciousness or its chain (saṃtānavṛtti) is *srñegra* Abhinava again repeats that the idea of generality is due to vibhavadis. We may say this is Abhinava's attempt to explain the participation of one's self in an aesthetic experience.

All rasas-of the nature of joy

An important point in Abhinava's theory remains to be discussed. [He accepts the theory of 'ānandarūpata sarva rasānām (p. 282 *ibid*). This point he has discussed while discussing the sixth vighna or obstacle. All the sthayins or permanent mental states by themselves in worldly experience are not of the nature of happiness. In rasa-experience, they give joy because they become the matter of cognitive chewing in one's own consciousness freed from obstacles. Such a consciousness is of the nature of one uniform compact light and its essence is joy or *ananda*. Therefore, even sorrow or anger and the like when they become the part of such a consciousness give joy. The theory that nirvighna *samvit* as such is accompanied by joy or has joy as its constituent is a tenet of the *pratyabhijñā* school.]

Different philosophical schools represented by different acaryas

The fact of *rasa* is particularly accepted by almost all the writers on Sanskrit poetics. Here its development has taken a psychological and epistemological direction. The explanation given in the *Nāṭya* of the *rasasūtra* was enough for the actor and his director, the *natyācārya*.

When however the interpretation of the *rasasūtra* was taken up by the pundits well versed in the *sāstras* it became more and more sophisticated.

We have seen above that in the interpretation of *rasa* doctrine there is an attempt to explain the psychological

mīmāṃsaka It is however doubtful, whether we can, on this evidence, take him to be a **mīmāṃsaka** It is well-known that the **mīmāṃsā** rules of interpretation are used by the followers of different schools

In the **utpattivāda** and the **pratitivāda** of **Lollata**, if both **utpatti** and **prattiti** refer to the spectator as **Mammata** and others have assumed, we can find in it the **mīmāṃsā** view of **svataḥpramāṇyavāda**, wherein the occurrence of knowledge is accompanied by its varacity That is, the occurrence of the knowledge of **Rama** is accompanied by the knowledge that this is **Rama**

Dr Pandey and **Gnoli** have shown that **Lollata** commented upon the **Spanda Kārikā**, and therefore was presumably a follower of the **Kashmir Saivism** According to **Dr Pandey**, **Lollata** uses the term **anusandhiguna** in the **Saiva** sense of **yojana** In fact, one reference in the **Abh** which says that **parispanda** is not the only **vyāpāra** of **ātman**, according to **Lollata**, suggests that it is at least one **vyāpāra** of **ātman** This would make him the follower of the **pratyabhijñā** school of **Kashmir Saivism**

In the presentation of **Sankuka's** views in the **Abh**, we find him emphasizing the imitation theory of **rasa** and assuming a sort of inferential process in its cognition, **Dr Pandey** thinks that he adopts the technique of **prācya nyāya** (P 50 **Indian Aesthetics**) Is this however, sufficient to call him a **Naiyāyika**? There is nothing in the **Nyāya** philosophy to suggest the imitation view And, no **Naiyāyika** worth his salt would call the psychological process of indirect knowledge a real inference So his views should be taken as his reflections on the nature and mode of **rasa**

In the theory of **Bhāṭṭa Nayaka**, there are no doubt some **sāṃkhya** concepts such as those of the three **gunas**, and that of **bhoga** But he also refers to the '**ānandamaya nija sarpvit**', and '**paramabrahmāsvada**' (P 277 *ibid*) However in **Abh**

(P. 5) Bhatta Nayaka's views would make him a māyavādi vedāntin. (see also Dr. Pandey who supports this. P. 72-73 Indian Aesthetics). It would seem however, that here too, we have not enough references to identify his schools of philosophy.

As to Abhinavagupta, we know that he was a follower of the pratyabhijñā darsana. Fortunately, some of the important works on Pratyabhijñā darsana are discovered and edited in Kashmir series of texts and studies. In these philosophical works, we find some basic concepts of the school which also hold good for his theory of rasa. As we noted above, terms like 'sāṃvit', 'nirvighnā sāṃvit', 'camatkāra' and 'ānanda' have a peculiar significance, which we can clearly understand only in the light of their meanings in the discussion of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Eventhough, we cannot go here into the details of this philosophy, a very brief account would be necessary for a proper understanding of these terms (24). The pratyabhijñā school is monist in its metaphysics. The one single substance which manifests itself as the cosmos of living and non-living objects is 'citi' 'or' 'caitanya'. It can therefore be called spiritual monism. The ultimate 'citi' or 'caitanya' is called in this school as 'Śiva'. All the phenomena of the universe are the self-manifestation or self-reflection of Śiva. This school differs from other schools of vedānta, particularly from that of Saṅkara, in regarding this power of self-manifestation of Siva as real. This Śiva caitanya is conceived not as something static, but fraught with dynamic energy.

This view of ultimate reality is explained through several concepts, and some of these are 'spanda', 'phurattā', 'vimarsa', 'camatkāra', 'icchā' etc. Abhinava himself has explained briefly but lucidly these terms in his work named *Tantrasāra*. We cannot do better than summarise what he has said in the upodghāta or introduction of this work.

He says that nature of all existants is light-prakāśa. This prakāśa is one and universal. It is not divided by time and

space (dēsa, kāla), because time and space themselves are of the nature of prakāsa. Thus prakāsa is then identified with samvit -sa eva ca samvit (p 2) Samvit is explained as-arthaprakāsarupā (arthaprakāsarupā hi samvit) This means that the nature of samvit is to enlighten objects (artha) But this prakāsa is also, enlightenment itself It is not dependent upon anything else (pāratantryam), for its enlightenment Thus, this prakāsa is one and svatantra, i.e. self-dependent, and because it is not limited by space, time and form it is all pervading (vyapaka), eternal (nitya), and formless, eventhough it has all the forms in it potentially

Thus this monism of prakāsa and samvit is monism of consciousness

After this are mentioned the various śaktis or powers of this samvit Its dependence (svatantryam) is its power of ananda (ānanda śaktih) Its camatkāra is its power of will (icchāśakti) Its nature of enlightenment is its power of cognition (jñānaśaktih) Its capacity to assume all forms is its power of acting (kriyāśaktih) Eventhough, it can be described as joined with these powers, in reality, it is Siva containing within Himself, icchā, jñāna, and kriyā, i.e. will, knowledge and activity It is light and it reposes in its own joy (p 5-6, Tantrasāra -Kashmir Series of Texts and studies,-No XVII Ed 1918)

Then, Abhinava describes how this Siva in its full independence shows itself as anu (25)

From this brief account, we find that samvit whose nature is to enlighten or present objects is the ultimate reality When it is completely independent, it is joy itself (ānanda) As desire it is camatkāra, Thus the three are identical To be reposing in this is to be Siva, or ānanda i.e. joy

In this school, everything that is or exists is Siva in reality And therefore, wherever the mind goes, there is the state of Śiva -

“yatra yatra mano yati bahye vā bhyantare’pi vā ।
tatra tatra śivāvasthā vyāpakatvat kva yāsyati ॥

Vijñanabhairava V 116, p 99—Kashmir Sanskrit Granthā-
valīh Vol 6, Ed 1918

The essential thing is that one’s *samvit* or consciousness must repose unobstructedly in its true nature i.e. in Śiva. This is joy itself. In this school the possibility of *samvit* knowing itself or reposing in itself is the source of all joy,—sensual, artistic or spiritual. The following verse from Vijñanabhairava is taken as authority by Abhinava and other writers of this school for this view.

“ jagdhipānakṛtollasaresānandavijṛmbhaṇat ।
bhāvayadbhāntāvasthām mahānandastato bhavet ॥

(Śloka 72, P 60)

Abhinava has explained this view in detail in his *Īśvara-pratyabhijñānavivartimarsinī* (P 117–179, Vol II Ed, 1941, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies). *Camatkṛti* is explained as *camatkṛtirhi bhujānasya yā kriyā* i.e. The mental activity of one who enjoys i.e. the mental activity of enjoying is *camatkṛti*. It is also ‘*bhogasamāpattimaya ānandaḥ*’. This is joy, *ānanda*, which consists in being identical with enjoyment. This is further clarified thus — the enlightenment of one’s own complete nature assumes the form of *parāmarśa* i.e. thought or consciousness. It is called *ānanda*. *Svarūpasya svātmanah paripurnanījasvarūpaprakāśanam eva paramārsamayātām dadhad ānanda itī ucyate* p 177 (ibid). This view is applied to the mundane experiences of men. It is also shown how and when one has joy and when one has not. The illustration of a hungry man is cited. Because he is empty, he is in need of something else. His mind has become *vivasa* (helpless) by the desire of food which is something different from himself. In this condition there is no one solid consciousness of one’s self (*ekagha navṛtti*) and therefore, he is as if without joy. We have seen that *vivasatā* or helplessness is a sort of *vighna* or obstacle.

When, however, his belly is full, his incompleteness in the form of his emptiness is destroyed. And so, in that condition of satisfaction, he has joy which lies in the cognition of oneself. But this joy is incomplete, because hunger exists in potential form—*samskārarūpatayā*—and therefore, he has still to desire the objects of the satisfaction of his appetite. Abhinava says that all the worldly joy is of this nature. When one gets something desired, one is afraid of its future loss and so one always remains disturbed and therefore incomplete. But even in this mundane existence, whatever little joy is there, is the result of experiencing one's own-self i.e. having a momentary touch or contact with Siva. Abhinava supports his view by a quotation from Śrī Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa who says that whatever joy is seen in this universe is a drop of the Ocean of joy which is Divinity itself.

Abhinava, by fine analysis isolates the aesthetic element of joy even in matters of food and drink. He says that while drinking sweet juice, there is a cognitive element viz. 'īdam-ītham'—'It is like this'—, which is distinct from gluttonous elements. And in this way, one reposes in oneself as a knower and while doing so, one thinks principally of the knower element i.e. *pramāṭrbhaga*. Thus, a person distinguishing in thought the knower-element of consciousness is called *bhūñjana* i.e. one who enjoys in proper sense. What Abhinava emphasises is the aesthetic element in the experience of such gross things as eating and drinking. This aesthetic element, according to his philosophy, is the repose in oneself as cogniser. We may put this in a simpler way and say that the thought viz. 'I enjoy' is the source of aesthetic joy.

Having thus made distinct the aesthetic element even in gross matters, he shows the aesthetic elements in poetry and drama (P. 178-9 *ibid*). *Rasas* like *śṛṅgāra* which are subject-matters of drama and poetry are, he says, distinct from sensual joys. Here, by the removal of obstacles like, earning and abandoning—*hanopādāna*—one tastes happiness by

completely overcoming the sense of otherness (*anyathābhāvam*) i.e. when one enjoys the sentiments depicted in poetry and drama, one does not think of anything else. This is in a way a precondition of aesthetic enjoyment. This experience because it is free from all obstacles—*nirvighnatvāt*—is *rasana* (or tasting), *carvana* (sampling), *nirvṛti* (bliss), *prāpti* (apprehension), and *pramāṇtvavisṛanti* or repose in the state of being a knower. In this experience, there is another part of enlightenment or knowledge which reposes in the objects of knowledge. But one has to be oblivious of this part and concentrate on the knower-element in order to enjoy *rasa*. Such a capacity makes one a *sahṛdaya*. For further discussion he here refers to his *Abh.*

This makes it clear that the element of joy in experiences of gross things and of art has the same source. When this element becomes supreme, and when the mind is freed from all other desires of objects, it is said to be enjoying the supreme divine bliss. This divine experience is—"I am *S'iva*".

Abhinava, at the end of this discussion shows the difference between the enjoyment of gross elements and aesthetic elements as follows *madhuraḥ rasāsvāde tu viśayaśpars'avyavādhānam* (p. 179) i.e. in the enjoyment of sweet drinks there is the obstruction in form of the contact with an outside object, i.e. here one can get joy only through an external object. This is its limitation. In the enjoyment of poetry and drama, one's experience is freed from such obstacles. But the potentiality of such obstacles remains latent and capable of getting into consciousness—*tato'pi kāyaśāntyadāu tadvyavādhānaś'ānyatā tadvyavādhānaśamskāraṇūvedhasu*.—But in poetry and drama, those who are careful of obviating the part of obstacles in experience can have the highest bliss, i.e. those who are real *sahṛdayas* can get the highest bliss—*tatrāpi tu tathoditavyavādhānaś'atiraskriyāśvādhāna-hṛdayaḥ labhanta eva paramānandam*. Thus Abhinava, like a true

aesthete, sees the possibility of the experience of highest joy in poetry and art

In this philosophy, highest joy (paramānanda), nirvṛti (bliss), and camatkāra are of the nature of parāmarśa i.e. thought or consciousness. But this parāmarśa has to be completely free and independent of anything other than itself, and it must have one compact cognitive chewing. This parāmarśa becomes paramānanda on account of its solid state of cognitive chewing anupacāritasya sampēdanarūpatā nantariyatvena avasthitasya svatantrasya rasanāḥkaghanatayaḥ parāmarśaḥ paramānanda nirvṛtiḥ camatkāra ucyate

The above discussion taken from the I P V.V. gives a sort of philosophical background to the aesthetics of Abhinavagupta (26). It is something which is not divorced from our empirical experience of joy. Both the aesthetic joy and the spiritual joy are cognate of this joy, or, we may put it as some writers of this school do, that whatever little joy we have in our mundane experience is cognate of this Divine joy. The degrees in these experiences of joy are caused by the degrees of the soul's dependence on something other than itself. When the soul is completely independent and does not rely upon or repose in anything else, it is the highest joy.

In the view of this philosophy, everything is S'iva. The limited individual human soul is S'iva itself. As long as the individual human soul (anu) does not recognise itself (pratyabhijñā) as Siva it is limited and consequently unhappy. So, one may say, that the moments of such recognition in the life of a soul are the moments of joy. Poetry and drama and art, everything that is beautiful and sublime in nature and anything which makes one sensitive of the inner vibration (spanda) or the inner throbbing sphurattā afford a peep into this world of Bliss and Joy.

Foot-notes

(1) See as an example the *Tattabodhavidhāyini* of Abhayadevasūri on the *Sanmatitarka* of Siddhasenadivākara-Ed Pundit Sukhlalji and Pundit Bechardas, Gujarat Vidyapeeth, Ahmedabad

(2) We are here particularly concerned with the A bh. on Nā Sā (VI, VII) The portion of the comm dealing with the *rasasūtra* was very corrupt and therefore obscure in the first edition (G O S) Luckily this portion has been almost quoted verbatim in the *viveka* on Kā Śā of Hemacandra With the help of this *viveka* as critically edited by Prof R C Parikh, Gnoli has tried to give a satisfactory text of this portion of A bh The second edition of the G O S has much improved upon the text of the first edition There are, however, many obscure places in all these texts including *Viveka* We here also draw upon the second edition of the Kā Sā (Prof Parikh) for *Viveka*

In this chapter, I have tried to translate the technical terms and the relevant portions from the A bh, with the help of Gnoli's invaluable work

(3) He says we have stated above that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was both a literary man and a philosopher He knew Saiva philosophy It is therefore, reasonable to support that the word 'anusandhāna', which he uses here, has the only meaning that was recognised in the contemporary philosophical circle That the word 'anusandhāna' was synonymous with "yojana" and not "abhiṃāna" as 'āropa' is evident from the following verses of Utpalācārya in the *Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā* and Abhinava's commentary on it

kadācūkāvabbhāse yāp ūrvābhāsadyojanā |
saṃskarat kaīpanā prokṭa sa'pī bhinnāvabhāsinī ||

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-kadacitkah kadacidbhavah ajñātedasakāṅkrah avabhāse
yasya dehādch svalaksanarūpasya, tatra yā pūrvabhāsenā bala-
disarīrābhāsenā yojanā yoham bālah sa evādyā yuvā ityanu-
sandhanam

(4) • Bhatta Lollata flourished in Kashmir in the IXth or Xth century. He wrote a commentary, now lost, on the Nāṭya-sāstra of Bharata. Ksemaraja (Spandanirṇaya, p. 34) and Aṅ (Abhinavagupta) (M V V, V 778) quote a Bhatta Lollata who wrote commentary (ṭīṭi) to the Spandakārikā of Vasugupta. In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhatta Lollatas are one and the same person, Bhatta Lollata, would, in this case, have lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856-83 A D, Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or in the reign of his successor, Saṅkaravarman. This change also involves a change in the dates of Saṅkuka (CS *Infra* p 32, n 4), who could then be identified no longer with the poet Saṅkuka, who was a contemporary of Ajṭapida (early IXth century) —R. Gnoli p. 30

See also K. C. Pandey—Comparative Aesthetics Vol I
Indian Aesthetics (Ed 1959), p. 38-39-40 says

—“we have discussed the date of Bhatta Lollata in an earlier work (Abb. 126-9). He was a contemporary of Bhatta Kallata, the author or publisher of the Spanda Kārikā. He commented not only on Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra but also on the Spanda Kārikā. He therefore, inherited both the drama-turgic and the philosophical traditions from his predecessors. In interpreting him we have to keep this fact in mind and also “Thus, we find that Bhatta Lollata was not concerned with the Spectator's point of view of rasa. In his commentary, ■ we learn it from Abhinava's presentation of his view, there was no reference to the spectator. The word “pratyakṣanah”, implying the spectator, has been introduced by Mammata, with very slight amendment of the text of Abhinava, which we have already given above. Mammata's amendment runs as follows :

"mukhyaya vṛtya rāmadāvanukārye,
tadrūpatānusandhānāt
nartakepi pratiyamāno rasah" K P IV

For Lollata's view, see also Locana

"tathāhi pūrvāvasthāyām ya sthāyī sa eva vyabhicārisampā-
tadinā prāptapariposo'nukāryagata eva rasah nātye tu prayujya-
mānatvāt nātya rasa iti kecit" (Locana on II 4 Dhv)

See also Mammata's presentation of Lollata's view

"vibhavaivṛtalanodyanādibhīralambanoddīpanakāranāih rat
yadiko bhāvo janitah anubhāvāih katṅksabbujakṣepaprabhrti-
bhūh kāryāih pratītyogyāh kṛtāh, vyabhicāribhīrnirvedadibhīh
śahakaribhīrupacito mukhyaya vṛtya rāmadāvanukārye,
tadrūpatānusandhānānnartakepi pratiyamāno rasa itī bhāta-
lollataprabhrtayāh (K P IV)

(5) This portion of the A bh is rather laconic. But fortunately this has been given a more amplified form in the Viveka of Hemacandra. I have followed it here

(6) This portion consisting of the above quotation and what follows in the A bh on the next page (p 273 GOS Ed '56) is given in a more logical form in the viveka of Hemacandra. The same trend of argument is found in the K P, of Mammata in a concise form

(7) See Ch VIII of the thesis

(8) Compare with Aristotle's mimesis

(9) How does the spectator who witnesses the sentiments of the actor feel those sentiments himself? The Viveka gives the following explanation vastusaundaryabalaḥ kasayaphala carvanāparapurusaḥ sanaprabhava muknaprasaṅgakalana kalpayā . etc (p 91-92, Ed 64 Prof R C Parikh)

The first explanation is that it is beauty of what is presented—vastusaundaryabala that evokes rasa in the spectator. The second is an analogy. When one perceives some

other person chewing a fruit with astringent flavour, saliva is produced in one's mouth. This physiological action has its counterpart in the nature of emotion also. Eventhough one may have no cause of laughter or sorrow if one sees someone laughing or weeping, one automatically feels like laughing or weeping. These two viz 'vastusaundaryabala' and kasāya-phalacarvanā' are not found in the text of Abh. Whether they are later additions or they formed part of the original text of Sankuka, we cannot say.

(10) Abhinaya is the art which uses natural modes of speech, movements of body, etc for the effective communication of ideas, feelings, emotions, sentiments, etc. In fact its success lies in endowing these with the semblance of reality which the mere speech or movement of the body fail to do. So here, what cannot be communicated by mere words is communicated or evoked by uttering words in an artistic appropriate way.

(11) See above

(12) "Sankuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhatta Lollata. It is doubtful whether he should be identified with the poet Sankuka, author of a poem called Bhavanābhyudaya, who, accordingly to Kalhana (R.T. IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitapada (about 830 A.D.) In this case, his predecessor, Bhatta Lollata can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the same name, on the Spandakarikā, and so his period should be put back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th. Sankuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A.G. On Sankuka see De, S.P., I p 38, Pandey, A.G. p 128 -Gnoli, p 32.

K. C. Pandey-Abhinavagupta p 128 Ed 1935-says "From frequent references to and criticism of S'rī Sankuka's interpretation of the Bharata Sutra by Abhinava in his commentary (pp. 67,75,104) as also from the fact that he points out

differences between his original of the Bharata Sūtra and that of Śrī Saṅkuka, (A bh 216 217) it is apparent that the latter also commented upon Bhārata Sūtra That he belonged to Kashmir and was a contemporary of King Ajitapīḍa (850), we have already stated in the foregoing pages

It may be noted that this theory of imitation reminds one of the "mimesis" i.e. 'imitation' of Aristotle.

As for Saṅkuka's views as noted in the Locana, read following "anye tu-anukartari yah sthāyavabhāśobhinayādisāmagryādikṛto bhūtviva haritālgdinaśvavabhāśah, sa eva lokatītalayāsvādaparasamjñayā pratītyā rasyamāno rasa itī nātyādrasā nātyarāh" (Locana on Dhv II 4)

See also Mammata (K P IV)

kāvyaṇusamdhānabalācchikṣābhyāsanīrvartitasvakāryapra-
kātana ca nātenaiva prakāśitaiḥ karanakāryasahakāribhīḥ
kṛtrimairapi tātā nābhīmānyamānairvibhāvādisabdavyapades-
yath 'samyogat' gamyagamakabhavarūpat, anumiyamānōpi
vastusaundaryabalādrasānyatvenānyānumiyamānavilaksanah
sthāyīvena sambhūtyamāno ratyādirbhāve rasa itī śrī
śaṅkukah

Guoli remarks (pp 39)—Saṅkuka's mistake consists in asserting that aesthetic experience is an experience of a discursive kind (savikalpa, it is an imitation), and at the same time saying that it differs from every other kind of discursive cognition The doctrine which he professes is thus vitiated by an intrinsic contradiction The whole of Bhatta Tota's confutation, reproduced by Abhinava, reduces in the last analysis to a close and often scholastic examination of this contradiction

{13} Hemacandra explains - ayaṁ bhāvah prasiddhāt
ratilaksanāt karanād ratyanukaranam nāma karanāntaram
tatprabhavaśced anubhāvah syuh tathāiva ca viśeṣavidaḥ yadi
jñāyeran tadā ratyanukaranalaksanasya vastvāntarasyānumānam
samānjasaṁ syāt na caivam, tat katham iva ratyanukarana-

pratītiḥ aviseśavida ca tathāvidhānubhāvadarśane ratirevānumi-
yate tac ca mithyājñānam eveti

As for Bhatta Tauta or Tota see

"The expression 'my masters' observes H C (Hemacandra) alludes to Bhatta Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A G and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th Century Bhatta Tota wrote a work of poetry, the Kāvya-kautuka, on which A G wrote a commentary (vivarana) which has not yet been found. The confutation of sankuka, given in the following pages, goes back therefore, to Bhatta Tota"-(Gnoli ■ 38)

(14) See also Locana on Dhv II 4

kavyepi ca tasmāt sthitametat abhivyajyante rasāḥ
pratītyaiva ca rasyanta it

See also Mammata (K P IV)

na tatasthyena nātmagatatvena rasah pratīyate, notpadyate
nābhivyajyate api tu kavye natye cābhidhato dvitīyena
vibhavadisādhāraṇīkaranātmanā bhavakatvavyāpārena bhāvya-
mānah sthāyi, sattvodrekaprakāśanandamayasaṁvidvisrānti-
sattitvena bhogena bhujyate

The expression sattvodreka is reproduced almost verbatim by Mammata. It has been commented upon in several ways. Vidyācakra-vartī (K ■ Trivendrum Sanskrit Series) explains as below : sattvodrekād yau prakāśanandau tanmayyāṁ saṁ-
vidi saṁādhivṛttirūpāyāṁ yā yogināṁ visrāntir vigalītasakalā
raṁ nistarāṅgenāvasthītiḥ tatsadṛśena

Māṇikyācandra (p 74) comments on sattvodrekena
prakāśah prakāśo ya ānandas tanmayi yā saṁvit tasyāṁ
visrāntiḥ, sā satattvam paramārtho yasya sa tathā

Abhinava says in the Locana (p 183)

rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayanijacitvabhāvanirv-
tīvisrāntilākṣaṇah Visvanātha says :

sattvodrekād akhandasvaprakāśanandaśīmāyah
vedyāntarasparśasanyo brahmāsvādasahodarah ||
lokottaracamatākāraprāṇah kascit pramāṭṛbhīḥ
svakaravad abhinnaatveneyam āsvādyate rasah ||

"Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons (i.e. qui rationem artis intelligunt) It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of sattva. It is made up of a full Intelligence, Beatitude and self-luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahman. It is animated by a *camatkāra* of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility" (Trans. Gnoli pp 55)-Gnoli further adds" cf. the translation of A. K. Coomaraswamy: *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard, 1934, pp 48. Coomaraswamy translated *camatkāra* with 'lighting-flash'. According to Visvanatha, *sattva* is nothing but the mind or inner sense (*manah*) devoid of any contact with *raja* and *tama* (pp 55).

Gnoli writes (p 50)-Bhatta Nāyaka flourished in Kashmir after Ānandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A.D.), the author of the *Dhvanyaloka*. Bhatta Nāyaka is, therefore, to be placed round about 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with brahmana Nāyaka, who lived during the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 A.D.), and who is mentioned by Kāhala (R.T.V. 159). In the I.P.V.V., III, p. 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of Śaiva inspiration, which he attributes to Bhatta Nāyaka, to which he gives the title of *mīmāṃsākagranth* (the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumārila, *mīmāṃsākapravara*). Another stanza of Bhatta Nāyaka (taken from a *stotra*) is quoted by Kṣemarāja (*Spandanirṇaya* p. 18). I am inclined to think that these two Bhatta Nāyakas were one and the same person. The poetic work of Bhatta Nāyaka is the *Hṛdayadarpana*, which has not yet come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation to Śiva, has been preserved in the *Abh*, I p. 5. The stanzas from Bhatta Nāyaka, which recur a few lines later, are taken, without any doubt, from this work. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhatta Nāyaka have been collected by T. P. Chintamani, J.O.R.M., Vol. I, pp. 267-276.

On the poetic doctrine of Bhatta Nāyaka and the confutation of dhvani, of T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., Vol 17, part 2, pp. 267-276 Bhatta Nāyaka's theory is also stated with few variations in the Dhv. Ā. L. pp. 180 ff. On Bhatta Nāyaka in general, see Kane, S.D.V. pp. 212-215, Pandey, A. G., pp 128-130.

On Bhatta Nāyaka, Pandey writes (Indian Aesthetics Ed. '59 ■ 72)—Intellectual Background of Bhatta Nāyaka—

Bhatta Nāyaka was an immediate predecessor, or an older contemporary, of Abhinava : for, he was king Śaṅkuka Varman's contemporary (883-902 A.D.). He therefore, lived in the same literary atmosphere as that in which Abhinava lived. By his time the two important factors in the evolution of the form, which the aesthetic theory assumed in the hands of Abhinava, had come into being. (1) Ānanda Vardhana had propounded the theory of Dhvani, the power of language to convey the spiritual meaning (Dhvanī) and (2) Śaiva metaphysics also had been well systematised by Utpalā in his detailed commentary, the vivṛti, on his own Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. But Bhatta Nāyaka did not come under the influence of either. He was an avowed opponent of the spiritual meaning theory and wrote a work, the Hṛdayadarpaṇa, with the expressed object of demolishing it. And he seems to have simply ignored the Śaiva philosophy. He followed the vedānta school and based his theory upon the same school of philosophy.

...He had vedantic tendencies. For, in the course of his commentary on the very first verse of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, he refers to the vedantic conception of the phenomenal world. He points out its similarity with the dramatic presentation. According to him, the activities of Rāma, Rāvaṇa, etc. (in stage presentation) shine wonderfully, though they are actually non-existent. They are mere creations of imagination and therefore are without any fixed form and are capable of millions of imaginative additions. They are different from

objects of dream, illusion, etc., and therefore, are capable of fully captivating the heart. They are products of actors, who in the course of production do not abandon their essential nature, exactly as Brahman does not give up his essential nature when he creates the phenomenal world. But in spite of all this they are capable of giving rise to aesthetic experience and thus serve a human purpose. Just so this phenomenal world, which is nothing but mere name and form, which really do not exist, serves the highest human purpose, through reflection and contemplation.

He also makes use of the vedantic conception of Ānanda, as predominance of pure Sattva, free from all admixture of Rajas and Tamas. He represents the aesthetic experience to be kin to the mystic realisation of Brahman. He however, does not thoroughly stick to vedantic technique in his exposition of the aesthetic theory. We shall briefly give an account of vedantic and allied conceptions, utilised by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in proper context.

The passage from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, suggesting his vedantic leaning may be quoted as below (A bh Vol I p 5)

bhaṭṭanāyakaस्तु ब्रह्मणः परमात्मना यदुदभ्रिता
 विद्याविरचितान्सारब्धेदग्राहे यदुदहारानिर्कृतं यन्नैतद्य
 तद वक्ष्यामि, यथाभिः कल्पना मीत्रासारं तदा एवावस्थि
 तैकारुपम् कथं कल्पनासारसारसामः स्वप्नदिवि
 लोकापि सुषुप्तारं ब्रह्मयग्राहानिर्गमत्यक्तसंलम्बना
 ब्रह्मकल्पनापारचितं रामारवणद्वेषसुखं कृतोप्यब्धु
 तद्विद्वत्प्राप्त्यं भवति, तथा भगवन्मनापि च पुरुषार्थोपा
 यमेति तैश्च तद्यथा विस्वमिदमसत्यानामरुपप्रपञ्च
 मकामता च स्तवनमननानादिवसेना परमपुरुषार्था
 प्रपञ्चमिति

(15) Viveka (p 96, Ed '64, Prof Parikh) has the following additional proposition "paragatātvena tu pratītau tāstāsthyā meva bhavet".—If the apprehension of rasa is taken with reference to someone other than himself, one would be indifferent to it. This proposition might have formed part

CHAPTER XVI

SOME OTHER WRITERS ON RASA

(1) Dhanañjaya and Dhanika (C. 10th A D)

(11) Bhoja (11th A D) and others

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika the authors of DR with its Avaloka occupy an important place in the history of Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy. Chronologically they come after Ānanda and are almost contemporaries of Abhinava. As against the Kashmirian writers on poetics Dhanañjaya and Dhanika along with Bhoja, the successor of Muñja represent the Malva school of writers. We must therefore consider in what aspects these authors differ from Ānanda and Abhinava. As to the views of the latter they may or may not have been known to these writers.

Dhanañjaya defines rasa as follows

vibhavaīraṇubhāvasca sattvikairvyabhīcaribhūḥ |

anīyamāṇaḥ svādyatvam sthāyibhavo rasah smṛtaḥ ||

(DR IV 1)

This definition is in a way explanatory of the famous sūtra of the Nā Śā which is taken as authority for all the discussions on the subject. We saw while discussing the views of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṣa, Śrī Saṅkuka and others that the absence of mention of sthāyibhava in the rasa sūtra is one of the main topics of discussion. We also saw that in the opinions of Śrī Saṅkuka and Abhinava, the mention of sthāyibhava is not only unnecessary but would have also ruined the definition because in their view sthāyibhāvas as such never becomes the objects of rasa.

Dhanañjaya however is definite in his view that it is the sthāyibhava which becomes the object of rasa. This is an important difference.

A minor difference is to be found in the addition of *sāttvikabhāvas* as one of the agents bringing about *rasa*. This is in fact an addition in the *rasa-sūtra* itself. Though the *sāttvika* can be taken as implied in *anubhāvas*, its separate mention is justified by *Dhananjaya* and *Dhanika* in the following way. Even though the *sāttvika bhāvas* are also *anubhāvas*, yet they are different from them as they originate from *sattva* i.e. mind alone. Says *Dhananjaya* (DR IV 4 b 5a.)—

prthagbhāva bhavantyanye 'anubhāvātve' pi sāttvikāḥ |—4b
sāttvadeva samutpattistacca tadbhāvabhāvanam ||—5a

Dhanika says

paragataduhkhaḥṣaḍbhāvanāyamatyantānukūlantahkar—
anātvaṃ sāttvam yadaha
sāttvaṃ nama manah prabhavam tacca
samahītamanaśtvādutpadyate

Another important point of difference lies in the *modus operandi* of *rasa* experience. We have already seen that *Dhananjaya* and *Dhanika* do not accept the *vyāgya-vyājakabhāva* but are satisfied with *bhāvya-bhāvaka* relation. This, we have already noted, is the view propounded by *Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka* also, who mentions *bhāvakatva* and *bhōjakatva vyāparas* (Na Sā Vol III GOS Edn P 276-7)

Yet another important topic to be found in *Dhananjaya* is that of the four *cintābhāvas* or four states of mind from which arise the different *rasas*. These are as follows

svādah kavyārthasambhedatmānandasamudbhavaḥ |
vikāsavistaraksobhaviksepaḥ sa caturvidhaḥ || DR IV 43

Dhanika explains it elaborately as below. He says that the *sthāyībhāva* correlated with *vibhāvādīs* is *kāvya-rtha*. On the strength of this the heart of *samājika* is harmonised with that of *Rama*, and the like. The ego centered limited cognition of I is obliterated. The joy caused due to this is the *kāvyananda*. This joy is basically the same with reference to all the *rasas* but different *rasas* come into force by different

vibhavadis On account of this difference In vibhavadis, the mental states—cittabhumis—are also divided into vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa Rasas are also classified on the basis of these cittabhumis Says he

kavyārthena vibhavadisamsṛtasthayaṭmakena bhāvakacetasaḥ sambhede' nyonyasamvalane pratyastamitasvaparavibhāge satī prabālatarasvānandodbhūtiḥ svādah tasya ca sāmānyātmanaike tvēpi pratīnīyatavibhāvādīkaranajanjena sambhedabhedena caturdha cittabhumayo bhavanti ~ (Avaloka on D R IV 44)

Vikāsa is with reference to śrāgāra and hāsyā, vistara with vīra and adbhuta, kṣobha with bibhatsa and bhayānaka and vikṣepa with raudra and karuṇa Says Dhanañjaya,

śrāgaravīrabibhatsaraudresu manasaḥ kramat |

hāsyadbhūtabhayotkarsakarūṇaṇaṃ || eva hi ||

(DR IV 44)

We have already seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka mentions three cittabhumis If Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka can be accepted as a predecessor of Dhanañjaya, we may say that he follows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in this respect

There is another important point in which Dhanañjaya differs, viz the number of rasas In the Nā Sa itself we find, 'astau nātye ṛasaḥ smṛtāḥ—(Nā Sa VI 15) Later on we find santarasa also as the ninth rasa This portion dealing with the topic of śantarasa is, in view of modern critics, an interpolation though we find that Abhinava, Mammata, Hema-candra etc all accept nine rasas Dhanañjaya and Dhanika however, forcibly controvert this latter view Their arguments as to why śantarasa cannot be a nātyarasa are interesting, They are as below

Dhanañjaya enumerates sthāyibhāvas in DR IV 35, as, 'ratyūtsahajupstāḥ krodho hasaḥ smayo bhayaṃ sokah | samamapi ketiprahuh puṣṭinātyeṣu naitasya ||

Dhanika adds that as sama is of the form of cessation of all activity it cannot be represented on the stage Thus śanta

has no place in a dramatic representation. In Nāgānanda love for Malayavati is described throughout and the attainment of the state of vidyādhara is narrated in the end. If śama is the sthāyibhāva in Nāgānanda it will not be in harmony with the above. The same anukārya cannot be the substance of two opposite types of things viz. anurāga and virāga. Thus in Nāgānanda śama is not the sthāyīn but uśāha is the sthāyīn that goes with dayāvira. Dayāvira is not opposed to śrāgāra which is subservient to it or phala in form of sovereignty (cakravaritva). Thus there only eight rasas in nāṭya. Says Dhanika .. sarvathā nāṭakadāvabhinayātmeḥ sthāyītvamaśm-
gbbhīśmasya nisidhyate...etc ..atōstāveva sthāyīnah . Avaloka on DR IV.35.)

Dhananjaya further adds that nirveda has its nature not identical with that of the sthāyīn. So how can it be relished? Its enhancement will only make for lack of relish. So there are only eight sthāyīns in drama. Says he,

nirvedādiratadrūpyadasthāyī svadate katham |
vairasyāyāva tatposah tenāstau sthāyīno matah || (DR IV 36)

As to the nature of rasa experience and as to the seat of rasa in the connoisseur they do agree with Ānanda and Abhinava. The concomittant of rasa experience is joy. In fact Dhanika says

vakṣyamānasuabdhavairvibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisattvikaiḥ
kāvyaopattairabhinayopadar utairvā srotiprekṣakanāmanantarvipari-
vartamāno ratyādirvakṣyamānalakṣanah sthāyī svadagocaratām
nirbharānandasamvidatmatāmānīyamāno rasaḥ

(DR. Avaloka IV. 1.)

As rasa is connected with cognition and joy, it rests only in the rasika or the connoisseur. Says Dhanika .

tera rasikah samājukah kāvyam tu tathavidānandasamvi-
dunmīlanahetubhāvena rasavadāyurghṛtamityādīvyapadeśavat.

(Avaloka on DR. I. i.)

Bhoja

Bhoja succeeded Muñja whose court pundits were Dhana-njaya and Dhanika. S.K. Ā and Sr Pra are the two works on poetics attributed to Bhoja. S.K. Ā is published. Sr Pra, is published in parts only. But we get a critical evaluation of the contents of this work in the learned thesis of Dr V. Raghavan.

The Rasa-Theory of Bhoja

Bhoja has dealt with the topics of rasa in his two voluminous works the S.K. Ā and the Sr Pra. The former has been published several times and the publication of the latter is undertaken by H.O.S. though it is not yet out. Dr V. Raghavan has, however, published an exhaustive treatise on Sr Pra. He has also given at the end of chapters full quotations of the relevant portions of the text. Here, I draw upon NS Ed. of the S.K. Ā and for Sr Pra I rely upon the passages quoted by Dr V. Raghavan.

Bhoja's theory of rasa appears in some aspect to be peculiar to himself, or we may say to the literary men of his court. I will here mainly discuss his views as far as they bear upon the interpretation of the rasa-sutra of the Na S'g.

Dr Raghavan has exhaustively and very ably analysed the different shreds of the complicated fabric of discussion on rasa.

Bhoja seems to have recognised three stages or kotis of rasa viz. the parā, madhyamā and the uttarā koti. He seems to have derived a plea for this arrangement from Dandin. For Bhoja, as for Dandin, rasa is also an alampkāra in the wide sense of kāvyasobhākara dharma. Bhoja includes rasas under alampkāras and cites Dandin who says

preyab priyatarakhyānam rasavadrasapesalam |
urjasvi rūdhāhamkāram yuktotkarsam ca tat trayam ||

'Yuktoikarṣam' is taken by Bhoja in an unusual sense and he bases his three kotis of rasa on this. Says he
 tatra 'urjasvi rudbhāṃkāraṃ' ityanena atmavis'ṣanisthasya
 utkrādīstajanmanah ; anekajanmanubhavasamskārasādītra-
 dḥimnah samagrātmasampadudayātis'ayahetoh alam (śham)-
 kāraviseśasya up-samgrahādahamkāra (da) bhīmānasīṅgīrā
 dyaparanāmo rasasya māṇsamayavikīrārūpeṇa abhīmanināp
 manasi jagratah pūrvāṃ kotim upavarnayati 'rasavad
 rasapeś'alam' ityanena vibhavanubhāvavyabhicārisamyoḡādrasa
 nispatirīti ratyādīrūpeṇa anekadhāvirbhāvatah abhivardhamā-
 nasya paraprakaraḡgāminah sīṅgīrasya madhyamāvasthāmava-
 sthāpayati 'preyaḥ priyatarākhyānam ityanena samastabhāva-
 mūrdhabhīkītyā rāteḥ paraprakarsādhigamāt bhāvanāpathatik-
 rame bhāvarūpatīmullāṅghya premarūpeṇa parinatītyā up-
 dānt bhāvantarānāmapi paraprakarsādhigame rasarūpeṇa
 parinatirīti jāpāyan ahaṃkārasya uttarāṃ kotim upalakṣayati
 (Śr Pra Vol II. p 365-70 Ch XI)

For Bhoja, the rasas and the rasa theory dealt with by other ālāṃkārikas fall under the madhyamāvasthā. It should be noted, however, that for him rasas in the madhyamāvasthā are really bhāvas only but are secondarily called rasas. As noted earlier, he has derived his clue from Dandin's dictum as quoted above viz preyaḥ priyatarākhyānam etc. For him, the process which would result in rasa is the process of development and intensification of sentiments and emotions. So, for Bhoja, rasa is the utkāṣṭa or prakāṣṭa of emotion. This is similar to the upacaya theory of Lollata. For the explanation of rasa-sūtra given by Bhoja, we have to rely on the passage in the Śr Pra (See Dr Raghavan's Śr Pra. p 516) (Śr Pra p 381-388). He explains the rasa sūtra with reference to what he calls the madhyamāvasthā, in the following way

Bhoja first explains the term 'vibhava' in its two aspects viz ālambana and uddīpana. He says katham pūnāḥ vibhava
 R 8 27

nubhāvavyabhīcārisamyogat rasanīpatuh ? ucyate-yathā indusannidheh gāṇḍakāḥ syandate, yathā rāsannidheh suryakānto jvalati, yathā karpūrasannidheh sphatikō vilīyate, tathā tebhyaḥ stebhvaḥ ālambanavibhāvebhyah tadākāraparīnatendriyabuddhyupādhiyogīno bhīmānimanasah te te ratikrodhas'okādayo bhavaḥ samutpadyante — "There is abhīmanā in the mind, when objects confront it, the abhīmanā takes the shapes of objects and according as the objects are pleasant or otherwise, the bhavas, rati, krodha, soka, etc are born. The process is respectively similar to the candrakānta stone flowing out in the presence of the moon (rati), the suryakānta blazing forth on the sight of the Sun (krodha), and the sphatika melting in the proximity of karpura (s'oka)—This explains ālambana-vibhāva" (Trans Raghavan p 487)

Then, he explains the uddīpana vibhāva as follows atha indudaye yathā samudraḥ ksubhyati, yathā apathyasevayā vyadhīrabhivardhate, yathānāryasannidheh sādūradhīkām dukkhakaroti, tathā tebhyaḥ stebhvaḥ uddīpanavibhāvebhyah tattadanubhavasampakārayogīnāḥ manasā tattadbhāva (a) bhivṛddhaye te te vikāra upajāyante

"Just as the sea becomes boisterous at moon-rise, just as disease increases by bad diet, just as a rogue creates more mischief when he gets to his aid one more of his own class, so also uddīpana-vibhāvas create trouble first (ksobha), then increase the suffering more and more. The uddīpanas are thus ksobhakas, abhivardhakas and pratikulas, agitating, inflaming and adverse. This explains uddīpana-vibhāva — (Raghavan p 487-8)

From these sthāyibhāvas thus created and kindled respectively from rasa by ālambana and uddīpana vibhāvas, arise anubhāvas and vyabhīcārin. They are essentially of the form of bhāvas, though differing in name and form. They are abhīyāntara or internal and bāhya or external.

How are these vibhāvadīs correlated and act upon the sthāyīnas to produce rasa ? Bhoja explains this in the words.

atha yathā ikṣubhyo rasah, sarsapebhyastailam, dhātubhyo hīranyām, asmabhyo loham, dadhno navaṅgam, kāsthato' gūḥ, tebhyastebhyah yantragñimanthasamyogebhyah nispatanti, tathā evebhyah vibhavanubhāvavyabhicārisamyogebhyah ratikrodhasokāḍibhyah, te te rasāḥ nispadyante

i.e. As juice is created from sugarcane, oil is pressed out of sarsapa, gold from metal, iron from stone, butter from curds, fire from faggots, by the instrumentality of machines, fire or churning, similarly, from rati, krodha, etc., with the help of particular vibhavadis, are produced particular rasas. So, rasas are intensified sthayins through the contact of the sthayins with vibhavadis. This upacaya takes place in the following way

yathā lavana (rasa) āmlādayah svasamyogīnāḥ mrdvīkṣā dīnāpi ātmarupatām nayantah upacīyante, tathā ratyadīni vibhavadīnāpyātmāmarupatām nayanti upacayante

(Sr Pra Vol II p 385)

These three viz. vibhava, anubhava and vyabhicārin differ in nature but they become identical and get merged in the one flood of rasa-rasatā, rasenaiva sāmānyam bhavati. *ibid* p. 385

So, it seems, Bhoja also, like Dandin and Lollata, adopts the causal view. But here an important point is to be borne in mind. The causal theory adopted by Bhoja is sāmkhya theory of satkāryavāda, according to which, effects pre-exist in an unmanifest form in the cause. The activity is concerned only with making manifest what was unmanifest. Similarly, according to this theory, rasas pre-exist in vibhavadis and their combination with sthayins bring them out, makes them manifest. Bhoja's prakarsa is similar to Lollata's upacaya.

Many such rasas combine to produce rasa-saṁkāra, even as many tastes go to make up drinks. Says Bhoja: atha yathā oṣādhirāsebhyah madhunīpattīḥ, yathā madhurādībhyah sadavot-pattīḥ, guḍādībhyah āsavotpattīḥ, tathā tabhyah tebhyah rasa-sāmānyebhyah rasavisesābhiniṣṭīḥ

Then he talks of the jātibhedas of rasas such as bhava, rasa, tadābhāsa etc., and also of the stages or avasthas such as utpāda i.e. birth, abhivṛddhi i.e. nourishment and sthāirya i.e. firmness. Says he :

atha yathā ekasyāpyagneh bhaumadivyaudaryādayo jātibhedāḥ dāhālokapākādayo arthakriyāḥ sandriyante, tathākas-yapī rasasya bhāvarasatadābhāsādayo jātibhedāḥ utkanthabhisānganirvṛtyādayaḥ arthakriyāḥ utpādābhivṛddhisthāirya-dayo avasthāḥ, samupalabhyante ।

Another novel feature of this theory is that Bhoja tries to obliterate the distinction between sthāyibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhi-cāriṇs. For Bhoja, all the 49 bhāvas can become rasa on attaining prakāsa by vibhāvādis :- ratyādīnāmekonapañcāśato'pī vibhāvānubhāvavyabhi-cārisamyogāt paraprakāsa-dhigame rasavyapadeśārhatā । (Śr. Pra. Vol. II. p 381)

These are called rasas only secondarily i.e. through upacāra. They are of three forms, prakṛsta, bhāvarūpa and ābhāsa : sa śrīgārah, so 'bhīmānah sa rasah, tathā etc. ratyādayo jāyante tadupādhi-cāryamupajāyamāno rasah tridhā vikhyāyate prakṛsto bhāvarūpah, ābhāsataisca । (ibid p. 356)

Now we come to the other kotis viz. parā and the uttara. These seem to be his own original thinking on the matter, though they are not so original as they appear at the first sight. Says Bhoja : etena rudhāhamkāratā rasasya pūrva kotib. ratyādīnāmekonapañcāśato'pī vibhāvānubhāvavyabhi-cārisamyogāt paraprakāsa-dhigame rasavyapadeśārhatā rasasyaiva madhyamā-vasthā. preyah priyatarākhyānamiti upalaksanena yathā rateḥ premarūpena parinatīḥ tathā bhāvantarānāmapi paramaparipāle premarūpena parinatau rasaikāyanamiti rasasya paramā kṛsthā iti pratisthitam bhavati. P. 351. Śr. Pra. Vol. II.

In the very first kāvya of the fifth ch. of his S. K. Ā. Bhoja puts forth his new theory of rasa in the words -
raso 'bhīmāno' hankārah śrīgāra itī gīyate ।
yo'rībhāḥ tasyānvayat kavyam kamanīyatvamānute ॥

In the Śr Pra (Vol I P 1-3 Mas Ed) he says,

atmāsthitam guṇaviśeṣamahamkṛtasya
 sṃgāramāhurīha jīvitamātmayoneh |
 tasyātmaśaktirasān, yatayā rasatvam
 yuktasya yena rasiko' yamiti pravādaḥ ||

In a person, says Bhoja, in whose consciousness Ego has become manifest, there is a particular quality of such Ego-consciousness. This is the very life of Eros who takes birth from such a self. This quality of Eros is known as sṃgāra. This quality i.e., sṃgāra is tasted in the self by the self. This tasting is rasa sui generis. A person in whom this self-tasting has become manifest or developed is called rasika. Thus, by this verse, Bhoja explains the meaning of the word ahamkara used in the first kārīkā of his S K Ā V.

Let us try to understand the implications of this statement. We take as our basis the samkhyā psychology, which Bhoja seems to follow or have in mind and which teaches that the man in the world is a particular correlation of puruṣa and prakṛti. According to its another dogma puruṣa is merely the subject of knowledge. It is completely unchanging and inactive. Puruṣa can not be said to do anything. It is consciousness itself and so to say enlightens the transformation that takes place in prakṛti. In such a relation, therefore, what we ordinarily call mental transformations are to be understood as the transformation of prakṛti which is material in nature but which is continuously being illumined by the cañtanya of the puruṣa.

In the evolution of prakṛti from its state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, the first evolute is known as mahat. This seems to indicate the vastness of reality as such. From this evolves what is known as buddhi which should be understood as cognition as such. This is to say that the vastness of reality first evolves the specific quality of cognition. Buddhi gives birth to ahaṃkāra which we may interpret as Ego or individuality. This evolute of individuality further evolves

into what are known as *pañca tanmātrās* i.e. the subtle elements which become gross in different kinds of matter and the motor organ and the sensoria organs and an inner organ called *antahkarana* or *manas*, which seems to be the active agent between the buddhi and the remaining fifteen elements. We need not go in the study of the further evolutes of *prakṛti*. What we are concerned with here is the fact of individualised buddhi and Ego which is called '*abhimānōhamkārah*' by *Is'varakṛṣṇa* (*Sā Kā* 24)

It is the self-enjoyment of this Ego which in the opinion of *Bhoja* is *rasa* or taste par excellence. In other words, when such a state of consciousness is reached it is called *rasa*. *Bhoja* seems to take this as his basic principle in the discussion of *rasa*. With this fact he joins up another fact and that is the nature of *Eros* or *kāma* as such. This is supposed to be self-originating (*ātmayoni*, compare *Amarakośa*, *ātmaabhū*). This is the fundamental fact of love or *rati*, which is usually identified with the sex-passion. Sex-passion is something which joins the two opposites. The relation of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, in a way, is visualised in a similar union, though not identical. *Eros* seems to become manifest in this way. Because the manifestation of *Eros* is known by the term *śṛṅgāra*, *Bhoja* is tempted to equate the three *abhimāna*, *ahamkāra* and *śṛṅgāra* as indicating the consciousness of taste or enjoyment.

How far *Bhoja* is justified in equating the three is another matter. If we here can take the *tāntrika* or the *Śākta* view of ultimate union of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* or *śiva* and *śakti*, we can find justification for *Bhoja*'s view of defining *rasa* as *śṛṅgāra*, *abhimāna* and *ahamkāra*.

He, however, to be consistent with his *utkarṣa* theory, interprets *śṛṅgāra* as *śṛṅgam riyate*-etc. This view of *Bhoja* is, in a way, a substitute for the *nirvighnā samvit* of the *kashmirian śākta ālampārikas*. In the discussion of *Abhinavagupta*, however, we find *nirvighnā samvit* coming as a final

state in *rasa*-consciousness. *Bhoja* starts with *abhimāna*, *ahamkāra* and *śṛṅgāra* as the prime condition of *rasa*. Thus for *Bhoja*, a person whose Ego has developed to the capacity of this tasting-*rasa*—is *rasika* proper. It is only such a person for whom *rasa* has meaning.

S K Ā. and Śr. Pra. however, do not in a systematic way develop these ideas. So many different items have been brought in, so that it is very difficult to discover a consistent theory, as for example we do in case of Dhv. *Bhoja's* attempt to derive all the eight or nine *rasas* from this basic *śṛṅgāra* has led to much confusion. *Śṛṅgāra* is by tradition the principal *rasa* amongst eight or nine other *rasas*. Its preponderance in literature is immense. It, therefore, in a popular way can be called *rasa par excellence*. But this is not the sense in which *Bhoja* uses the word *śṛṅgāra* in his S K Ā V 1, and its further explanation in the Śr. Pra. Here *śṛṅgāra* is the primary fact of the Ego experiencing itself. Even when we identify Ego and Eros, *Śṛṅgāra* in the usual sense cannot be identified with it. It is as much a derivative as the other *rasas* like *vīra*, *adbhūta*, *karuṇa*, etc. *Bhoja* seems to have been misled into confusing these positions, unless we take the old platonic idea of Eros or the Modern Freudian idea of Libido as the source of all emotions. Anyway, *Bhoja* has the unique distinction of putting a new dynamic idea into the dialectics of *rasa*.

As Dr. Raghvan has pointed out, *Bhoja* bases his speculations on *rasa* on his concept of *rasika*. He tries to explain the current usage of the term '*rasika*' as follows: *rasaḥ, asya astīti rasikah*. *Rasa* is thus a quality of an individual which makes a man *rasika*. *Rasika*, for *Bhoja*, is not merely the connoisseur or the enjoyer of poetry alone. It means the cultured man in general. He has in him the excellent quality of *rasa* and this distinguishes him from the other viz. the *nirasa*. This quality of *rasa* is identical with all *rasikas*. *Bhoja* says that this *rasa* of the *rasika* is nothing else but the Ego-*Ahampakāra* *tattva*.

itself This rasa āhampkāra is in the poet, character, actor and spectator It is endowed in a person on account of meritorious deeds in past life Says he ātmasthitaṁ guṇavisesaṁ etc (see above)

Rasa is cittaśamvāda But all men do not have cittaśamvāda In all rasas So, Bharata and following him Abhinava classify characters into *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama* *dhiroddatta*, *dhirodhata*, *dhiralalita* and *dhirasṅgata* etc Bhoja also therefore, tries to find out one characterising rasa for each of the four types of heroes such as *dhiroddatta*, *dhirodhata* etc This classification becomes intelligible only when we accept a scheme of four different rasas as dominating the characters as their distinguishing marks and as their permanent moods So, Bhoja speaks of *udgata*, *uddhata*, *preyas* and *santa* as the rasas of the four types of heroes

Bhoja has also criticised Bharata's scheme of four prakṛti rasas producing the other four rasas This scheme, Bhoja himself accepts with modifications But Bhoja unnecessarily criticises Bharata by confusing his idea of *abhimāna-sṅgāra* with Bharata's idea of the usual *sṅgāra*

Bhoja's new *sṅgāra* is not the old *sṅgāra* or *rati prakāśa* This he makes amply clear by his classification of *sṅgāra* into *dharma-sṅgāra*, *artha sṅgāra*, *kāma sṅgāra* and *mokṣa-sṅgāra*, and by this he means the activities or *purusārtha* of men in these directions Here, by *kāma sṅgāra* is meant the usual *sṅgāra* of *rati-prakāśa* Says he

vibhāvanubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogāt (vi) prakāśamāpadya
manah pradhānaḥ (bhā) vo ratiṁ nama kamaśṅgārakhyāṁ
labhate P 733 Vol IV Ch 32 Śr Pra

This *kāma-sṅgāra* also is subdivided by Bhoja into *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* (1) It should be noted, however, that for Bhoja activity towards *mokṣa* is *mokṣa-sṅgāra* in which Bhoja treats the pure type of *jñānamṛga* of the *sanyāsīn* or that

of a karmayogin or he also speaks of gr̥hastha-mumukṣu and his activities. The last in the dhīra-prāsānta and his wife married according to vedic rites is the heroine in this case.

In his uttarā koṭi he talks of all rasas merging into one rasa—the preman rasa—

rasam tvīha premānamevāmananti, sarveśāmeva hi ratyādī
prakarsānām ratipriyo rānapriyo'marsapriyah parihāsapriyah
premnyeva paryavasānat, (Sr Pra Vol II P 352-7 ch XI)

The bhūmā of ratī, hāsa, etc. is not rasa, but sṛṅgāra alone is rasa. Says he — tatkāthamucyate, 'ratyādibhūmāni punarvitatbā rasoktiḥ' iti? ucyate-na ratyādibhūmā rasah, kim tarhi? sṛṅgarah, sṛṅgāro hi nāma viśiṣṭeśādrśīceśābbhivyanjakaṇṭīm ātmagūṇasampadām utkarṣābjjam buddhisukhecchādvēṣaprayatnasamskāradyatīś'ayāhetuh ātmanōhankāravīśeśah saccetasā rasyamāno rasa ityucyate, yadastitve rasiko'nyathabbhāve nīrasa iti, (Sr Pra, Vol II) 352-7 Ch XI)

In this last part we see that rasa, far from remaining merely a matter of poetic taste, becomes a sort of the realisation of the essence of the self in form of preman.

Here I may incidentally point out that in the later works of vaiṣṇavite writers such as Ujvalanilāmaṇi sṛṅgāra rasa does not remain merely a matter of human love but rises to the status of Divine love, the love of the Gopī's for ŚrīKṛṣṇa. We also find a similar but curious treatment of the subject in the work called Hamsavilāsa of Mithu Kavi of Gujarat.

The Rasa theory of Ramachandra and Gunachandra

The influence of DR, and that of SK Ā and Sr Pra the works of Malva, is evident in Hemacandra and his disciples *Ramachandra and Gunachandra in Gujarat*. Hemacandra is cognised of the new ideas put forth by Bhoja and his works. But he prefers to follow the tradition of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and subsumes some of the items under old terms. Thus sneha-rasa with ārdra-tā as its sthāyī is subsumed under ratī,

The love for a friend is *rati*, love for a brother as in case of Lakṣmaṇas love for Rāma is *dharmavīra*, that of children for their parents is *bhaya*. In the same way, says Hemacandra that *laulyarasa* with *gardha* as its *sthāyin* can be subsumed under either *hāsa* or *rati*. Similar is the case with *bhakti*.

As the ND is more independent in holding certain views, we will take it up first. Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the pupils of Hemacandra, however, are more independent of tradition of their guru in this respect. They seem to follow Bhoja in recognising some of the *sañcārins* as *sthāyins* developing into independent *rasas*. They hold that over and above the nine *rasas* there can be many more such as *laulya* *rasa* with *gardha* as its *sthāyin*, *śreha* with *ardrata* as its *sthāyin*, *vyasanarasa* with *āsakti* with its *sthāyin* etc. They also recognise additional *vyabhi-cārins* such as *ksut*, *trṣṇā*, *maitri*, *mudita*, *śraddhā*, *dayā*, *upekṣā*, *rati*, *santosa*, *ksamā*, *mārdava*, *ārjava*, *dakṣiṇya*, etc. They also hold that even the *sthāyins* and *anubhavas* become *vyabhi-cārins*. This is seen in Bhoja also who says—*nanu astau sthāyinaḥ astau sātत्वikaḥ, trayastri-mśad vyabhi-cārinaḥ iti bruvate na tat sādhu, yatōmīśamany-atamasya etaireva parasparam nirvartyamānatvāt kascit kadacit sthāyi, kadacittu vyabhi-cārī ato'vasthāvasāt sarve'pyami vyabhi-carinaḥ, sarve'pi ca sthāyinaḥ sātत्वikaḥ api sarva eva, mana-ḥprabhavatvāt, anupabataṁ hi manaḥ sātत्वamityucyate* (Śr Pra Vol II p 352-7. Ch XI)

Bhoja also speaks of many other *rasas* such as *ānandarasa* with *praharsa* as its *sthāyin* and also *vīra*, *auddhatya*, *svā-tantrya*, *sādhvasa*, *vilāsa*, *anurāga* and *saṅgama* *rasas*. He also speaks of twenty more *rasas* such as *rati*, *utkarsa*, *dṛṣṭi*, *utka-ntā*, *vismaya*, *matī*, *vitarka*, *cintā*, *capalata*, *hāsa*, *utsāha*, *stambha*, *gadgada*, *unmāda*, *vridā*, *avahitthā*, *bhaya* and *saṅka* etc (Śr Pra P 400). It should be noted that the inclusion of *vīra* in the list given as above is something curious, for *vīra* *rasa* is recognised by all the *śāṅkārīkas* and there is nothing new in it.

The tendency to recognise nine traditional *rasas* is not altogether new. Even Abhinava quotes the views of others who accepted *rasas* such as *sneha*, *lauhya*, etc. with *ardratā* and *gardha* etc. as their *sthāyins* respectively.

Let us examine the definition of *rasa* as given in the ND. The ND says

*sthāyibhāvah srotokarsah vibhavavyabhicāribhīh ;
spasānubhāvaniscayah ; sukhaduhkhātmako rasah ||*

The first thing that we note is the mention, in this definition, of the term *sthāyibhāvah*. This is in accordance with the practice of Dhananjaya and Bhoja.

The second point to be noted is that in the *rasa-sūtra* of Bharata, all the three : *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārin*, combine to give *rasa*, while here, a little different analysis is given. The effect of *rasa* is brought about by *vibhavas* and the *vyabhicārins* : i.e. these are taken as the causes of *rasa*. But the determination of *rasa* is explained as due to clear and distinct *anubhāvas*. This determination or *niscaya* comes about in an inferential process dependent upon concomitants. This reminds us of the *Naiyāyika* view of Śrī Sankuka (*anumiti-anukṛti*).

The third important point of difference lies in recognising the dual nature of *rasa*, i.e. causing *sukha* or *duḥkha*. The meaning is that some *rasas* give pleasure while others give pain. In all these matters Hemacandra follows the traditional view of Ānanda and Abhinava.

The ideas underlying this definition are explained by the authors in their commentary. They take up the position of realists like Bhoja. For them, as noted in the *kārikā* itself, *sthāyibhāva*, when intensified, is itself *rasa*. This really happens with the original persons. The love for Sītā can only reside in Rāma, and vice-versa. They enjoy the sentiment of mutual *rati* in reality. Their love cannot be experienced by anyone else.

Then how are we to explain the rasa in the readers and the spectators ? The authors say that it is a well-known fact that people do recognise other peoples' sentiments. This cognition is not of course, direct, because sentiments of others are beyond direct perception. They are, therefore, only inferred. This inferential cognition is dependent upon concomitance. But how in a poem or a stage-play can we bring the original characters whose feelings we can infer ? The actor gives a semblance of the vibhāvas etc. of the original characters, while during this act, even though the actor has not the original feeling in him, yet by his anubhāvas he creates the possibility of the inference of feelings in the minds of the spectators. It is for this reason that the authors say that rasa is determined by *spandanubhāva* i.e. clear gestures etc.

The idea seems to be something like this. The actor with the help of the vibhāvas and vyabhicārins, is enabled to work out the proper anubhāvas which give rasa to his spectators.

The authors make this point clear in the part of the *vṛtti* which discusses the rasa sūtra : *yadapyucyate vibhāvānubhāvarvyabhicārisampyogādṛasanispattirīti tatṛāpyanubhāva vyabhicārinas ca stryādīvarnanaṁanukāryāpekṣayaiva dṛṣṭavyaḥ* etc. (p. 143 G O S Ed). The terms anubhāvas and vyabhicārins in the sūtra, according to their interpretation, refer to the described or represented women etc. From these comes rasa by direct perception of one's own experience and by indirect inference of other's experience. This is in conformity with the other exponents of the sūtra who naturally take the anubhāvas and vyabhicārins as those of described or represented characters. The difference lies in taking vibhāvas as belonging to the original person. Probably here they follow Bhoja. The authors say that rasa in its distinctness can only reside in the original characters, because vibhāvādis are real only to them and for this reason, the vyabhicārins and anubhāvas born out of rasa are distinct only in their case. But for others i.e. spectators etc., the vibhāvādis are not real (*kevalam mukhya-*

dayanti sumanasah purusah harsādīms'cādhigacchanti tathā
 nanābhāvabhīnayaavyanplān vāgāṅgasattvopetān sthāyibhāvanā-
 svādayanti : sumanasah preksakah ca harsādīmscādhigacchanti
 tasmanñātyarasā ityabhivyaḥyātāḥ (GOS Ed Nā S'a VI),
 Thus, according to this view, it is held that the rasas, presu-
 mably all, are pleasant. But those, however, who think that
 all the rasas are not pleasant, interpret the passage differently.
 Abhinavagupta says anye tvādis'abjēna s'okādīnāmātra
 samgrahaḥ (Abb on Nā S'a GOS Ed p 290) Abhinava's
 own view is as said above, that all rasas are pleasant. He
 rejects the other opinion by saying -sa ca na yuktāḥ sāmāji-
 kām harsaikaphalam : nātyam, na s'okādīphalam. He says
 with emphasis -asmaṁmate tu samvedanamevanandaghanamās-
 vadyate tatra lā dukkhas'anlā kevalam tasyaiva citratākarane
 ratī's'okādivṛṣanavyāpārastadudbodhane : cābhīnayadivyāpārāḥ
 (p 293 ibid) Dr Raghavan notes the sukha-dukkhātma-katā
 view of one Rudrabhaṭṭa given in his Rasakārikā. He also
 refers to Haripala's view regarding the painful nature of
 vipralambha. (J O R Madras Vol XI P 113-14, 107)

Thus we see that Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra do not
 follow tradition of their guru in many respects

We will now take up some other authors, such as—

- (i) Mammata (11th-12th A D)
- (ii) Hemacandra (1088 A D—1172 A D)
- (iii) Viśvanatha (1300-1350 A D)
- (iv) Jagannatha (1620-1660 A D) and others

Mammata, the great syncretist of Sanskrit Poetics has tried
 to synthesise most of the views of earlier ācāryas. In his
 mañeśa, he characterises the poetic creation as pleasant on
 account of nine rasas. But in the definition of poetry, he
 does not mention rasa as such. This, however, is implied
 in s'abdārthan, because in the three varieties of artha, the
 vyaṅgyārtha for him is the meaning of poetry par excellence.
 In the varieties of vyaṅgyārtha it is rasavyaṅgya which is the
 most important. He summarises the discussions of Abb. in

one elaborate sentence. In this matter, Mammata implicitly follows Ānanda and Abhinava.

So does Hemacandra in his *Kavyanus'āsana*. In fact he has quoted the whole passage bearing on rasa from Abh. At the end of this he says that he also follows Abhinava in this matter—*etanmatameva ca smābhirupajvitatam* (Viveka p. 103). Viśvanātha similarly follows Ānanda and Abhinava in this matter. But he gives prominence to rasa in his definition of *kavya* viz *vākyam rasātmakam kavyam* (S D f). He has, however, clarified one point as to how rasa becomes *abhi-vyakta*. He says *vyakto dadhyādinyāyena rupantaraparīnāto vyaktikṛta eva rasah na tu dīpena ghata iva purvasiddho vyajyata taduktam locanākāraḥ—'rasah pratiyanta iti tvodanam pacatītivad vyavaharah iti'* (S D III 1).

Pundit Jagannātha in his R G has discussed many of the problems of Sanskrit Poetics in an independent way. The sum and substance of his ideas on rasa, however, are not different from those of Ānanda, Abhinava and Mammata. He, however, like the earlier theorists of rasa such as Bhaṭṭa Lollāta, Śrī Sankukā, Bhaṭṭa Nayaka, etc., who give the explanation of rasa-experience according to their philosophical dogma, gives his vedantic twist to the explanation of rasa-experience. According to vedantic view, the nature of the ātman is 'sat', 'cit' and 'ānanda'. This 'cit' in our ordinary life is darkened by a cloud (*āvaraṇa*), may be of *māyā*. The poet's speech through its *vibhāvādisamagrī* breaks up this covering-*āvaraṇa*—and when this happens, the essential constituent of the soul, viz *ānanda*, becomes self-revealed. This is the reason according to him why all rasa experiences have as their condition *ānanda*-bliss. And it is for this reason that, according to Jagannātha, *rasānanda* is regarded as similar to *brahmānanda*, of course, it is not *brahmānanda* as such. We may say following Jagannātha that poetry by temporarily removing the coverage of the consciousness gives for the time being a glimpse of the bliss of the soul.

Resume'

It is my purpose here to put together the main ideas arising out of the discussions in the different chapters of this thesis. I have tried to trace the semantic history of dhvani, vyanjana and rasa.

As to dhvani we saw that the meaning that is attached to it in works of poetics is not found, as far as my inquiry goes, in either early vedic literature or later. It is found in its usual sense of sound or making sound. In this sense it is used as a synonym for sabda in the works of the vaiyākaranas, particularly in connection with Sphota. This usage of the grammarians seems to have been taken up by the poeticians in their works. But as dhvani suggests Sphota, similarly in a poem word and its meaning suggest something else and are on that analogy called dhvani. When and by whom such a usage was made current is not known. Anyway, by the time of Ānandavardhana it seems to have been an established usage because his work is called *Dhvanyaloka* which, as we have seen, is devoted to the discussion of dhvani and vyañjana. It may be noted here that in some of the modern regional languages such as Gujarati, the word dhvani is used in the sense of purport or suggestion.

Coming to vyanjana or vyañjana we find that we do not find these verbal nouns used in the vedas. But $\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ and $\text{vi}+\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ are frequently used.

The meaning that we gather from this is interesting. $\sqrt{\text{Añ}}$ has the sense of anointing. The survey of the occurrences of $\text{vi}+\sqrt{\text{añ}}$ in the vedas shows two connected meanings viz., to bring out something hidden by applying some other thing, to brighten, to adorn, to decorate, to embellish, to manifest. In this sense vyanjana becomes something like *alamkarana*. It has the sense almost of adding beauty or exhibiting it.

The Nighantu and the Nirukta, as in case of the vedas, do not have any word like vyañjana. The Nighantu has not

even $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ or $v_1 + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ in any form. The *Nirukta* contains occurrences of $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ in the sense of 'to anoint'. In *Nirukta* we come across 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indicator'. In Ch I, Yāska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas, though not meaningful by themselves, are yet suggestive of (dyotakāḥ) the relation of nāma and ākhyāta. Yāska does not mention 'dyotana' by name, but he seems to come very close to 'dyotana' here, which, however, is equivalent to 'vyanjana' of the later *ālamkāras*.

In the *Rk-pratisākhya* we come across 'vyanjana' only in the technical sense of a consonant. As to why consonants are called vyañjana is not explained. But we may presume that they are so called because the consonants are indicated or made manifest by their relevant sound units.

In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭadhyāyī*, we find 'vyanjana' used in a special sense in addition to the technical sense of a consonant. In Pa II 1.34, we have, 'vyanjanairupasikṭe', wherein 'vyañjana' is something which serves to enhance the relish of the main item of food. This usage extends the meaning of the word vyañjana to ingredients which add to the flavour of the original substance or bring out its original taste to a greater advantage. When Bharata (Na Sṛ VI) while describing the nature of *rasa* gave the analogy of *śālavandirasa* and show the importance of vyañjana, he might have had in his mind this idea viz. that of ingredients enhancing or exhibiting the taste of the original substance. This has an important bearing on the relation of vyanjanā and *rasa*. For Bharata vibhava, anubhava and vyabhicārīn are ingredients which enhance or make manifest the taste of the sthāyīn.

How far this analogical application of vyañjana to *rasa* is responsible for the later relation of vyanjanā and *rasa* is difficult to say. In the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of $\sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ and $v_1 + \sqrt{a\tilde{n}j}$ and also words such as

vyañjana We find *vi+añj* in the sense of suggestion as in Mbh Pa VIII 1 70 line 15/page 381 (Mbh Ed Keilhorn)- *ihāpi mandrasādhanaṁ kṛyāṅgā vyajyate* At Mbh Pa VIII 2 48 line 23 23/page 408 (Mbh Ed Keilhorn) we have vyanjana in the sense of 'prakāśana

Thus we learn from the earlier literature that vyañjana has the sense of decoration, decorator, indication, indicator, consonant sounds suggesting or giving the inner meaning and ingredients enhancing or exhibiting to advantage the original taste of substance

From the study of the works of classical writers prior to Bhāṣya and Dandin such as Bhaṣa, Aśvaghoṣa and Kaṭhaka, we find that the meanings of the earlier literature continue. But in these works we also find the later sense of suggested meaning or suggestion or something other than directly expressed or clearly grasped. e.g. Bu Ca IV 84 has 'upapannam idam vakyam sauhardavyaṅjakam tvayī, wherein a vākya is said to be suggestive of sauharḍa or the feeling of friendship, or Megha (pūrva) 29 has-saubhāgyam te subhaga virahāvasthaya vyañjayanti, wherein Nirvindhya suggests, by her state, the good luck of the cloud

In Saundarananda XVIII 11-we have vyanjana in the sense of alamkāra. We know that in Vamāna the word alamkāra has two senses viz that of saundarya and a figure of speech. It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana also had a sense similar to alamkāra i.e. beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion. The first sense of alamkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in Sanskrit poetics. Thus vyanjana in the sense used in Sanskrit poetics seems to be current in the work of early classical writers

Thus with the earlier poets vyañjana seems to have been accepted as suggestion in poetry. This naturally makes for the recognition of vyañjana as one of the functions of a word. The

topic of the functions of words has to be studied through the discussions in the works of grammarians and other philosophical schools. From these discussions the following points emerge. Firstly as regards the relation between *Sphota* and *dhvani*, we can make the following, observations

(1) In the view of grammarians *dhvani* is explained as '*dhvanatīti dhvaniḥ*'. *Dhvani* is so termed because it sounds, or rings or reverberates *Sphota*. The word *ghata*, for example, is used for the object *ghata* which is seen, touched, etc. while the utterance of *ghata* is sound by itself. This means that what is touched and seen is expressed through sound which is the function of hearing. Thus *dhvani* came to have the meaning of suggesting one thing by another. This import of *dhvani* was taken up in poetics as suggestion-*vyāñjana* in all its varied forms. All the different items that had the capacity to suggest something were regarded as *vyāñjakas* e.g. *śabda*, *artha*, *pada*, *padāṃśa*, *varṇa* and also *guṇa*, *ālankāra*, *riti*, *vṛtti*, *vākya-racana*, *prabandha* as a whole etc.

(2) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound '*ghata*' for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through *Sphota* which in its turn is suggested by the sound *ghata*. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the *śāṅkarikas* also, the process of *vyāṅgyārthagrāhaṇa* is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through *abhidhā* or through *lakṣaṇa*.

(3) The grammarians believe in *vākya-sphota*. They do not accept the separate existence of *padas* i.e. individual words, and much less of letters or *varṇas*. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or *padas* and thus through letters or *varṇas*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the *Mīmāṃsakas*, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and they mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the

contents The nature of the condition is the multiplicity of letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word—the vākyasphota

Similar is the case with some ālamkārikas Abhidhā and laksanā form the nature of condition and vyañjanā or dhvani is the nature of the contents Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse abhidhā and laksanā with vyañjanā

(4) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians, the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i.e. jñānasya viśayah while the word-whole is jñānasya phalam—the result or the fruit of knowledge For the ālamkārikas also, abhidhā and laksanā are jñānasya viśayah, while vyañjanā may be taken as jñānasya phalam These two are not to be confused

(5) The grammarians believe in vākyasphota So they avoid the contingency faced by the padavādin viz that of recognising parts even of letters or varṇas Similarly those ālamkārikas who want to arrive at the vyaṅgyārtha with the help of laksanā, will have to go for a second laksanā, and a third and a fourth laksanā ad infinitum, involving further prayojanas

(6) Sphota is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with dhvani i.e. sound of a word The 'vyaṅgya' is also a separate entity, not to be confused with abhidhēyārtha or lakṣyārtha

(7) For the grammarians, there is a krama or sequence in the process of gathering meaning from a word From word to Sphota and from Sphota to meaning—this is the sequence In the same way with the ālamkārikas also, there is a sequence perceptible or imperceptible, between vacyārtha and vyaṅgyārtha

Ānandavardhana, Abhinavaguptapada and Mammata etc, while discussing this topic refer to the budhas, the wise men

who have taught this doctrine. These budhas are Vaiyākaranas. And they are, as we have seen, justified in making this remark.

The second line of inquiry leads us into the consideration of sabdārtahavṛttis in other schools of thought such as those represented by the Vaiyākaranas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. The points that emerge are as follows. The vaiyākaraṇa view, particularly as represented by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari is as follows. In Patañjali, we find the discussion of mukhyārtha and gaunārtha. But we do not come across any definition as such of abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣaṇā or vyañjana. While discussing the gaunārtha or secondary sense, he mentions four different circumstances in which secondary function takes place. Tātasīhya or the relation of location, tādḍharṁya, or the relation of substance and quality, or function, sāmīpya or the relation of proximity and sāhacarya or being together are mentioned under Pa. IV. I 48. We come across the term abhidhāna paving way for abhidhā vṛtti. In sādharṁya relation as mentioned above, we find the material for gaunī vṛtti and for lakṣaṇā we find material in other relations as mentioned above. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gaunī and lakṣaṇā. When we come to Bhartṛhari, we find material which is the source of vyañjana in the later ālambikārikas. In the Mbh. nothing more definite for vyañjana is noticed than already noted by us earlier.

Bhartṛhari not only mentions gauna and mukhya artha but also discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention (saṅketa) with reference to more than one senses, i.e. a word having multiple senses. In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc. (V P II 317-318). It is important to note that later ālambikārikas like Abhinava, Mammata, etc. quote these very verses while explaining the abhidhāmūlī śabdī vyañjana. Now, the particular sense being fixed, others come to our mind,

according to the *ālamkārikas* with the help of *vyañjan* Bhartṛhari does not concern himself with the gathering of the extra sense. He only discusses how a particular word, out of the many conventional senses, is limited to convey only one sense at a time. But it is exactly here that the *ālamkārik* begin where the grammarian has ended. Thus the origin of inspiration for *vyañjana* is supplied by the grammarian.

Among the later grammarians, Nagesa was the first to recommend the case of *vyañjanā* clearly.

As for the *Mīmāṃsakas*, we find in Jaimini and Sabara clear references to *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. We also come across some varieties of *lakṣana* and *dharma lakṣanā* is also termed *gunavāda* (Mī. Su. 1.2.10). *Gunavāda* is also found to be used in a wider connotation of *upacāra* or secondary application in general. Later *Mīmāṃsakas* such as Kumarila and others mention the *tātparyā* vṛtti also. But, there seems to be no reference to *vyañjanā* as such.

As for the *Naiyāyikas* the acceptance of *abhidhā* by Gotama and others is clearly indicated in the discussion of *saṃketagrahana* (Nyā. Su. II.2.65). We also come across reference to the nature of secondary usage or *upacāra* in Nyā. Su. II.2.64. The *Vatsyāyanabhāṣya* illustrates different varieties and also refers elsewhere to *bhakti* and *bhākta artha*. But we do not come across any reference to *vyañjanā* as such.

Later *Naiyāyikas* such as Gaṇādharā and Jaṇakīśa are not inclined favourably towards *vyañjanā* which is just a mental cognition or *mānaśa bodha* for them. They accept words to be *rūdhā lakṣaka*, *yogarūdhā* and *yaugika* (Sa. Sa. Pra. 16).

The relevance of noting different views on *śabdārthavṛtti* in different schools of thought is that our earliest writers o

Bhāmaha seems to be quite familiar with *abhidhā*. But as to his familiarity with functions of word other than the direct one, particularly *vyanjana*, we may say that *vyañjanā* does not find the same place as *abhidhā* in his mind i.e. he does not seem to have recognised *vyanjana* as a separate *vṛtti*. He, however, uses *vi+√an* with the later meaning of *vyanjana* at different places. Similar is the case with *Dandin* who also mentions *gaunavṛtti* in clear terms. *Vaṃśana* refers to *lakṣaṇā* but we miss any clear reference to *vyañjanā* in his writing. It is in *Udbhata* that we come across a clear mention of 'avagamana' *vṛtti* as distinct from *vācyaśabdakavṛtti* (IV 47) when he defines *pariyāyokta*. This *avagamana vṛtti* cal. *vyanjanā*. In *Rudrata*, we come across only an indirect recognition of *vyañjanā* when he defines and illustrates *bhāva-lakṣaṇa* (VIII, 38-39).

Thus, it seems that the import of *vyañjana* was not unknown to the early poeticists, though they had not clearly recognised it.

Ānandavardhana, *Abhinava*, *Ruyyaka* and *Jagannātha* observe that the fact of *dhvani*, though not clearly so named, was not unknown to the early poeticists such as *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin*, etc who tried to subsume it under different categories. But I have tried to show that we do find an element of implicit sense in the treatment of various topics such as *guṇa*, *alakṣaṇa*, etc by these authors, but it does not go to prove that they knew *dhvani* theory clearly and subsumed it knowingly under various heads.

This may be the basis for the belief of *Ānanda*, *Abhinava* etc who observe that *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin* etc knew *dhvani* and subsumed it under different poetic categories. The extent works of *Bhāmaha*, *Dandin*, etc however do not give proof of the fact that they recognised consciously and subsumed *dhvani* under various heads.

Thus it is only in the *Dhvanyaloka* that we find the first śāstric discussion of *śabdārthavṛttis* giving a definite

status to vyañjana as one of the three sabdārvāṇīś. In the discussion of the varieties of dhvani, Ānandavardhana gives mainly three viz vastudhvanī, ālankāra dhvanī and rasadhvanī. In poetry, however, vastu and ālankāra can be also conveyed by abhīdhā and lakṣaṇā. It is only rasa which is exclusively conveyed by vyañjana. It therefore seems that the clear recognition of rasa as the very essence of poetry necessitated the discussion as to how rasa, which is not conveyed directly, is conveyed. The process of vyañjanā appeared to be the most satisfying process for the suggestion of rasa. Thus the fact of rasa and the function of vyañjana become interrelated, and hence the theory of vyañjanā and rasa has to be viewed as one. For the proper understanding of this inter relation, an inquiry into the origin and development of the concept of rasa becomes desirable (3).

In the vedas we find rasa not only in the physical sense of something liquid, but also in the sense of sap in the plants, animals, etc., and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted, taste etc. In one context, Rv IX 67 31 and 32 we may be able to find some reference to a meaning similar to kāvyarasa. There are the pāṇīnī sūktas to be studied by the ṛṣis. Feeling of ecstasy or fulfilment is attached to rasa at Av X 8 44. Qualities as those of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flavour etc. are also associated with rasa which thus becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence. These meanings make it very easy for the connoisseurs to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literature.

In the Nāṭya Śāstra (I, 17) rasa is associated with Av. Rasa occurs very often in the AV but there is no clear case of later meaning of kāvyarasa or nāṭyarasa in it. Abhinava tries to explain this connection in his own way. But I have suggested that probably a better link can be sought in the love-charms, which are as many as 33, and which can be safely taken as beautiful love lyrics, their ritualistic application notwithstanding.

The *Taittirīya Up.* contains the famous utterance in which *rasa* is said to be the soul of the universe and which, on attainment, results in highest joy. This also can be taken as an original inspiration for later theorists.

In the *Nighantu*, *Nirukta*, and *Bṛhaddevatā*, we have nothing new to take a note of with reference to *rasa*. Pāṇini's use (V. 2.95) of *rasa* is not very clear. But the *Mbh* supplies some interesting data. On Pā V 2.95, Patañjali has the following discussion. He tries to justify this sūtra when preceding sūtra to the same effect is already there. A possible answer suggested is that this sūtra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of other *matup* suffixes. Patañjali illustrates other *matvarthīya* suffixes as in 'rasiko natah', 'urvast vai rūpini apsarasaṁ' etc. *Kaśikā* and *Tattvabodhinī* on the *Siddhāntakaumudī* make it clear that here 'rasa' in 'rasiko natah' and 'rūpa' in 'rūpini' do not stand for sense qualities to be perceived by the corresponding sense of taste and sight, but for aesthetic taste and beauty respectively. Thus it is in the *Mbh* of Patañjali that we first find a clear mention of *rasa* in 'rasiko natah' in the later sense of the *Nāṣā*. Naturally the usage must have been much older for Patañjali to give it as an illustration.

'Rasa' in the early classical poets such as Bhaṣa, Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa, has the sense of taste. The authors lived before 500 A.D. and the *Nāṣā* of Bharata which is placed between 300-500 A.D. may be regarded as familiar with these poets or with such other works. Whatever it may be, in the *Nāṣā* we find the theory of *rasa* crystallised into a sūtra. This naturally presupposes previous discussions on the subject. Whether the discussion on the nature of *rasa* started in the schools of dramaturgy or in earlier *nāṭyasūtras* mentioned by Pāṇini, we have no means of giving a definite opinion. As in case of *vyañjanā*, the earlier poeticists such as Bhaṁaha, Dandin, etc. seem to be aware of *rasa* and bring it under *alamkāra-guṇa* and. It is

only in Dhv. that like *vyāñjanā* rasa gets full recognition and is taken as the very essence or soul of poetry

Thus in Dhv. we find a full exposition of the theory of *rasa*, particularly the nature of conveying *rasa*. We saw that according to Ānanda, *rasa* can be conveyed only through *vyāñjanā*. In the *Nāṭyavedavivṛti* and the *Locana* by Abhinavaguptapadācārya, we find other theories of the process of *rasa* realisation such as those represented by Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śrī, Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, etc. It seems that Ānanda had all these theories before him in their embryonic form and he tried to establish that it is only *vyāñjanā* that can convey *rasa*. Abhinava elaborated this point by giving in the *purva-pakṣa* the views of different thinkers and refuting them and finally establishing the *vyāñjana* process as the exclusive process for *rasa* realisation.

However, there were still others who tried to disagree from Ānanda. Dhanañjaya, like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka seems to maintain *bhavyabbhāvaka* relation with reference to *rasa* and *kāvya*, while Kuntaka has *vicitrā abhidhā*, *rasa* being a form of *vakrokti* in the wider sense of the term and Mahimā tries to revive the *anumitivāda*. In Bhoja we find a different trend. He has a novel approach and tries to correlate *rasa-abhinayā-abhāṅkāra-sṅgāra*, with the *sāṃkhya* trend of thought in its background (see also Bhojavṛtti on Patañjala sūtra I ■ P 6, and II 6 P 18- ed. Ānandāsrama series). Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra also strike a different note though the traditional views of Ānanda and Abhinava ultimately gain ground and are firmly reestablished in the hands of Mammata, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jaganmātha.

The mental process which enables one to experience *rasa* can not be really separated from the experience itself as said above. It may be analytically separated for the purpose of discussion. But in fact it is one unitary whole. It is for this reason that we have to consider the theory of the process of *rasa* and the experience of *rasa* as one. It is for this very

reason that the view that one holds about the process of *rasa* affects the theory regarding the nature of the experience of *rasa* and vice-versa. The consideration of this aspect is essential for the understanding of the nature of *rasa*. We have therefore to consider the different views on *rasa* experience from this point of view also. (As noted earlier in the earlier vedic literature *rasa* is something liquid. It is flavour in the mouth, sense of taste etc. On the other side, it is the juicy extract of something, the essence of a thing. In the *Taittiriya Upanisad* we find that the *atman* which is the supreme reality of the universe is also the essence of the universe—*raso vai sah*—) In sanskrit literature on one side we find the different meanings of *rasa* given in *Amarakosa* and other lexicons continue. On the other side, however we find that right from the time of *Patanjali* and probably even earlier, the term *rasa* is in use for non-material flavour or taste i.e. in its aesthetic sense. In '*rasiko natah*' as noted earlier, we find the word *rasa* used in this sense. When the word *rasa* is used in early poetry, it appears in this sense of literary or artistic flavour.

In the period of the *Nāṣā* and even in earlier ages the nature of *rasa* seems to have been a subject of great and varied discussion. The *Nāṣā* has crystallised it in form of *sūtra* viz. "*vibhāvanubhāvavyābhicārisam-yogādrasanispattiḥ*". (*Nāṣā* Ch 6). The explanation given in the *Nāṣā* shows that *rasa* is a resultant of many things, technically of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyābhicāribhāva*. It is explained on the analogy of *sadavādirasa*. It is accompanied by a feeling of joy. But any resultant of various ingredients is not *rasa* in the *Nāṣā*. The sentiments and the emotions, the *sthāyībhāvas* and the *vyābhicāris*, *sattvikabhāvas* and their expressions *anubhāvas* that are part and parcel of the human mind are experienced as *rasa*.

To put it in another way, one may say that *rasa* is a taste of sentiments and emotions as they ooze out from the cognitive

he belonged to the school of Kashmir Śaivism. We have tried to suggest that excepting the case of Abhinavagupta who was a philosopher of the Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir Śaivism, nothing definite can be said of other ācāryas. As nirvighnā samvit and camatkāra play the central role in Abhinava's philosophy of rasa, their technical meanings have to be understood from a consideration of them in the pratyabhijñā school.

Abhinavagupta has said in the verses preceding his discussion that his is an attempt not to find fault with the teaching of the previous ācāryas but to put them in clearer and purer form. This is not merely an expression of modesty on his part. If we analyse the different threads in the web of Abhinava's final statement, we will see in them the opinion of the previous ācāryas put in a more acceptable position. The sahādaya who only has the capacity to apprehend rasa is well informed about the relation of things and events, and the sentiments, emotions and feeling that they arouse in life. This ingredient in rasa perception comes from, we may say, Lolāta. The element in rasa perception of the swiftness with which a sahādaya, witnessing a drama or reading a poem, infers from the spectacle, the appropriate emotions, comes from Śrī Sankuka. Śrī Sankuka also by invoking the citraturaganyāya frees the presentation in a poem of drama from the limitations of reality which would necessitate the judgement about the truth or falsehood or the doubtfulness or similarity of the poetic fact with life. In other words, Śrī Sankuka takes poetic creation out of the field of gross reality.

The universality in the perception of rasa comes from the sūdhāranīkarāṇa of Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka. In rasa perception one is not troubled by the intrusion of the egoistic impulses of myness, thyness or hisness. This makes it possible for the sahādaya to see a sthāyibhāva in its universality, free from these obstructions. This makes for the heightening of pure consciousness sattvodoreka—which is joy itself.

Abhinava weaves in his theory all these ideas freeing them from logical blemishes. Abhinava accepts from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka his *sādhāranīkarana vyāpāra*, but not his idea of *bhoga*. In his view *vibhāvādīs* are adequate for the manifestation-*vyakti*-of *rasa*. The contemplation of the *vibhāvādīs* is compared to chewing. Thus contemplative chewing yields *rasa*. But the activity of chewing and the experience of *rasa* are, so to say, *pari passu*.

Jagannātha accepts this view but substitutes vedantic terminology. He calls it '*bhagāvaranā cit*' and equates *rasa* with the experience of the highest reality, quoting '*raso, vai sah*'.

We have already seen that though Dhanañjaya and Dhanika do not accept the theory of *vyāñjanā*, yet they regard the experience of all *rasas* as joyful. Bhoja also regards the experience of all the *rasas* as joyful. But Ramacandra and Guṇacandra, and later on Siddhicandra in his commentary on K. P. called *Kāvyaaprakāśakhaṇḍana*, follow a different tradition. They take the realistic view that the sentiments, emotions and feelings, not pleasant in life, cannot be pleasant, because they are conveyed through poetry. We do not know whether Lollata who is a realist held this view. But it is quite consistent for those who do not distinguish between the nature of the experience, in ordinary life, of sentiments, emotions and feelings from their cognition in poetry and art, to hold such a view.

Most of the theorists in Sanskrit poetics have adopted the view of *lokottaratā* in poetic experience. In fact it is by the suppression of the conative side of the ego that the *rasa* experience becomes possible. Bhoja however regards *ahamkāra* and *abhimāna* as central to *rasa*. As already noted in his view a *nāyaka*, according to the type of his *abhimāna* or *ahamkāra*, is able to experience the relevant *rasa*, e.g. *dhīralolita* enjoys *kāma śṛṅgāra*, *dhīroddhata* enjoys *artha śṛṅgāra*, *dharma śṛṅgāra*

is enjoyed by a gr̥hastha with his wedded wife, etc (Śr Pra. Chs 18, 19, 20)

In Bhoja's philosophy there are three stages of rasa viz parā, or (पूर्वा), madhyamā and uttarā. For him the traditional understanding of rasas comes in the madhyamā kotī. His highest stage of uttarā kotī is the experience of preman rasa.

We have seen that Bharata regards eight only as the nāṭya-rasas. But we find the ninth rasa viz s̥ānta, even in the Nā Śā, whether as a later addition or the view of a different school we are unable to say. In any case, the experience of s̥ānta rasa carries a man beyond the aesthetic stage as such. In it he comes back to life, where however, the ego and its passion are calmed down. This is the life of an unworldly man. If the suppression of egoistic passions is the condition of rasa, s̥ānta is also rasa. But because it is a part of his life, it does not reach the aesthetic or imaginative stage. The rasika of Bhoja who has the highest preman-rasa is in a way similar to this but different in as much as his view goes beyond the aesthetic s̥ānta rasa to the state of preman-great love. This imperceptibly carries us in to Bhakti rasa. It is both imaginative and aesthetic in its nature as well as real for the Bhakta. There is so much genuine poetry in the songs of the Bhakta which is a reality as far as Bhaktas are concerned.

The work of Rūpagoṣvāmī viz Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu and Ujvalaṅkāmaṇī illustrate this development. Hamsavilāsa, the Sanskrit work of the Gujarati poet Mittu (18 th Cen) also illustrates this development in a new way.

We thus find in the rasa theorists an attempt to grapple with the type of experience which in poetry and art, using the material of life, yet takes them beyond life's egoistic limitations and in certain cases makes their very life free from such limitations. Thus rasa is a spiritual experience and we find it illustrated in the history of Indian culture, wherein poetry, art and religion move together.

Foot-notes

- (1) Editions (1) A Barooah, Calcutta 1884 (2) by Vireśvara, Sastri, Benaras 1888 (chs iv and v) (3) by Jivanand Vidhyasagar with Com. of Ratnesvara (on chs 1-11), Calcutta 1894, (4) by Kedarnath Durgaprasad and Vasudev L Pansikar, Nirnaya Sagar Press, with Comm of Ratnesvara (on chs 1-11), and of Jagaddhara (on iv), Bombay 1925, 1934 Our references are to this
- (2) This classification seems to be based upon the different types of marriage
- (3) It may be noted here that Guoli in his learned introduction mentions only *rasa* as *dhvani* proper

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ABBREVIATIONS

- Abhi Sā -Abhiyāna Sāṅkuntala
A bh -Abhinavabharatī
A V M -Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā
Av -Atharvaveda
B O R I Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Bu Ca -Buddha Carita
Dhv Dhvanyaloka
D R Dattarupaka of Dhanadījaya
G O S Gachwad's Oriental Series
K P -Kavyaprakāśa of Maṇmātha
Kumara-Sam -Kumārasambhava
Mālavikā -Mālavikāgnimitram
Mbh-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali
Megha Meghadūta
Mī Sū Mīmāṃsā Sūtras
Nā Śa-Nāṭyaśāstra
Pa Panini
Pā Sū Panini Sūtra
Pratijñā -Pratijñāyagandharāyana
Pratima Pratimānāṭaka
Rv -Rgveda
Rk-Prā Rkprāśikhyā
Raghu -Raghuvarṇa
Sau -Saundarananda
Sā -Sāyana
■ B -Sābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtras
S K A -Sarasvatī Kāṇḍābhāṣya of Bhoja
Śr Pra -Śrāṅgāra Prakāśa of Bhoja
Svapna -Svapnāvāsavadattam
Sv -Samaveda
Vikramo -Vikramorvashya
V P -Vākyapadīya

V J -Vakroktiṭīṣṭa of Kuntaka.

Vy V Vyaktiviveka of Mahima.

Yv -Yajurveda

वे सू वेदा-तसूत्र

न्या सू.-न्यायसूत्र

मी सू मीमांसा सूत्र

सा द -साहित्यदर्पण of विश्वनाथ

दुर्ग-दुर्गाचायं ०४ मिरुवत

श श प्र -शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका

वै सू -वैशेषिक सूत्र

शाबर मा -शाबरभाष्य

व्य वि.-व्यक्तिविवेक

व जी -वक्रोक्तिओवित

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